advocatemmmohan

My photo

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN -  Practicing both IN CIVIL, CRIMINAL AND FAMILY LAWS,Etc.,

WELCOME TO LEGAL WORLD

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - FOR KNOWLEDGE IN LAW & FOR LEGAL OPINIONS - SHARE THIS

Friday, August 30, 2013

LAND ACQUISITION ACT SEC. 11 A = if no Award is made within that 2 years period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse:=Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act reads as follows: “11-A. Period within which an Award shall be made. – (1) The Collector shall make an Award under section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no Award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse: Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the Award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement. Explanation - In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.” = the High Court has dismissed the Writ Appeal and the review petition filed by the appellant holding that the LAO/Collector, Land Acquisition having made the Award beyond the period of two years stipulated in Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, the acquisition proceedings initiated by the authorities have lapsed.= whether the doctrine of casus omissus could be invoked while interpreting Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act so as to provide for exclusion of time taken for service of copy of the order upon the Collector. Repelling the contention this Court said: “12. The court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislation must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. xxx xxx xxx 14. While interpreting a provision the court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary.” 22. There is in the case at hand no ambiguity nor do we see any apparent omission in Section 11-A to justify application of the doctrine of casus omissus and by that route re-write 11-A providing for exclusion of time taken for obtaining a copy of the order which exclusion is not currently provided by the said provision. The omission of a provision under Section 11-A analogous to the proviso under Section 28A is obviously not unintended or inadvertent which is the very essence of the doctrine of casus omissus.-The High Court was in the above circumstances perfectly justified in holding that the Award made by the Collector/Land Acquisition Officer was non est and that the acquisition proceedings had elapsed by reason of a breach of Section 11-A of the Act. We, however, make it clear that the declaration granted by the High Court and proceedings initiated by the Collector shall be deemed to have elapsed only qua the writ petitioners- respondents herein. With those observations, these appeals fail and are hereby dismissed but in the circumstances without any orders as to costs.

                         published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40703                 
     REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                     CIVIL APPEAL NOs.7212-7213  OF 2013
             (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos.29306-29307 of 2010)


Singareni Collieries Co. Ltd.                      …Appellant

      Versus

Vemuganti Ramakrishan Rao & Ors.        …Respondents



                               J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1.    Leave granted.



2.    These appeals arise out of a judgment and order  dated  7th  September
2006 passed by the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh  at  Hyderabad
in Writ Appeal No.936 of 2006 and an order dated 21st August 2009 passed  in
W.A.M.P. No.2901 of 2008 in W.A. No.936 of 2006 whereby
the High  Court  has
dismissed the Writ Appeal and the review petition  filed  by  the  appellant
holding that the LAO/Collector,  Land  Acquisition  having  made  the  Award
beyond the period of two years  stipulated  in  Section  11-A  of  the  Land
Acquisition Act, the acquisition proceedings initiated  by  the  authorities
have lapsed.

3.    The appellant happens to be  a  Government  company  engaged  in  coal
mining  operations  in  the  State  of  Andhra  Pradesh.   In  terms  of   a
notification dated 30th August, 1992 issued under Section 4(1) of  the  Land
Acquisition Act, a large extent of land measuring 35 acres and  09  gts.  in
Survey Nos.285, 287 and 288  situated in village Jallaram,  Kamanpur  Mandal
and Karimnagar Districts was notified for acquisition  for  the  benefit  of
the appellant-company. A final declaration in terms of Section  6  was  made
on 2nd March,  1994, the  validity  whereof  was  assailed  by  four  owners
(Pattadars), respondents in this appeal in Writ Petition No.27/483  of  1995
primarily on the ground that  the  declaration  under  Section  6  had  been
issued beyond the period  of  limitation  stipulated  for  the  purpose.  An
application for interim stay was also  moved  by  the  writ-petitioners,  in
which a Single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh granted an  interim
stay on 6th September, 1995. The writ petition was finally dismissed by  the
High Court by a judgment and order dated 20th July, 1999. Aggrieved  by  the
said order of dismissal the respondent filed Writ  Appeal  No.1228  of  1999
which too failed and was dismissed by the Division  Bench  on  13th  August,
1999.

