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Sunday, March 6, 2016

Section 300. The expression “bodily injury” in clause thirdly includes also its plural, so that the clause would cover a case where all the injuries intentionally caused by the accused are cumulatively sufficient to cause the death in the ordinary course of nature, even if none of those injuries individually measures upto such sufficiency. The sufficiency spoken of in this clause, as already noticed, is the high probability of death in the ordinary course of nature, and if such sufficiency exists and death is caused and the injury causing it is intentional, the case would fall under clause thirdly of Section 300. All the conditions which are a prerequisite for the applicability of this clause have been established and the offence committed by the accused, in the instant case was ‘murder’.”= the accused hurled country made bombs, has been established. The incised injuries caused to Hari were intentional and were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature even if it cannot be said that his death was intended. This is sufficient to bring the case within thirdly of Section 300. 11. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the High Court was in error in altering the conviction of the respondents/accused from one under Section 302 to that under Section 304-I Indian Penal Code.


                                                         REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 185  of 2016
                        (@ SLP(Crl.) No.967 of 2015)



State of Madhya Pradesh             ...                        Appellant

                                   versus

Goloo Raikwar and Anr.                ...           Respondent(s)




                               J U D G M E N T



C. NAGAPPAN, J.

Leave granted.

This appeal is preferred against the judgment dated 26.9.2012 passed by  the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh Principal seat at Jabalpur in  Criminal  Appeal
No. 1797 of 2004 whereby the High Court partly allowed the appeal  filed  by
the respondents/accused, by setting aside  their  conviction  under  Section
302 IPC and convicted them for the offence under Section 304 Part I IPC  and
thereby  reducing  their  sentence  from  life  imprisonment   to   Rigorous
Imprisonment for 10 years.

Briefly the facts are as follows :  Deceased Hari Choudhary   is  the  uncle
of PW1 Kallu Choudhary.  On 15.8.2000 at about 3.30 p.m. both  of them  were
going to eat betel and on their way they saw respondent  no.1/accused  Golu,
respondent no.2/accused Bhura and three other accused  namely  Puttu  @  Ram
Charan, Gabbar and Bedilal armed with  weapons,  coming  and  accused  Bhura
hurled  country bomb at them.  On  explosion  they  fell  down  and  accused
Bhura dealt a blow of sword  to  PW1  Kallu  and  the  other  accused   also
assaulted him with their weapons.  PW1 saw the  accused  persons  assaulting
Hari Choudhary with their weapons.  He  ran  and  informed  PW3  Ram  Niwas,
brother of  Hari  and  they  carried  injured  Hari  to  Victoria  Hospital,
Jabalpur where he was declared dead.  On telephonic  information  PW10  Sub-
Inspector R.B. Soni reached  the  hospital  and  recorded  Exh.P1  complaint
given by PW1 Kallu and prepared Exh.P2 Murg Report.   He  conducted  inquest
and prepared Exh.P3 Inquest Report and gave requisition for conducting post-
mortem.  He also sent injured PW1 Kallu for medical examination.

Dr. Ashok Kumar Jain conducted the autopsy and  found following injuries  on
the body of Hari:

Incised wound 3” x ½” muscle deep on right cheek

 Incised wound 4” x ½” x bone deep on left cheek extending up to  ear.   The
pinna of the ear was cut.

Incised wound on right knee joint  posteriorly  to  lateral  aspect.   Joint
disarticulated. Patella hanging with the help of  tendon.   Vessels,  nerves
and other soft tissues severed.

 Incised wound 3” x ¾” x bone deep over occipital region  obliquely  placed.
Clotted blood matting the skull hair.

    Swelling of blue colour on the right shoulder on the  back  side  6”  in
length.

Linear abrasion over left side of chest lateral aspect 4” in length,  bluish
in colour.

Injuries No.1,2,3 and 4 were caused by  hard  and  sharp  object.   Injuries
No.5 and 6 might have been  caused  by  hard  and  blunt  object.   All  the
injuries were ante mortem in nature and were sufficient to cause death.   In
the opinion of Dr. Jain, cause  of  death  was  excessive  haemorrhage  from
Injury No.3.  The death of deceased was homicidal.



 PW10 Sub-Inspector Soni, after registering a case  under  Section  302  IPC
and Section  3(2)(v)  of  Scheduled  Caste/Scheduled  Tribe  (Prevention  of
Atrocities) Act against the accused persons and  after  investigation  filed
the  charge-sheet.   After  committal  the  Sessions  Court  framed  charges
against both  the  respondents  herein  and  accused  Puttu  @  Ram  Charan.
Accused Gabbar and Bedilal were absconding.  The trial court  convicted  the
respondents herein for the offence under Section 302 IPC and acquitted  them
for the  offence  under  Section  3(2)(v)  of  the  SC/ST  (P.A.)  Act   and
sentenced each of them to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of   Rs.1000/-
each in default to undergo one month simple imprisonment for the  charge  of
murder. At the same time the trial  court  acquitted  accused  Puttu  @  Ram
Charan of the charges.  Challenging the same, both  the  respondents  herein
preferred appeal and the High Court altered the conviction and  sentence  as
mentioned above.  Aggrieved by the same the State has preferred the  present
appeal.

The learned counsel for the appellant State submitted that  the  view  taken
by the High Court is patently erroneous in law as the offence under  Section
302 IPC was clearly made out.  It is his further submission  that  the  High
Court has committed an error in holding that injury no.3 was  not  on  vital
part of the body and the other  injuries  were  not  fatal  in  nature,  and
therefore, intention to  commit  murder  of  the  deceased  cannot  be  held
established. According to him the accused attacked the deceased by hard  and
sharp weapons at the time of occurrence  resulting  in  his  death  and  the
offence of murder is clearly made  out.   Per  contra  the  learned  counsel
appearing for the respondents supported the view taken  by  the  High  Court
and submitted that the impugned judgment is sustainable in law.

