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Saturday, January 18, 2014

Art.226 of Constitution of India as sec.438 was omitted by Uttara Pradesh State - Sec.419/420 of I.P.C - fraud and forgery in the matter of preparation of documents of Government Office regarding selection for the post of Assistant Teacher - Accused is women - made an application to the S.P. of district from arrest under sec.41 (A) and 1 (B) of Cr.P.C. - no reply - filed writ for quashing of FIR and for bail type relief under sec.41 (A) and 1(B) of Cr.P.C- High court dismissed the same - Apex court granted interim relief like an anticipatory Bail - Whether the court can grant relief under constitutional jurisdiction - Apex court held that in rarest of rare cases can grant the relief in the absence of other provisions = Km. Hema Mishra .. Appellant Versus State of U.P. and Others .. Respondents = 2014 ( January - Vol - 1 -D.B.) Judis.nic.in/ S.C./ file name =41152

Art.226 of Constitution of India as sec.438 was omitted by Uttara Pradesh State - Sec.419/420 of I.P.C - fraud  and forgery in the matter of preparation of documents of Government Office regarding  selection  for  the  post   of   Assistant   Teacher - Accused is women - made an application to the S.P. of district from arrest under sec.41 (A) and 1 (B) of Cr.P.C. - no reply - filed writ for quashing of FIR and for bail type relief under sec.41 (A) and 1(B) of Cr.P.C- High court dismissed the same - Apex court granted interim relief like an anticipatory Bail - Whether the court can grant relief under constitutional jurisdiction - Apex court held that in rarest of rare cases can grant the relief in the absence of other provisions =
 whether the High
           Court under Art.226 would be right in entertaining proceedings to
           quash the charge-sheet or to grant bail to a person accused of an
           offence under the Act or  other  offences  committed  during  the
           course  of  the  same  transaction  exclusively  triable  by  the
           Designated Court.=

The Secretary, U.P. Secondary Education Board, Allahabad and the
      District School Inspector vide their letter dated 8.12.2011 registered
      a complaint alleging  that  the  appellant  had  committed  fraud  and
      forgery in the matter of preparation of documents of Government Office
      regarding  selection  for  the  post   of   Assistant   Teacher   and,
      consequently, got appointment as the Assistant Teacher in Janpad Inter-
      College  at  Harakh,  District  Barabanki,  with  payment  of   salary
      amounting to Rs.1,10,000/- from the  Government  exchequer.    
  On  the
      basis of the FIR, Case Crime No. 797  of  2011  was  registered  under
      Sections 419/420 IPC before  the  Police  Station,  Jaizpur,  District
      Barabanki. 
After having come to know of the registration of the crime,
      the  appellant  filed  a  representation  on  27.12.2011  before   the
      Superintendent of Police, District  Barabanki  and  the  Investigating
      Officer making the following prayer:
           “As such through this application/representation  the  applicant
           prays that keeping in view the willingness of the applicant  for
           cooperating  in  investigation  and   to   appear   before   the
           investigating officer upon being called in case crime no. 797/11
           u/Ss 419/420 IPC, PS  Jaipdur,  District  Barabanki,  order  for
           staying the arrest of applicant be passed so that compliance  to
           the provision 41(1)(B) Section 41(A) amended  to  CrPC  1973  be
           made.”


      6.     Since  the  appellant  did  not  get  any  reply  to  the  said
      representation, she invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High
      Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India  by  filing  Writ
      Petition Misc. Bench No. 171 of 2012 which was dismissed,  as  already
      indicated, on 9.1.2012.
When the matter came up for hearing before this Court, it passed
      an interim order on 1.3.2013, the operative portion of which reads  as
      under:
                 “Considering the facts and circumstances of  the  case,  we
           are inclined to direct that  in  the  event  of  arrest  of  the
           petitioner, she shall be released on bail on furnishing personal
           bond of Rs.50,000/-      (Fifty Thousand only) with two  solvent
           sureties for the like amount to the satisfaction  of  the  Trial
           Court, subject to the condition that she will join investigation
           as and when required and shall  abide   by   the  provisions  of
           Section 438(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” =
Shri  Siddharth  Luthra,  Additional  Solicitor  General,   who
      appeared on our request, submitted that the High  Court  can  in  only
      rarest of rare cases grant pre-arrest  bail  while  exercising  powers
      under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,  since  the  provision
      for the grant of anticipatory  bail  under  Section  438  Cr.P.C.  was
      consciously  omitted  by  the  State  Legislature.   
The   legislative
      intention is, therefore, not to seek or provide pre-arrest  bail  when
      the FIR discloses a cognizable offence.  
Shri  Luthra  submitted  that
      since there is a conscious withdrawal/deletion of Section 438 CrPC  by
      the Legislature from the Code of Criminal Procedure, by Section  9  of
      the Criminal Procedure (Uttar Pradesh) Amendment Act, 1976, the relief
      which otherwise the appellant could not have obtained under the  Code,
      is sought to be obtained indirectly by invoking the writ  jurisdiction
      of the High Court, which is impermissible in law.
I am conscious of the fact that since the provisions similar  to
      Section 438 Cr.P.C. being absent in the State of  Uttar  Pradesh,  the
      High Court is burdened with large number of writ petitions filed under
      Article 226 of the Constitution  of  India  seeking  pre-arrest  bail.
      Section 438 was added to the Code of Criminal Procedure  in  the  year
      1973, in  pursuance  to  the  recommendation  made  by  the  41st  Law
      Commission, but in  the State of Uttar Pradesh by Section  9  Criminal
      Procedure  (Uttar  Pradesh)  Amendment  Act,  1976,  Section  438  was
      specifically omitted, the legality of which came up for  consideration
      before the Constitution Bench of this Court in Kartar Singh  v.  State
      of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569 and the Court held that the deletion of the
      application of Section 438 in the State of Uttar Pradesh by Section  9
      of the above mentioned Amendment Act does not  offend  either  Article
      14, Article 19 or Article 21 of the  Constitution  of  India  and  the
      State Legislature is competent to delete that section, which is one of
      the matters enumerated in the concurrent list, and such a deletion  is
      valid under Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India. =

