advocatemmmohan

My photo

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN -  Practicing both IN CIVIL, CRIMINAL AND FAMILY LAWS,Etc.,

WELCOME TO LEGAL WORLD

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - FOR KNOWLEDGE IN LAW & FOR LEGAL OPINIONS - SHARE THIS

Friday, January 10, 2014

Sec.12 (1)(c) of M.P.Act - Eviction suit - Purchaser filed suit for eviction as the defendant failed to pay rent and for demolishing the old building - Defendant denied the title - denied the sale deed - admitted tenancy under predecessor - in - title of plaintiff - suit decreed - Appeal confirmed - High court wrongly reversed as the defendant not admitted landlord and tenancy relationship as demanded by him no documents were given to him prior to filing of suit about the transfer of title - Apex court set aside the order of High court on the ground that a tenant can not deny the title of the subsequent owner who purchased the property under reg. sale deed - denial of title of owner in the written statement even after receiving all records was also a good ground for eviction under sec.12 (1)(c) of M.P. Act = KESHAR BAI … APPELLANT Versus CHHUNULAL … RESPONDENT= 2014 ( JANUARY - VOL -1) JUDIS.NIC.IN/ S.C./ FILE NAME= 41138

  Sec.12 (1)(c) of M.P.Act - Eviction suit - Purchaser filed suit for eviction as the defendant failed to pay rent and for demolishing the old building - Defendant denied the title - denied the sale deed - admitted tenancy under predecessor - in - title of plaintiff - suit decreed - Appeal confirmed - High court wrongly reversed as the defendant not admitted landlord and tenancy relationship as demanded by him no documents were given to him prior to filing of suit about the transfer of title - Apex court set aside the order of High court on the ground that a tenant can not deny the title of the subsequent owner who purchased the property under reg. sale deed - denial of title of owner in the written statement even after receiving all records was also a good ground for eviction under sec.12 (1)(c) of M.P. Act =
 At the time  of  purchase
of the said building, the respondent-tenant was occupying  one  room  (‘suit
premises’) situated on the rear side of the said building  as  tenant.   The
respondent was informed by the predecessors-in-title of the  appellant  that
the appellant is the new landlady of the said building  and  he  should  pay
the rent to her. 
The respondent agreed to pay the rent  but  failed  to  pay
it. Failure of the respondent to pay the rent resulted  in  a  notice  being
sent by the appellant to him on  23/11/2002,  but  despite  the  notice  the
respondent did not pay the rent.-   
The  respondent  denied  that
there was any attornement between the parties and that there was a landlord-
tenant relationship between him and the appellant. He claimed to  be  tenant
of the earlier landlord Shri Khar.  He contended that he had never paid  any
rent to the appellant.  He denied the genuineness  of  the  registered  sale
deed dated 26/9/1991.

6.    The trial court decreed the suit under Section 12(1)(c)  of  the  M.P.
Act.  The suit was dismissed so far as  the  other  grounds  are  concerned.
The trial court’s judgment was confirmed by the first appellate court.   The
High Court by the impugned order set aside the  eviction  decree  passed  by
the courts below holding that in the facts  of  the  case  no  decree  under
Section 12 (1) (c) of the  M.P.  Act  could  be  passed.   =

  In eviction proceedings the  question
of title to the properties in question may be incidentally  gone  into,  but
cannot be decided finally.  Similar question fell for consideration of  this
Court in Bhagadi Kannabalu.  In that case it was argued  that  the  landlady
was not entitled to inherit the properties in question and hence  could  not
maintain the application for eviction on the  ground  of  default  and  sub-
letting under the A.P. Tenancy Act.  This Court referred to its decision  in
Tej Bhan Madan  v.  II Additional District Judge and Ors.[11]  in  which  it
was held that a tenant was precluded from denying the title of the  landlady
on the general principle of estoppel between landlord and  tenant  and  that
this principle, in its basic foundations, means  no  more  than  that  under
certain  circumstances  law  considers  it  unjust  to  allow  a  person  to
approbate and reprobate.   Section  116  of  the  Evidence  Act  is  clearly
applicable to such a situation.  This Court held that even if  the  landlady
was not entitled to inherit the properties  in  question,  she  could  still
maintain the application for eviction and the finding of  fact  recorded  by
the courts below in favour of the landlady was not liable to  be  disturbed.
The position on law was stated by this Court as under:

