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Wednesday, August 21, 2013

Sections 498A and 304B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC) and Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act (hereinafter called the ‘DP Act’). = What is material contradiction and the material omissions =It is well settled legal proposition that while appreciating the evidence, the court has to take into consideration whether the contradictions/omissions were of such magnitude so as to materially affect the trial. Minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements in relation to trivial matters, which do not effect the core of the case of the prosecution, must not be made a ground for rejection of evidence in its entirety. The trial court, after going through the entire evidence available, must form an opinion about the credibility of the witnesses, and the appellate court in the normal course of action, would not be justified in reviewing the same, without providing justifiable reasons for doing so. Where the omission(s) amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt regarding the truthfulness of a witness, and the other witnesses also make material improvements before the court in order to make the evidence acceptable, it would not be safe to rely upon such evidence. The discrepancies in the evidence of eyewitnesses, if found not to be minor in nature, may be a ground for disbelieving and discrediting their evidence. In such circumstances, the witnesses may not inspire confidence and if their evidence is found to be in conflict and contradiction with other evidence available or with a statement that has already been recorded, then in such a case, it cannot be held that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.; Recording a finding against the medical evidence is perverse = The defence version has been that Shanthi, deceased, had developed illicit relations with one Raju, a close friend of her brother Manimaran (PW.2) and was pregnant at the time of marriage. The Trial Court accepted this version in spite of the fact that the medical evidence was otherwise. Dr. B.R.S. Kashyap (PW.17) mentioned in the post-mortem report (Ex.P-12) that the uterus was intact. Subsequently, an explanation was specifically sought on 2.2.1995 as to whether Shanthi was pregnant at the time of death. Dr. Kashyap (PW.17) opined that she was not pregnant at the time of post-mortem examination. Dr. Kashyap (PW.17) denied the suggestion that he had issued report (Ex.P-14) in collusion with the complainant to the effect that she was not pregnant. 20. The Trial Court placed reliance on the medical history (Ex.P-10) mentioned in the Accident Register of the hospital that Shanthi had 3 months pregnancy. We have examined the original documents also, there is nothing on record to show as at whose behest remarks had been recorded therein. Thus, the finding of the Trial Court about pregnancy of Shanthi recorded by the Trial Court is not worth acceptance.; Duty of accused under sec. 313 Cr.P.C. to give explanation =He did not give any version about the incident, rather pleaded a false defence that Shanthi, deceased, had developed illicit relationship with Raju, a friend of her brother Manimaran, (PW.2) and was pregnant before marriage. To question no. 32, as to whether he wanted to say anything, his reply was only `No’. 23. It is obligatory on the part of the accused while being examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., to furnish some explanation with respect to the incriminating circumstances associated with him, and the Court must take note of such explanation even in a case of circumstantial evidence in order to decide whether or not the chain of circumstances is complete. When the attention of the accused is drawn to circumstances that inculpate him in relation to the commission of the crime, and he fails to offer an appropriate explanation, or gives a false answer with respect to the same, the said act may be counted as providing a missing link for completing the chain of circumstances. (Vide: Munish Mabar v State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 912). When sec. 113 and 116 Evidence Act comes in to play =The prosecution successfully proved its case and, therefore, provisions of Section 113 of the Evidence Act 1872 come into play. The appellant/accused did not make any attempt, whatsoever, to rebut the said presumption contained therein. More so, Shanthi, deceased, died in the house of the appellant. He did not disclose as where he had been at the time of incident. In such a fact-situation, the provisions of Section 106 of Evidence Act may also be made applicable as the appellant/accused had special knowledge regarding such facts, though he failed to furnish any explanation thus, the court could draw an adverse inference against him. 26. In view of the above, the findings recorded by the Trial Court on each issue had been perverse and the High Court has rightly reversed the said findings. The conduct of the appellant/accused during the trial also disentitled him of any indulgence whatsoever. The appeal lacks merit, and is, accordingly dismissed.

                published in      http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40665                                     
   Non-Reportable


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2280 of 2009




     S. Govidaraju
     …Appellant


                                   Versus


     State of Karnataka
           …Respondent




                               J U D G M E N T




      Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.