I am also faced with the situation that on dismissal of the  writ
      by the High Court under Article 226  of  the  Constitution  of  India,
      while examining the challenge for quashing the FIR or a  charge-sheet,
      whether the High Court could grant further relief against arrest for a
      specific period or till the completion of the trial.   
The language of Article 226 does not permit such  an  action  and
      once the Court finds no merits in the challenge,  writ  petition  will
      have to be dismissed and the question of granting further relief after
      dismissal of the writ, does not arise.  Consequently, once a  writ  is
      dismissed, all the interim reliefs granted would also go.
I have carefully gone through the judgment  authored  by  my  esteemed
brother, Justice Radhakrishnan.   I  entirely  agree  with  the  conclusions
arrived at by my learned brother in the said judgment. 
In entertaining such a petition under Art.226, the High  Court  is
supposed to balance the two interests.  
On the one hand,  the  Court  is  to
ensure that such a power under Art.226 is not to be exercised  liberally  so
as to convert it into Section 438,Cr.P.C. proceedings, keeping in mind  that
when this provision is specifically omitted in the State of  Uttar  Pradesh,
it cannot be resorted to as to back door entry via Art.226.   
On  the  other
hand, wherever the High Court finds that in a given case if  the  protection
against pre-arrest is not given, it would amount  to  gross  miscarriage  of
justice and no case, at all, is made for  arrest  pending  trial,  the  High
Court would be free to grant the relief in the nature of  anticipatory  bail
in exercise of its power under Art. 226 of the Constitution.  
 It  is  again
clarified that this power has to  be  exercised  sparingly  in  those  cases
where it is absolutely warranted and justified.

      25.   This Court has already  passed  an  interim  order  on  1.3.2013
      granting bail to the appellant on certain conditions.  The said  order
      will continue till the completion of  the  trial.    However,  if  the
      appellant is not co-operating with the investigation,  the  State  can
      always move  for  vacating  the  order.   The  appeal  is  accordingly
      dismissed as above.




2014 ( January - Vol - 1-D.B.) Judis.nic.in/ S.C./ file name  =41152

                                                          REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 146 OF 2014
                 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.7439 of 2013)




      Km. Hema Mishra                              .. Appellant


                                   Versus


      State of U.P. and Others                           .. Respondents






                               J U D G M E N T








      K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.




        1. Leave granted.




      2.    Appellant herein had invoked the extraordinary  jurisdiction  of
      the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India  seeking
      the following reliefs:
        i) Issue a writ, order or direction in  the  nature  of  Certiorari
           thereby quashing the impugned FIR dated 21.12.2011, contained in
           Annexure No. 1 to this writ petition, lodged at crime No. 797/11
           under Sections 419/420 IPC, at Police Station Zaidpur,  District
           Barabanki;


       ii) Issue a writ, order or  direction  in  the  nature  of  Mandamus
           thereby directing the Superintendant of Police,  Barabanki,  the
           opposite Party No. 2, and the Investigating Officer, Case  Crime
           No. 797/11, under Sections 419/420 IPC, Police Station, Zaidpur,
           District Barabanki, the opposite  party  No.  3,  to  defer  the
           arrest of  the  petitioner  until  collection  of  the  credible
           evidence sufficient for filing the charge-sheet by following the
           amended proviso to Sections 41(1)(b) read with Section 41A CrPC;


      iii) Issue a writ, order or  direction  in  the  nature  of  Mandamus
           thereby directing the Superintendent of Police,  Barabanki,  the
           opposite party  No.  2,  for  compliance  of  the  provision  of
           Sections 41(1)(b) and 41A  CrPC  in  the  investigation  of  the
           impugned FIR dated 21.12.2011 contained in  Annexure  No.  1  to
           this writ petition, lodged in crime No. 797/11,  under  Sections
           419/420 IPC, Zaidpur, District Barabanki; and


       iv) Allow this writ petition with costs.


      3.    The High Court, after hearing the parties as well as the  State,
      dismissed the writ petition  on  9.1.2012  and  passed  the  following
      order:
                 “Heard learned counsel  for  the  petitioner  and  learned
           Additional Government Advocate.  Under challenge in the  instant
           writ petition is FIR relating to Case Crime  No.  797  of  2011,
           under Sections 419 & 420 IPC, police station  Zaidpur,  district
           Barabanki.  We  have  gone  through  the  FIR,  which  discloses
           commission of cognizable offence, as such, the  same  cannot  be
           quashed. The  writ  petition  lacks  merit  and  is  accordingly
           dismissed.


                 However, the petitioner being lady, it is provided that  if
           she surrenders and moves application for bail the same shall  be
           considered and decided by the courts below expeditiously.”


      4.    The appellant, complaining that she was  falsely  implicated  in
      the case, has approached this Court contending that the High Court had
      failed to exercise its certiorari jurisdiction under  Article  226  of
      the Constitution of India in not quashing the FIR dated 21.12.2011 and
      in refusing to grant anticipatory bail to  the  appellant.   Appellant
      submitted that the High Court ought to have issued a writ of  mandamus
      directing the Superintendent of Police, Barabanki to defer the  arrest
      of the appellant until the collection of credible evidence  sufficient
      for filing the charge-sheet, following the amended proviso to  Section
      41(1)(b) read with Section 41A Cr.P.C.


      5.    The Secretary, U.P. Secondary Education Board, Allahabad and the
      District School Inspector vide their letter dated 8.12.2011 registered
      a complaint alleging  that  the  appellant  had  committed  fraud  and
      forgery in the matter of preparation of documents of Government Office
      regarding  selection  for  the  post   of   Assistant   Teacher   and,
      consequently, got appointment as the Assistant Teacher in Janpad Inter-
      College  at  Harakh,  District  Barabanki,  with  payment  of   salary
      amounting to Rs.1,10,000/- from the  Government  exchequer.  
On  the
      basis of the FIR, Case Crime No. 797  of  2011  was  registered  under
      Sections 419/420 IPC before  the  Police  Station,  Jaizpur,  District
      Barabanki. 
After having come to know of the registration of the crime,
      the  appellant  filed  a  representation  on  27.12.2011  before   the
      Superintendent of Police, District  Barabanki  and  the  Investigating
      Officer making the following prayer:
           “As such through this application/representation  the  applicant
           prays that keeping in view the willingness of the applicant  for
           cooperating  in  investigation  and   to   appear   before   the
           investigating officer upon being called in case crime no. 797/11
           u/Ss 419/420 IPC, PS  Jaipdur,  District  Barabanki,  order  for
           staying the arrest of applicant be passed so that compliance  to
           the provision 41(1)(B) Section 41(A) amended  to  CrPC  1973  be
           made.”