4.    With the dismissal of the writ petition and the appeal arising out  of
the same, the  Collector  made  an  Award  under  Section  11  of  the  Land
Acquisition Act on 5th November, 1999. The appellant-company’s case is  that
all the owners, except the four respondents who had moved  the  High  Court,
sought a reference of the dispute  regarding  the  quantum  of  compensation
payable to them to the Civil Court in which Senior  Civil  Judge,  Manthani,
District Karimnagar, A.P. held the expropriated owners entitled  to  receive
compensation  @  Rs.60,000/-  per  acre  besides  enhanced  value   of   the
structure, wells and trees  standing  on  the  same.  The  appellant-company
claims to have deposited one third of the enhanced value of compensation  in
the appeal preferred by it against the Award made by the Civil  Court.   The
appeal is, according to the appellant, pending  for  disposal  by  the  High
Court.

5.    In the meantime respondents 1 to 4 in this appeal who  apparently  did
not  seek  any  reference  to  the  Civil  Court  for  enhancement  of   the
compensation filed Writ Petition No.22875 of 1999 challenging  the  validity
of the Award made by the LAO/Collector on  the  ground  that  the  same  was
beyond the period of two years stipulated under Section  11-A  of  the  Act.
That contention found favour with the  learned  Single  Judge  of  the  High
Court before whom the matter was argued.  The Single  Judge  held  that  the
Award having been passed beyond the period of  limitation  stipulated  under
Section 11-A of the Act, the land acquisition proceedings had lapsed.

6.    Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Single Judge,  the  appellant
filed Writ Appeal Nos.1315 of 2001 and  936  of  2006  before  the  Division
Bench of the High Court who affirmed the view taken by the Single Judge  and
dismissed the appeals by its order dated 7th September, 2006. The appellant-
company then appears to have filed review petition  No.2901  of  2008  which
too failed and was dismissed by the Division Bench by its order  dated  21st
August, 2009 as already indicated.  The present  appeals  call  in  question
the said two judgments and orders.

7.    We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length.
Section  11-A
of the Land Acquisition Act reads as follows:


           “11-A. Period within which an Award shall be  made.  –  
(1)  The
           Collector shall make an Award under section 11 within  a  period
           of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration
           and  if  no  Award  is  made  within  that  period,  the  entire
           proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse:


           Provided that in a case where  the  said  declaration  has  been
           published  before  the  commencement  of  the  Land  Acquisition
           (Amendment) Act, 1984, the Award shall be made within  a  period
           of two years from such commencement.


           Explanation - In computing the period of two years  referred  to
           in  this  section,  the  period  during  which  any  action   or
           proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said  declaration  is
           stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.”



8.    It is evident from the above that in order  to  be  valid,  the  Award
must be made within a period of two years from the date of  the  publication
of the declaration under Section 6  of  the  Act.  The  declaration  in  the
instant case was published on 2nd March, 1994 while the Award  was  made  on
5th November, 1999. The same  was,  therefore,  clearly  beyond  two  years’
period stipulated under the above provisions. Even so  the  Award  could  be
held to be valid if the same was within two years of the  declaration  after
excluding the period during which the High Court had stayed the  proceedings
in the writ petition filed by the respondent-landowners.   That  is  because
Explanation to Section 11-A (supra) permits exclusion of the  period  during
which the Court had stayed the acquisition proceedings for  the  purpose  of
reckoning the period of two years prescribed for making the  Award.  In  the
case at hand the interim order of stay was issued by the High Court  on  6th
December, 1995 which order was finally vacated on 28th July, 1999  with  the
dismissal of the  writ  petition.   This  means  that  the  restraint  order
remained in force for a period of 3 years,  7  months  and  22  days.   That
period shall have to be added to the period  of  two  years  prescribed  for
making  the  Award  in  the  light  of  Explanation  to  Section  11-A.  The
difficulty is that even if the said period is added to the time allowed  for
making an Award, the Award stands beyond the period  prescribed.  Confronted
with this proposition Mr. Altaf  Ahmad  argued  that  the  period  taken  to
obtain a copy of the order by which the High Court vacated the stay  earlier
granted by it ought also to be  excluded  from  consideration  and  when  so
excluded  the  Award  would  fall  within  the  outer  limit  of  two  years
stipulated under Section 11-A.  Reliance in support of that  submission  was
placed by Mr. Altaf Ahmad on the decision of this Court in  N.  Narasimhaiah
and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. Union of India  and  Ors.  (1996)  3
SCC 88. It was contended that although the said decision was reversed  by  a
Constitution Bench of this Court in Padma Sundara Rao  (dead)  and  Ors.  v.
State of T.N. and Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 533, the law declared by this Court  was
made applicable prospectively. This would, according  to  Mr.  Altaf  Ahmad,
imply that on the date the Award in question was made,  the  legal  position
stated in Narasimhaiah’s case (supra) would hold the field. It  would  also,
according to the learned counsel, mean that the time taken for  obtaining  a
copy of the order of the High Court would have to be excluded in  the  light
of the judgment in Narasimhaiah’s case (supra).