      1.    This appeal has been preferred against the  judgment  and  order
      dated 6.6.2007, passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore  in
      Criminal Appeal No.1146 of 2000, preferred by the  State  against  the
      judgment and  order  of  the  Sessions  Judge,  Bangalore  city  dated
      8.6.2000, passed in  Sessions  Case  No.550  of  1995,  by  which  and
      whereunder, the appellant stood acquitted of  all  the  charges  under
      Sections 498A and 304B of the Indian  Penal  Code,  1860  (hereinafter
      referred to as ‘IPC) and Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry  Prohibition
      Act (hereinafter called the  ‘DP  Act’).  The  High  Court  on  appeal
      convicted the appellant under Section 304B IPC and awarded a  sentence
      of 7 years; under Section 498A IPC awarded the sentence for  a  period
      of 3 years and also a fine of Rs.5,000/- was imposed,  and in default,
      to undergo further sentence  of  6  months.  The  appellant  was  also
      convicted under Section 3 of DP Act and imprisonment for a period of 5
      years was awarded alongwith a fine of Rs.10,000/-, and in  default  to
      undergo imprisonment  for  one  year;  under  Section  4  of  DP  Act,
      imprisonment for a period of 6  months  was  awarded  and  a  fine  of
      Rs.10,000/- was imposed, in default, to  undergo  imprisonment  for  3
      months.  However, all the sentences were directed to run concurrently.


      2.    Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:


      A.    The appellant got married  to  one  Shanthi  on  16.9.1994.  The
      marriage  was  negotiated  by  their  parents  at  the  house  of  one
      Jayasingh. The parents of Shanthi gave 7 to 8 gold ornaments including
      a neck chain and a ring to the appellant in the marriage.   After  the
      marriage, the appellant and Shanthi were residing at  the  appellant’s
      house bearing no.93,  2nd  Cross,  Basaveshwara  Nagar,  Magadi  Road,
      Bangalore.  It was only at  a  distance  of  one  kilometre  from  her
      parents’ house.  It is alleged that Shanthi  was  ill-treated  by  the
      appellant and also physically and mentally  tortured,  demanding  more
      dowry.
      B.    On 14.12.1994, the appellant  quarrelled  with  Shanthi  on  the
      ground that she had taken Rs.50/- from his shirt  pocket  without  his
      consent.  Shanthi committed suicide by pouring kerosene   and  setting
      herself ablaze.   She  was  taken  to  Victoria  Hospital,  Bangalore,
      however, she died at about 7 p.m. on the same day.  As it was  a  case
      of unnatural death, the post-mortem was conducted on the dead body  of
      Shanthi on 15.12.1994  and  in  the  opinion  of  Dr.  B.R.S.  Kashyap
      (PW.17), the cause of death was shock as a result of burns  sustained.
      About 95% ante-mortem burns were noticed.


      C.    Sundaresh (PW.1), father of  deceased Shanthi lodged a complaint
      on 16.12.1994 alleging that the  appellant  was  responsible  for  the
      death of  his  daughter  Shanthi  and  in  view  thereof,  the  Police
      registered an FIR in case No.773 of 1994 under Sections 498A and  304B
      IPC.  The appellant was arrested  on  17.12.1994.   The  investigation
      commenced and charge-sheet was filed under Sections 498A, 304B IPC and
      3, 4 and 6 of DP Act and the matter was committed to Sessions.


      D.    During the trial, 17 witnesses were examined by the prosecution.
       The star witnesses were Sundaresh (PW.1), father of deceased Shanthi,
      Manimaran (PW.2), brother of deceased Shanthi,  and  Sakkubai  (PW.6),
      mother of deceased.  In addition thereto,  the  other  witnesses  were
      Smt. M. Sarala Somaiah, (PW.15), I.O., Dr. B.R.S. Kashyap (PW.17)  who
      conducted the post-mortem examination.  The appellant was examined  at
      the verge of conclusion of trial under Section  313  of  the  Code  of
      Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to  as  ‘Cr.P.C.’)  and
      vide judgment and order dated 8.6.2000, the appellant was acquitted of
      all the charges.