      6.     Since  the  appellant  did  not  get  any  reply  to  the  said
      representation, she invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High
      Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India  by  filing  Writ
      Petition Misc. Bench No. 171 of 2012 which was dismissed,  as  already
      indicated, on 9.1.2012.


      7.    When the matter came up for hearing before this Court, it passed
      an interim order on 1.3.2013, the operative portion of which reads  as
      under:
                 “Considering the facts and circumstances of  the  case,  we
           are inclined to direct that  in  the  event  of  arrest  of  the
           petitioner, she shall be released on bail on furnishing personal
           bond of Rs.50,000/-      (Fifty Thousand only) with two  solvent
           sureties for the like amount to the satisfaction  of  the  Trial
           Court, subject to the condition that she will join investigation
           as and when required and shall  abide   by   the  provisions  of
           Section 438(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”


      8.    Shri Aseem Chandra, learned counsel appearing for the appellant,
      submitted that the High Court has committed an error in  not  quashing
      the FIR, since the registration  of  the  crime  was  with  mala  fide
      intention to harass the  appellant  and  in  clear  violation  of  the
      fundamental rights guaranteed to the appellant under Articles  14,  19
      and 21 of the Constitution of India.  Learned counsel  submitted  that
      the appellant was falsely implicated and that the ingredients  of  the
      offence under Sections 419/420 IPC were not prima facie made  out  for
      registering the crime.
Learned counsel also pointed out that the High
      Court has not properly appreciated the scope of Sections 41(1)(b)  and
      41A CrPC, 1973 and that no attempt  has  been  made  to  follow  those
      statutory provisions by the State and its officials.


      9.    Shri Gaurav  Bhatia,  learned  AAG,  appearing  for  the  State,
      submitted that the investigation was properly conducted and the  crime
      was registered.  
Further, it was also pointed out that the  President
      has also withheld the assent of the Code of Criminal Procedure  (Uttar
      Pradesh Amendment) Bill, 2010, since the provisions of the  Bill  were
      found to be in contravention to Section 438 of the Cr.P.C.  and  hence
      the High Court rightly declined the stay sought for under Article  226
      of the Constitution of India.


      10.    Shri  Siddharth  Luthra,  Additional  Solicitor  General,   who
      appeared on our request, submitted that the High  Court  can  in  only
      rarest of rare cases grant pre-arrest  bail  while  exercising  powers
      under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,  since  the  provision
      for the grant of anticipatory  bail  under  Section  438  Cr.P.C.  was
      consciously  omitted  by  the  State  Legislature.  
The   legislative
      intention is, therefore, not to seek or provide pre-arrest  bail  when
      the FIR discloses a cognizable offence.
Shri  Luthra  submitted  that
      since there is a conscious withdrawal/deletion of Section 438 CrPC  by
      the Legislature from the Code of Criminal Procedure, by Section  9  of
      the Criminal Procedure (Uttar Pradesh) Amendment Act, 1976, the relief
      which otherwise the appellant could not have obtained under the  Code,
      is sought to be obtained indirectly by invoking the writ  jurisdiction
      of the High Court, which is impermissible in law.


      11.   Shri Luthra also submitted that since the appellant has no legal
      right to move for anticipatory  bail  and  that  practice  is  not  an
      integral part  of  Article  21  of  the  Constitution  of  India,  the
      contention that the High Court  has  failed  to  examine  the  charges
      levelled against the appellant, was mala fide or violative of Articles
      14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, does not arise.   Shri  Luthra
      also submitted that the High Court was not correct in granting further
      reliefs after having dismissed the writ petition  and  that,  only  in
      extraordinary cases, the High Court could  exercise  its  jurisdiction
      under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the  case  in  hand
      does not fall in that category.


      12.   I may indicate that the legal issues raised in this case are  no
      more res integra.    All the same, it calls for a  relook  on  certain
      aspects which I may deal with during the course of the judgment.


      13.   I am conscious of the fact that since the provisions similar  to
      Section 438 Cr.P.C. being absent in the State of  Uttar  Pradesh,  the
      High Court is burdened with large number of writ petitions filed under
      Article 226 of the Constitution  of  India  seeking  pre-arrest  bail.
      Section 438 was added to the Code of Criminal Procedure  in  the  year
      1973, in  pursuance  to  the  recommendation  made  by  the  41st  Law
      Commission, but in  the State of Uttar Pradesh by Section  9  Criminal
      Procedure  (Uttar  Pradesh)  Amendment  Act,  1976,  Section  438  was
      specifically omitted, the legality of which came up for  consideration
      before the Constitution Bench of this Court in Kartar Singh  v.  State
      of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569 and the Court held that the deletion of the
      application of Section 438 in the State of Uttar Pradesh by Section  9
      of the above mentioned Amendment Act does not  offend  either  Article
      14, Article 19 or Article 21 of the  Constitution  of  India  and  the
      State Legislature is competent to delete that section, which is one of
      the matters enumerated in the concurrent list, and such a deletion  is
      valid under Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India.


