REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1266 OF 2011
[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.628 of 2008]
Senior Intelligence Officer ... Appellant
Versus
Jugal Kishore Samra ... Respondent
J U D G M E N T
AFTAB ALAM, J.
1. Leave granted
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court dated March 22, 2007 in Crl. R.C. No.300 of 2007 by
which the High Court dismissed the criminal revision filed by the appellant
and affirmed the order of the Metropolitan Sessions Judge dated December
15, 2006, directing that any interrogation of the respondent may be held only
in the presence of his advocate.
3. The facts and circumstances in which this appeal arises need to be
noticed first. On July 20, 2006, the officers of the Directorate of Revenue
Intelligence (for short "DRI") Hyderabad, raided the premises of M/s Hy-
Gro Chemicals Pharmatek Private Ltd. and found a shortage of 250kgs of
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Dextropropoxyphene Hydrochloride (DPP HCL). DPP HCL is a
manufactured narcotic drug as specified in Government of India's
notification S.O. 826(E), dated November 14, 1985, at Serial no.87.
4. C.K. Bishnoi (accused no.1) and P.V.Satyanarayana Raju (accused
no.2), the Managing Director and the Production Manager, respectively, of
M/s Hy-Gro Chemicals Pharmatek Private Ltd., admitted that the drug was
clandestinely cleared to M/s J. K. Pharma Agencies, New Delhi, of which
the respondent, Jugal Kishore Samra and his brother, Ramesh Kumar Samra
(accused no.3) happen to be the partners. On the next day, i.e., July 21,
2006, a search was carried out at the Cargo Complex of the Indira Gandhi
International Airport, New Delhi, and five drums containing DPP HCL were
discovered. On examination of the cargo it was found that the contraband
was manufactured by M/s Hy-Gro Chemicals Pharmatek Pvt. Ltd. and was
sent to M/s J.K. Pharma Agencies by wrongly declaring the consignment as
5-Amino Salicylic Acid. The Directorate of Revenue Intelligence registered
a case against C.K. Bishnoi, P.V.Satyanarayana Raju and Ramesh Kumar
Samra for the offences punishable under sections 21 and 29 of the Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short "NDPS Act").
5. While the statements of accused no.1 and accused no.2 had already
been recorded under section 67 of the NDPS Act, the DRI officials
summoned the respondent and his brother (accused no.3). According to the
respondent, on November 5, 2006, when he, accompanied by his brother and
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another person arrived at the DRI office in, Hyderabad, at 10:30pm, they
were tortured by the DRI Officials. Unable to withstand the torture, the
respondent suffered a heart attack and was moved to a hospital. The
respondent was discharged on November 7, 2006 and advised complete bed
rest for a month. But he went directly to the DRI Office to enquire about the
whereabouts of his brother. He was kept waiting for 2 days and was also
given threats of third degree methods. On November 9, 2006, en route to the
DRI Office, the respondent developed chest pain and was again hospitalized
till November 11, 2006.
6. In this background, the respondent filed an application for anticipatory
bail under section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which was
allowed by the Metropolitan Sessions Judge by order dated December 1,
2006, on the ground that the respondent was not shown as an accused in
the case and, therefore, the bar under section 37 of the NDPS Act did not
apply to him and further, the medical record filed by the respondent showed
that he had been suffering from heart disease and had already undergone
heart surgery on two occasions.
7. After the grant of anticipatory bail, the respondent filed another
application under section 438(2) of the Cr .P. C. for modification of the
order of anticipatory bail to the extent that the interrogation and examination
of the respondent be conducted in the presence of his advocate and a
cardiologist. The Metropolitan Sessions Judge, by order dated December 15,
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2006, partly allowed the application of the respondent after perusing the
medical record and holding that the presence of an advocate at the time of
interrogation of the respondent by the DRI officials is necessary to ensure
free and fair interrogation.
8. Aggrieved by the order of the Metropolitan Sessions Judge dated
December 1, 2006, the appellant moved the Andhra Pradesh High Court in
Crl. M.P. No.5772 of 2006 praying for cancellation of the anticipatory bail
granted to the respondent. The High Court found no merit in the petition and
dismissed it by order dated January 31, 2007.