      E.    Aggrieved, the State preferred an appeal before the  High  Court
      which  has  been  allowed  vide  impugned  judgment  and  order  dated
      6.6.2007.
            Hence, this appeal.


      3.    Mr. Rohat Bansal, learned counsel appearing  for  the  appellant
      has submitted that the High Court failed to appreciate the judgment of
      the Trial Court in the correct perspective  and  interfered  with  the
      judgment  and  order  of  acquittal  passed  by  the  Trial  Court  in
      contravention of the parameters laid down by  this  Court.  There  had
      been material contradictions in the statements of PWs.1, 2, 6  and  7.
      Therefore, the Trial Court had rightly passed the order of  acquittal.
      The FIR itself  was  lodged  on  16.12.1994  though  Shanthi  died  on
      14.12.1994.  The question  of  dowry  demand  would  not  arise.   The
      statement made by Sarasa, sister of deceased before her family members
      was accepted by the High Court without realising that Sarasa  was  not
      examined by the prosecution.  The High Court failed to appreciate that
      when two views are possible, the view beneficial to the  accused  must
      be accepted. Therefore, the appeal deserves to be allowed.


      4.    Per contra, Ms. Anitha Shenoy, learned counsel for the State has
      vehemently opposed the appeal contending that Shanthi, a 20  year  old
      girl died within 3  months  of  her  marriage  in  the  house  of  the
      appellant.  Therefore, the incident was within the  special  knowledge
      of the appellant and he failed to explain how Shanthi had  died.   The
      appellant doubted the  fidelity  of  Shanthi  alleging  that  she  had
      developed illicit  relations  with  Raju,  a  friend  of  her  brother
      Manimaran (PW.2) and got pregnant before their marriage and   that  is
      why she had committed suicide.  Though the medical report specifically
      revealed that Shanthi was not pregnant, the  doubt  harboured  in  the
      mind of the appellant would itself a  ground  for  torturing  Shanthi,
      which had driven her to commit suicide. Law is well  settled  that  in
      case the findings recorded by the Trial Court are perverse, the  order
      of acquittal can be interfered by the Appellate Court.   Thus, in view
      of the above, no interference is called for.  The appeal  lacks  merit
      and is accordingly dismissed.


      5.    We have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel
      for the parties and perused the record.


      6.    The case of the prosecution had been that Shanthi was treated in
      a hostile and cruel manner by the appellant who  asked  her  to  bring
      additional gold articles which drove her to commit  suicide.  She  had
      also been assaulted by the accused/appellant on  14.2.1994  suspecting
      that she had taken Rs.50/- from his pocket without  his  consent.  The
      undisputed facts remain that Shanthi was residing at  1  Km.  distance
      from her parents’ house and she had been  visiting  the  said   family
      quite often and died within a period of three months of  her  marriage
      as she suffered from 95% burn injuries.


      7.    Sundaresh (PW.1), father of the deceased deposed that about  one
      month earlier to her marriage, the marriage talks  were  held  at  the
      house of Jayasingh,  a  relative  of  the  appellant-accused  and  his
      parents had demanded 10 sovereign gold ornaments as  dowry.  He  could
      give only some lesser gold ornaments  then  what  had  been  demanded.
      That after one month of marriage, when Shanthi, deceased, had come  to
      his house and told him that she was beaten by her husband and asked to
      bring the balance 4 sovereign gold ornaments from her parents.


      8.    Manimaran (PW.2), brother of the deceased, deposed that about  6
      months prior to  the  marriage,  talks  were  held  at  the  house  of
      Jayasingh and his parents had demanded 10  sovereign  gold  ornaments.
      Gold necklace, jumuki, gold ring and silver leg chain  were  given  in
      the marriage alongwith other articles like wrist  watch,  clothes  and
      almirah etc.  About 15-20 days prior to the  death  of  Shanthi,  some
      neighbours had informed his family that there were always quarrels and
      galata between the appellant and his sister Shanthi  in  their  house.
      His other sister Sarasa,  who  had   visited  the  house  of  Shanthi-
      deceased,  told him that her husband was often  quarrelling  with  her
      saying that the dowry gold articles given at the time of marriage were
      not sufficient and the same were of less quantity.