      14.   I notice, therefore, as per the Constitution Bench, a claim  for
      pre-arrest protection is neither a statutory nor a   right  guaranteed
      under Article 14, Article 19 or Article  21  of  the  Constitution  of
      India.   All the same, in Karatar Singh’s case (supra), this Court  in
      sub-para (17) of Para 368, has also stated as follows:

                     “368         xxx        xxx         xxx


                           (17) Though it cannot be said that the High Court
                     has no jurisdiction to entertain  an  application  for
                     bail under Article 226 of the  Constitution  and  pass
                     orders either way, relating to the cases under the Act
                     1987, that power should be exercised  sparingly,  that
                     too only in rare  and  appropriate  cases  in  extreme
                     circumstances. But the judicial discipline and  comity
                     of courts require that the High Courts should  refrain
                     from exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction in such
                     matters;


                           xxx          xxx        xxx”


      15.   The High Court of Allahabad has also  taken  the  same  view  in
      several judgments.  Reference may be made to the  judgments  in  Satya
      Pal v. State of U.P. (2000 Cri.L.J. 569), Ajeet Singh v. State of U.P.
      (2007 Cri.L.J. 170), Lalji Yadav & Others v. State of U.P.  &  Another
      (1998 Cri.L.J. 2366), Kamlesh Singh v. State of U.P. &  Another  (1997
      Cri.L.J. 2705) and Natho Mal v. State of U.P. (1994 Cri.L.J. 1919).


      16.   We  have,  therefore,  no  concept  of  “anticipatory  bail”  as
      understood in Section 438 of the Code in the State of  Uttar  Pradesh.
      In Balchand Jain v. State  of  M.P.  (1976)  4  SCC  572,  this  Court
      observed that “anticipatory bail” is a misnomer.    Bail,  by  itself,
      cannot be claimed as a matter of right  under  the  Code  of  Criminal
      Procedure, 1973, except for bailable offences  (Section  436  Cr.P.C.,
      1973).  For non-bailable offences,  conditions  are  prescribed  under
      Sections 437 and 439 Cr.P.C.   The discretion to grant  bail  in  non-
      bailable offences remains with the  Court  and  hence,  it  cannot  be
      claimed as a matter of right, but the aggrieved party can only seek  a
      remedy and it is on the discretion of the Court to grant  it  or  not.
      In this connection reference may also be made to the Judgment  of  the
      seven-Judge Bench of the Allahabad High Court in  Smt.  Amarawati  and
      Ors. V. State of U.P. (2005) Cri.L.J. 755, 
wherein  the  Court,  while
      interpreting the provisions of Sections 41, 2(c) and  157(1)  CrPC  as
      well as the scope of Sections 437 and 439, held as follows:

                 “47. In view of the above we answer the questions  referred
           to the Full Bench as follows:


           (1)  Even if cognizable offence is  disclosed,  in  the  FIR  or
                 complaint the arrest of the accused is not a  must,  rather
                 the police officer should be guided by the decision of  the
                 Supreme Court in Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P.,  1994  Cr
                 LJ 1981 before deciding whether to make an arrest or not.


           (2)    The  High  Court  should  ordinarily   not   direct   any
                 Subordinate Court to decide the bail application  the  same
                 day,  as  that  would  be  interfering  with  the  judicial
                 discretion of  the  Court  hearing  the  bail  application.
                 However, as stated above,  when  the  bail  application  is
                 under Section 437 Cr.P.C. ordinarily the Magistrate  should
                 himself decide the bail application the same day, and if he
                 decides in a rare and exceptional case not to decide it  on
                 the same day, he must record his  reasons  in  writing.  As
                 regards the application under Section 439 Cr.P.C. it is  in
                 the discretion of the learned  Sessions  Judge  considering
                 the facts and circumstances  whether  to  decide  the  bail
                 application the same day or not, and  it  is  also  in  his
                 discretion to grant interim bail the same  day  subject  to
                 the final decision on the bail application later.


           (3)   The decision in  Dr.  Vinod  Narain  v.  State  of  UP  is
                 incorrect and is substituted accordingly by this judgment.”



      17.   This Court in Lal Kamlendra  Pratap  Singh  v.  State  of  Uttar
      Pradesh and Others (2009) 4 SCC 437, while affirming the  judgment  in
      Amarawati (supra), held as follows:

           “6. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  apprehends  that  the
           appellant  will  be  arrested  as  there  is  no  provision  for
           anticipatory bail in the State of U.P. He placed reliance  on  a
           decision of the Allahabad High Court in Amarawati  v.  State  of
           U.P. in which a seven-Judge Full Bench  of  the  Allahabad  High
           Court held that the court, if it deems  fit  in  the  facts  and
           circumstances of the case, may grant interim bail pending  final
           disposal of the bail application. The Full Bench  also  observed
           that arrest is not a  must  whenever  an  FIR  of  a  cognizable
           offence is  lodged.  The  Full  Bench  placed  reliance  on  the
           decision of this Court in Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. (1994)
           4 SCC 260.


           7. We fully agree with the view of the High Court  in  Amarawati
           case and we direct that the said decision  be  followed  by  all
           courts in U.P. in letter  and  spirit,  particularly  since  the
           provision for anticipatory bail does not exist in U.P.


           8. In appropriate cases interim bail should be  granted  pending
           disposal  of  the  final  bail  application,  since  arrest  and
           detention of a person can cause irreparable loss to  a  person’s
           reputation, as held by this Court in Joginder Kumar case.  Also,
           arrest is not a must in all cases of cognizable offences, and in
           deciding whether to arrest or not the  police  officer  must  be
           guided and act according to the principles laid down in Joginder
           Kumar case.”




      18.   Later, a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Som Mittal v. State of
      Karnataka (2008) 3 SCC  753,  while  dealing  with  an  order  of  the
      Karnataka High Court under Section 482 CrPC, one of  the  Judges  made
      some strong observations as well as recommendations to restore Section
      438 in the State of U.P.  Learned Judges constituting the  Bench  also
      expressed contrary views on certain legal issues,  hence,  the  matter
      was later placed before a three-Judge Bench, the judgment of which  is
      reported in same caption (2008) 3 SCC 574, wherein this  Court  opined
      that insofar as the observations, recommendations  and  directions  in
      paras 17 to 39 of the concurrent judgment is concerned, they  did  not
      relate to the subject matter of the criminal appeal and the directions
      given were held to be obiter and were set aside.