The respondents have not challenged their conviction. The  trial  court,  as
already noticed, had convicted the respondents of  the  offence  of  murder.
The High Court has disagreed with the Trial Court and held the  offence  was
not ‘murder’ but one under  Section 304-I of the  Indian  Penal  Code.   The
High Court reached this  conclusion on the following reasoning:

 “17. On perusal of the evidence of Dr. Ashok Kumar  Jain  (PW-6)  it  seems
that injuries No.1 and 2, which were caused on  right  and  left  cheeks  of
deceased by    sharp edged weapons, were not  grievous.   Similarly,  injury
No.4, which was an incised wound on the occipital region of  the  skull  was
bone deep.  Though there was bleeding from it, but the bone  was  not  found
cut. Injuries No.5  and  6  were  respectively  swelling  and  abrasions  on
shoulder and chest. No. underneath organ was found  damaged.  No  doubt  Dr.
Jain stated that injuries found on the body of deceased were  sufficient  to
cause his death, but he did not mention this fact in the  postmortem  report
(Ex.P/10).  In Ex.P/10 as well as in court he specifically stated  that  the
cause of death of deceased was excessive haemorrhage from  the  injury  No.3
which was on the knee.

18. In view of the above medical evidence, in  our  opinion,  it  cannot  be
held established with certainty that appellants intended  to  commit  murder
of the deceased, but, since they caused number of injuries  by  sharp  edged
weapons to deceased and the injury No.3 proved fatal, it can  be  held  that
appellants assaulted deceased with  an  intention  of  causing  such  bodily
injuries to him as were likely to cause his death making them liable  to  be
punished under Section 304-I of the Indian Penal Code”.



8.    We are unable to appreciate  and  accept  this  reasoning.   When  the
deceased  along  with  PW1  Kallu  Choudhary  were  going  to   eat   betals
respondents/accused came from the front side  and  second  respondent  Bhura
pelted country bomb at them and inflicted blow of sword   on  Hari  and  the
other accused assaulted Hari with sword, Gupti  and  Kankur  and  they  also
attacked PW1 Kallu Choudhary with weapons.  Hari was  soiled  in  blood  and
was moaning and on being taken to hospital,  was  declared  dead.   Injuries
no.1 to 4 found on the body of Hari were incised wounds and 3rd and  4th  of
them were inflicted on the right knee  joint  and  head  respectively.   Dr.
Ashok Kumar Jain who conducted the autopsy  has  stated  that  the  injuries
found on the body were sufficient to cause death.  It was pointed  out  that
the cause of death was excessive haemorrhage from injury no.3 which  was  on
the knee.

9.    In State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr.  (1976)  4
SCC 382), this Court had to deal with a similar  situation.  In  that  case,
the accused 5 in number beat the victim with sticks on the legs and arms  of
the deceased and when hospitalized the deceased succumbed to  his  injuries.
The medical officer who conducted the  autopsy  opined  that  the  cause  of
death was shock and haemorrhage resulting from multiple  injuries  and  said
injuries were cumulatively sufficient to cause death in the ordinary  course
of nature.   Question arose whether in  such  a  case  when  no  significant
injury had been inflicted on a vital part of the body, and the weapons  used
were sticks and the accused could not be  said  to  have  the  intention  of
causing death, the offence would be ‘murder’ or  merely  ‘culpable  homicide
not amounting to murder’.  This Court answered the question in these terms:

“39. ……. . All these acts of the accused were  preplanned  and  intentional,
which, considered objectively in the light of  the  medical  evidence,  were
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.  The  mere  fact
that the beating was designedly confined by the assailants to the  legs  and
arms, or that none of  the  multiple  injuries  inflicted  was  individually
sufficient in the ordinary  course  of  nature  to  cause  death,  will  not
exclude the application of clause thirdly of Section  300.   The  expression
“bodily injury” in clause thirdly includes also  its  plural,  so  that  the
clause would cover a case where all the  injuries  intentionally  caused  by
the accused are cumulatively sufficient to cause the death in  the  ordinary
course of nature, even if  none  of  those  injuries  individually  measures
upto such sufficiency.   The  sufficiency  spoken  of  in  this  clause,  as
already noticed, is the high probability of death in the ordinary course  of
nature, and if such sufficiency exists and death is caused  and  the  injury
causing it is intentional, the case  would  fall  under  clause  thirdly  of
Section  300.   All  the  conditions  which  are  a  prerequisite  for   the
applicability of  this  clause  have  been  established    and  the  offence
committed by the accused, in the instant case was ‘murder’.”



10.   In the present case, the fact that the  accused  hurled  country  made
bombs, has been established.   The incised  injuries  caused  to  Hari  were
intentional and were sufficient to cause death in  the  ordinary  course  of
nature even if it cannot be said that  his  death  was  intended.   This  is
sufficient to bring the case within thirdly of Section 300.

11.   For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the  High  Court
was in error in altering the conviction of the respondents/accused from  one
under  Section  302  to  that  under  Section  304-I  Indian   Penal   Code.
Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the  impugned  judgment  and
restore the judgment of the trial court convicting  the  respondents/accused
for the offence of murder, with a sentence of imprisonment  for  life.   The
respondents/accused are directed to surrender  before  the  trial  court  to
serve out the remaining  sentence,  failing  which  the  trial  court  would
forthwith issue warrants of arrest and send them to jail.


                                                      …….………………………….J.
                                                      (Jagdish Singh Khehar)



                                                           ……..…..……………………J.
                                                                (C.Nagappan)


New Delhi;
March 02, 2016


not even note down the six injuries on the complainant which included a grievous injury on the temporal part, a reddish blue mark on the upper side of right eye, another injury having blue mark on the forehead and another wound on the eyebrow on the right eye. There was hardly any mitigating circumstance to take such a lenient view as has been done by the High Court. The law on the principles governing proper sentencing has been elaborated by this Court in large number of cases. It is the duty of the Court awarding sentence to ensure justice to both the parties and therefore undue leniency in awarding sentence needs to be avoided because it does not have the necessary effect of being a deterrent for the accused and does not re-assure the society that the offender has been properly dealt with. It is not a very healthy situation to leave the injured and complainant side thoroughly dissatisfied with a very lenient punishment to the accused. In the present case the order of punishment imposed by the High Court suffers from the vice of being over-lenient even in absence of any mitigating circumstance.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 182 OF 2016
                [Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.)No.8006 of 2012]

State of M.P.                                            …..Appellant

      Versus

Udaibhan                                            …..Respondent

                                   W I T H

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 183  OF 2016
                [Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.)No.8011 of 2012]

State of M.P.                                            …..Appellant

      Versus

Hakim Singh & Anr.                                  …..Respondents


                               J U D G M E N T



SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J.

