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Friday, March 30, 2012

On a careful perusal of the aforesaid decision, it is plain and patent that the three-Judge Bench had dealt with the consideration of the terms of the decree and eventually, placing reliance on the decision in Jai Narain Ram Lundia (supra), expressed the view that no execution can be ordered unless the party seeking execution not only offered to perform his part but, also when objection was taken, satisfied the executing court that he was in a position to do so. Be it noted, in the case Jai Narain Ram Lundia (supra), this Court has adverted to the reciprocal application, their inter-linking and the indivisibility of the terms of the decree and opined that the executing court cannot go behind the decree and it cannot defeat the directions in the decree. In both the decisions, the issue pertained to the nature of order to be passed by the executing court or the type of direction to be issued by it. The ratio enunciated therein does not remotely deal with the filing of an execution petition in respect of a compromise decree prior to the expiry of the date as stipulated in the terms and conditions of the decree. Hence, we have no scintilla of doubt that the said authorities do not support the stand so vehemently put forth by Mr. Dubey, learned senior counsel for the first respondent. 19. In view of our aforesaid premised reasons, we arrive at the irresistible conclusion that the executing court did not commit any error by entertaining the execution petition. The learned Single Judge in civil revision has annulled the said order without any justification. While so doing, he had not dealt with other objections raised by the Judgment-debtor on the ground that they are raised for the first time. On a query being made, Mr Dwivedi, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, fairly stated that the said objections were raised in a different manner in the objection filed under Section 47 of the Code and the revisional court should have been well advised to deal with the same on merits. Regard being had to the aforesaid analysis, we set aside the order passed in civil revision and remit the matter to the High Court to deal with the objections on merits. As it is an old matter, we request the learned Chief Justice of the High Court of Allahabad to nominate a learned Judge to dispose of the civil revision within a period of six months. It is hereby made clear that the parties shall not seek unnecessary adjournment before the revisional court and should cooperate so that the revision shall be disposed of within the timeframe. 20. Consequently, the appeals are allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove leaving the parties to bear their respective costs. "However, the court shall not exercise its discretion in favour of decreeing a premature suit in the following cases: (i) when there is a mandatory bar created by a statute which disables the plaintiff from filing the suit on or before a particular date or the occurrence of a particular event; (ii) when the institution of the suit before the lapse of a particular time or occurrence of a particular event would have the effect of defeating a public policy or public purpose; (iii) if such premature institution renders the presentation itself patently void and the invalidity is incurable such as when it goes to the root of the court's jurisdiction; and (iv) where the lis is not confined to parties alone and affects and involves persons other than those arrayed as parties, such as in an election petition which affects and involves the entire constituency. (See Samar Singh v. Kedar Nath 13.) One more category of suits which may be added to the above, is: where leave of the court or some authority is mandatorily required to be obtained before the institution of the suit and was not so obtained." =The question of suit being premature does not go to the root of jurisdiction of the court; the court entertaining such a suit and passing decree therein is not acting without jurisdiction but it is in the judicial discretion of the court to grant decree or not. The court would examine whether any irreparable prejudice was caused to the defendant on account of the suit having been filed a little before the date on which the plaintiff's entitlement to relief became due and whether by granting the relief in such suit a manifest injustice would be caused to the defendant. Taking into consideration the explanation offered by the plaintiff for filing the suit before the date of maturity of cause of action, the court may deny the plaintiff his costs or may make such other order adjusting equities and satisfying the ends of justice as it may deem fit in its discretion. The conduct of the parties and unmerited advantage to the plaintiff or disadvantage amounting to prejudice to the defendant, if any, would be relevant factors."


                                                              Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                     CIVIL APPEAL No. 8297-8298 OF 2004



M/s. Pushpa Sahakari Avas Samiti Ltd.             ..... Appellant

                            Versus

M/s. Gangotri Sahakari Avas S. Ltd. & Ors.   ... Respondents







                            J U D G M E N T





Dipak  Misra, J.