      19.   I notice in  this  case  FIR  was  lodged  for  offences,  under
      Sections 419 and 420 IPC which carry a sentence of  maximum  of  three
      years and seven years respectively with or without fine.   
Benefit  of
      Section 41(a) Cr.P.C.  must  be  available  in  a  given  case,  which
      provides that an investigating officer shall not arrest the accused of
      such offences in a routine manner and the arrest be made,  only  after
      following the restrictions imposed under Section 41(b).   
The relevant
      provisions, as it stands now reads as follow:
           “41. When police may arrest without  warrant.-
(1)  Any  police
           officer may without an order from a  Magistrate  and  without  a
           warrant, arrest any person –


                 a) who commits, in the presence  of  a  police  officer,  a
                    cognizable offence;


                 b) against whom a reasonable complaint has  been  made,  or
                    credible information has been received, or a  reasonable
                    suspicion exists that  he  has  committed  a  cognizable
                    offence punishable with imprisonment for  a  term  which
                    may be less than seven years  or  which  may  extend  to
                    seven  years  whether  with  or  without  fine,  if  the
                    following conditions are satisfied, namely:-


                      i)    the police officer has reason to believe on the
                         basis of such complaint, information, or suspicion
                         that such person has committed the said offence;


                     ii)     the police  officer  is  satisfied  that  such
                         arrest is necessary –


                         a) to prevent  such  person  from  committing  any
                            further offence; or
                         b) for proper investigation of the offence; or
                         c)  to  prevent  such  person  from  causing   the
                            evidence  of  the  offence  to   disappear   or
                            tampering with such evidence in any manner, or
                         d)  to  prevent  such  person  from   making   any
                            inducement, threat or  promise  to  any  person
                            acquainted with the facts of the case so as  to
                            dissuade him from disclosing such facts to  the
                            Court or to the police officer; or
                         e) as unless such person is arrested, his presence
                            in  the  Court  whenever  required  cannot   be
                            ensured,
                    and the police officer shall record  while  making  such
                    arrest, his reasons in writing:


                    Provided that a police officer shall, in all cases where
                    the arrest  of  a  person  is  not  required  under  the
                    provisions of this sub-section; record  the  reasons  in
                    writing for not making the arrest.”




      20.   Amended provisions make it compulsory for the police  to  record
      the reasons for making arrest as well as for not making an  arrest  in
      respect of a cognizable offence for which the maximum sentence is upto
      seven years.
Reference in this connection may also be made to Section
      41A inserted vide Act 5 of 2009  w.e.f.  01.11.2010,  which  reads  as
      follows:
           “41A. Notice of appearance  before  police  officer  
(1)  The
           police officer shall, in all cases where the arrest of a  person
           is not required under  the  provisions  of  sub-section  (1)  of
           section 41, issue a notice directing the person against  whom  a
           reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information  has
           been received, or a reasonable  suspicion  exists  that  he  has
           committed a cognizable offence, to appear before him or at  such
           other place as may be specified in the notice.


           (2) Where such a notice is issued to any person, it shall be the
           duty of that person to comply with the terms of the notice.


           (3) Where such person complies and continues to comply with  the
           notice, he shall not be  arrested  in  respect  of  the  offence
           referred to in the notice unless, for reasons  to  be  recorded,
           the police officer is  of  the  opinion  that  he  ought  to  be
           arrested.


           (4) Where such person, at any time, fails  to  comply  with  the
           terms of the notice or is unwilling  to  identify  himself,  the
           police officer may, subject to such  orders  as  may  have  been
           passed by a competent Court in this behalf, arrest him  for  the
           offence mentioned in the notice.”


      21.   Above mentioned provisions make it compulsory for the police  to
      issue a notice in all such cases where arrest is not  required  to  be
      made under Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of the  amended  Section  41.
      But, all the same, unwillingness of a person who has not been arrested
      to identify himself and to whom a notice has been issued under Section
      41A, could be a ground for his  arrest.   Legislation  has  laid  down
      various parameters, warranting arrest of a person, which itself  is  a
      check on arbitrary or unwarranted arrest and  the  right  to  personal
      liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.


      22.    I may, however, point out that there is unanimity in  the  view
      that in spite of the fact  that  Section  438  has  been  specifically
      omitted and made inapplicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh,  still  a
      party aggrieved can invoke the jurisdiction of the  High  Court  under
      Article  226  of  the  Constitution  of  India,  being   extraordinary
      jurisdiction  and  the  vastness  of  the  powers   naturally   impose
      considerable responsibility in its application.   All  the  same,  the
      High Court has got the power and sometimes duty in  appropriate  cases
      to grant reliefs, though it is not possible to pin-point what are  the
      appropriate cases, which have to be left to the wisdom  of  the  Court
      exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.


      23.  I am also faced with the situation that on dismissal of the  writ
      by the High Court under Article 226  of  the  Constitution  of  India,
      while examining the challenge for quashing the FIR or a  charge-sheet,
      whether the High Court could grant further relief against arrest for a
      specific period or till the completion of the trial.  
This  Court  in
      State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta reported  in  AIR  1952  SC  12,
      while dealing with the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution,  held
      as follows :-
             “Article 226 cannot be used for the purpose of  giving  interim
             relief as the only and final relief  on  the  application.  The
             directions  had  been  given  here  only  to   circumvent   the
             provisions of Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, and  that
             was not within the scope of Article 226. An interim relief  can
             be granted only in aid of and as ancillary to the  main  relief
             which may be available to the party on final  determination  of
             his rights in a suit or proceeding. If the Court was of opinion
             that there was no other convenient or adequate remedy  open  to
             the petitioners, it might have  proceeded  to  investigate  the
             case on its merits and come to a decision  as  to  whether  the
             petitioners  succeeded  in  establishing  that  there  was   an
             infringement of any of their legal rights which  entitled  them
             to a writ of mandamus or any other directions of a like nature;
             and pending such determination it might have  made  a  suitable
             interim order for maintaining the status quo ante. But when the
             Court declined to decide on  the  rights  of  the  parties  and
             expressly held that they should be investigated  more  properly
             in a civil suit, it could not, for the purpose of  facilitating
             the institution of such suit, issue directions in the nature of
             temporary injunctions, under Article 226 of  the  Constitution.
             The language of Article 226 does not permit such an action.”

      24.  The language of Article 226 does not permit such  an  action  and
      once the Court finds no merits in the challenge,  writ  petition  will
      have to be dismissed and the question of granting further relief after
      dismissal of the writ, does not arise.  Consequently, once a  writ  is
      dismissed, all the interim reliefs granted would also go.