9. Here it may be noted that on the same day, i.e. January 31, 2007,
another bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court allowed another petition
(Crl. M.P. No.5880 of 2006) filed by the appellant and cancelled the bail
granted to the respondent's brother, Ramesh Samra by the Metropolitan
Sessions Judge on December 19, 2006. Challenging the order of the High
Court, however, Ramesh Kumar Samra, came to this Court in SLP (Crl.)
No.1077/07. The special leave petition was allowed and by order dated
December 10, 2009 this Court set aside the order of the High Court. The bail
of Ramesh Kumar Samra too was, thus, restored.
10. Coming back to the case of the respondent, aggrieved by the order of
the Metropolitan Sessions Judge dated December 15, 2006 directing for the
respondent's interrogation to take place only in presence of his lawyer, the
appellant sought to challenge it in revision before the High Court in Crl. R.
5
C. No.300 of 2007. The High Court dismissed the revision petition by order
dated March 22, 2007, upholding the order of the Sessions Judge and
observing as follows:
"9. In the present case, on account of the apprehension of the
respondent, the lower court permitted the Advocate to be
present during the course of interrogation. But the Advocate
was directed not to interfere during the course of interrogation.
The purpose of the respondent requesting the presence of the
Advocate is only on account of the apprehension that the
Investigating Officers are likely to apply third degree methods
like physical assault, etc., therefore, the learned Sessions Judge
passed the impugned order.
10. It is an undisputed fact that application of third degree
method to the accused is prohibited and interrogation of the
accused is a right provided to the Investigating Officer to elicit
certain information regarding the commission of the offence.
Though the Advocate was permitted to be present during the
course of interrogation, he was prevented from interference
during the course of interrogation. When the police do not
resort to apply third degree methods, there cannot be any
problem for them to interrogate the respondent to elicit
necessary information relating to the above crime in the
presence of his Advocate.
11. After considering the above aspects, I am of the view that
the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge is in no way
affecting the right of the Investigating Officer to interrogate the
respondent in the presence of his Advocate, therefore, I do not
find any merit in this Revision Case."
11. Now, the matter has been brought to this Court by the appellant in
appeal by grant of leave. At the special leave petition stage, the Court had
made the direction that interrogation of the respondent can be carried out in
accordance with the direction of the High Court. We are, however, informed
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that the respondent has not been interrogated so far and the appellant is
awaiting the order of the Court on his appeal.
12. Mr. K. T. S. Tulsi, Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondent
stoutly defended the order passed by the Sessions judge and affirmed by the
High Court. He invoked the rights guaranteed under Articles 20(3), 22(1)
and 22(2) of the Constitution of India to justify the respondent's plea that his
interrogation can take place only in presence of his lawyer. In support of the
submission he placed great reliance on a decision by a bench of three judges
of this Court in Nandini Satpathy v. P. L. Dani, (1978) 2 SCC 424.
13. Nandini Satpathy, a former Chief Minister of the State of Orissa was
named as one of the accused in a case registered under sections 5 (2) read
with section 5 (1) (d) & (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and
under sections 161, 165 and 120B and 109 of the Penal Code on the
allegation of amassing assets disproportionate to her known and licit sources
of income. For interrogation in connection with that case she was sent a long
questionnaire along with summons to appear before the investigating officer
on the fixed date and time and to answer those questions. She did not appear
before the investigating officer as required by the summons where-upon the
investigating officer filed a complaint against her under section 179 of the
Penal Code. The Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the
offence and issued process against her. Questioning the order of the
magistrate as violative of her right to silence she challenged it first before
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the High Court of Orissa and on being unsuccessful there brought the matter
to this Court.
14. The decision of the Court in the case of Nandini Satpathi was
delivered by Justice Krishna Iyer and it is a fine example of his Lordship's
inimitable polemical style of writing. The boldness of Miranda v. Arizona,
(1966) 384 US 436 as an instance of judicial innovation and positivism was
still quite fresh and taking Miranda as a source of inspiration, Iyer J.,
pondered over issues of Judicial philosophy and speculated about the
frontiers to which he would have liked to expand the constitutional
guarantee under Article 20(3), maintaining, of course, the fine balance
between the rights of the individual and the social obligation "to discover
guilt, wherever hidden, and to fulfill the final tryst of the justice system with
the society.