      The  present  appeals  by  special  leave  are  directed  against  the
judgment and order dated 10.01.2002 and 07.03.2003  passed  by  the  learned
Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil  Revision
No. 341 of 1997 and Review  Application  No.  38861  of  2002  respectively.
The facts as uncurtained in the  two  appeals  are  that  the  appellant  as
plaintiff initiated a civil action forming subject matter of  suit  No.  501
of 1995 against the respondent and others  for  permanent  injunction.    In
the suit, the parties entered into a compromise and  on  the  basis  of  the
compromise, a decree was drawn up on 06.09.1996.  The terms  and  conditions
of the compromise were made  a  part  of  the  decree.   Be  it  noted,  the
compromise between the parties stipulated certain conditions  and  one  such
condition was that within a span of six months' time,  the  defendant  would
pay  a  certain  sum  to  the  plaintiff.   For  the  sake  of  clarity  and
convenience, the said clause of the compromise is reproduced hereunder:-

             "That the defendant No. 1 acknowledges and undertakes  to  pay
           Lacs Rs. 38,38000/- (Rupees Thirty Eight Lacs and  Thirty  Eight
           Thousand) only to the plaintiff within six months from the  date
           of this compromise.  The payment  of  the  said  amount  by  the
           defendant No. 1 to  the  plaintiff  shall  have  the  effect  of
           settling entire claim of the plaintiff as against the  defendant
           No. 1 in full and final"




 2.   In the petition for compromise which formed  a  part  of  the  decree,
there were other stipulations but they are not necessary  to be  stated  for
the adjudication of these appeals.   As  has  been  indicated  earlier,  the
decree was drawn up on 06.09.1996.

3.    As the first respondent did not honour the terms of  the  decree,  the
appellant filed an application for execution of  the  decree  on  17.02.1997
and the said application was registered as Misc. Case No. 9  of  1997.   The
respondent No. 1 entered contest and filed an objection under Section 47  of
the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, 'the Code') which was registered  as
Misc.  Case   No.  43  of  1997.   Allegations,  counter   allegations   and
rejoinders  were  put  forth  before  the  Executing  Court.    One  of  the
objections raised in the application under Section 47 of the Code  was  that
as the decree holder had moved  the executing court  for  execution  of  the
decree prior to the expiry of the six months' period,  the  application  was
premature and, therefore, entire execution  proceeding  was  vitiated  being
not maintainable.  The learned Civil Judge  who  dealt  with  the  execution
case did not find any merit in any of the  objections  raised  and  rejected
the same.  It is worth noting that by the time the matter was taken  up  and
the order came to be passed, the decree had  become  mature  for  execution.
After  rejection  of  the  objection,  the   executing   court   took   into
consideration  the  submission  of  the  judgment-debtor  and,  accordingly,
directed that the entire balance  money  as  agreed  to  in  the  compromise
should be paid to the decree holder.

4.    Aggrieved by the  aforesaid  order,  the  first  respondent  preferred
Civil Revision No. 341  of  1997.    The  learned  Single  Judge  noted  the
contentions  and  subsequent  orders  that  were  passed  in  the  execution
petition.  The revisional court opined that  no  other  objection  could  be
raised for the first  time  in  the  revision  and  hence,  no  finding  was
warranted to be recorded on the said score.

 5.    As  far  as  the  premature  filing  of  the  execution  petition  is
concerned, the learned Single Judge expressed his view as under:-

            "The question whether the execution was premature or not is  to
           be decided with regard to the date at which  the  execution  was
           filed.  If a suit is found to  have  been  filed  premature,  it
           cannot be decreed for the reason that  the  period  has  expired
           during the pendency of the suit.   Similar  principle  will  not
           apply to the execution.  If the execution was premature when  it
           was filed, it is liable to be rejected and cannot  be  proceeded
           with because it has prematured during the pendency of the case."



Being of this view, he allowed the revision and set aside the  order  passed
by the learned Civil Judge as a consequence  of  which  the  execution  case
entailed in dismissal.

6.    We have heard Mr. Dinesh  Dwivedi,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the
appellant, and Mr. S.  K.  Dubey,  learned  Senior  counsel  for  the  first
respondent.