9.    On behalf of the respondents, on the contrary, learned counsel  placed
reliance upon a decision of this Court in R. Indira  Saratchandra  v.  State
of Tamil Nadu and Ors. (2011) 10 SCC 344 to contend that this  Court  having
noticed the previous decisions on  the  subject  had  clearly  repelled  the
contention that a stay order vacated  by  the  Court  should  all  the  same
remain operative till delivery or receipt of a copy of  such  order  by  the
Collector/LAO.  It  was  submitted   that   the   view   expressed   in   N.
Narasimhaiah’s case (supra) which was followed  in  State  of  Karnataka  v.
D.C. Nanjudaiah (1996) 10 SCC 619 having been overruled  by  this  Court  in
case of Padma Sundara Rao’s case, there was no question of placing  reliance
upon the ratio of the said two decisions. The  contrary  view  expressed  in
A.S. Naidu and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others  (2010)  2  SCC  801
having been found to be the correct  view,  not  only  by  the  Constitution
Bench  in  Padma  Sundara  Rao’s  case  (supra)  but  also  in   R.   Indira
Sartchandra’s case (supra), the ratio of the  said  decisions  alone  stated
the correct legal position, which was squarely applicable  to  the  case  at
hand.

10.   It is, in our opinion, not necessary to delve deep into the merits  of
the contention urged on behalf of the appellant which  is  founded  entirely
on the ratio of the  decision  of  this  Court  in  N.  Narasimhaiah’s  case
(supra).  Correctness of the view taken in N.  Narasimhaiah’s  case  (supra)
was examined by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Padma Sundara  Rao’s
case (supra) and overruled.   If  the  matter  rested  there,  we  may  have
examined the question whether the prospective overruling of the decision  in
N. Narasimhaiah’s case (supra) was of any assistance  to  the  appellant  in
the facts and circumstances of the case at hand.  That exercise is  rendered
unnecessary  by  the  decision  rendered  by  this  Court   in   R.   Indira
Sartchandra’s case (supra), which places the matter beyond the pale  of  any
further debate on the subject.  In  R.  Indira  Sartchandra’s  case  (supra)
also the Award made by the Collector was  sought  to  be  supported  on  the
ground that the period of two years prescribed under  Section  11-A  of  the
Act should be counted, not from the  date  of  the  Judgment  by  which  the
interim stay order was vacated but from the date on  which  a  copy  thereof
was supplied to the Collector. The High Court had accepted  that  contention
relying upon the decisions of this Court  in  N  Narasimhaiah  and  Ors.  v.
State of Karnataka and Ors. Union of India and Ors. (1996) 3 SCC  88;  State
of Tamil Nadu and Ors. v.  L.  N.  Krishnan  and  Ors.  1996  (1)  SCC  250;
Executive Engineer, Jal Nigam Central Stores Division, U.P. v. Suresha  Nand
Juyal alial Musa  Ram  (Deceased)  by  Lrs.  and  Ors.  1997  (9)  SCC  224;
Municipal  Corporation  of  Greater  Bombay   v.    Industrial   Development
Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Others 1996 (11) SCC  501;  Municipal  Council,
Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig and Ors. 2000 (2) SCC 48; Tej  Kaur  and  Ors.
v. State of Punjab 2003 (4) SCC 48.