      9.    Sakkubai (PW.6), mother of the deceased, deposed that talks  for
      marriage took place six months prior to the marriage at the  house  of
      Jayasingh and appellant’s parents and uncles had demanded 10 sovereign
      gold ornaments but they expressed  their  ability  to  give  only  7-8
      sovereign gold ornaments.   She  corroborated  the  version  of  other
      witnesses about the quarrels and  galata  between  the  appellant  and
      Shanthi, deceased. That after her marriage  Shanthi  did  not  have  a
      peaceful married life and it had been revealed by Shanthi  herself  to
      the witness that quarrels used to take place frequently between  them.
      Shanthi, deceased, had visited her parents’ house 7-8 times.


      10.   Hamsaveni (PW.5) deposed that talks for marriage took  place  at
      the house of Jayasingh about 1-1/2 months earlier to the marriage  but
      she did not depose about the demand of gold ornaments.


      11.    Bhuvaneshwari  (PW.7)  who  was  tenant  of  Sundaresh  (PW.1),
      deposed that when Shanthi visited her parents’ house, she had told her
      that quarrels and galata used to take place between  Shanthi  and  her
      husband as he had been demanding gold ring etc.


      12.   The aforesaid evidence reveals the following facts:
        I) The talk of marriage was held  at  the  house  of  Jayasingh,  a
           relative of the appellant/accused.
       II) The version of the aforesaid witnesses in respect  of  the  time
           when the talks took  place  varied  between  one  month  to  six
           months.
      III) The demand of 10 sovereign gold ornaments by the appellant  from
           the parents  of  deceased  Shanthi  had  been  revealed  in  the
           depositions of Sundaresh (PW.1), Manimaran (PW.2)  and  Sakkubai
           (PW.6).  The deposition of Hamsaveni (PW.5) in  regard  to  such
           demand is silent.
       IV) In respect of cruelty, Sundaresh (PW.1) deposed that he got this
           information from Shanthi, deceased  herself,  though,  Manimaran
           (PW.2) deposed that he came to know about  it  from  his  sister
           Sarasa.  Sakkubai (PW.6) and Bhuvaneshwari (PW.7)  deposed  that
           regarding the  demand  of  dowry  and  cruelty,  they  had  been
           informed by Shanthi, deceased.


      13.   The Trial Court appreciated the  aforesaid  evidence  and  found
      that the time with regard  to  the  negotiations  of  marriage  varied
      between one month and  six  months  prior  to  marriage.   There  were
      contradictions, in this respect in the statements of  witnesses.   The
      demand of quantity of gold varied  from  7-10  sovereign  as  per  the
      version given by the witnesses.  Sakkubai (PW.6) has also  deposed  in
      respect of the demand made by the  uncles  of  the  accused  and  such
      version has not been given by Sundaresh (PW.1) and  Manimaran  (PW.2).
      Different versions  had  been  given  in  respect  of  description  of
      articles of gold ornaments by Sundaresh (PW.1), Manimaran (PW.2)., and
      Sakkubai (PW.6), i.e., as to whether it was a necklace,  Jumuki,  ring
      or silver leg chain.  Sundaresh (PW.1) did not mention the fact  while
      lodging the FIR that negotiation of marriage took place at  the  house
      of Jayasingh but he had specifically mentioned therein that there  was
      a demand of 8 to 10 sovereign gold.
           In view of aforesaid findings,  the  trial  court  came  to  the
      conclusion  that  there  had  been  material  contradictions  in   the
      statements of the witnesses on material issues and therefore the  same
      could not be relied upon. Hence, the court accorded acquittal.

      14.   The High Court reversed the findings of fact observing that  the
      same  were  perverse  and  there  were  no   material   contradictions
      whatsoever  as the material aspects of the case had been whether there
      was a demand of gold articles at the time of negotiations of  marriage
      and whether subsequent to marriage  Shanthi  was  ill-treated  by  the
      appellant.
      15.    It  is  a  settled  legal  proposition  that   in   exceptional
      circumstances, the appellate court, for compelling reasons, should not
      hesitate to reverse a judgment of acquittal passed by the court below,
      if the findings so recorded  by  the  court  below  are  found  to  be
      perverse, i.e. if the conclusions arrived at by the  court  below  are
      contrary to the evidence on record, or if the court’s entire  approach
      with respect to dealing with the evidence  is  found  to  be  patently
      illegal, leading to the miscarriage of justice, or if its judgment  is
      unreasonable and is based on an erroneous understanding of the law and
      of the facts of the case. While doing so,  the  appellate  court  must
      bear in mind the presumption of innocence in favour  of  the  accused,
      and  also  that  an  acquittal  by  the  court  below  bolsters   such
      presumption of innocence.