7.      Criticizing  the  impugned  order  passed  in  Civil  Revision,  Mr.
Dwivedi,  learned  senior  counsel,  has  contended  that  when  a  suit  is
premature on the date of its institution and the Court can grant  relief  to
the plaintiff if no manifest injustice or prejudice is caused to  the  party
proceeded against, there is no reason or justification for not applying  the
said principle to an execution proceeding.  It is  urged  by  him  that  the
question of a  suit  being  premature  does  not  go  to  the  root  of  the
jurisdiction of the Court, but the Court  in  its  judicial  discretion  may
grant a decree or refuse to do so and, therefore, in the case at hand,  when
the executing court had proceeded after the expiry of the stipulated  period
in the decree, there was no warrant on the part of the revisional  court  to
interfere with the same, for the said order did  not  suffer  from  lack  of
appropriate exercise of jurisdiction or exercise of  jurisdiction  that  the
court did not possess.   It is canvassed by him that if the  petition  filed
under Section 47 of the Code is scrutinized, it  will  clearly  reveal  that
objections have been raised in a  routine  manner  to  delay  the  execution
proceeding and such dilatory tactics by a  judgment-debtor  should,  in  all
circumstances, be deprecated and decried.    In support of his  contentions,
he has placed reliance on Vithalbhai (P) Ltd. v. Union Bank of India[1].

8.    Mr. Dubey, learned  senior  counsel  for  the  first  respondent,  per
contra, contended that the executing court could not  have  entertained  the
application as it was filed prior to  the  expiration  of  the  period.   In
support of his stand, he has placed reliance on  Lal  Ram  v.  Hari  Ram[2].
The next submission of Mr. Dubey is that as the execution was  levied  in  a
premature manner before the expiry  of  the  period,  the  decree  lost  its
potentiality of executability.   Elaborating  the  said  submission,  it  is
canvassed that the compromise decree could not have been taken  up  for  the
purpose of execution and hence, the objection under Section 47 of  the  Code
should have been accepted by the executing court, but as  it  failed  to  do
so, the High  Court,  in  exercise  of  the  supervisory  jurisdiction,  has
rectified the jurisdictional error.

The learned senior counsel further urged that  when  the  compromise  decree
imposed mutual obligations on both sides some of which were conditional,  no
execution could be ordered unless  the  party  seeking  execution  not  only
offered to perform his part but also satisfied the executing court  that  he
was in a position to do so.    In essence, the proponement of Mr.  Dubey  is
that by levying the execution in a premature  manner,  the  stipulations  in
the  compromise  decree  have  been  totally   overlooked   and   the   real
construction of the terms of the decree have been given an indecent  burial.
   To bolster the said submissions, he has commended us to the decisions  in
Jai Narain Ram Lundia v. Kedar Nath Khetan[3] and Chen  Shen  Ling  v.  Nand
Kishore Jhajharia[4].

9.    At the very outset, it may be stated that it is an  admitted  position
that the execution  was  levied  prior  to  the  expiration  of  the  period
stipulated  in  the  decree.   The  executing  court,  as  is  evident,  has
addressed itself to all the objections that were raised in  the  application
and  rejected  the  same.   The  principal   objection   relating   to   the
maintainability of the proceeding on the foundation that it  was  instituted
prematurely did not find favour with it.    The  learned  Single  Judge  has
observed that if an execution is premature when it is filed,  it  is  liable
to be rejected.   Mr. Dwivedi has drawn an analogy between a premature  suit
and premature execution by  placing  heavy  reliance  on  the  authority  in
Vithalbhai (P) Ltd. (supra).   In Vithalbhai  (supra),  while  dealing  with
the premature filing of a suit, a  two-Judge  Bench  of  this  Court,  after
referring to a number of decisions of various High Courts  and  this  Court,
came to hold as follows:-


           "The question of suit being premature does not go to the root of
           jurisdiction of the court; the court entertaining  such  a  suit
           and passing decree therein is not  acting  without  jurisdiction
           but it is in the judicial  discretion  of  the  court  to  grant
           decree or not.  The court would examine whether any  irreparable
           prejudice was caused to the defendant on  account  of  the  suit
           having been  filed  a  little  before  the  date  on  which  the
           plaintiff's entitlement to relief  became  due  and  whether  by
           granting the relief in such suit a manifest injustice  would  be
           caused  to  the  defendant.   Taking  into   consideration   the
           explanation offered by the plaintiff for filing the suit  before
           the date of maturity of cause of action, the court may deny  the
           plaintiff his costs or  may  make  such  other  order  adjusting
           equities and satisfying the ends of justice as it may  deem  fit
           in its discretion.  The conduct of  the  parties  and  unmerited
           advantage  to  the  plaintiff  or  disadvantage   amounting   to
           prejudice to the defendant, if any, would be relevant factors."