15. At the beginning of the judgment in paragraph 10, the Court framed
10 issues that arose for consideration, three of which may have some
relevance for our present purpose and those are as follows:
"1. Is a person likely to be accused of crimes i.e. a suspect
accused, entitled to the sanctuary of silence as one 'accused of
any offence'? Is it sufficient that he is a potential-of course, not
distant-candidate for accusation by the police?
3. Does the constitutional shield of silence swing into action
only in court or can it barricade the 'accused' against
incriminating interrogation at the stages of police investigation?
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7. Does 'any person' in Section 161 Criminal Procedure Code
include an accused person or only a witness?"
16. At the end of a lengthy debate, the Court proceeded to answer the
issues in paragraph 57, which is reproduced below:
"57. We hold that Section 161 enables the police to examine the
accused during investigation. The prohibitive sweep of Article
20(3) goes back to the stage of police interrogation-not, as
contended, commencing in court only. In our judgment, the
provisions of Article 20(3) and Section 161(1) substantially
cover the same area, so far as police investigations are
concerned. The ban on self-accusation and the right to silence,
while one investigation or trial is under way, goes beyond that
case and protects the accused in regard to other offences
pending or imminent, which may deter him from voluntary
disclosure of criminatory matter. We are disposed to read
'compelled testimony' as evidence procured not merely by
physical threats or violence but by psychic torture, atmospheric
pressure, environmental coercion, tiring interrogative prolixity,
overbearing and intimidatory methods and the like-not legal
penalty for violation. So, the legal perils following upon refusal
to answer, or answer truthfully, cannot be regarded as
compulsion within the meaning of Article 20(3). The prospect
of prosecution may lead to legal tension in the exercise of a
constitutional right, but then, a stance of silence is running a
calculated risk. On the other hand, if there is any mode of
pressure, subtle or crude, mental or physical, direct or indirect,
but sufficiently substantial, applied by the policeman for
obtaining information from an accused strongly suggestive of
guilt, it becomes 'compelled testimony', violative of Article
20(3)."
17. It may be mentioned here that in holding, "the prohibitive sweep of
Article 20(3) goes back to the stage of police interrogation-not, as
contended, commencing in court only" the decision in Nandini Satpathy
apparently went against two earlier constitution bench decisions of this
9
Court in Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal, 1969 (2) SCR 461
and Illias v. Collector of Customs, Madras, 1969 (2) SCR 613.
18. In Nandini Satpathy, the Court proceeded further, and though the
issue neither arose in the facts of the case nor it was one of the issues framed
in paragraph 10 of the judgment, proceeded to dwell upon the need for the
presence of the advocate at the time of interrogation of a person in
connection with a case. In paragraphs 61-65 of the judgment, the Court
made the following observations:
"61. It may not be sufficient merely to state the rules of
jurisprudence in a branch like this. The man who has to work it
is the average police head constable in the Indian countryside.
The man who has to defend himself with the constitutional
shield is the little individual, by and large. The place where
these principles have to have play is the unpleasant police
station, unused to constitutional nuances and habituated to other
strategies. Naturally, practical points which lend themselves to
adoption without much sophistication must be indicated if this
judgment is to have full social relevance. In this perspective we
address ourselves to the further task of concretising guidelines.
62. Right at the beginning we must notice Article 22(1) of the
Constitution, which reads:
No person who is arrested shall be detained in
custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of
the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the
right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal
practitioner of his choice.
The right to consult an advocate of his choice shall not be
denied to any person who is arrested. This does not mean that
persons who are not under arrest or custody can be denied that
right. The spirit and sense of Article 22(1) is that it is
fundamental to the rule of law that the services of a lawyer shall
be available for consultation to any accused person under
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circumstances of near custodial interrogation. Moreover, the
observance of the right against self-incrimination is best
promoted by conceding to the accused the right to consult a-
legal practitioner of his choice.