These appeals by special leave  have  been  preferred  by  State  of  Madhya
Pradesh against  common  judgment  and  order  dated  14.12.2011  passed  in
Criminal Appeal Nos.92/2002 and 106/2002.
By the impugned judgment  and  order  the  High  Court  has  partly  allowed
criminal appeals preferred by the three accused, namely,  Rajaram,  Udaibhan
and Hakim Singh, respondents  in  these  appeals  so  as  to  convert  their
conviction under Section 307 of IPC for Rajaram and under Section  307  read
with Section 34 of the IPC for the  other  two  appellants  into  one  under
Section 326 for Rajaram and 326/34 for the other two.  The  High  Court  did
not interfere with the fine imposed  on  the  respondents  for  the  offence
noted above as well as for the offence under Section  323  IPC  but  reduced
the sentence for imprisonment which was R.I. for 10 years  for  the  offence
punishable under Section 307 as well as Section 307 read with Section 34  of
the IPC to a period already undergone by the respondents which  was  of  one
year and nine months only.
Since the High Court did not disbelieve the substratum  of  the  prosecution
case and has  maintained  the  conviction  of  respondents,  albeit  for  an
offence minor to one under Section 307 or Section 307 read with  Section  34
of IPC, the only material issue worth  consideration  in  these  appeals  is
whether the High Court in the matter of awarding of punishment  has  ignored
the relevant considerations and adopted an  erroneous  approach.   The  High
Court accepted the contention advanced on behalf of  the  accused  that  the
evidence on record did not establish  any  intention  on  the  part  of  the
accused persons to kill the complainant or his brother, the two  injured  in
this case.  The High Court did not doubt nor did the accused  persons  raise
any contention that the injury sustained by the complainant on head was  not
a grievous injury.  Being an incised wound on temporal region of  the  head,
it was clearly caused by a sharp cutting weapon and dangerous to life.   The
doctor held the aforesaid injury no.1 on the head  to  be  grievous  on  the
basis of X-ray which showed fracture of the skull bone.
The High Court in our considered opinion failed to keep under focus  various
relevant factors for a proper decision on  the  quantum  of  sentence  which
should have been imposed even for the altered conviction under  Section  326
or Section 326/34 of the IPC.  The prosecution case which has been  accepted
as true disclosed that the complainant  Kriparam  was  called  to  Panchayat
Bhawan  where  the  accused  persons  were  already  present  with  weapons.
Rajaram was having farsa whereas Hakim  was  armed  with  an  iron  rod  and
Udaibhan with lathi.  As soon as the complainant arrived he  was  threatened
and assaulted by all the  three  with  their  respective  weapons.   Rajaram
caused a farsa injury on the head, Hakim caused an injury with iron  bar  on
the eyebrow near the right eye.  Udaibhan gave more than  one  lathi  blows.
When complainant’s brother Prabhu came for  his  rescue  then  he  was  also
assaulted with lathi blows by Udaibhan.
The High Court did not even note down the six injuries  on  the  complainant
which included a grievous injury on the temporal part, a reddish  blue  mark
on the upper side of right eye, another  injury  having  blue  mark  on  the
forehead and another wound on the eyebrow  on  the  right  eye.   There  was
hardly any mitigating circumstance to take such a lenient view as  has  been
done by the  High  Court.   The  law  on  the  principles  governing  proper
sentencing has been elaborated by this Court in large number of  cases.   It
is the duty of the Court awarding sentence to ensure  justice  to  both  the
parties and therefore undue  leniency  in  awarding  sentence  needs  to  be
avoided because it does not have the necessary effect of being  a  deterrent
for the accused and does not re-assure the society  that  the  offender  has
been properly dealt with.  It is not a very healthy situation to  leave  the
injured and complainant side thoroughly dissatisfied  with  a  very  lenient
punishment to the accused.  In the present  case  the  order  of  punishment
imposed by the High Court suffers from the vice of being  over-lenient  even
in absence of any  mitigating circumstance.
In such a situation, the interest of justice requires interference with  the
punishment imposed by  the  High  Court.   The  ends  of  justice  would  be
satisfied by imposing on  all  the  three  accused  persons  a  sentence  of
rigorous imprisonment for three years in place of period already  undergone,
for the offence under Section 326 as well as  Section  326/34  of  the  IPC.
The other sentence which has been maintained  by  the  High  Court  is  left
intact.   However,  it  is  clarified  that  sentence  of  imprisonment  for
different offences against  the  respondents  shall  run  concurrently.  The
impugned judgment and order are modified accordingly. The Trial Court  shall
take all necessary steps to ensure  that  the  respondents  are  taken  into
custody forthwith to serve out  the  remainder  period  of  imprisonment  in
connection with  Sessions  Case  No.  16/2001,  tried  by  Third  Additional
Sessions Judge, Shivpuri (Madhya Pradesh).  The  appeals  preferred  by  the
State are allowed to the aforesaid extent only.

