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Wednesday, August 28, 2013

No reduction of sentence =Rape is a non-compoundable offence and it is an offence against the society and is not a matter to be left for the parties to compromise and settle. Since the Court cannot always be assured that the consent given by the victim in compromising the case is a genuine consent, there is every chance that she might have been pressurized by the convicts or the trauma undergone by her all the years might have compelled her to opt for a compromise. In fact, accepting this proposition will put an additional burden on the victim. The accused may use all his influence to pressurize her for a compromise. So, in the interest of justice and to avoid unnecessary pressure/harassment to the victim, it would not be safe in considering the compromise arrived at between the parties in rape cases to be a ground for the Court to exercise the discretionary power under the proviso of Section 376(2) of IPC. 23) It is imperative to mention that the legislature through the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 has deleted this proviso in the wake of increasing crimes against women. Though, the said amendment will not come in the way of exercising discretion in this case, on perusal of the above legislative provision and catena of cases on the issue, we feel that the present case fails to fall within the ambit of exceptional case where the Court shall use its extraordinary discretion to reduce the period of sentence than the minimum prescribed.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40699


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                   1 CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1278-1279 OF 2013

            (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 1011-1012 of 2012)


Shimbhu and Anr.                             .... Appellant(s)

            Versus

State of Haryana                               .... Respondent(s)


                                      2



                               J U D G M E N T

P.Sathasivam,CJI.