            After so stating, the Bench ruled that the plea as  regards  the
      maintainability of the suit on  the  ground  of  its  being  premature
      should be promptly raised and it will be equally the responsibility of
      the Court to dispose of such a plea.  Thereafter, it was  observed  as
      follows:-

           "However, the court shall not exercise its discretion in  favour
           of decreeing a premature suit in the following cases:  (i)  when
           there is a mandatory bar created by a statute which disables the
           plaintiff from filing the suit on or before a particular date or
           the occurrence of a particular event;  (ii) when the institution
           of the suit before the lapse of a particular time or  occurrence
           of a particular event would  have  the  effect  of  defeating  a
           public  policy  or  public  purpose;  (iii)  if  such  premature
           institution renders the presentation itself  patently  void  and
           the invalidity is incurable such as when it goes to the root  of
           the court's jurisdiction; and (iv) where the lis is not confined
           to parties alone and affects and  involves  persons  other  than
           those arrayed as parties, such as in an election petition  which
           affects and involves the entire constituency.  (See Samar  Singh
           v. Kedar Nath 13.)  One more category  of  suits  which  may  be
           added to the above, is:   where  leave  of  the  court  or  some
           authority is mandatorily required  to  be  obtained  before  the
           institution of the suit and was not so obtained."

                                             [Emphasis Supplied]




10.   We have referred to the aforesaid dictum in extenso as  we  find  that
the Bench has given emphasis on various aspects, namely,  an  issue  getting
into the root of the jurisdiction of the Court; causing of  irreparable  and
manifest injustice;  adjustment  of  equities;  concept  of  statutory  bar;
presentation that invites a  void  action  and  anything  that  affects  the
rights of the other party; and obtaining of leave of the Court or  authority
where it is a mandatory requirement, etc.   On  a  perusal  of  the  various
provisions relating to execution as enshrined under Order XXI of  the  Code,
we do not find  anything  which  lays  down  that  premature  filing  of  an
execution would entail its rejection.   The principles that have  been  laid
down for filing of a premature suit, in our  considered  opinion,  do  throw
certain light while dealing with an application for execution that is  filed
prematurely and we are disposed  to  think  that  the  same  can  safely  be
applied to the case at hand.

11.   Presently, we shall advert to the submission of  Mr.  Dubey  that  the
executing court could not have entertained the application as it  was  filed
before the expiration of the period.  The learned senior counsel has  relied
on the decision rendered in Lala Ram (supra).  In the said  case,  an  order
of acquittal passed -by the learned Magistrate was assailed before the  High
Court by seeking  leave  under  Section  417(3)  of  the  Code  of  Criminal
Procedure, 1898 and the High Court granted leave as a consequence  of  which
the appeal came to be filed eventually.  The High Court accepted the  appeal
and convicted the accused.  It was contended  before  this  Court  that  the
appeal could not have been entertained by the High Court having  been  filed
beyond the expiry of sixty days in  view  of  the  language  employed  under
Section 417(4) of the Code.  Emphasis was  laid  on  the  term  "entertain".
Repelling the contention, this court held as follows: -


                  "The  learned  counsel  also  suggests  that   the   word
           "entertain" which occurs in Section 417 (4) means "to deal  with
           or hear" and in this connection he relies  on  the  judgment  of
           this Court in Lakshmi Rattan Engineering Works v. Asst.  Commr.,
           Sales Tax, (1968) 1 SCR 505 = (AIR 1968 SC 488).  It seems to us
           that in this context "entertain" means "file or received by  the
           Court" and it has no reference to  the  actual  hearing  of  the
           application for leave to appeal; otherwise the result  would  be
           that in many cases applications for leave  to  appeal  would  be
           barred because the applications have not been put up for hearing
           before the High Court within 60 days of the order of acquittal"

On a perusal of the aforesaid passage, it  is  vivid  that  the  three-Judge
Bench interpreted the terms 'were entertained' in  the   context  they  were
used under the old Code and did not accept the submission 'to deal  with  or
hear'.  Regard being had to the context, we have no  shadow  of  doubt  that
the said decision is distinguishable and not  applicable  to  the  obtaining
factual matrix.