11.   This Court, however,  reversed  the  view  taken  by  the  High  Court
holding that Section 11-A did not admit of an interpretation  by  which  the
period of two years would start running from the date a copy  of  the  order
vacating the stay granted by the Court is served upon the  Collector.   This
Court observed:


           “10. There is nothing in Section  11-A  from  which  it  can  be
           inferred that  the  stay  order  passed  by  the  court  remains
           operative till the delivery of copy of  the  order.  Ordinarily,
           the rules framed by the High Court do not provide for supply  of
           copy of the judgment or order to the parties free of  cost.  The
           parties to the litigation can apply for certified copy which  is
           required  to  be  supplied  on  fulfillment  of  the  conditions
           specified in the relevant rules. However,  no  period  has  been
           prescribed for making of an application for  certified  copy  of
           the judgment or order or preparation and  delivery  thereof.  Of
           course, once an application is made within the prescribed period
           of limitation, the time spent in the preparation and  supply  of
           the copy is excluded  in  computing  the  period  of  limitation
           prescribed for filing an appeal or revision.”




12.   The above, in our opinion, is a  complete  answer  to  the  contention
urged on behalf of the appellant that not only the period during  which  the
interim order of  stay  remains  in  force  but  also  the  time  taken  for
obtaining the copy of the order vacating the stay  should  be  excluded  for
reckoning the period of two years stipulated under Section 11-A of the Act.

13.   There is yet another dimension  to  the  contention  urged  before  us
which too in our opinion stands concluded by the decision of this  Court  in
Ravi Khullar and Another v. Union of India & Ors. (2007) 5  SCC  231.   That
was a case where a preliminary notification under Section 4  was  issued  on
23rd January, 1965 and a declaration  under  Section  6  published  on  26th
December, 1968 i.e. before the commencement of the Amendment  Act  of  1984.
In  terms  of  sub-section  (1)  of  Section  11-A  applicable  to  such   a
declaration, an Award was required to be made within a period of  two  years
from such commencement. So calculated, the Award ought to have been made  on
or before 28th September, 1986  when  the  period  of  two  years  from  the
commencement of the Amendment Act of 1984 expired.  The land  owner  however
had filed a writ petition before the High Court on 12th September,  1986  in
which an order for maintenance of status quo was  made  on  18th  September,
1986 restraining the Land Acquisition Officer  from  announcing  the  Award.
That order continued to remain in force till 13th February, 2003.  The  High
court, eventually, dismissed the writ petition on 13th  February,  2003.  An
application was made for obtaining a certified copy of  the  judgment  which
was ready only on 27th February, 2003.  The Award  was  then  pronounced  on
1st March, 2003 after excluding the period during  which  the  interim  stay
order was operative.  The Award should have been  pronounced  on  or  before
18th February, 2003. Having been pronounced on 1st March,  2003,  the  Award
was made beyond the period prescribed under  Section  11-A.  The  contention
urged  on  behalf  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Officer  was  that  a  public
functionary had to look into the contents of the order passed by  the  Court
before taking any action, including the  pronouncement  of  the  Award  and,
therefore, the time taken between 14th February,  2003  and  27th  February,
2003 must also be excluded which meant that the Award could have  been  made
up to any date till 4th March, 2003. Support was drawn for that  proposition
from the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act which  according  to
the Land Acquisition Officer ought to have applied for computing the  period
of limitation under Section 11-A of the  Land  Acquisition  Act.   Rejecting
that contention, this Court observed:

           “54. ……The Land Acquisition Collector in making  an  Award  does
           not act as a court within the meaning of the Limitation Act.  It
           is also clear from the provisions of the  Land  Acquisition  Act
           that the provisions of the Limitation Act  have  not  been  made
           applicable to proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act in  the
           matter of making  an  Award  under  Section  11-A  of  the  Act.
           However, Section 11-A of  the  Act  does  provide  a  period  of
           limitation within which the Collector shall make his Award.  The
           Explanation thereto also provides for exclusion  of  the  period
           during which any action or proceeding to be taken  in  pursuance
           of the declaration is stayed by an order of a court. Such  being
           the provision, there is no scope for importing into Section 11-A
           of the Land Acquisition Act the provisions of Section 12 of  the
           Limitation Act. The application of Section 12 of the  Limitation
           Act is also confined to matters  enumerated  therein.  The  time
           taken for obtaining a certified copy of the judgment is excluded
           because  a  certified  copy  is  required  to  be  filed   while
           preferring  an  appeal/revision/review,  etc.  challenging   the
           impugned order. Thus a court  is  not  permitted  to  read  into
           Section 11-A of the Act a provision for exclusion of time  taken
           to obtain a certified copy of the judgment and order. The  Court
           has,  therefore,  no  option  but  to  compute  the  period   of
           limitation for making an Award in accordance with the provisions
           of Section 11-A of the Act after excluding such period as can be
           excluded under the Explanation to Section 11-A of the Act.”