           “In this connection, we may also point out that in  an  eviction
           petition filed on the ground of  sub-letting  and  default,  the
           court needs to  decide  whether  relationship  of  landlord  and
           tenant exists and not the question of title to the properties in
           question, which may be incidentally gone  into,  but  cannot  be
           decided finally in the eviction proceeding.”
 Reliance placed by learned counsel for the respondent on Mohd.  Nooman
 is misplaced.
In that case,  the  landlord  had  filed  an  eviction  suit
described as Title Suit No.36 of 1973 to evict the tenant.
The trial  court
held that the relationship of landlord and tenant had not  been  proved  and
since the tenant had raised the question of title the  proper  course  would
be to dismiss the suit and  not  to  convert  it  into  a  declaratory  suit
because the suit was neither for declaration of title nor had the  plaintiff
paid ad valorem court fee.
The trial court dismissed the suit as there  was
no landlord and tenant relationship, but, upheld the  plaintiff’s  claim  of
title.  In the appeal, the first appellate court observed that by  filing  a
suit for eviction and paying court fee on twelve months  alleged  rent,  the
plaintiff had adopted a tricky  way  of  getting  the  title  decided.   The
plaintiff, then, filed a suit on title.  The trial court decreed  the  suit.
The first appellate court allowed the appeal and  dismissed  the  suit.   In
the second appeal before  the  High  Court  the  question  was  whether  the
judgment and decree  regarding  title  passed  in  the  earlier  suit  shall
operate as res judicata between the parties on the question of  title.   
The
High Court observed that pleas taken by  both  parties  regarding  title  in
both the title suits are the same and answered the question in  affirmative.

This Court endorsed the High Court’s view and held that the issue of  title
was directly and substantially an issue between the parties in  the  earlier
eviction suit, hence, the High Court was right in holding that  the  finding
of title recorded in the earlier suit would operate as res judicata  in  the
subsequent suit.  This view was expressly restricted by this  Court  to  the
facts before it.  This Court clarified that ordinarily it is true that in  a
suit for eviction even if the court goes  into  the  question  of  title  it
examines the  issue  in  an  ancillary  manner  and  in  such  cases  (which
constitute a  very  large  majority)  any  observation  or  finding  on  the
question of title would certainly not be binding in any subsequent  suit  on
the dispute of title.  
This Court  further  clarified  that  the  case  with
which it was dealing fell in an exceptional category of very limited  number
of cases.  
Thus, in our  opinion,  no  parallel  can  be  drawn  from  Mohd.
Nooman.  In that case issue of title  was  framed.    In  the  instant  case
issue of title was not even framed.  Mohd. Nooman arose out  of  exceptional
facts and must be restricted to those facts.


      In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the  High  Court  was
wrong in setting aside the  concurrent  finding  of  fact  recorded  by  the
courts below that the respondent had denied the title of the appellant.   We
are of the view that the present case is covered by Section 12(1)(c) of  the
M.P. Act.  It is, therefore, necessary to restore the  decree  of  eviction.
In the circumstances, we allow the appeal.  The  impugned  judgment  of  the
High Court is set aside and eviction decree passed by the  trial  court  and
confirmed by the first appellate court under Section 12(1)(c)  of  the  M.P.
Act is restored.


2014 ( JANUARY - VOL -1) JUDIS.NIC.IN/ S.C./ FILE NAME= 41138


                                                   REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 106   OF 2014
       [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.5126 of 2011]


KESHAR BAI                        …          APPELLANT

                                   Versus

CHHUNULAL                         …          RESPONDENT



                                  JUDGMENT


(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.


1.    Leave granted.


2.    This appeal, by grant  of  special  leave,  is  directed  against  the
judgment and order dated 03/08/2010 passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Madhya
Pradesh, Bench at Indore allowing Second Appeal No. 756  of  2004  filed  by
the respondent.


3. Briefly put, the facts are that the  appellant-landlady  purchased  House
No. 1/2, Street No. 6, Parsi Mohallah, Indore  (‘the  said  building’)  from
M/s. Pyare Mohan Khar, Hari Mohan Khar, Shayam Sunder  Khar  and  Anil  Khar
predecessors-in-title of the appellant  by  a  registered  sale  deed  dated
26/9/1991  for a consideration of Rs. 1,70,000/-.
At the time  of  purchase
of the said building, the respondent-tenant was occupying  one  room  (‘suit
premises’) situated on the rear side of the said building  as  tenant.   The
respondent was informed by the predecessors-in-title of the  appellant  that
the appellant is the new landlady of the said building  and  he  should  pay
the rent to her. 
The respondent agreed to pay the rent  but  failed  to  pay
it. Failure of the respondent to pay the rent resulted  in  a  notice  being
sent by the appellant to him on  23/11/2002,  but  despite  the  notice  the
respondent did not pay the rent.