12.   In this context, we may refer  with  profit  to  the  two-Judge  Bench
decision in Martin & Harris  Ltd.  v.  VIth   Additional  Distt.  Judge  and
others[5].  In the said  Case,  the  Court  was  interpreting  the  language
employed in the proviso  to  Section  21(1)  of  the  U.P.  Urban  Buildings
(Regulation  of  Letting,  Rent  and  Eviction)  Act,  1972.   The   proviso
stipulated that where the building was in occupation of a tenant before  its
purchase by the landlord, such purchase being made  after  the  commencement
of the Act, no application shall be entertained on the grounds mentioned  in
Clause (a) of the said Section unless three years' period had  lapsed  since
the date of  purchase.   A  contention  was  canvassed  that  filing  of  an
application before the expiry of the three years' period was barred  by  the
provision contained in the said proviso.   Repelling  the  said  submission,
the Bench opined thus: -




           "It must be kept in view that the proviso nowhere lays down that
           no application on the grounds mentioned in clause (a) of Section
           21(1) could be "instituted" within a period of three years  from
           the date of purchase.  On the contrary, the  proviso  lays  down
           that  such  application  on   the   said   grounds   cannot   be
           "entertained" by the authority before the expiry of that period.
            Consequently it is not  possible  to  agree  with  the  extreme
           contention canvassed by  the  learned  Senior  Counsel  for  the
           appellant that such an application could not have been filed  at
           all within the said period of three years."

After  so  stating,  the  Bench  distinguished  the  decision  rendered   in
Anandilal  Bhanwarlal  v.  Kasturi  Devi  Ganeriwala[6]  which  dealt   with
"institution" and eventually came to hold as follows: -

           "Thus the word "entertain" mentioned in  the  first  proviso  to
           Section 21(1) in connection with grounds mentioned in clause (a)
           would necessarily mean entertaining the ground for consideration
           for the purpose of adjudication on merits and not at  any  stage
           prior thereto  as  tried  to  be  submitted  by  learned  Senior
           Counsel, Shri Rao, for the appellant.  Neither at the  stage  at
           which the application is filed in the office  of  the  authority
           nor at the stage when  summons  is  issued  to  the  tenant  the
           question of entertaining  such  application  by  the  prescribed
           authority would arise for consideration.




13.  In this context, we may usefully refer to the  decision  in  Hindusthan
Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Punnu Sahu (Dead) Through Legal  Representatives[7].
 In the said case, this Court was interpreting Rule 90 of Order XXI  of  the
Code of Civil Procedure  as  amended  by  the  Allahabad  High  Court.   The
amended proviso to Rule 90  stipulated  the  circumstances  under  which  no
application to set aside the sale shall be entertained.   It  was  contended
before this Court that the  expression  "entertain"  found  in  the  proviso
referred to the initiation of the proceedings and not to the stage when  the
Court had taken up the application for consideration.  This  Court  referred
to the earlier decision in Lakshmiratan  Engineering  Works  Ltd.  v.  Asst.
Comm., Sales Tax, Kanpur[8]  and  opined  that  the  expression  "entertain"
conveys the meaning "adjudicate upon" or "proceed to consider on merits".

14.   In State of Haryana v. Maruti Udyog Ltd. and Others  [9],  this  Court
was dealing with Section 39 (5) of the Haryana General Sales Tax  Act,  1973
which stipulated that no appeal shall be  entertained  unless  it  is  filed
within sixty days from the date of  the   order  appealed  against  and  the
appellate authority was satisfied that the amount of tax  assessed  and  the
penalty and interest, if any, recoverable from the persons  had  been  paid.
The Bench interpreting the term "entertainment" of  the  appeal  ruled  that
when the first proviso to Section 39 (5) speaks  of  the  "entertainment  of
the  appeal",  it  means  that  the  appeal  will  not   be   admitted   for
consideration unless there is satisfactory proof available of the making  of
the deposit of admitted tax.

15.     In view of the aforesaid authorities in the  field,  the  submission
of Mr. Dubey that  the  executing  court  could  not  have  entertained  the
execution proceeding solely because it was instituted before the  expiry  of
the period stipulated in the compromised decree despite the factum  that  by
the time the Court adverted to the petition the said  period  was  over,  is
absolutely unacceptable.