14.   This Court drew a comparison between Section 11-A and Section 28-A  of
the Act, and based on the difference between the two provisions, observed:


           “56. It will thus be  seen  that  the  legislature  wherever  it
           considered necessary incorporated  by  express  words  the  rule
           incorporated in Section 12 of the Limitation Act. It has done so
           expressly in Section 28-A of the Act while  it  has  consciously
           not incorporated this rule in Section 11-A even while  providing
           for exclusion of time under the Explanation. The  intendment  of
           the legislature is therefore unambiguous and does not permit the
           court to read words into Section 11-A of the Act so as to enable
           it to read Section 12 of the Limitation Act into Section 11-A of
           the Land Acquisition Act.”



15.   We are in respectful agreement  with  the  above  line  of  reasoning.
Section 11-A in terms does not provide for exclusion of the  time  taken  to
obtain a certified copy of the Judgment or order by  which  the  stay  order
was either granted or vacated.  Section 12 of  the  Limitation  Act  has  no
application to the making of an Award under the  Land  Acquisition  Act.  In
the absence of any enabling provision either in Section  11-A  of  the  Land
Acquisition Act or in the Limitation Act, there is  no  room  for  borrowing
the principles underlying Section 12 of the  Limitation  Act  for  computing
the period or determining the validity of an Award by reference  to  Section
11-A of the Land Acquisition Act.


16.   Mr. Altaf Ahmad made a feeble attempt to  argue  that  omission  of  a
specific provision in Section 11-A excluding the time taken in  obtaining  a
copy of the order passed by the Court was casus omissus and that this  Court
could while interpreting the said provision supply the  unintended  omission
of the Parliament. There is, in our view, no merit in  that  contention.  We
say so for more than one  reasons.   Firstly,  because  while  applying  the
doctrine of casus omissus the Court has to look at the entire enactment  and
the scheme  underlying  the  same.  In  the  case  at  hand,  we  find  that
Parliament has, wherever it intended, specifically  provided  for  exclusion
of time requisite for obtaining a copy of the  order.  For  instance,  under
Section  28A  which  provides  for  re-determination  of   the   amount   of
compensation on the basis of the Award of the Court, the aggrieved party  is
entitled to move a written application to the Collector within three  months
from the date of the Award of the Court or the Collector  requiring  him  to
determine the amount of compensation payable to him  on  the  basis  of  the
amount Awarded by the Court. Proviso to Section  28A  specifically  excludes
the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the  Award  while  computing  the
period of three months within which the application shall  be  made  to  the
Collector.  It reads:

           “28A. Re- determination of the amount  of  compensation  on  the
           basis of the Award of the Court.- (1) Where in  an  Award  under
           this part, the court allows  to  the  applicant  any  amount  of
           compensation in excess of the amount Awarded  by  the  collector
           under section 11, the persons interested in all the  other  land
           covered by the same notification under  section  4,  sub-section
           (1) and who are also aggrieved by the  Award  of  the  Collector
           may, notwithstanding that they had not made  an  application  to
           the Collector under section 18, by written  application  to  the
           Collector within three months from the date of the Award of  the
           Court require that the amount of compensation  payable  to  them
           may be re- determined on the basis of the amount of compensation
           Awarded by the Court:

                 Provided that in  computing  the  period  of  three  months
           within which an application to the Collector shall be made under
           this sub- section, the day on which the Award was pronounced and
           the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the  Award  shall  be
           excluded.”

                                           (emphasis supplied)

                 xxx              xxx              xxx




17.   Absence of a provision analogous to proviso to Section 28A (supra)  in
the scheme of Section 11-A militates against the argument that the  omission
of such a provision in Section 11-A is unintended which  could  be  supplied
by the Court taking resort to the doctrine of casus omissus.