      16.   The time when the talks of marriage  were  held  and  the  place
      where the negotiations took place are totally  irrelevant.   More  so,
      the marriage took  place  in  September  1994,  incident  occurred  on
      14.12.1994 and evidence of the witnesses was recorded in  August  1999
      i.e. after 5 years of the date of  marriage.   Thus,  it  may  not  be
      possible for the witnesses to remember dates etc. exactly  at  such  a
      belated stage. The quantity of gold demanded by the accused  side  may
      vary as per the versions of the prosecution witnesses but  the  demand
      was there which is the most material issue to be examined in the case.
       Further, it is also immaterial  as  to  whether  the  uncles  of  the
      accused also joined  negotiations in this regard as stated by Sakkubai
      (PW.6).  In the FIR, if the issue of demand had been mentioned. It may
      not be fatal if it had not been mentioned  therein  that  negotiations
      took place at the house of Jayasingh for the reason that the place  of
      negotiation is totally immaterial as it has no relevance to  determine
      the issue of demand. If the  description  of  ornaments  varied  to  a
      limited extent in  the  versions  of  the  prosecution  witnesses,  it
      remains of no consequence for the reason that people may not  remember
      exactly what had been given.


      17.   Similarly, in respect of the issue of cruelty, it could  not  be
      held to be any contradiction if Sundaresh (PW.1) and  Sakkubai  (PW.6)
      deposed that Shanthi, deceased herself told them and Manimaran  (PW.2)
      deposed that she was informed by his other sister  Sarasa.      We  do
      not see any contradiction, forget material contradictions on the basis
      of which the Trial Court had granted acquittal.


      18.   It is well settled legal proposition that while appreciating the
      evidence, the  court  has  to  take  into  consideration  
whether  the
      contradictions/omissions were of such magnitude so  as  to  materially
      affect   the    trial.    
Minor    contradictions,    inconsistencies,
      embellishments or improvements in relation to trivial  matters,  which
      do not effect the core of the case of the  prosecution,  must  not  be
      made a ground for rejection of evidence in  its  entirety.  
The  trial
      court, after going through the entire evidence available, must form an
      opinion about the credibility of  the  witnesses,  and  the  appellate
      court in the normal course  of  action,  would  not  be  justified  in
      reviewing the same, without providing justifiable  reasons  for  doing
      so. 
Where the  omission(s)  amount  to  a  contradiction,  creating  a
      serious doubt regarding the truthfulness of a witness, and  the  other
      witnesses also make material improvements before the court in order to
      make the evidence acceptable, it would not be safe to rely  upon  such
      evidence.  
The discrepancies in the evidence of eyewitnesses, if found
      not to be minor in nature,  may  be  a  ground  for  disbelieving  and
      discrediting their evidence.
 In such circumstances, the witnesses  may
      not inspire confidence and  if  their  evidence  is  found  to  be  in
      conflict and contradiction with other evidence  available  or  with  a
      statement that has already been recorded, then  in  such  a  case,  it
      cannot be held  that  the  prosecution  has  proved  its  case  beyond
      reasonable doubt.


      19.   The  defence  version  has  been  that  Shanthi,  deceased,  had
      developed illicit relations with one  Raju,  a  close  friend  of  her
      brother Manimaran (PW.2) and was pregnant at  the  time  of  marriage.
      The Trial Court accepted this version in spite of the  fact  that  the
      medical evidence was otherwise.
Dr. B.R.S. Kashyap  (PW.17)  mentioned
      in the post-mortem  report  (Ex.P-12)  that  the  uterus  was  intact.
      Subsequently, an explanation was specifically sought on 2.2.1995 as to
      whether Shanthi was pregnant at the time of death. Dr. Kashyap (PW.17)
      opined  that  she  was  not  pregnant  at  the  time  of   post-mortem
      examination.  Dr. Kashyap (PW.17) denied the suggestion  that  he  had
      issued report (Ex.P-14) in  collusion  with  the  complainant  to  the
      effect that she was not pregnant.