1)    Leave granted.
2)    These appeals are directed against the final judgment and order  dated
22.02.2011 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at  Chandigarh  in
Criminal Appeal Nos. 577 and 479 of 1998 whereby the  High  Court  dismissed
the appeals filed by the appellants herein while  affirming  the  conviction
and sentence dated 30/31.03.1998 awarded by the Additional  Sessions  Judge,
Narnaul.
3)    Brief facts:
(a)   The case relates to the gang rape of  the  victim  in  village  Nangal
Durgu, Haryana.   Purushottam-her  grandfather,  had  a  shop  in  the  said
village.  Balu Ram (the appellant herein) also had a shop  adjacent  to  the
shop  of  Purushottam.  On  28.12.1995,  at  about  5.00  a.m.,   when   the
prosecutrix (PW-3) came out of her house  to  attend  the  call  of  nature,
Shimbhu (A-1) and Balu Ram (A-2)-the appellants herein, met  her  and  asked
her to accompany them to  their  shop.   When  she  tried  to  resist  their
attempt,  they  threatened  her  by  pointing  out   a   knife   with   dire
consequences.  They took her inside the shop of Balu  Ram  (A-2)  and  raped
her, turn by turn.  They kept her confined in the same shop  for  two  days,
i.e., 28.12.1995 and 29.12.1995 and committed rape upon her repeatedly.   It
was only on 29.12.1995, she was allowed to leave the  said  place  when  the
appellants-accused learnt that her family members  were  on  her  look  out.
When she reached her house, she narrated the entire incident to  her  family
members.
 (b)  On 30.12.1995, the prosecutrix, accompanied  by  her  father  –  Luxmi
Narain Sharma (PW-4), went  to  the  Police  Station  Nangal  Chaudhary  and
lodged a First Information Report  (FIR)  being  No.  195  dated  30.12.1995
under Sections 376(2)(g), 366, 342, 363, 506 read with  Section  34  of  the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short ‘IPC’).
(c)   After investigation, the case  was  committed  to  the  Court  of  the
Additional Sessions Judge, Narnaul which was numbered as Sessions  Case  No.
RT-9   of   28.08.1997/11.03.1996   and   Sessions   Trial    No.    4    of
28.08.1997/25.03.1996.  The Additional  Sessions  Judge,  vide  order  dated
30/31.03.1998, convicted and sentenced the appellants  to  undergo  rigorous
imprisonment (RI) for ten years along with a fine of Rs.  5,000/-  each,  in
default, to further undergo RI for six months  for  the  offence  punishable
under Section 376(2)(g) read with Section 34 of IPC.   The  appellants  were
also sentenced to undergo RI for three  years  along  with  a  fine  of  Rs.
1,000/- each, in default, to further undergo  RI  for  two  months  for  the
offence punishable under Section 366 read with  Section  34  of  IPC.   They
were further sentenced to undergo RI for three months along with a  fine  of
Rs. 200/- each, in default, to further undergo RI for fifteen days  for  the
offence punishable under Section 342 read with  Section  34  of  IPC.   They
were also sentenced to undergo RI for one year along  with  a  fine  of  Rs.
500/- each, in default, to further undergo RI for one month for the  offence
under Section 506 read with Section 34 of IPC.
(d)    Being  aggrieved  of  the  order  of  conviction  and  sentence,  the
appellants herein preferred Criminal Appeal Nos. 577 and 479 of 1998  before
the High Court.  The Division Bench of the High Court,  by  a  common  order
dated  22.02.2011,  dismissed  the  appeals  and  confirmed  the  order   of
conviction  and  sentence  dated  30/31.03.1998  passed  by  the  Additional
Sessions Judge, Narnaul.
(e)   Being aggrieved of the above, the  appellants  herein  have  preferred
these appeals by way of special leave before this Court.
4)    Heard Mr. Rishi Malhotra, learned counsel for  the  appellants-accused
herein and Mr. Brijender Chahar, learned senior counsel for the  respondent-
State.
5)    The only contention of Mr. Rishi Malhotra,  learned  counsel  is  with
regard to the settlement arrived at between the appellants-accused  and  the
victim dated 24.12.2011, in the form of an affidavit  by  the  victim  filed
before this Court, based on which he prayed for the  reduction  of  sentence
to the period already undergone.  On the other hand, Mr.  Brijender  Chahar,
learned senior counsel for the respondent – State vehemently contended  that
in view of the statutory provision, as it stood, in the absence of  adequate
and special reasons and  the  offence  being  a  gang  rape  having  minimum
sentence of ten years, the same cannot be  reduced  to  the  period  already
undergone merely because the victim has entered into a settlement  with  the
accused.  He also brought to our notice the Criminal  Law  (Amendment)  Act,
2013, which not only deleted the proviso which enables the court  to  reduce
the minimum sentence  by  giving  adequate  and  special  reasons  but  also
enhanced the minimum sentence to twenty years,  which  may  extend  to  life
which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder  of  that  person’s  natural
life and with fine.  He also pointed out  that  for  the  said  purpose  the
legislature has introduced new Section,  namely,  Section  376D  IPC,  which
came into effect from 03.02.2013.
6)    In the light of the limited relief prayed, there  is  no  need  to  go
into the aspects relating to conviction and sentence.  In other  words,  the
only question to be considered in these appeals is whether  the  appellants-
accused have made out a case for imposition of a lesser  sentence  than  ten
years?
7)    During the pendency  of  the  above  appeals,  the  appellants-accused
placed on record an affidavit dated 24.12.2011 signed  by  the  victim.   In
the said affidavit, the deponent had stated that she was the prosecutrix  in
the instant case which arose out of  FIR  No.  195  dated  30.12.1995  under
Sections 363, 366, 342, 376(2)(g), 506/34  IPC  registered  at  P.S.  Nangal
Chaudhary which is 16 years old where she was  a  consenting  party  to  the
alleged act.  She also stated that due to passage of time and the fact  that
the deponent has  settled/compromised  the  said  matter  with  the  accused
persons on account of they belonging to neighbouring  village  and  also  of
the fact that the deponent is married  since  January,  1999  and  has  four
children, she did not want the said case to be  pursued  any  further.   She
further stated that she is living happily with  her  husband  for  the  last
twelve years.  Finally, she stated that in view of  the  compromise  entered
into by her with the accused persons and  in  order  to  buy  peace  and  to
maintain dignity in her matrimonial  life,  she  has  no  objection  if  the
sentence of the appellants be reduced to the period already undergone.
8)    We carefully perused the contents of the said affidavit.  It  contains
two pages and the deponent has signed in Hindi, that too only  on  the  last
page.  Nothing was brought  to  the  notice  before  any  forum.   In  these
circumstances, let us consider the relevant provision, as it  stood  on  the
date of the incident, and various decisions of this Court.
Sentencing Policy under Section 376(2)(g) of IPC:

9)    The crucial stage  in  every  criminal  proceeding  is  the  stage  of
sentencing. It is the most complex  and  difficult  stage  in  the  judicial
process. The Indian legal system confers ample discretion on the  judges  to
levy the appropriate sentence. However, this discretion  is  not  unfettered
in nature rather various factors like the nature, gravity,  the  manner  and
the circumstances of the commission of the offence, the personality  of  the
accused,  character,  aggravating  as  well  as  mitigating   circumstances,
antecedents etc., cumulatively constitute as the yardsticks for  the  judges
to decide on the  sentence  to  be  imposed.  Indisputably,  the  sentencing
Courts shall consider all relevant facts and circumstances  bearing  on  the
question of sentence and impose  a  sentence  commensurate  with  the  crime
committed.

10)   Before we evaluate the case at hand in the light of above  established
principle that all punishments must be directly proportionate to  the  crime
committed, it is imperative to  comprehend  the  legislative  intent  behind
Section 376(2)(g) IPC which is as under:


      “376. Punishment for rape.—


      (1) Whoever, except in the cases provided for  by  sub-  section  (2),
      commits rape shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
      for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which  may  be
      for life or for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be
      liable to fine unless the woman raped is his own wife and is not under
      twelve years of  age,  in  which  case,  he  shall  be  punished  with
      imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to  two
      years or with fine or with both:






      Provided that the court may, for adequate and special  reasons  to  be
      mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence  of  imprisonment  for  a
      term of less than seven years.


      (2) Whoever,-


      (a) Being a police officer commits rape-


            (i) within the limits of the  police  station  to  which  he  is
      appointed; or


            (ii) in the  premises  of  any  station  house  whether  or  not
      situated in the police station to which he is appointed; or


            (iii) on a woman in his custody or in the custody  of  a  police
      officer subordinate to him; or


      (b) Being a public servant, takes advantage of his  official  position
      and commits rape on a woman in his custody as such public  servant  or
      in the custody of a public servant subordinate to him; or


      (c) Being on the management or on the staff of a jail, remand home  or
      other place of custody established by or under any law  for  the  time
      being in force  or  of  a  women's  or  children's  institution  takes
      advantage of his official position and commits rape on any  inmate  of
      such jail, remand home, place or institution; or


      (d) Being on the management or on  the  staff  of  a  hospital,  takes
      advantage of his official position and commits rape on a woman in that
      hospital; or


      (e) Commits rape on a woman knowing her to be pregnant; or


      (f) Commits rape on a woman when she is under twelve years of age; or


      (g) Commits gang rape, shall be punished  with  rigorous  imprisonment
      for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may be for
      life and shall also be liable to fine.


      Provided that the court may, for adequate and special  reasons  to  be
      mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment of either
      description for a term of less than ten years.”

11)   A perusal of the above provision shows that  the  legislative  mandate
is to impose a sentence, for the offence of gang rape,  for  a  term,  which
shall not be less than 10 years, but it may extend to life  and  shall  also
be liable to fine. The proviso to Section 376(2) IPC, of course,  lays  down
that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in  the
judgment, impose sentence of imprisonment of either description for  a  term
of less than 10 years. Thus, the normal sentence in a case where  gang  rape
is committed is not less than 10 years  though  in  exceptional  cases,  the
Court by giving “special and adequate reasons", can also award the  sentence
of less than 10 years.

12)   It is a fundamental rule  of  construction  that  a  proviso  must  be
considered in relation to the  main  provision  to  which  it  stands  as  a
proviso, particularly, in such penal provisions.  Whether  there  exist  any
"special and adequate reason" would depend upon a  variety  of  factors  and
the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. This  Court,  in  various
judgments, has reached the consensus that no hard and fast rule can be  laid
down in that behalf for universal application.

13)   It is on this proviso to the Section, the accused is relying upon  and
praying for a reduction of sentence of imprisonment for a term of less  than
10 years. Based on the  following  three  grounds,  the  accused  seeks  for
reduction of sentence than prescribed by the statute:

      Firstly, on the ground that a compromise has been arrived  at  between
      the parties;

      Secondly, that the occurrence of the incident dates back to 1995; and

      Lastly, that the victim is happily married and blessed with children.