18.   Secondly, because the legal position regarding  applicability  of  the
doctrine of casus omissus is settled by a long line  of  decisions  of  this
Court as well as Courts in England.  Lord Diplock  in  Wentworth  Securities
v. Jones (1980)  AC  1974,  revived  the  doctrine  which  was  under  major
criticism, by formulating three conditions  for  its  exercise  namely,  (1)
What is the intended purpose of the statute or provision  in  question;  (2)
Whether it was by inadvertence that the draftsman  and  the  Parliament  had
failed to give effect to that purpose in the provision in question; and  (3)
What would be the substance of the provision that the Parliament would  have
made, although not necessarily the precise words that the  Parliament  would
have used, had the error in the Bill been noticed. The House of Lords  while
approving the above conditions in Inco Europe v. First  Choice  Distribution
(2000) 1 All ER 109, went further to say that there are  certain  exceptions
to the rule inasmuch the power will not be exercised when the alteration  is
far-reaching  or  when  the  legislation   in   question   requires   strict
construction as a matter of law.

19.   The legal position prevalent in this country  is  not  much  different
from the law as stated in England. This Court has in several decisions  held
that casus omissus cannot be supplied except in the case of clear  necessity
and when reason for it is found within  the  four  corners  of  the  statute
itself.  The doctrine was first discussed by  Justice  V.D.  Tulzapurkar  in
the case of Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central  Calcutta  v.  National  Taj
Tradus (1980) 1 SCC 370. Interpretative assistance was taken by  this  Court
from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn.) pg. 33 and  47.   The
Court said:

           “10.  Two  principles  of  construction-one  relating  to  casus
           omissus and the other in regard to  reading  the  statute  as  a
           whole-appear to be well settled. In regard  to  the  former  the
           following statement of law appears in Maxwell on  Interpretation
           of Statutes (12th Edn.) at page 33:


           Omissions not to be inferred-"It is a corollary to  the  general
           rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added  to  or
           taken from a  statute  unless  there  are  adequate  grounds  to
           justify the inference that the  legislature  intended  something
           which it omitted to express. Lord Mersey said: 'It is  a  strong
           thing to read into an Act of  Parliament  words  which  are  not
           there, and in the absence of clear necessity it is a wrong thing
           to do.' 'We are not entitled,' said  Lords  Loreburn  L.C.,  'to
           read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for  it
           is to be found within the four corners of  the  Act  itself.'  A
           case not provided for in a statute  is  not  to  be  dealt  with
           merely because there seems no good reason  why  it  should  have
           been omitted, and the  omission  in  consequence  to  have  been
           unintentional.


           In regard to the latter principle the following statement of law
           appears in Maxwell at page 47:


           A statute is to be read as a whole-"It was resolved in the  case
           of Lincoln College (1595) 3 Co. Rep. 58 that the good  expositor
           of an Act of Parliament should 'make  construction  on  all  the
           parts together, and not of  one  part  only  by  itself.'  Every
           clause of a statute is to 'be construed with  reference  to  the
           context and other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible,
           to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute.' (Per  Lord
           Davey in Canada Sugar Refining Co., Ltd. v. R: 1898 AC 735)


           In other words, under the first principle a casus omissus cannot
           be supplied by the Court except in the case of  clear  necessity
           and when reason for it found in the four corners of the  statute
           itself but at the same  time  a  casus  omissus  should  not  be
           readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute
           or section must be construed together  and  every  clause  of  a
           section should be construed with reference to  the  context  and
           other clauses thereof so that the construction to be  put  on  a
           particular provision makes a consistent enactment of  the  whole
           statute. This would be more so  if  literal  construction  of  a
           particular  clause  leads  to  manifestly  absurd  or  anomalous
           results which could not have been intended by  the  Legislature.
           "An  intention  to  produce  an,  unreasonable   result",   said
           Danckwerts L.J. in Artemiou v. Procopiou [1966] 1 Q.B.  878  "is
           not  to  be  imputed  to  a  statute  if  there  is  some  other
           construction available." Where to apply  words  literally  would
           "defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and  produce  a
           wholly unreasonable result" we must "do  some  violence  to  the
           words" and so achieve  that  obvious  intention  and  produce  a
           rational construction, (Per Lord Reid in Luke v. I.R.C.-1968  AC
           557 where at p. 577  he  also  observed:  "this  is  not  a  new
           problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it  rarely
           emerges. In the light  of  these  principles  we  will  have  to
           construe Sub-section (2)(b) with reference to  the  context  and
           other clauses of Section 33B.”