4.     On 06/1/2003,  the  appellant  filed  a  suit  for  eviction  of  the
respondent under the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (‘the  M.P.  Act’)
on grounds of non-payment of rent, denial of the appellant’s  title  by  the
respondent, bona fide need for residential  purpose  and  reconstruction  of
the said building as it had become  unsafe  for  human  habitation.  It  was
specifically averred in the plaint that  the  appellant  had  purchased  the
said building vide a registered document on 26/9/1991.

5.    The respondent contested the said suit and filed a  written  statement
denying the title of the appellant as well  as  the  grounds  on  which  his
eviction from the suit premises  was  sought.
The  respondent  denied  that
there was any attornement between the parties and that there was a landlord-
tenant relationship between him and the appellant. He claimed to  be  tenant
of the earlier landlord Shri Khar.  He contended that he had never paid  any
rent to the appellant.  He denied the genuineness  of  the  registered  sale
deed dated 26/9/1991.

6.    The trial court decreed the suit under Section 12(1)(c)  of  the  M.P.
Act.  The suit was dismissed so far as  the  other  grounds  are  concerned.
The trial court’s judgment was confirmed by the first appellate court.   The
High Court by the impugned order set aside the  eviction  decree  passed  by
the courts below holding that in the facts  of  the  case  no  decree  under
Section 12 (1) (c) of the  M.P.  Act  could  be  passed.  
The  controversy,
therefore, revolves around Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Act in  the  context
of the facts of this case.

7.    Shri Ardhendumauli Kumar Prasad, learned counsel  for  the  appellant,
submitted that both the courts having concurrently found that  the  landlord
was entitled to a decree of eviction under Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P.  Act
and since there was no perversity attached to the  said  finding,  the  High
Court ought not to have interfered with  it  while  dealing  with  a  second
appeal, particularly,  when  there  was   no  substantial  question  of  law
involved in the matter.  In this  connection,  he  relied  on  Deep  Chandra
Juneja  v. Lajwanti Kathuria (dead) through LRs.[1],  Yash Pal  v.  Ram  Lal
& Ors.[2] and Firojuddin & Anr.   v.   Babu Singh[3].
Mr. Prasad  submitted
that it is  clearly  established  from  the  evidence  on  record  that  the
respondent had denied the title of the appellant and,  therefore,  the  case
clearly falls within the ambit of Section 12(1)(c)  of  the  M.P.  Act.  The
eviction decree was, therefore, correctly passed  by  the  trial  court  and
confirmed by the first appellate court. In  this  connection  he  relied  on
Devasahyam v. P. Savithramma[4],  State of Andgra  Pradesh  &  Ors.   v.  D.
Raghukul Pershad(dead) by LRs.& Ors.[5]  and   Bhogadi Kannababu &  Ors.  v.
Vuggina Pydamma & Ors.[6]. Counsel submitted that in the  circumstances  the
impugned order be set aside.


8.     Shri Amit Pawan, learned counsel for the  respondent,  on  the  other
hand submitted that attornment of tenancy to the appellant  is  not  proved.
Counsel submitted that the  respondent  had  no  knowledge  about  the  sale
transaction that allegedly took place between the appellant and  Shri  Khar,
under which the appellant is said  to  have  purchased  the  suit  premises.
This is a case of derivative title which the tenant can deny if  he  had  no
knowledge of the sale transaction.  Counsel submitted that the  trial  court
and lower appellate court ignored this vital legal position and,  therefore,
the High Court rightly set aside the eviction  decree.   Counsel  relied  on
Mohd. Nooman & Ors. v.  Mohd.  Jabed  Alam  &  Ors.[7]  in  support  of  his
submission that the issue regarding title can  be  decided  in  an  eviction
suit and, therefore, it was correctly raised by the respondent.

9.    It is well settled by a long line of judgments of this Court that  the
High Court should not interfere with a concurrent finding of fact unless  it
is perverse. (See: Deep Chandra Juneja, Yash Pal  &  Firojuddin).
 In  this
case, for the reasons which we shall soon record, we are unable to find  any
such perversity in the concurrent finding of fact  returned  by  the  courts
below warranting the High Court’s interference.