14)   This Court, in a catena of cases, has  categorically  reiterated  that
none of the  grounds  raised  will  suffice  to  be  ‘special  and  adequate
reasons’ even if put together.

15)   In Kamal Kishore vs. State of H.P. (2000) 4  SCC  502,  a  three-Judge
Bench of this Court arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  the  fact  that  the
occurrence took place 10 years ago and the accused or the victim might  have
settled in life is no special reason for reducing the  statutory  prescribed
minimum sentence, stating:

      “22. The expression "adequate and special reasons" indicates  that  it
      is  not  enough  to  have  special  reasons,  nor   adequate   reasons
      disjunctively. There should be a conjunction of both for enabling  the
      court to invoke the discretion. Reasons which are general or common in
      many cases cannot be regarded as special reasons.  What  the  Division
      Bench of the High Court mentioned (i.e. occurrence took place 10 years
      ago and the accused might have settled in life) are not special to the
      accused in this case or to the situations in this case.  Such  reasons
      can be noticed in many other cases and hence they cannot  be  regarded
      as special reasons. No catalogue can be  prescribed  for  adequacy  of
      reasons nor instance can be cited regarding special reasons,  as  they
      may differ from case to case.


      23. As the reasons advanced by the Division Bench of  the  High  Court
      could not be supported as adequate and special reasons learned Counsel
      for the accused projected an alternative profile in order  to  support
      his contention  that  there  are  adequate  and  special  reasons.  He
      submitted the following: Shishna Devi (PW2) has since been married  to
      another person and she is now mother of children and  is  well-settled
      in life. The accused was aged 23 when the offence  was  committed  and
      now he is 34, but he remains unmarried. He says that on two  occasions
      his marriage had reached the stage of engagement but both  had  to  be
      dropped off before reaching the stage of marriage due  to  the  social
      stigma and disrepute which surrounded him. These are the reasons which
      he advanced for extending the benefit of the proviso.


      24. Those circumstances pleaded by him are  not  special  reasons  for
      tiding over the legislative mandate for imposing the minimum sentence.
      We, therefore, enhance the sentence for the offence under Section  376
      I.P.C. to imprisonment for 7 years.”

      Similar view was taken in the  State  of  A.P.  vs.  Polamala  Raju  @
Rajarao (2000) 7 SCC 75.
16)   In State of M.P. vs. Bala @ Balaram (2005) 8 SCC 1,  this  Court  held
that the long pendency of the criminal trial  or  offer  of  the  rapist  to
marry the victim are no relevant reasons for  exercising  the  discretionary
power under the proviso of Section 376(2) IPC.  This Court further  held  as
under:

      “11. The crime here is rape. It is a  particularly  heinous  crime,  a
      crime against society, a crime against human dignity, one that reduces
      a man to an animal. The penal statute has prescribed a maximum  and  a
      minimum punishment for an offence under Section  376  I.P.C.  To  view
      such an offence once it is proved, lightly, is itself  an  affront  to
      society. Though the award of maximum  punishment  may  depend  on  the
      circumstances of the  case,  the  award  of  the  minimum  punishment,
      generally, is imperative. The provisos to Section  376(1)  and  376(2)
      I.P.C. give the power to the court to award a sentence lesser than the
      minimum for adequate and special reasons. The power under the  proviso
      is not to be used indiscriminately or routinely.  It  is  to  be  used
      sparingly and only in cases  where  special  facts  and  circumstances
      justify a reduction. The reasons must be relevant to the  exercise  of
      such discretion vested in the court.  The  reasons  must  be  set  out
      clearly and cogently. The mere existence of  a  discretion  by  itself
      does not justify its exercise. The long pendency of the criminal trial
      or the offer of the rapist  to  marry  the  victim  are  not  relevant
      reasons. Nor is the age of the offender by itself an adequate reason.
      12.  The  punishments  prescribed  by  the  Penal  Code  reflect   the
      legislative recognition of  the  social  needs,  the  gravity  of  the
      concerned offence, its impact on the society and what the  legislature
      considers as a punishment suitable for the particular offence.  It  is
      necessary for the courts to imbibe  that  legislative  wisdom  and  to
      respect it.”