      20.   The Trial Court placed reliance on the medical history (Ex.P-10)
      mentioned in the Accident Register of the hospital that Shanthi had  3 months pregnancy.  
We have examined the original documents also, there
      is nothing on record to show as  at  whose  behest  remarks  had  been recorded therein.
           Thus, the finding of the Trial Court about pregnancy of  Shanthi
      recorded by the Trial Court is not worth acceptance.


      21.   In the instant case, we have explained hereinabove that none  of
      the contradictions found by the  trial  court  could  be  labelled  as
      major/material contradictions.  Therefore, the finding  of  the  trial
      court to the extent that there  was  material  contradiction,  is  not
      worth acceptance.


      22.   The appellant-accused denied all the questions put to him in his
      examination  under  Section  313  Cr.P.C.  and  did  not  furnish  any
      explanation whatsoever to any question.  He did not give  any  version
      about the incident, rather  pleaded  a  false  defence  that  Shanthi,
      deceased, had developed illicit relationship with Raju,  a  friend  of
      her brother Manimaran, (PW.2) and was  pregnant  before  marriage.
To
      question no. 32, as to whether he wanted to say  anything,  his  reply
      was only `No’.


      23.   It is obligatory on the part of the accused while being examined
      under Section 313 Cr.P.C., to furnish some explanation with respect to
      the incriminating circumstances associated with  him,  and  the  Court
      must take note of such explanation even in a  case  of  circumstantial
      evidence in order to decide whether or not the chain of  circumstances
      is  complete.   When  the  attention  of  the  accused  is  drawn   to
      circumstances that inculpate him in relation to the commission of  the
      crime, and he fails to offer an appropriate explanation,  or  gives  a
      false answer with respect to the same, the said act may be counted  as
      providing a missing link for completing the  chain  of  circumstances.
      (Vide: Munish Mabar v State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 912).


      24.   This Court in  Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, JT 2013 (8) SC
      181 held as under:
           “Undoubtedly, the prosecution  has  to  prove  its  case  beyond
           reasonable doubt. However, in certain circumstances, the accused
           has  to  furnish   some   explanation   to   the   incriminating
           circumstances, which has come in evidence, put to him.  A  false
           explanation may be counted  as  providing  a  missing  link  for
           completing       a        chain        of        circumstances”.
           (Emphasis added)




      25.   The prosecution successfully proved  its  case  and,  therefore,
      provisions of Section 113 of the Evidence Act 1872 come into play. The
      appellant/accused did not make any attempt, whatsoever, to  rebut  the
      said presumption contained therein. More so, Shanthi,  deceased,  died
      in the house of the appellant.  He did not disclose as  where  he  had
      been  at  the  time  of  incident.   In  such  a  fact-situation,  the
      provisions of Section 106 of Evidence Act may also be made  applicable
      as the appellant/accused had special knowledge regarding  such  facts,
      though he failed to furnish any  explanation  thus,  the  court  could
      draw an adverse inference against him.


      26.   In view of the above, the findings recorded by the  Trial  Court
      on each issue had  been  perverse  and  the  High  Court  has  rightly
      reversed the said findings.   The  conduct  of  the  appellant/accused
      during the trial also disentitled him of  any  indulgence  whatsoever.
      The appeal lacks merit, and is, accordingly dismissed.  The appellant-
      accused is on bail. His bail bonds stand cancelled. He must  surrender
      within a period of  four  weeks  from  today  failing  which  the  III
      Additional Sessions Judge, Bangalore City, CCH No.25 shall take him in
      custody to serve out the remaining sentence. A copy of  the  order  be
      sent to the learned Additional  Sessions  Judge  for  information  and
      compliance.
                                       ….………………..........J.            (DR.
                                       B.S. CHAUHAN)





      …...................................J.
                                                              (S.A. BOBDE)
      NEW DELHI;
      August 19, 2013

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