10.   The trial court passed the decree under Section 12 (1)(c) of the  M.P.
Act on the ground  that  the  respondent-tenant  denied  the  title  of  the
appellant-landlady.  
It was confirmed by the first appellate court.  It  is,
therefore, necessary to reproduce Section 12(1) (c) of  the  M.P.  Act.   It
reads as under:

        “12.  Restriction  on  eviction  of  tenants.
(1)   Notwithstanding
        anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no
        suit shall be filed in any civil court against  a  tenant  for  his
        eviction from any accommodation  except  on  one  or  more  of  the
        following grounds only, namely—


        (a)      xxx




        (b)            xxx


        (c) that the tenant or any person residing  with  him  has  created
        nuisance or has done any act which is inconsistent with the purpose
        for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the  accommodation,  or
        which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the  interest
        of the landlord therein:




        Provided that the use by a tenant of a portion of the accommodation
        as his office shall not be deemed to be an  act  inconsistent  with
        the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy;”

 11.  The first question that arises is how denial  of  title  falls  within
the ambit of Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Act.
Under Section 111(g) of  the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the lease is determined  by  forfeiture,  if
the lessee denies the lessor’s title.
While  dealing  with  eviction  suit,
arising out of the M.P. Act, in Devasahayam, this Court  has  held  that  so
just is the above rule that in various  rent  control  legislations  such  a
ground is recognized and incorporated as a ground for eviction of  a  tenant
either expressly or impliedly within the net of  an  act  injurious  to  the
interest of the landlord.  It is further  held  that  denial  of  landlord’s
title or disclaimer of tenancy by tenant  is  an  act  which  is  likely  to
affect adversely and substantially the interest of  the  landlord.   It  is,
therefore, covered by Section 12(1)(c)  of  the  M.P.  Act.  
The  following
observations of this Court in Devasahayam are relevant:


      “27. In Sheela v. Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash[8] whereupon Mr.  Nageswara
   Rao placed strong reliance, Lahoti, J., as the learned Chief Justice then
   was, while construing the provisions of clause (c) of sub-section (1)  of
   Section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 observed:




           13. The law as to tenancy  being  determined  by  forfeiture  by
           denial of the lessor’s title or disclaimer of  the  tenancy  has
           been  adopted  in  India  from  the  law  of  England  where  it
           originated as a principle in consonance with justice, equity and
           good conscience. On enactment of the Transfer of  Property  Act,
           1882, the same was incorporated into clause (g) of Section  111.
           So just is the rule that it has been held applicable even in the
           areas where the Transfer of Property Act does not  apply.  (See:
           Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur[9].)
           The  principle  of  determination  of  tenancy   by   forfeiture
           consequent  upon  denial  of  the  lessor’s  title  may  not  be
           applicable where rent control legislation  intervenes  and  such
           legislation while extending protection to tenants from  eviction
           does not recognise such denial or disclaimer  as  a  ground  for
           termination of tenancy  and  eviction  of  tenant.  However,  in
           various rent control legislations such a  ground  is  recognised
           and incorporated as a  ground  for  eviction  of  tenant  either
           expressly or impliedly by bringing it within the net of  an  act
           injurious to the interest of the  landlord  on  account  of  its
           mischievous content to prejudice adversely and substantially the
           interest of the landlord.
                                   … … … …
                                   … … … …


           17. In our opinion, denial of landlord’s title or disclaimer  of
           tenancy by tenant is an act which is likely to affect  adversely
           and substantially the interest of the landlord and  hence  is  a
           ground for eviction of tenant within the meaning of  clause  (c)
           of sub-section (1) of  Section  12  of  the  M.P.  Accommodation
           Control Act, 1961. To amount to such denial  or  disclaimer,  as
           would  entail  forfeiture  of  tenancy  rights  and  incur   the
           liability to be evicted, the tenant should  have  renounced  his
           character as tenant and in clear and unequivocal  terms  set  up
           title of the landlord in himself or in a third party.  A  tenant
           bona fide calling upon the landlord to prove  his  ownership  or
           putting the landlord to proof of his  title  so  as  to  protect
           himself (i.e. the tenant) or to earn a protection made available
           to him by  the  rent  control  law  but  without  disowning  his
           character of possession over  the  tenancy  premises  as  tenant
           cannot  be  said  to  have  denied  the  title  of  landlord  or
           disclaimed the tenancy. Such an  act  of  the  tenant  does  not
           attract applicability of Section 12(1)(c) abovesaid. It  is  the
           intention of the tenant, as culled out from the  nature  of  the
           plea  raised   by   him,   which   is   determinative   of   its
           vulnerability.”