20.   Arijit Pasayat, J. has verbatim relied upon the above in  Padmasundara
Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu 2 (2002) 3 SCC 533, Union of India v.  Dharmendra
Textile Processors (2008) 13 SCC 369, Nagar  Palika  Nigam  v.  Krishi  Upaj
Mandi Samiti & Ors. (2008) 12 SCC 364, Sangeeta  Singh  v.  Union  of  India
(2005) 7 SCC 484, State of Kerala & Anr. v. P.V.  Neelakandan  Nair  &  Ors.
(2005) 5 SCC 561, UOI v. Priyankan Sharan and Anr. (2008) 9 SCC 15,  Maulavi
Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat (2004)  CriLJ  3860,  Unique
Butyle Tube Industries Pvt. Ltd. v.  U.P.  Financial  Corporation  and  Ors.
(2003) 2 SCC 455, UOI v. Rajiv Kumar with UOI v. Bani Singh (2003) SCC  (LS)
928, Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society,  Nagpur  v.  Swaraj  Developers  and
Ors. (2003) 6 SCC 659, Prakash Nath  Khanna  and  Anr.  v.  Commissioner  of
Income Tax and Anr. (2004) 9 SCC 686, State of Jharkhand &  Anr.  v.  Govind
Singh (2005) 10 SCC 437, Trutuf Safety Glass Industries v.  Commissioner  of
Sales Tax, U.P. (2007) 7 SCC 242.

21.   In Padma  Sundara  Rao’s  (supra)  this  Court  examined  whether  the
doctrine of casus omissus could be invoked while  interpreting Section  6(1)
of the Land Acquisition Act so as to provide for  exclusion  of  time  taken
for service  of  copy  of  the  order  upon  the  Collector.  Repelling  the
contention this Court said:




           “12.  The court cannot read anything into a statutory  provision
           which is plain and unambiguous.  A statute is an  edict  of  the
           legislature.   The  language  employed  in  a  statute  is   the
           determinative  factor  of  legislative  intent.  The  first  and
           primary rule of  construction  is  that  the  intention  of  the
           legislation must be found in the words used by  the  legislature
           itself.  The question is not what may be supposed and  has  been
           intended but what has been said.




                 xxx              xxx              xxx




           14.   While interpreting a provision the court  only  interprets
           the law and cannot legislate  it.  If  a  provision  of  law  is
           misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is  for
           the legislature  to  amend,  modify  or  repeal  it,  if  deemed
           necessary.”







22.   There is in the case at hand no ambiguity nor do we see  any  apparent
omission in Section 11-A to justify application of  the  doctrine  of  casus
omissus and by that route re-write 11-A  providing  for  exclusion  of  time
taken for obtaining a copy of the order which  exclusion  is  not  currently
provided by the said provision. 
The omission of a  provision  under  Section
11-A analogous to the proviso under Section 28A is obviously not  unintended
or inadvertent which is the very essence of the doctrine of  casus  omissus.
We, therefore, have no hesitation in rejecting the contention urged  by  Mr.
Altaf Ahmad.


23.   The High Court was in the above circumstances perfectly  justified  in
holding that the Award made by the Collector/Land  Acquisition  Officer  was non est and that the acquisition proceedings had  elapsed  by  reason  of  a breach of Section 11-A of the Act.  
We, however,  make  it  clear  that  the
declaration granted by the High  Court  and  proceedings  initiated  by  the
Collector shall be deemed to have elapsed only  qua  the  writ  petitioners-
respondents herein.  With those observations, these  appeals  fail  and  are
hereby dismissed but in the circumstances without any orders  as  to  costs.







                                                  ……………………………………….……….…..…J.
                           (T.S. THAKUR)





                                                  …………………………..…………………..…..J.
                           (VIKRAMAJIT SEN)
New Delhi
August 29, 2013

No comments:

Post a Comment

Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.