63. Lawyer's presence is a constitutional claim in some
circumstances in our country also, and, in the context of Article
20(3), is an assurance of awareness and observance of the right
to silence. The Miranda decision has insisted that if an accused
person asks for lawyer's assistance, at the stage of interrogation,
it shall be granted before commencing or continuing with the
questioning. We think that Article 20(3) and Article 22(1) may,
in a way, be telescoped by making it prudent for the police to
permit the advocate of the accused, if there be one, to be
present at the time he is examined. Overreaching Article 20(3)
and Section 161(2) will be obviated by this requirement. We do
not lay down that the police must secure the services of a
lawyer. That will lead to `police-station-lawyer' system, an
abuse which breeds other vices. But all that we mean is that if
an accused person expresses the wish to have his lawyer by his
side when his examination goes on, this facility shall not be
denied, without being exposed to the serious reproof that
involuntary self-crimination secured in secrecy and by coercing
the will, was the project.
64. Not that a lawyer's presence is a panacea for all problems of
involuntary self-crimination, for he cannot supply answers or
whisper hints or otherwise interfere with the course of
questioning except to intercept where intimidatory tactics are
tried, caution his client where incrimination is attempted and
insist on questions and answers being noted where objections
are not otherwise fully appreciated. He cannot harangue the
police but may help his client and complain on his behalf,
although his very presence will ordinarily remove the implicit
menace of a police station.
65. We realize that the presence of a lawyer is asking for the
moon in many cases until a public defender system becomes
ubiquitous. The police need not wait for more than for a
reasonable while for an advocate's arrival. But they must
invariably warn -and record that fact- about the right to silence
against self-incrimination; and where the accused is literate take
his written acknowledgment."
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19. It is on these passages in Nandini Satpathy that Mr. Tulsi heavily
relies and which practically forms the sheet-anchor of his case.
20. The difficulty, however, is that Nandini Satpathy was not followed by
the Court in later decisions. In Poolpandi & Ors v. Superintendent, Central
Excise & Ors., (1992) 3 SCC 259, the question before a three judge bench of
this Court was directly whether a person called for interrogation is entitled to
the presence of his lawyer when he is questioned during the investigation
under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 and the Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act, 1973. On behalf of the persons summoned for interrogation,
strong reliance was placed on Nandini Satpathy. The Court rejected the
submission tersely observing in paragraph of 4 of the judgment as follows:
"4. Both Mr. Salve and Mr. Lalit strongly relied on the
observations in Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, (1978) 2 SCC
424. We are afraid, in view of two judgments of the
Constitution Bench of this Court in Ramesh Chandra Mehta v.
State of W.B., (1969) 2 SCR 461, and Illias v. Collector of
Customs, Madras, (1969) 2 SCR 613, the stand of the appellant
cannot be accepted. The learned counsel urged that since
Nandini Satpathy case was decided later, the observations
therein must be given effect to by this Court now. There is no
force in this argument."
21. Further, in paragraph 6 of the judgment, the Court referred to the
Constitution Bench decision in Ramesh Chandra Mehta and observed as
follows:
"6. Clause (3) of Article 20 declares that no person accused of
any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
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It does not refer to the hypothetical person who may in the
future be discovered to have been guilty of some offence. In
Ramesh Chandra Mehta case, the appellant was searched at the
Calcutta Airport and diamonds and jewelleries of substantial
value were found on his person as also currency notes in a
suitcase with him, and in pursuance to a statement made by him
more pearls and jewellery were recovered from different places.
He was charged with offences under the Sea Customs Act.
During the trial, reliance was placed on his confessional
statements made before the Customs authorities, which was
objected to on the ground that the same were inadmissible in
evidence inter alia in view of the provisions of Article 20(3).
While rejecting the objection, the Supreme Court held that in
order that the guarantee against testimonial compulsion
incorporated in Article 20(3) may be claimed by a person, it has
to be established that when he made the statement in question,
he was a person accused of an offence. Pointing out to the
similar provisions of the Sea Customs Act as in the present Act
and referring to the power of a Customs Officer, in an inquiry
in connection with the smuggling of goods, to summon any
person whose attendance he considers necessary to give
evidence or to produce a particular document the Supreme
Court observed thus: (pp.469-70)
"The expression `any person' includes a person
who is suspected or believed to be concerned in the
smuggling of goods. But a person arrested by a Customs
Officer because he is found in possession of smuggled
goods or on suspicion that he is concerned in smuggling
is not when called upon by the Customs Officer to make
a statement or to produce a document or thing, a person
accused of an offence within the meaning of Article
20(3) of the Constitution. The steps taken by the Customs
Officer are for the purpose of holding an enquiry under
the Sea Customs Act and for adjudging confiscation of
goods dutiable or prohibited and imposing penalties. The
Customs Officer does not at that stage accuse the person
suspected or infringing the provisions of the Sea Customs
Act with the commission of any offence. His primary
duty is to prevent smuggling and to recover duties of
Customs when collecting evidence in respect of
smuggling against a person suspected of infringing the
provisions of the Sea Customs Act, he is not accusing the
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person of any offence punishable at a trial before a
Magistrate."