12.   Having ascertained the legal position we will now state  why  we  feel
that the High Court is not right in disturbing  the  concurrent  finding  of
fact that the respondent-tenant denied the title of the appellant-landlady.


13.   There is a specific reference to the registered document  under  which
the appellant purchased the suit building from the earlier landlord  in  the
plaint.  Yet, in the written statement the respondent denied  the  title  of
the appellant.  We  notice  that  there  are  several  documents  on  record
relating to the ownership of the appellant, apart from the  registered  sale
deed, such as municipal tax receipts, ration card etc. Yet,  the  respondent
refused  to  acknowledge  the  appellant’s  title.   He  denied  it  in  his
evidence.  This is not a simple case of denial  of  derivative  title  by  a
person who did not know about the purchase of the building by the  landlord.
  Even  after  going  through  the  relevant  documents  relating   to   the
appellant’s title the respondent  feigned  ignorance  about  it.  
The  High
Court has accepted that in his cross-examination the respondent  has  stated
that he was not accepting the appellant as  his  landlady.  The  High  Court
has, however, gone on to say that by this piece of  evidence  no  decree  of
eviction can be passed against the respondent under Section 12(1)(c) of  the
M.P. Act because the respondent will have no occasion to establish  in  what
circumstances he denied the title of the  appellant.   The  High  Court  has
further held that the respondent was within permissible limit in asking  the
appellant to produce documentary evidence about his  title  as  a  landlord.
The High Court, in our opinion, fell into a grave error in  drawing  such  a
conclusion.  Even denial of a landlord’s title in the written statement  can
provide a ground for eviction of a tenant.  
It is also settled  position  in
law that it is not necessary that  the  denial  of  title  by  the  landlord
should be anterior to the institution of eviction proceedings.  This  is  so
stated by this Court in Majati Subbarao v.  P.V.K.  Krishnarao(deceased)  by
LRs.[10].

14.   The High Court has expressed that  the  respondent  was  justified  in
asking  the  appellant  to  produce  the  documents.    Implicit   in   this
observation is the High Court’s view that the respondent could  have  in  an
eviction suit got the title  of  the  appellant  finally  adjudicated  upon.
There is a fallacy in this reasoning.  In eviction proceedings the  question
of title to the properties in question may be incidentally  gone  into,  but
cannot be decided finally.  Similar question fell for consideration of  this
Court in Bhagadi Kannabalu.  In that case it was argued  that  the  landlady
was not entitled to inherit the properties in question and hence  could  not
maintain the application for eviction on the  ground  of  default  and  sub-
letting under the A.P. Tenancy Act.  This Court referred to its decision  in
Tej Bhan Madan  v.  II Additional District Judge and Ors.[11]  in  which  it
was held that a tenant was precluded from denying the title of the  landlady
on the general principle of estoppel between landlord and  tenant  and  that
this principle, in its basic foundations, means  no  more  than  that  under
certain  circumstances  law  considers  it  unjust  to  allow  a  person  to
approbate and reprobate.   Section  116  of  the  Evidence  Act  is  clearly
applicable to such a situation.  This Court held that even if  the  landlady
was not entitled to inherit the properties  in  question,  she  could  still
maintain the application for eviction and the finding of  fact  recorded  by
the courts below in favour of the landlady was not liable to  be  disturbed.
The position on law was stated by this Court as under:

           “In this connection, we may also point out that in  an  eviction
           petition filed on the ground of  sub-letting  and  default,  the
           court needs to  decide  whether  relationship  of  landlord  and
           tenant exists and not the question of title to the properties in
           question, which may be incidentally gone  into,  but  cannot  be
           decided finally in the eviction proceeding.”