16.   The next limb of proponement of Mr. Dubey is that the decree had  lost
its potentiality of executability having been filed on a premature date.  On
a first flush, the aforesaid submission looks  quite  attractive  but  on  a
deeper probe  and  keener  scrutiny,  it  melts  into  insignificance.    In
Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai  Prakash  University  and  Others[10],  while
dealing with the power of the executing court under Section 47 of  the  Code
of Civil Procedure, a two-Judge Bench has expressed thus:-


          "The  exercise  of  powers  under  Section  47  of  the  Code   is
          microscopic and lies in a very narrow inspection hole.  Thus it is
          plain that executing court can allow objection under Section 47 of
          the Code to the executability of the decree if it  is  found  that
          the same is void ab initio  and a nullity, apart from  the  ground
          that the decree is not  capable  of  execution  under  law  either
          because the same was passed in ignorance of such  a  provision  of
          law or the law was promulgated making a decree inexecutable  after
          its passing "

17.   Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid principle,  it  is  difficult  to
accept the stand that the decree had become inexecutable, and,  accordingly,
we repel the same.

18.   The learned senior counsel for the respondent has  further  propounded
that the executing court could not have passed any order on the  application
for  execution  as  it  was  filed  prior  to  the  expiry  of  the  period.
Pyramiding the said submission, it is urged by him that such  advertence  in
an execution proceeding frustrates the construction  of  the  terms  of  the
decree.  Mr.   Dubey has drawn immense inspiration from the verdict in  Chen
 Shen Ling (supra).   On a careful perusal of the aforesaid decision, it  is
  plain  and  patent  that  the  three-Judge  Bench  had  dealt   with   the
consideration of the terms of the decree and  eventually,  placing  reliance
on the decision in Jai Narain Ram Lundia (supra), expressed  the  view  that
no execution can be ordered unless the  party  seeking  execution  not  only
offered to perform his part but, also when objection  was  taken,  satisfied
the executing court that he was in a position to do so.   Be  it  noted,  in
the case Jai Narain Ram Lundia (supra),  this  Court  has  adverted  to  the
reciprocal application, their inter-linking and the  indivisibility  of  the
terms of the decree and opined that the executing  court  cannot  go  behind
the decree and it cannot defeat the directions in the decree.  In  both  the
decisions, the issue pertained to the nature of order to be  passed  by  the
executing court or the type of direction to be  issued  by  it.   The  ratio
enunciated therein does not remotely deal with the filing  of  an  execution
petition in respect of a compromise decree prior to the expiry of  the  date
as stipulated in the terms and conditions of the decree.  Hence, we have  no
scintilla of doubt that the said authorities do not  support  the  stand  so
vehemently put forth by Mr. Dubey, learned  senior  counsel  for  the  first
respondent.

19.    In  view  of  our  aforesaid  premised  reasons,  we  arrive  at  the
irresistible conclusion that the executing court did not  commit  any  error
by entertaining the execution petition.  The learned Single Judge  in  civil
revision has annulled the said order without any  justification.   While  so
doing, he had not dealt with other objections raised by the  Judgment-debtor
on the ground that they are raised for the first time.   On  a  query  being
made, Mr Dwivedi, learned senior counsel for the petitioner,  fairly  stated
that the said objections were raised in a different manner in the  objection
filed under Section 47 of the Code and  the  revisional  court  should  have
been well advised to deal with the same on merits.  Regard being had to  the
aforesaid analysis, we set aside the order  passed  in  civil  revision  and
remit the matter to the High Court  to deal with the objections  on  merits.
As it is an old matter, we request the learned Chief  Justice  of  the  High
Court of Allahabad to nominate a learned  Judge  to  dispose  of  the  civil
revision within a period of six months.  It is hereby made  clear  that  the
parties shall not seek unnecessary adjournment before the  revisional  court
and should cooperate so that the revision shall be disposed  of  within  the
timeframe.


20.    Consequently,  the  appeals  are  allowed  to  the  extent  indicated
hereinabove leaving the parties to bear their respective costs.

                                    ......................................J.
                                                       [Deepak Verma]



                                    ......................................J.
                                                 [Dipak Misra]

New Delhi;
March  30, 2012.






-----------------------
[1]

      [2]  (2005)  4 SCC 315



[3]

      [4]  AIR 1970 SC 1093



[5]

      [6]  AIR 1956 SC 359



[7]

      [8] AIR 1972 SC 726



[9]

      [10] (1998) 1 SCC 732



[11]

      [12] (1985) 1 SCC 442



[13]

      [14]  (1971) 3 SCC 124



[15]

      [16]  AIR 1968 SC 488



[17]

      [18]  (2000) 7 SCC 348



[19]

      [20]  (2001) 6 SCC 534





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