                       …………………………………….J.
                       [DIPAK MISRA]


                       ……………………………………..J.
                             [SHIVA KIRTI SINGH]
New Delhi.
March 01, 2016.
-----------------------
5


Saturday, February 20, 2016

whether the so called agreement to sell dated 6.1.1995, which is extracted hereinbelow, is enforceable in law for passing a decree for specific performance of contract. The said agreement reads as under :- ”RECEIPT + AGREEMENT DATED 6.1.1995= In the instant case both the Trial Court and the High Court have completely overlooked and failed to appreciate the following facts:- (a) The receipt + agreement dated 6.1.1995 is a document by which the defendant alleged to have received a sum of Rs.2,30,000/- against the alternative plot in question which the DDA recommended to give to the defendant. The said plot will in turn will be given by the defendant to the plaintiff after a lease was executed in favour of the defendant by the DDA; (b) The total premium amount settled by the said agreement in respect of the plot was Rs.4,60,000/- whereas the defendant deposited a sum of Rs.8,13,389/- with the DDA for the allotment of the said plot; (c) The plaintiff pleaded in his plaint that the defendant had agreed to sell his rights in the recommendation letter and the plot to be allotted thereunder to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs.4,60,000/-; (d) Although the right to get the plot was agreed to be sold to the plaintiff by the defendant for Rs.4,60,000/- but the suit was valued at Rs. 6,77,262.75p. being the rate fixed by the DDA.-“It is stated on oath by Umed Singh (DW1) that the DDA allotted plot in dispute to his deceased father on certain terms and conditions, which were embodied in the lease deed. One of such conditions was that suit will remain non-transferable for a period of ten years.”- that the land so allotted to the defendant- is not transferable for a period of 10 years, the High Court failed to hold that a decree for specific performance cannot be passed. Consequently, we direct the appellant to refund a sum of Rs.4,30,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs Thirty Thousand) which was paid by the respondents to the appellant together with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of such receipt within two months from today.

                                                                ‘REPORTABLE’

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7385 OF 2013


Satish Kumar                                          ….Appellant(s)
                                   versus
Karan Singh and Another                              ….Respondent(s)

                               J U D G M E N T

M.Y. EQBAL, J.

            The question that needs consideration  in the instant appeal  is
as to whether the so called agreement  to  sell  dated  6.1.1995,  which  is
extracted hereinbelow, is enforceable  in  law  for  passing  a  decree  for
specific performance of contract.  The said agreement reads as under :-
”RECEIPT + AGREEMENT DATED 6.1.1995

Received a sum of amount Rs.2,30,000/-(Two Lac Thirty Thousand)  from  Karan
Singh S/o Sh. Basti Ram R/o Village and PO Mahipal Pur New Delhi-110 037  on
sixth    January,    1995    against    our     DDA     alternative     plot
F.No.32(5)113/87/L&B/Alt./2511 dated 11.8.1989 in the  name  of  Sh.  Jaishi
S/o Sh. Ram Saran R/o V&PO Mahipalpur New Delhi.   The  total  area  of  the
above said plot is 400 Sq.Yds.  The total  premium  settled  for  the  above
said plot is Rs.4,60,000/- (Four Lacs Sixty Thousand) will be given  at  the
time of receive the lease after  execution  at  the  Registrar  Office.   No
payment will be given in between.”
                                                                        Sd/-
                                                                   Jaisi Ram
In the presence of                      S/o Ram Saran
J.N. Sehrawat                       Village Mahipal Pur
V& PO Mahipal Pur
New Delhi-110037.

2.    The trial court after recording  the  evidence  decreed  the  suit  of
plaintiff-respondent for specific performance and  the  High  Court  by  the
impugned judgment dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant  and  affirmed
the decree passed by the Trial Court.

3.    We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties.

4.    The plaintiff’s case in the plaint is that a  decision  was  taken  by
the Delhi Development Authority for allotment of a plot  of  land  measuring
400 Sq.yds. in favour of the defendant-respondent.  It was pleaded  that  in
the year 1995 the defendant had desired  to  sell  his  right  in  the  said
recommendation letter which was to be allotted by the DDA in favour  of  the
defendant.  It was further pleaded that the defendant  agreed  to  sell  his
right in the aforesaid recommendation letter and the plot to be allotted  at
a price of Rs.4,60,000/-.  For better appreciation para 6 of the  plaint  is
extracted hereinbelow :-

“6.  That the negotiations in between the parties had taken  place  and  the
plaintiff had agreed to purchase the said rights of  the  defendant  in  the
said recommendation letter  and  the  plot  to  be  allotted  thereto.   The
dealings were finalized and a Receipt-cum-Agreement  (for  short  Agreement)
was also executed in between the parties on January 6, 1995.

It is stated that the defendant  had  agreed  to  sell  his  rights  in  the
aforementioned recommendation letter and the plot to be allotted  thereunder
to the plaintiff for the sale consideration of  Rs.4,60,000/-  (Rupees  Four
lakhs and Sixty thousand only).  A sum of Rs.2,30,000/-  (Rupees  Two  Lakhs
and Thirty Thousand only) was also paid by the plaintiff  to  the  defendant
on January 6, 1995 itself.  Vide the said agreement dated January  6,  1995,
the defendant had acknowledged receipt of the sum  of Rs.2,30,000/-  (Rupees
Two Lakhs Thirty Thousand only) from the plaintiff.  It was  further  agreed
that the balance amount of Rs.2,30,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs  Thirty  Thousand
only) would be paid by the plaintiff to the  defendant  when  the  defendant
hands over the original lease deed duly executed by  the  Delhi  Development
Authority in favour of the defendant.”

5.    Curiously enough although the total sale consideration fixed  was  Rs.
4,60,000/- but the suit was valued at Rs.6,77,262.75p. on the basis  of  the
value fixed by the DDA in respect of the plot in question.

6.    During the pendency of the  suit  in  the  trial  court  the  original
defendant who was an old  person  died  and  his  legal  representative  was
substituted.  The  original  defendant  as  also  the  legal  representative
contested the suit denying and disputing the  alleged  receipt-cum-agreement
and stated that no decree for  specific  performance  can  be  passed.   The
trial court held  that  the  receipt-cum-agreement  is  a  legal  and  valid
agreement to sell and shall be enforced by passing  a  decree  for  specific
performance.  The High Court  on  the  basis  of  evidence  adduced  by  the
parties affirmed the finding recorded by the trial court.

7.    Prima facie, we are of the view that both  the  trial  court  and  the
High Court have completely failed to consider  the  provisions  of  Specific
Relief Act and  the  principles  laid  down  by  this  Court  in  catena  of
decisions as to the requirement of law for  passing a  decree  for  specific
performance.