15.   Reliance placed by learned counsel for the respondent on Mohd.  Nooman
 is misplaced.
In that case,  the  landlord  had  filed  an  eviction  suit
described as Title Suit No.36 of 1973 to evict the tenant.
The trial  court
held that the relationship of landlord and tenant had not  been  proved  and
since the tenant had raised the question of title the  proper  course  would
be to dismiss the suit and  not  to  convert  it  into  a  declaratory  suit
because the suit was neither for declaration of title nor had the  plaintiff
paid ad valorem court fee.
The trial court dismissed the suit as there  was
no landlord and tenant relationship, but, upheld the  plaintiff’s  claim  of
title.  In the appeal, the first appellate court observed that by  filing  a
suit for eviction and paying court fee on twelve months  alleged  rent,  the
plaintiff had adopted a tricky  way  of  getting  the  title  decided.   The
plaintiff, then, filed a suit on title.  The trial court decreed  the  suit.
The first appellate court allowed the appeal and  dismissed  the  suit.   In
the second appeal before  the  High  Court  the  question  was  whether  the
judgment and decree  regarding  title  passed  in  the  earlier  suit  shall
operate as res judicata between the parties on the question of  title.   
The
High Court observed that pleas taken by  both  parties  regarding  title  in
both the title suits are the same and answered the question in  affirmative.

This Court endorsed the High Court’s view and held that the issue of  title
was directly and substantially an issue between the parties in  the  earlier
eviction suit, hence, the High Court was right in holding that  the  finding
of title recorded in the earlier suit would operate as res judicata  in  the
subsequent suit.  This view was expressly restricted by this  Court  to  the
facts before it.  This Court clarified that ordinarily it is true that in  a
suit for eviction even if the court goes  into  the  question  of  title  it
examines the  issue  in  an  ancillary  manner  and  in  such  cases  (which
constitute a  very  large  majority)  any  observation  or  finding  on  the
question of title would certainly not be binding in any subsequent  suit  on
the dispute of title.  
This Court  further  clarified  that  the  case  with
which it was dealing fell in an exceptional category of very limited  number
of cases.  
Thus, in our  opinion,  no  parallel  can  be  drawn  from  Mohd.
Nooman.  In that case issue of title  was  framed.    In  the  instant  case
issue of title was not even framed.  Mohd. Nooman arose out  of  exceptional
facts and must be restricted to those facts.


16.   In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the  High  Court  was
wrong in setting aside the  concurrent  finding  of  fact  recorded  by  the
courts below that the respondent had denied the title of the appellant.   We
are of the view that the present case is covered by Section 12(1)(c) of  the
M.P. Act.  It is, therefore, necessary to restore the  decree  of  eviction.
In the circumstances, we allow the appeal.  The  impugned  judgment  of  the
High Court is set aside and eviction decree passed by the  trial  court  and
confirmed by the first appellate court under Section 12(1)(c)  of  the  M.P.
Act is restored.

17.   The appeal is disposed of in the afore-stated terms.




                                                           ………………………………………J.
                                                     (Ranjana Prakash Desai)



                                                           ………………………………………J.
                                                            (J. Chelameswar)


New Delhi,
January 7, 2014.

ITEM NO.1A               COURT NO.12             SECTION IVA
(For Judgment)

            S U P R E M E   C O U R T   O F   I N D I A
                         RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Civil Appeal No.106 of 2014
arising out of
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.5126/2011

(From the judgement and order  dated 03/08/2010 in  SA  No.756/2004  of  The
HIGH COURT OF M.P AT INDORE)

KESHAR BAI                           Petitioner(s)

                 VERSUS

CHHUNULAL                             Respondent(s)

Date: 07/01/2014  This Petition was called on for
pronouncement of judgment today.


For Petitioner(s)      Mr. Ardhendumauli Kumar Prasad, Adv.
                 Mr. A. Shukla, Adv.
                    Mr. Nirnimesh Dube,Adv.

For Respondent(s)    Mr. Amit Pawan,Adv.


            Hon'ble  Mrs.  Justice  Ranjana  Prakash  Desai  pronounced  the
     reportable judgment of the Bench comprising Her  Ladyship  and  Hon'ble
     Mr. Justice J. Chelameswar.
            The appeal is disposed of in  terms  of  the  signed  reportable
     judgment.



            [RAJNI MUKHI]                 [USHA SHARMA]
             SR. P.A.                COURT MASTER
                          (Signed reportable Judgment is placed on the file)
                                                     -----------------------
[1]    (2008) 8 SCC 497
[2]    (2005) 12 SCC 239
[3]    (2012) 3 SCC 319
[4]    (2005) 7 SCC 653
[5]    (2012) 8 SCC 584
[6]    (2006) 5 SCC 532
[7]    (2010) 9 SCC 560
[8]    (2002) 3 SCC 375
[9]    AIR 1965 SC 1923
[10]   (1989) 4 SCC 732
[11]   (1988) 3 SCC 137

-----------------------
16


No comments:

Post a Comment

Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.