      25.   This Court has already  passed  an  interim  order  on  1.3.2013
      granting bail to the appellant on certain conditions.  The said  order
      will continue till the completion of  the  trial.    However,  if  the
      appellant is not co-operating with the investigation,  the  State  can
      always move  for  vacating  the  order.   The  appeal  is  accordingly
      dismissed as above.






                                             eard Hear……………………………..J.
                                             (K. S. Radhakrishnan)
    New Delhi,
    January 16, 2014.
                                                         [REPORTABLE]

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 146/2014
        (arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7439/2013)

      Km. Hema Mishra                                       …..Appellant

                             Vs.

      State of U.P. & Ors.
….Respondents



                                  J U D G M E N T

A.K.SIKRI,J.

1.    I have carefully gone through the judgment  authored  by  my  esteemed
brother, Justice Radhakrishnan.   I  entirely  agree  with  the  conclusions
arrived at by my learned brother in the said judgment.  At the same time,  I
would also like to make some observations pertaining to the powers  of  High
Court under Article 226  of  the  Constitution  of  India  to  grant  relief
against  pre-arrest  (commonly  called  as  anticipatory  bail),  even  when
Section 438,Cr.P.C.  authorizing  the  Court  to  grant  such  a  relief  is
specifically omitted and made inapplicable in  so  far  as  State  of  Uttar
Pradesh is concerned.  I would like to start with reproducing the  following
observations in the  opinion  of  my  brother,  on  this  aspect  which  are
contained in paragraph 21 of the judgment.  It reads as under:

                 “We may, however, point out that there is unanimity in the
           view that in spite  of  the  fact  that  Section  438  has  been
           specifically omitted and made inapplicable in the State of Uttar
           Pradesh, still a party aggrieved can invoke the jurisdiction  of
           the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution  of  India,
           being extraordinary jurisdiction and the vastness of the  powers
           naturally impose considerable responsibility in its application.
            All the same, the High Court has got the  power  and  sometimes
           duty in appropriate cases to grant reliefs,  though  it  is  not
           possible to pin-point what are the appropriate cases,  which  we
           have to leave to the wisdom of the Court exercising powers under
           Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”




2.    Another aspect which  is  highlighted  in  the  judgment  rendered  by
Justice Radhakrishnan is that many times in the Writ  Petition  filed  under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking quashing of the FIR or  the
charge-sheet, the  petitioners  pray  for  interim  relief  against  arrest.
While entertaining the Writ Petition the High Court invariably  grants  such
an interim relief.  It is rightly pointed out that once  the  Writ  Petition
claiming main relief for quashing of  FIR  or  the  charge-sheet  itself  is
dismissed, the question of granting further relief after  dismissal  of  the
Writ Petition, does not arise.  It is so explained in para 22 and 23 of  the
judgment of my learned brother.

3.    I would like to remark that in the  absence  of  any  provisions  like
Section 438 of Cr.P.C. applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh, there is  a
tendency on the part of the accused persons,  against  whom  FIR  is  lodged
and/or charge-sheet is  filed  in  the  Court  to  file  Writ  Petition  for
quashing of those proceedings so  that  they  are  able  to  get  protection
against the arrest in the  interregnum  which  is  the  primary  motive  for
filing such petitions.  It is for this  reason  that  invariably  after  the
lodging of FIR, Writ Petition under Article 226 is filed  with  main  prayer
to quash those proceedings and to claim interim  relief  against  pre-arrest
in the  meantime  or  till  the  completion  of  the  trial.   However,  the
considerations which have to weigh with the  High  Court  to  decide  as  to
whether such proceedings are to be quashed or  not  are  entirely  different
than that of granting interim protection  against  the  arrest.   Since  the
grounds on which such an FIR or charge sheet can  be  quashed  are  limited,
once the Writ Petition challenging the validity of FIR  or  charge-sheet  is
dismissed, the grant of relief, incidental in nature, against  arrest  would
obviously not arise, even when a justifiable case for grant of  anticipatory
bail is made out .

4.    It is for this reason, we are  of  the  opinion  that  in  appropriate
cases the High Court is empowered to entertain the  petition  under  Article
226 of the Constitution of India where the main  relief  itself  is  against
arrest.  Obviously, when provisions  of  Section  438  of  Cr.P.C.  are  not
available to the accused persons in the State of Uttar  Pradesh,  under  the
normal circumstances such an accused persons would not be entitled to  claim
such a relief under Art.  226  of  the  Constitution.         It  cannot  be
converted into a second window for the relief which  is  consciously  denied
statutorily making it a case of casus omissus. At the same time, as  rightly
observed in para 21 extracted above, the High  Court  cannot  be  completely
denuded of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, to  grant  such
a relief in appropriate and deserving cases; albeit  this  power  is  to  be
exercised with extreme caution and sparingly in those cases where arrest  of
a person would lead to total miscarriage of justice.   There  may  be  cases
where  pre-arrest  may  be  entirely  unwarranted  and  lead  to  disastrous
consequences.  Whenever the High Court is convinced  of  such  a  situation,
it would be appropriate to grant  the  relief  against  pre-arrest  in  such
cases.  What would be those cases will have to be left to the wisdom of  the
High Court.  What is emphasized is that the High Court is not bereft of  its
powers to grant this relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution.

            A Bench  of  this  Court,  headed  by  the  then  Chief  Justice
           Y.V.Chandrachud,  laid  down   first   principles   of   granting
           anticipatory bail in the Gurbaksh Singh v. State of  Punjab  1980
           Crl.L.J. 417 (P&H), reemphasizing that liberty… - ‘A  person  who
           has yet to lose his freedom by being arrested asks for freedom in
           the event of arrest. That is the stage at which it is  imperative
           to protect his freedom, in so far as one may, and  to  give  full
           play to the presumption that he is innocent.