The above conclusion was reached after consideration of
several relevant decisions and deep deliberation on the issue,
and cannot be ignored on the strength of certain observations in
the judgment by three learned Judges in Nandini Satpathy case
which is, as will be pointed out hereinafter, clearly
distinguishable."
22. An argument in support of the right of the persons called for
interrogation was advanced on the basis of Article 21 of the Constitution.
The Court rejected that submission also observing in paragraph 9 of the
judgment as follows:
"9. Mr. Salve has, next, contended that the appellant is within
his right to insist on the presence of his lawyer on the basis of
Article 21 of the Constitution. He has urged that by way of
ensuring protection to his life and liberty he is entitled to
demand that he shall not be asked any question in the absence
of his lawyer. The argument proceeds to suggest that although
strictly the questioning by the Revenue authorities does not
amount to custodial interrogation, it must be treated as near
custodial interrogation, and if the same is continued for a long
period it may amount to mental third degree. It was submitted
by both Mr. Salve and Mr. Lalit that the present issue should be
resolved only by applying the 'just, fair and reasonable test', and
Mr. Lalit further added that the point has to be decided in the
light of the facts and circumstances obtaining in a particular
case and a general rule should not be laid down one way or the
other. Mr. Salve urged that when a person is called by the
Customs authorities to their office or to any place away from
his house, and is subjected to intensive interrogation without
the presence of somebody who can aid and advise him, he is
bound to get upset, which by itself amounts to loss of liberty.
Reference was made by the learned counsel to the minority
view in Re Groban, 352 US 330, 1 L Ed 2d 376, declaring that
it violates the protection guaranteed by the Constitution for the
State to compel a person to appear alone before any law
14
enforcement officer and give testimony in secret against his
will."
23. Referring to the facts in Re Groban and the view taken in the minority
judgment in the case the decision in Poolpandi observed in paragraph 10 as
follows:
"10.....We do not share the apprehension as expressed above in
the minority judgment in connection with enquiry and
investigation under the Customs Act and other similar statutes
of our country. There is no question of whisking away the
persons concerned in these cases before us for secret
interrogation, and there is no reason for us to impute the motive
of preparing the groundwork of false cases for securing
conviction of innocent persons, to the officers of the state duly
engaged in performing their duty of prevention and detection of
economic crimes and recovering misappropriated money justly
belonging to the public. Reference was also made to the
observation in the judgment in Carlos Garza De Luna, Appt. v.
United States, American Law Reports 3d 969, setting out the
historical background of the right of silence of an accused in a
criminal case. Mr. Salve has relied upon the opinion of
Wisdom, Circuit Judge, that the history of development of the
right of silence is a history of accretions, not of an avulsion and
the line of growth in the course of time discloses the expanding
conception of the right than its restricted application. The Judge
was fair enough to discuss the other point of view espoused by
the great jurists of both sides of Atlantic before expressing his
opinion. In any event we are not concerned with the right of an
accused in a criminal case and the decision is, therefore, not
relevant at all. The facts as emerging from the judgment
indicate that narcotics were thrown from a car carrying the two
persons accused in the case. One of the accused persons
testified at the trial and his counsel in argument to the jury
made adverse comments on the failure of the other accused to
go to the witness box. The first accused was acquitted and the
second accused was convicted. The question of the right of
silence of the accused came up for consideration in this set up.
In the cases before us the persons concerned are not accused
and we do not find any justification for "expanding" the right
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reserved by the Constitution of India in favour of accused
persons to be enjoyed by others."