8.     It  is  well  settled  that  the  jurisdiction  to   order   specific
performance  of  contract  is  based  on  the  existence  of  a  valid   and
enforceable contract.  Where a valid and enforceable contract has  not  been
made, the Court will not make a contract  for  them.   Specific  performance
will not be ordered if the contract itself suffers from  some  defect  which
makes the contract invalid or unenforceable.  The discretion  of  the  Court
will  not  be  there  even  though  the  contract  is  otherwise  valid  and
enforceable.

9.    This Court in Mayawanti  vs.  Kaushalya Devi   (1990)  3  SCC  1  held
thus:-

“8. In a case of specific performance it  is  settled  law,  and  indeed  it
cannot be doubted, that the jurisdiction to order specific performance of  a
contract is based on the existence of a valid and enforceable contract.  The
Law of Contract is based  on  the  ideal  of  freedom  of  contract  and  it
provides the limiting principles within which the parties are free  to  make
their own contracts. Where a valid and enforceable  contract  has  not  been
made, the court will not make a  contract  for  them.  Specific  performance
will not be ordered if the contract itself suffers from  some  defect  which
makes the contract invalid or unenforceable. The  discretion  of  the  court
will be there even though the contract is otherwise  valid  and  enforceable
and it can pass a decree of specific performance even before there has  been
any breach of the  contract.  It  is,  therefore,  necessary  first  to  see
whether there has been a valid and enforceable contract and then to see  the
nature and obligation arising out of it. The contract being  the  foundation
of the obligation the order of  specific  performance  is  to  enforce  that
obligation.”

10.   Exercise of discretionary power  under  Section  20  of  the  Specific
Relief Act for granting a decree, this  Court  in  the  case  of  Parakunnan
Veetill Joseph’s Son Mathew  vs.  Nedumbara Kuruivila’s Son and others,  AIR
1987 SC 2328  observed:-
“14. Section  20  of  the  Specific  Relief  Act,  1963  preserves  judicial
discretion of courts as to decreeing specific performance. The court  should
meticulously consider all facts and circumstances of the case. The court  is
not bound to grant specific performance merely because it is  lawful  to  do
so. The motive behind the litigation should also  enter  into  the  judicial
verdict. The court should take care to  see  that  it  is  not  used  as  an
instrument of oppression to have an unfair advantage to the  plaintiff.  The
High Court has failed to consider the motive with which Varghese  instituted
the suit. It was instituted because Kuruvila could not get  the  estate  and
Mathew was not prepared to part with it. The sheet anchor  of  the  suit  by
Varghese is the agreement for sale Exhibit A-1. Since  Chettiar  had  waived
his rights thereunder, Varghese as an assignee could not get a better  right
to enforce that agreement. He is, therefore, not entitled to  a  decree  for
specific performance.”

11.   In the instant case both the Trial  Court  and  the  High  Court  have
completely overlooked and failed to appreciate the following facts:-
(a)   The receipt + agreement dated 6.1.1995 is  a  document  by  which  the
defendant alleged to have  received  a  sum  of  Rs.2,30,000/-  against  the
alternative plot in question which  the  DDA  recommended  to  give  to  the
defendant.  The said plot will in turn will be given  by  the  defendant  to
the plaintiff after a lease was executed in favour of the defendant  by  the
DDA;

(b)   The total premium amount settled by the said agreement in  respect  of
the plot  was  Rs.4,60,000/-  whereas  the  defendant  deposited  a  sum  of
Rs.8,13,389/-  with the DDA for the allotment of the said plot;

(c)     The plaintiff pleaded in his plaint that the  defendant  had  agreed
to sell his rights in the recommendation letter and the plot to be  allotted
thereunder to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs.4,60,000/-;

(d)   Although the right to get the plot  was  agreed  to  be  sold  to  the
plaintiff by the defendant for Rs.4,60,000/- but the suit was valued at  Rs.
6,77,262.75p. being the rate fixed by the DDA.

12.   On the basis of these admitted facts the Trial Court erroneously  held
that the receipt-cum-agreement  is  an  enforceable  contract  and  on  that
finding decreed the suit which was affirmed by the High Court.
13.   It is interesting to note that the High Court  has  noticed  the  fact
mentioned in para 24 of trial court judgment that  during  the  pendency  of
the lis DDA allotted the plot in question in favour of the  deceased  father
of the defendant (original plaintiff) by executing a lease  deed  putting  a
condition that the plot in  question  will  remain  non-transferable  for  a
period of ten years.   Para  24  of  the  trial  court  judgment  is  quoted
hereinbelow:-
“It is stated on oath by Umed Singh (DW1) that  the  DDA  allotted  plot  in
dispute to his deceased father on certain terms and conditions,  which  were
embodied in the lease deed.  One of  such  conditions  was  that  suit  will
remain non-transferable for a period of ten  years.”

14.   In spite of the aforesaid fact noticed by the  High  Court,  that  the
land so allotted to the defendant- is not transferable for a  period  of  10
years, the High Court failed to hold that a decree for specific  performance
cannot be passed.
15.   We are sorry to hold that both the Trial  Court  and  the  High  Court
have completely misconstrued the facts of the  case  and  misunderstood  the
law laid down by this Court in the matter of exercising discretionary  power
for granting a decree for specific performance.
16.   After giving our anxious consideration to the matter, we  are  of  the
view that the impugned order passed by the trial court and affirmed  by  the
High Court cannot be sustained in law inasmuch as no   decree  for  specific
performance  can  be  passed  on  the  basis  of  the  alleged  receipt-cum-
agreement. We therefore, allow this  appeal  and  set  aside  the  judgments
passed by the Trial Court and the High Court.
17.   Consequently, we direct the appellant to refund a sum of Rs.4,30,000/-
 (Rupees Four Lakhs Thirty Thousand) which was paid by  the  respondents  to
the appellant together with interest @ 6% per annum from the  date  of  such
receipt  within  two  months  from  today.  Any  amount  deposited  by   the
respondents in the High Court shall be withdrawn by them.