5.    In Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. and Others, 1994 Cr L.J. 1981,  the
Supreme Court observed:

                 “No arrest can be made because it is lawful for the police
         officer to do so. The existence of the  power  to  arrest  is  one
         thing. The justification for the exercise of it is quite  another.
         The police officer must be able to justify the arrest  apart  from
         his power to do so. Arrest and detention in police  lock-up  of  a
         person can cause incalculable harm  to  the  reputation  and  self
         esteem of a person. No arrest can be made in a routine manner on a
         mere allegation of commission of an offence made against a person.
         It would be prudent for  a  police  officer  in  the  interest  of
         protection of the constitutional rights of a citizen  and  perhaps
         in his own interest that  no  arrest  should  be  made  without  a
         reasonable satisfaction reached after some investigation as to the
         genuineness of a complaint and a reasonable belief both as to  the
         person’s complicity and even so as to the need to effect arrest.”




6.    It is pertinent to  explain  there  may  be  imminent  need  to  grant
protection against pre-arrest. The object of this provision is to relieve  a
person from being disgraced by trumped up charges so  that  liberty  of  the
subject is not put in jeopardy on frivolous grounds at the instance  of  the
unscrupulous  or  irresponsible  persons  who  may  be  in  charge  of   the
prosecution.  An order of anticipatory bail does not in  any  way,  directly
or indirectly; take away for the police  their  right  to  investigate  into
charges made or to be made against the person released on bail.

7.    The purposes for which the provisions of anticipatory  bail  are  made
are quite obvious. One of the purposes of the arrest  is  that  the  accused
should  be  available   to   the   investigating   machinery   for   further
investigation and questioning whenever he is required.  Another  purpose  is
that  the  trial  should  not  be  jeopardized  and  for  this  purpose  the
restrictions  on  the  movements  of  the  accused   are   necessary.    The
genuineness of the alleged need for police custody has to  be  examined  and
it must be balanced against the duty of courts  to  uphold  the  dignity  of
every man and to vigilantly guard the right to liberty without  jeopardizing
the state objective of maintenance of law and order.

8.    I would also like to reproduce certain paragraphs  from  Kartar  Singh
and Ors. V. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569, 
wherein  Justice  K.Ramaswamy,
speaking for the Court, discussed the importance of life and liberty in  the
following words.

                  “The foundation of Indian political and social  democracy,
           as envisioned in the  preamble  of  the  Constitution,  rests  on
           justice,  equality,  liberty  and  fraternity  in   secular   and
           socialist  republic  in  which   every   individual   has   equal
           opportunity to strive towards excellence and of  his  dignity  of
           person in an integrated egalitarian Bharat. Right to justice  and
           equality  and  stated  liberties   which   include   freedom   of
           expression, belief and movement are the means for excellence. The
           right to life with human dignity of person is a fundamental right
           of  every  citizen  for  pursuit  of  happiness  and  excellence.
           Personal freedom is a basic condition  for  full  development  of
           human personality. Art.21 of the Constitution protects  right  to
           life which is the most precious right in a civilized society. The
           trinity i.e. liberty, equality and fraternity always blossoms and
           enlivens the flower  of  human  dignity.  One  of  the  gifts  of
           democracy to mankind is the right to personal liberty.  Life  and
           personal freedom are the prized jewels  under  Art.19  conjointly
           assured by Art.20(3), 21 and 22 of the  Constitution  and  Art.19
           ensures freedom of movement. Liberty aims  at  freedom  not  only
           from arbitrary restraint but also to secure such conditions which
           are essential for the  full  development  of  human  personality.
           Liberty is the essential concomitant  for  other  rights  without
           which a man cannot be at his  best.  The  essence  of  all  civil
           liberties is to keep alive the freedom of the individual  subject
           to  the  limitations  of  social  control  envisaged  in  diverse
           articles in the chapter of Fundamental Rights Part III in harmony
           with social good envisaged in the Directive Principles in Part IV
           of the Constitution.  Freedom  cannot  last  long  unless  it  is
           coupled with  order.  Freedom  can  never  exist  without  order.
           Freedom and order may  coexist.  It  is  essential  that  freedom
           should be exercised under authority and order should be  enforced
           by authority which is vested solely in the executive. Fundamental
           rights are the means and directive principles are essential  ends
           in a welfare State. The evolution of the State from police  State
           to a welfare State is the ultimate measure and accepted  standard
           of democratic society which is an avowed constitutional  mandate.
           Though one of the main functions of the democratic Government  is
           to safeguard liberty of the individual, unless  its  exercise  is
           subject to social control, it becomes anti-social  or  undermines
           the security of the State. The Indian democracy wedded to rule of
           law aims not only  to  protect  the  fundamental  rights  of  its
           citizens but also to establish an egalitarian social  order.  The
           individual has to grow within the social confines preventing  his
           unsocial or unbridled growth which could be done  by  reconciling
           individual  liberty  with  social  control.   Liberty   must   be
           controlled in the interest of the society but the social interest
           must  never  be  overbearing  to  justify  total  deprivation  of
           individual liberty. Liberty cannot stand alone but must be paired
           with a companion virtue; liberty and morality; liberty  and  law;
           liberty  and  justice;  liberty  and  common  good;  liberty  and
           responsibility which are concomitants for  orderly  progress  and
           social stability. Man being a rational individual has to life  in
           harmony with equal rights of others and more differently for  the
           attainment of antithetic desires.  This  intertwined  network  is
           difficult to delineate within defined spheres of  conduct  within
           which freedom of action may be confined. Therefore, liberty would
           not always be an absolute license but must arm itself within  the
           confines of law. In other words, here can be no  liberty  without
           social restraint. Liberty, therefore, as a social conception is a
           right to be assured to all members of a society. Unless restraint
           is enforced on and accepted by all members of  the  society,  the
           liberty of some must involve the oppression of others. If liberty
           be regarded a social order, the problem of  establishing  liberty
           must be a problem of organizing restraint which society  controls
           over the individual. Therefore, liberty of each citizen is  borne
           of and must be  subordinated  to  the  liberty  of  the  greatest
           number, in other words common happiness as an end of the society,
           lest lawlessness and anarchy will tamper social weal and  harmony
           and powerful courses or forces would  be  at  work  to  undermine
           social welfare and order. Thus the essence of civil liberty is to
           keep  alive  the  freedom  of  the  individual  subject  to   the
           limitation of social control which could be adjusted according to
           the needs of the dynamic social evolution.