24. In the end, the Court allowed the appeal filed by the Revenue
authorities in the case in which the High Court had directed for interrogation
to take place in presence of the advocate and dismissed all the other appeals
in the batch on behalf of the individuals in whose cases the High Court had
declined to give any such direction.
25. It is seen above that the respondent applied for and got anticipatory
bail on the premise that he was not an accused in the case. There was no
change in his position or status since the grant of bail till he was summoned
to appear before the DRI officers. On the facts of the case, therefore, it is
futile to contend that the respondent is entitled, as of right, to the presence of
his lawyer at the time of his interrogation in connection with the case.
Moreover, the respondent's plea for the presence of his lawyer at the time of
his interrogation clearly appears to be in teeth of the decision in Poolpandi.
Nonetheless, Mr. Tulsi contended that the respondent's right was recognized
by this Court and preserved in Nandini Satpathy and the decision in
Poolpandi has no application to the present case. According to Mr. Tulsi, the
respondent is summoned for interrogation in connection with a case
registered under the NDPS Act, which Mr. Tulsi called a "regular criminal"
case, while Poolpandi was a case under the Customs Act and so were the
two cases before the constitution bench in Ramesh Chandra Mehta and in
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Illias that formed the basis of the decision in Poolpandi. In our view, the
distinction sought to be drawn by Mr. Tulsi is illusory and non-existent. The
decision in Poolpandi was in cases under the Customs Act, 1962 and the
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. Both these Acts have stringent
provisions regarding search, seizure and arrest and some of the offences
under each of these two Acts carry a punishment of imprisonment up to 7
years. We, therefore, fail to see, how a case registered under NDPS Act can
be said to be a "regular criminal" case and the cases under the Customs Act
and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, not as criminal cases.
26. In view of the clear and direct decision in Poolpandi, we find the
order of the High Court, affirming the direction given by the Sessions Judge
clearly unsustainable.
27. We may, however, at this stage refer to another decision of this Court
in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416. In this case, the
Court, extensively considered the issues of arrest or detention in the
backdrop of Articles 21, 22 and 32 of the Constitution and made a number
of directions to be followed as preventive measures in all cases of arrest or
detention till legal provisions are made in that behalf. The direction at serial
number 10 in paragraph 35 is as follows:
"(10). The arrestee may be permitted to meet his lawyer during
interrogation, though not throughout the interrogation."
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28. Strictly speaking the aforesaid direction does not apply to the case of
the respondent, because he being on bail cannot be described as an arrestee.
But, it is stated on behalf of the respondent that he suffers from heart disease
and on going to the DRI office, in pursuance to the summons issued by the
authorities, he had suffered a heart attack. It is also alleged that his brother
was subjected to torture and the respondent himself was threatened with
third degree methods. The medical condition of the respondent was accepted
by the Metropolitan Sessions Judge and that forms one of the grounds for
grant of anticipatory bail to him. Taking a cue, therefore, from the direction
made in DK Basu and having regard to the special facts and circumstances
of the case, we deem it appropriate to direct that the interrogation of the
respondent may be held within the sight of his advocate or any other person
duly authorized by him. The advocate or the person authorized by the
respondent may watch the proceedings from a distance or from beyond a
glass partition but he will not be within the hearing distance and it will not
be open to the respondent to have consultations with him in course of the
interrogation.
29. The order passed by the Metropolitan Sessions Judge and affirmed by
the High Court is substituted by the aforesaid directions made by us.
30. Before closing the record of the case, we may state that arguments
were advanced before us, when does a person called for interrogation in
connection with a case ceases to be a mere provider of relevant information
18
or a witness and becomes an accused entitled to the Constitutional
protections. Arguments were also addressed on Article 20(3), 22(1) and
22(2) and section 161 of the Cr.P.C. But, in the facts of the case we see no
reason to go into those questions and we are satisfied that the present case is
fully covered by the three judge bench decision of this Court in Poolpandi.
31. In the result, the orders passed by the High Court and the
Metropolitan Session Judge are set aside and the appeal is allowed to the
extent indicated above.
.........................................J
(AFTAB ALAM)
.........................................J
(R.M. LODHA)
New Delhi,
July 5, 2011.