17)   In State of Karnataka vs. Krishnappa (2000) 4 SCC  75,  a  three-Judge
Bench of this Court held that the  socio-economic  status,  religion,  race,
caste  or  creed  of  the  accused  are  irrelevant  considerations  in  the
sentencing policy.  It was further held:

      “18. The High Court however, differed with the reasoning of the  Trial
      Court in the matter of sentence and as already  noticed,  the  reasons
      given by the High Court are wholly unsatisfactory and even irrelevant.
      We are at a loss to understand how the High Court considered that  the
      "discretion had not been properly exercised by the Trial Court". There
      is no warrant for such an observation. The High  Court  justified  the
      reduction of sentence on the ground that the  accused  respondent  was
      "unsophisticated and illiterate citizen belonging to a weaker  section
      of the society" that he was "a chronic addict  to  drinking"  and  had
      committed rape on the girl while in state of "intoxication"  and  that
      his family comprising of "an  old  mother,  wife  and  children"  were
      dependent upon him. These factors, in  our  opinion  did  not  justify
      recourse to the proviso to Section 376(2) IPC  to  impose  a  sentence
      less than the prescribed minimum. These reasons  are  neither  special
      nor adequate. The measure of punishment  in  a  case  of  rape  cannot
      depend upon the social status of the victim or the  accused.  It  must
      depend upon the conduct of the accused,  the  state  and  age  of  the
      sexually assaulted female and the gravity of the criminal act.  Crimes
      of violence upon women need to be severely dealt with.  Socio-economic
      status religion race caste or creed of the accused or the  victim  are
      irrelevant considerations in sentencing policy. Protection of  society
      and deterring the criminal is the avowed object of  law  and  that  is
      required to be achieved  by  imposing  an  appropriate  sentence.  The
      sentencing Courts are expected to  consider  all  relevant  facts  and
      circumstance bearing on the question of sentence and proceed to impose
      a sentence commensurate with the gravity of the offence.  Courts  must
      hear the loud cry for justice by  the  society  in  cases  of  heinous
      crimes of rape on innocent helpless girls of tender years as  in  this
      case, and respond by imposition of proper sentence. Public  abhorrence
      of the  crime  needs  reflection  through  imposition  of  appropriate
      sentence  by  the  Court.  There  are  no  extenuating  or  mitigating
      circumstances available on the record which may justify imposition  of
      any sentence less than the prescribed minimum to  the  respondent.  To
      show mercy in the case of such a heinous crime would  be  travesty  of
      justice and the plea for leniency is wholly misplaced. The High  Court
      in the facts and circumstances of  the  case,  was  not  justified  in
      interfering with the discretion exercised by the Trial Court  and  our
      answer to the question posed in the earlier part of the judgment is an
      emphatic - No.”

18)   Similar view point was largely  adopted  in  various  cases,  like  in
Bhupinder Sharma vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2003) 8 SCC  551;  State  of
M.P. vs. Balu (2005) 1 SCC 108;  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh  vs. Bablu  Natt
(2009) 2 SCC 272; and State of Rajasthan vs. Vinod Kumar (2012) 6 SCC 770.

19)   At this juncture, it is pertinent to refer two decisions on  the  very
same Section, i.e., Section  376  IPC  wherein  while  considering  peculiar
circumstances, this  Court  reduced  the  prescribed  minimum  sentence  and
confirmed the orders passed by the High Court.  In Baldev Singh  and  Others
vs. State of Punjab (2011)  13  SCC  705,  though  courts  below  awarded  a
sentence of ten years, taking note of the facts that the occurrence  was  14
years old,  the  appellants  therein  had  undergone  about  3  ½  years  of
imprisonment, the prosecutrix  and  the  appellants  married  (not  to  each
other)  and  entered  into  a  compromise,  this  Court,  while  considering
peculiar  circumstances,  reduced  the  sentence  to  the   period   already
undergone, but enhanced the fine from Rs. 1,000/- to Rs. 50,000/-.   In  the
light of series of decisions, taking contrary view, we hold  that  the  said
decision in Baldev Singh (supra) cannot be  cited  as  a  precedent  and  it
should be confined to that case.