                                                              …………………………….J.
                                                                (M.Y. Eqbal)




                                                              …………………………….J.
                                                               (Arun Mishra)
New Delhi
January 21, 2016

Thursday, February 18, 2016

starting point of limitation for redemption of usufructuary mortgage should run from the date the mortgage money is paid or is otherwise satisfied.= question of limitation on redemption of usufructuary mortgage, the High Court has placed reliance on Sampuran Singh & Others Vs. Niranjan Kaur & Others reported in (1999) 2 SCC 679 and Prabhakaran & Others Vs. M. Azhagiri Pillai reported in (2006) 4 SCC 484. The position taken by the High Court in those decisions has been held to be no more good law in Singh Ram Vs. Sheo Ram and Others reported in (2014) 9 SCC 185 wherein it has been held that the starting point of limitation for redemption of usufructuary mortgage should run from the date the mortgage money is paid or is otherwise satisfied.



                                                              NON-REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                      CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 788-789 OF 2016
              (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 31469-31470 of 2014)



      MOHAN LAL                                         APPELLANT

                                VERSUS

      MOHAN LAL & ORS                               RESPONDENTS


                               J U D G M E N T


      KURIAN,J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    The appellant is aggrieved by the  impugned  orders  dated  25.07.2013
and 18.12.2013 passed by the High  Court  of  Judicature  for  Rajasthan  at
Jodhpur.  The application filed by the respondent under Order VII,  Rule  11
(d) CPC in Suit No. 219/2004 on the file of Civil  Judge,  Junior  Division,
Jodhpur was allowed.
3.    On the question of limitation on redemption of usufructuary  mortgage,
the High Court has placed reliance on Sampuran Singh & Others  Vs.  Niranjan
Kaur & Others reported in (1999) 2 SCC 679 and Prabhakaran & Others  Vs.  M.
Azhagiri Pillai reported in (2006) 4 SCC 484.  The  position  taken  by  the
High Court in those decisions  has been held to  be  no  more  good  law  in
Singh Ram Vs. Sheo Ram and Others reported in (2014) 9 SCC  185  wherein  it
has been held that the  starting  point  of  limitation  for  redemption  of
usufructuary mortgage should run from the date the mortgage  money  is  paid
or is otherwise satisfied.

4.    In that view of the matter, the impugned judgments of the  High  Court
are set aside.  The matters are remitted  to  the  Trial  Court.   The  suit
shall be tried on all issues raised for trial.  Being a  suit  of  the  year
2004, we request the Trial Court to dispose of the suit  within  six  months
from the date of next appearance of the parties.  The parties  shall  appear
before the Trial Court on 4th April, 2016.

5.    The appeals are allowed as above with no order as to costs.


                                             .....................J.
                                             [KURIAN JOSEPH]



                                            ....................J.
                                            [ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN

      NEW DELHI;
      JANUARY 29, 2016


Whether Late Azimuddin on 24.2.76 made a valid gift of 1/3 undivided share in the disputed property in favour of the plaintiffs and was receiving the rent from tenants in his lifetime till 1.1.77 and was paying 1/3 part of it to the plaintiffs? =Validity of gift deed dated 24th February, 1976 executed by late Hazi Azimuddin in favour of the plaintiff Rafiuddin is the sole question for consideration. The courts below have held the same to be a gift of undivided share of property which was capable of division and thus invalid under Muslim Law being hiba-bil-musha. It has also been held that gift was of no effect as possession was not delivered to the donee. Factually, the gift was held to be genuinely executed. = Apex court held The gift is valid = while gift of immovable property is not complete unless the donor parts with the possession and donee enters into possession but if the property is in occupation of tenants, gift can be completed by delivery of title deed or by request to tenants to attorn to the donee or by mutation. It is further clear that gift of property which is capable of division is irregular but can be perfected and rendered valid by subsequent partition or delivery. Exceptions to the rule are : where the gift is made by one co-heir to the other; where the gift is of share in a zemindari or taluka; where gift is of a share in freehold property in a large commercial town, and where gift is of share in a land company.= “Mulla Principles of Mohammedan Law, 20th Edition by Lexis Nexis, paras 152 and 160 which are : “152. Delivery of possession of immovable property (1) Where donor is in possession – A gift of immovable property of which the donor is in actual possession is not complete, unless the donor physically departs from the premises with all his goods and chattels, and the donee formally enters into possession. (2) Where property is in the occupation of tenants – A gift of immovable property which is in the occupation of tenants may be completed by a request by the donor to the tenants to attorn to the donee, or by delivery of the title deed or by mutation in the Revenue Register or the landlord’s sherista. But if the husband reserves to himself the right to receive rents during his lifetime and also undertakes to pay Municipal dues, a mere recital in the deed that delivery of possession has been given to the donee will not make the gift complete. (3) Where donor and donee both reside in the property – No physical departure or formal entry is necessary in the case of a gift of immovable property in which the donor and the donee are both residing at the time of the gift. In such a case the gift may be completed by some overt act by the donor indicating a clear intention on his part to transfer possession and to divest himself of all control over the subject of the gift. The principle for the determination of questions of this nature was thus stated by West, J. in a Bombay case. “When a person is present on the premises proposed to be delivered to him, a declaration of the person previously possessed puts him into possession without any physical departure or formal entry. 160. Gift of mushaa where property divisible. A gift of an undivided share (mushaa) in property which is capable of division is irregular (fasid), but not void (batil). The gift being irregular, and not void, it may be perfected and rendered valid by subsequent partition and delivery to the donee of the share given to him. If possession is once taken the gift is validated. Exceptions – A gift of an undivided share (mushaa), though it be a share in property capable of division, is valid from the moment of the gift, even if the share is not divided off and delivered to the donee, in the following cases – (1) where the gift is made by one co-heir to another. (2) where the gift is of a share in a zemindari or taluka (3) where the gift is of a share in freehold property in a large commercial town. (4) where the gift is of shares in a land company.”=Requirement of possession is also met when right to collect rent has been assigned to the plaintiff under the gift deed itself, genuineness of which stands proved.-The gift had no infirmity under the Muslim Law either on the ground that the possession was not delivered or on the ground that the gift was hit by Hiba-bil-Musha. The gift was by father to his minor son. Property is under tenancy. The gift is by a registered deed. Right to collect rent stands transferred to donee. The property is located in the city of Jaipur which is mentioned in Para 2 of the plaint as well as in the gift deed. The courts below are not justified in not giving effect to the gift which has been held to be genuine.