             The  modem  social  evolution  is  the  growing  need  to  keep
           individual to  be  as  free  as  possible,  consistent  with  his
           correlative obligation to the society. According to Dr.  Ambedkar
           in his closing speech in the Constituent Assembly, the principles
           of liberty, equality and fraternity are  not  to  be  treated  as
           separate entities but in  a  trinity.  They  form  the  union  or
           trinity in the sense that to divorce one from  the  other  is  to
           defeat the very purpose of democracy. Liberty cannot be  divorced
           from equality.  Equality cannot be divorced from liberty. Nor can
           equality  and  liberty  be  divorced  from  fraternity.   Without
           equality,  liberty  would  produce  supremacy  of  law.  Equality
           without  liberty  would  kill  individual   initiative.   Without
           fraternity, liberty and  equality  would  not  become  a  natural
           course of things. Courts, as sentinel on the qui vive, therefore,
           must strike a balance between the changing needs of  the  society
           for peaceful transformation with orders  and  protection  of  the
           rights of the citizen.(Para 374)




9.    It was also held in that judgment that the High Courts  under  Art.226
had the right to entertain writ petitions for quashing of FIR  and  granting
of interim  protection  from  arrest.  
This  position,  in  the  context  of
contours of Art.226, is stated as follows in the same judgment:

                  “From this scenario, the question emerges 
whether the High
           Court under Art.226 would be right in entertaining proceedings to
           quash the charge-sheet or to grant bail to a person accused of an
           offence under the Act or  other  offences  committed  during  the
           course  of  the  same  transaction  exclusively  triable  by  the
           Designated Court. 
Nothing is more striking than  the  failure  of
           law to  evolve  a  consistent  jurisdictional  doctrine  or  even
           elementary  principles,  if  it  is  subject  to  conflicting  or
           inconceivable or inconsistent result which lead  to  uncertainty,
           incongruity  and  disbelief  in  the   efficacy   of   law.   
The
           jurisdiction and power of the High Court  under  Art.226  of  the
           Constitution is undoubtedly constituent power and the High  Court
           has untrammeled powers and jurisdiction  to  issue  any  writ  or
           order  or  direction  to  any  person  or  authority  within  its
           territorial  jurisdiction  for  enforcement   of   any   of   the
           fundamental rights or for any other purpose. 
The legislature  has
           no power to divest the court of the constituent  power  engrafted
           under Art.226.  
A  superior  court  is  deemed  to  have  general
           jurisdiction and the law presumes that the court has acted within
           its jurisdiction. This presumption  is  denied  to  the  inferior
           courts.  
The  judgment  of  a  superior  court  unreservedly   is
           conclusive as to all relevant matters thereby decided, while  the
           judgment  of  the  inferior  court  involving   a   question   of
           jurisdiction is not final. 
The  superior  court,  therefore,  has
           jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction, may be rightly or
           wrongly. 
Therefore, the court in an  appropriate  proceeding  may
           erroneously exercise jurisdiction. It does not constitute want of
           jurisdiction, but it impinges upon its propriety in the  exercise
           of the jurisdiction. Want  of  jurisdiction  can  be  established
           solely by a superior court and that in practice no  decision  can
           be impeached collaterally by an  inferior  court.  
However,  acts
           done by a superior court are always deemed  valid  wherever  they
           are relied upon. The exclusion thereof from the rule of  validity
           is indispensable in its finality. 
The superior courts, therefore,
           are the final arbiters of the validity of the acts done not  only
           by other inferior courts  or  authorities,  but  also  their  own
           decisions. 
Though they are immune from collateral attack, but  to
           avoid confusion the superior court’s decisions lay down the rules
           of validity; are not governed by those rules. The valid  decision
           is not only conclusive, it may affect, but it is also  conclusive
           in proceedings where it is sought to be  collaterally  impeached.
           
However, the  term  conclusiveness  may  acquire  other  specific
           meanings. It may mean that the finding upon which the decision is
           founded as distinct or it is the operative  part  or  has  to  be
           conclusive or these  findings  bind  only  parties  on  litigated
           disputes or that the organ which has made the decision is  itself
           precluded from revoking, rescinding or otherwise altering it.”




10.   It would  be  pertinent  to  mention  here  that  in  light  of  above
mentioned statements and cases, the High Court would  not  be  incorrect  or
acting out of jurisdiction if it exercises its power under Art.226 to  issue
appropriate writ or direction or order in exceptional cases  at  the  behest
of a person accused of an offence triable under the Act or  offence  jointly
triable with the offences under the Act.

11.   It is pertinent to mention that though the High Courts have very  wide
powers under Art.226, the very vastness of the  powers  imposes  on  it  the
responsibility to use them with circumspection and in  accordance  with  the
judicial consideration and well established  principles,  so  much  so  that
while entertaining writ  petitions  for  granting  interim  protection  from
arrest, the Court would not go on to the extent of including  the  provision
of anticipatory bail as a blanket provision.

12.   Thus, such a power has to be  exercised  very  cautiously  keeping  in
view, at the same time, that the provisions of Article 226 are a  devise  to
advance justice and not to frustrate it.  
The powers are, therefore,  to  be
exercised to prevent miscarriage of justice and to prevent abuse of  process
of law by authorities indiscriminately  making  pre-arrest  of  the  accused
persons.
In entertaining such a petition under Art.226, the High  Court  is
supposed to balance the two interests.  
On the one hand,  the  Court  is  to
ensure that such a power under Art.226 is not to be exercised  liberally  so
as to convert it into Section 438,Cr.P.C. proceedings, keeping in mind  that
when this provision is specifically omitted in the State of  Uttar  Pradesh,
it cannot be resorted to as to back door entry via Art.226.   
On  the  other
hand, wherever the High Court finds that in a given case if  the  protection
against pre-arrest is not given, it would amount  to  gross  miscarriage  of
justice and no case, at all, is made for  arrest  pending  trial,  the  High
Court would be free to grant the relief in the nature of  anticipatory  bail
in exercise of its power under Art. 226 of the Constitution.  
 It  is  again
clarified that this power has to  be  exercised  sparingly  in  those  cases
where it is absolutely warranted and justified.

                                                   ……………………….J.
                                                             (A.K. SIKRI)
New Delhi,
16th January 2014

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