20)   Similarly, in Mohd. Imran Khan vs. State  Government  (NCT  of  Delhi)
(2011) 10 SCC 192, this Court, after pointing out that  as  the  High  Court
itself has awarded the sentence lesser than the minimum prescribed  for  the
offence recording special reasons, viz., that the  prosecutrix  therein  had
willingly accompanied the appellants to Meerut and stayed with them  in  the
hotel; she was  more  than  15  years  of  age  when  she  eloped  with  the
appellants and the appellants were young boys held that  there  is  no  case
for further reduction of sentence and dismissed the  appeals  filed  by  the
appellants-accused.  Inasmuch as the prosecutrix herself had  consented  and
stayed along with the  appellants-accused  in  the  hotel,  the  High  Court
reduced the  sentence  to  five  years  which  was  less  than  the  minimum
prescribed for the offence which in  turn  affirmed  by  this  Court.   This
decision is also confined to the peculiar circumstances under the  important
aspect that the prosecutrix was a consenting party, hence, the same is  also
not applicable to the case on hand or any other case.

21)   Thus, the law on the issue  can  be  summarized  to  the  effect  that
punishment should always be proportionate/commensurate  to  the  gravity  of
offence. Religion, race, caste, economic or social status of the accused  or
victim or the long pendency of the criminal trial or offer of the rapist  to
marry the victim or the victim is married and  settled  in  life  cannot  be
construed as special factors for reducing the  sentence  prescribed  by  the
statute. The power under the proviso should not be used indiscriminately  in
a routine, casual and cavalier manner  for  the  reason  that  an  exception
clause requires strict interpretation.

22)   Further, a compromise entered  into  between  the  parties  cannot  be
construed as a leading factor  based  on  which  lesser  punishment  can  be
awarded. Rape is a non-compoundable offence and it  is  an  offence  against
the society and is not a matter to be left for  the  parties  to  compromise
and settle. Since the Court cannot always be assured that the consent  given
by the victim in compromising the case is a genuine consent, there is  every
chance that she might have been pressurized by the convicts  or  the  trauma
undergone by her all the years  might  have  compelled  her  to  opt  for  a
compromise. In fact, accepting  this  proposition  will  put  an  additional
burden on the victim. The accused may use all his  influence  to  pressurize
her for  a  compromise.  So,  in  the  interest  of  justice  and  to  avoid
unnecessary pressure/harassment to the victim,  it  would  not  be  safe  in
considering the compromise arrived at between the parties in rape  cases  to
be a ground for the Court to exercise  the  discretionary  power  under  the
proviso of Section 376(2) of IPC.

23)   It is imperative to mention that the legislature through the  Criminal
Law  (Amendment)  Act,  2013  has  deleted  this  proviso  in  the  wake  of
increasing crimes against women.  
Though, the said amendment will  not  come
in the way of exercising discretion in this case, on perusal  of  the  above
legislative provision and catena of cases on the issue,  we  feel  that  the
present case fails to fall within the ambit of exceptional  case  where  the
Court shall use  its  extraordinary  discretion  to  reduce  the  period  of
sentence than the minimum prescribed.

24)   This is yet another opportunity to inform the subordinate  Courts  and
the High Courts that despite stringent provisions  for  rape  under  Section
376 IPC, many Courts in the past have taken a  softer  view  while  awarding
sentence for such a heinous crime.  This Court has in the past noticed  that
few subordinate and High Courts have reduced the sentence of the accused  to
the period already undergone to suffice as the punishment, by taking aid  of
the  proviso  to  Section  376(2)  IPC.   The  above  trend  exhibits  stark
insensitivity to the need for proportionate punishments  to  be  imposed  in
such cases.

25)   In the light of  the  above  discussion,  we  reject  the  request  of
learned counsel for the appellants for reduction of sentence,  consequently,
the appeals fail and the same are dismissed.




                                                      ...…………….………………………CJI.

                             (P. SATHASIVAM)




                             .…....…………………………………J.

                             (RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI)



                             …....……………………………………J.

                             (RANJAN GOGOI)

NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 27, 2013.






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