                                 REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.2845 OF 2006


KHURSIDA BEGUM (D) BY LRS. & ORS.          …APPELLANTS




                                   VERSUS


KOMAMMAD FAROOQ (D) BY LRS. & ANR.      ...RESPONDENTS



                               J U D G M E N T




ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.


1.    Validity of gift deed dated 24th February, 1976 executed by late  Hazi
Azimuddin in favour of the plaintiff Rafiuddin  is  the  sole  question  for
consideration.  The courts below  have  held  the  same  to  be  a  gift  of
undivided share of property which was capable of division and  thus  invalid
under Muslim Law being hiba-bil-musha.  It has also been held that gift  was
of no effect as possession was not delivered to the donee.   Factually,  the
gift was held to be genuinely executed.


2.    Facts are as follows : The appellant filed suit for  recovery  of  the
amount received by the defendants by way of rent to the extent of  one-third
share of the plaintiff (based on gift deed in his favour by his  father)  in
the property which was rented out to the tenants.  Claim  of  the  plaintiff
is that his father late Hazi Azimuddin was the absolute owner  of  the  suit
property.  In the sale deed, his father got  the  names  of  the  defendants
(brothers of the plaintiff) recorded as owners to the extent  of  two-third.
On 24th February, 1976, he gifted his one-third share to the plaintiff by  a
registered deed  and  informed  the  tenants.   After  the  gift  deed,  the
plaintiff was to get one-third share  of  the  rent.   The  total  rent  was
Rs.50/- per month.  From 1st January,  1977,  the  defendants  received  the
entire rent and did not  pay  the  plaintiff’s  share  to  him.   Thus,  the
plaintiff was entitled to recover one-third of the  amount  falling  to  his
share.


3.    The respondents defendants contested the suit denying the validity  of
the gift deed.   It  was  stated  that  Hazi  Azimuddin  was  95  years  old
suffering from certain ailments and was not in a fit condition to  make  the
gift deed.  He had no right in the property  and  had  never  recovered  any
part of the rent.  There was an oral  family  arrangement  under  which  the
defendants became the exclusive owners and Hazi Azimuddin  relinquished  all
his rights.


4.    The trial Court framed following issues :


1.    Whether the disputed property has come  to  the  defendants  20  years
prior to the institution of the suit  by  way  of  oral  family  arrangement
between late Azimuddin and the defendants and  they  are  in  possession  as
owners in their shares for 20 years?


2.    Whether Late Azimuddin on 24.2.76 made a valid gift of  1/3  undivided
share in  the  disputed  property  in  favour  of  the  plaintiffs  and  was
receiving the rent from tenants in his lifetime till 1.1.77 and  was  paying
1/3 part of it to the plaintiffs?


3.    Whether sufficient court fees has been paid?


4.    Whether  the  suit  is  for  partial  partition  of  the  property  of
Azimuddin.   If  yes,  then  whether  suit  for  partial  partition   cannot
continue?


5.    Whether the suit is barred by limitation?


6.    Whether the other sons and daughters of Azimudin are  necessary  party
to the suit.  If yes,  what  is  the  effect  of  non-joinder  of  necessary
parties to the suit?


7.    Relief.”

      The trial Court dismissed the  suit.   It  was  held  that  no  family
arrangement had taken place as claimed by the  defendants.   Hazi  Azimuddin
alone was receiving the rent from the tenants till his  death  as  shown  by
the rent receipts and other documents which were  proved  on  record.   Gift
deed dated 24th February, 1976 was duly executed.   Hazi  Azimuddin  himself
had gone to the office of the Sub Registrar.  The  case  of  the  defendants
that he was not in a fit state of health was not  accepted.   However,  gift
of undivided property was not valid as the plaintiff was never given  actual
or symbolic possession of one-third share of property and that the gift  was
hiba-bil-musha.  The High Court dismissed the appeal.
5.    We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
6.    Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that once  the  gift  was
held to have been duly proved in favour of  the  appellant  who  was  minor,
transfer of  possession  was  not  required  to  be  proved.   Further,  the
property being in possession of  the  tenant,  execution  of  gift  deed  by
itself amounted to transfer of  constructive  possession.   It  was  further
submitted that the gift could not have been declared invalid on  the  ground
that it related to undivided share of divisible property which was  not  the
plea in the written statement.  There was no  absolute  bar  to  such  gift.
Even if there is such a bar in certain situations, there are  exceptions  to
the rule which apply.  One of the exceptions is that  property  is  freehold
property in a large commercial town  which  is  clearly  applicable  to  the
present case.   The courts below thus  erred  in  holding  the  gift  to  be
illegal on that ground.
7.    Learned counsel for the respondents supported the impugned judgment.
8.    Before we advert to the issue, it will be appropriate to refer to  the
finding recorded by the courts below.  The trial court observed :

“Now, it only remains to be decided as to what is the  effect  of  the  said
gift-deed.  I have gone through Section  206  of  Muslim  Law  which  is  as
follows :

206.   Hiba of undivided property (hiba-bil-mushaa)

Subject to the provisions of Sec. 207  a  hiba  of  an  undivided  share  in
property which is capable of division is invalid  except  in  the  following
cases :

a.    Where it is made by one co-sharer in the property to another;
b.    Where the property admits of definite ascertainment of shares  and  is
capable of separate enjoyment without division;
c.    Where it is made to a minor who is under the custody of the donor  and
to whom the donor transfers a part of the property;
d.    Where the property is freehold property in  a  large  commercial  town
(c)

For Hiba-bil-Mushaa, it is settled principle of  Muslim  Law  that  gift  of
undivided share in property, which is capable of division is invalid  except
in 4 aforesaid cases.  In my view, this disputed Hiba does not fall  in  any
of above-stated exception and it can be said to be  invalid.   I  have  gone
through the  judgment  cited  by  the  Learned  Counsel  for  the  plaintiff
according to which even if the case is covered under exception “c” and  “d”,
even then it has to be said that handing over of possession is necessary  in
Hiba-bil-Mushaa.  If the possession has  not  been  handed  over,  then  the
principle of Musha would be applicable and  that  Hiba  will  be  considered
invalid.
xxxxxxx

The plaintiff has totally failed to prove that on  24.2.76  or  later,  they
had been handed over possession actual or symbolic of  undivided  1/3  share
of the property.  In  such  circumstances,  it  has  to  be  said  that  the
principle of Musha would be applicable to Hiba and Hiba that has  been  made
on 24.2.76 is not as per the rules and is invalid.  As  a  consequence  this
issue is decided against the plaintiff.”





9.    The High Court held :
“Bare reading of the above provision would show that the  gift  in  question
in the present case does not come in any of the exceptions mentioned  above.
 It has also not been pleaded or proved in any manner that the  property  in
question is freehold property in a large commercial town, so as  to  attract
clause (d) of the exception as referred to above.

After having considered the entire facts and circumstances  of  the  present
case, in view of the clear provisions of law, as referred to above,  I  find
no error or illegality in the judgment and decree passed by the trial  court
so as to call for any further interference of this court.”


10.   Learned counsel for the parties have referred  to  the  principles  of
Mohammedan Law as compiled in “Mulla  Principles  of  Mohammedan  Law,  20th
Edition by Lexis Nexis, paras 152 and 160 which are :
“152. Delivery of possession of immovable property (1)  Where  donor  is  in
possession – A gift of immovable property of which the donor  is  in  actual
possession is not complete, unless the donor  physically  departs  from  the
premises with all his goods and chattels,  and  the  donee  formally  enters
into possession.

(2)   Where property is in the occupation of tenants – A gift  of  immovable
property which is in the  occupation  of  tenants  may  be  completed  by  a
request by the donor to the tenants to attorn to the donee, or  by  delivery
of the title deed or by mutation in the Revenue Register or  the  landlord’s
sherista.  But if the husband reserves  to  himself  the  right  to  receive
rents during his lifetime and also undertakes to pay Municipal dues, a  mere
recital in the deed that delivery of possession has been given to the  donee
will not make the gift complete.

(3) Where donor and  donee  both  reside  in  the  property  –  No  physical
departure or formal entry is necessary in the case of a  gift  of  immovable
property in which the donor and the donee are both residing at the  time  of
the gift.  In such a case the gift may be completed by  some  overt  act  by
the donor indicating a clear intention on his part  to  transfer  possession
and to divest himself of all control over the  subject  of  the  gift.   The
principle for the determination of questions of this nature was thus  stated
by West, J. in a Bombay case.  “When a person is  present  on  the  premises
proposed to be delivered to him, a  declaration  of  the  person  previously
possessed puts him into possession without any physical departure or  formal
entry.

160.  Gift of mushaa where property  divisible.   A  gift  of  an  undivided
share (mushaa) in  property  which  is  capable  of  division  is  irregular
(fasid), but not void (batil).  The gift being irregular, and not  void,  it
may be perfected and rendered valid by subsequent partition and delivery  to
the donee of the share given to him.  If possession is once taken  the  gift
is validated.

Exceptions – A gift of an undivided share (mushaa), though it be a share  in
property capable of division, is valid from the moment of the gift, even  if
the share is not divided off and delivered to the donee,  in  the  following
cases –

(1)    where the gift is made by one co-heir to another.
(2)    where the gift is of a share in a zemindari or taluka
(3)    where the gift is of a share in freehold property  in  a        large
commercial town.
(4)    where the gift is of shares in a land company.”

11.   A perusal of the above shows that while gift of immovable property  is
not complete unless the donor parts with the  possession  and  donee  enters
into possession but if the property is in occupation of  tenants,  gift  can
be completed by delivery of title deed or by request to  tenants  to  attorn
to the donee or by mutation.  It is further  clear  that  gift  of  property
which is capable of division is irregular but can be perfected and  rendered
valid by subsequent partition or delivery. Exceptions  to  the  rule  are  :
where the gift is made by one co-heir to the other; where  the  gift  is  of
share in a zemindari or taluka;  where  gift  is  of  a  share  in  freehold
property in a large commercial town, and where gift is of share  in  a  land
company.
12.   The courts below appear  to  have  quoted  “Mohammedan  Law”  by  B.R.
Verma, Law Publishers (India) Pvt. Ltd, 13th Edition which is by  and  large
to same effect as Mulla’s book on the subject.
13.   The courts below have held the gift to be invalid on the  ground  that
it was gift of undivided property which is capable of division and  was  not
covered by any of the exceptions to the rule that gift of such  property  is
irregular.  It is submitted by learned counsel for the  appellant  that  the
property is freehold property in the  city  of  Jaipur,  which  is  a  large
commercial town. This has been wrongly ignored by the courts  below  on  the
ground that there was no pleading or proof to that effect.   Description  of
property mentioned in plaint and in the  gift deed itself shows that  it  is
commercial property in the city of Jaipur which is the capital of the  State
of  Rajasthan  and  is,  thus,  a  large  commercial  town.  Requirement  of
possession is also met when right to collect rent has been assigned  to  the
plaintiff under the gift deed itself, genuineness of which stands proved.
14.   We find force in the submission.  The gift had no infirmity under  the
Muslim Law either on the ground that the possession was not delivered or  on
the ground that the gift was hit by Hiba-bil-Musha.  The gift was by  father
to his minor son.  Property is under tenancy.  The gift is by  a  registered
deed.  Right to collect rent stands transferred to donee.  The  property  is
located in the city of Jaipur which is mentioned in Para 2 of the plaint  as
well as in the gift deed.  The courts below are not justified in not  giving
effect to the gift which has been held to be genuine.
15.   Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set  aside  the  impugned  judgment
and decree the suit.

                                                          ……..…………………………….J.
                                                              [ANIL R. DAVE]

                                                         .….………………………………..J.
                                                        [ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL]
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 1, 2016.