Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100
Second Appeal – Scope – Substantial question of law
Jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 100 CPC can be exercised only when a substantial question of law arises. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court, based on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, are not liable to interference unless shown to be perverse, based on inadmissible evidence, or rendered by ignoring material evidence.
(Paras 17–21, 28–32)
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 16(c)
Specific performance – Readiness and willingness
Specific performance cannot be granted unless the plaintiff not only pleads but also proves continuous readiness and willingness to perform essential terms of the contract. Mere assertion without supporting conduct and evidence is insufficient.
(Paras 10–11, 22–26, 27–29)
Specific performance – Equitable relief – Clean hands
Relief of specific performance being discretionary and equitable, a party approaching the Court with unclean hands, false pleas, or forged documents is not entitled to such relief.
(Paras 10–11, 24, 31)
Burden of proof – Agreement of sale denied
Where execution of an unregistered agreement of sale is specifically denied, the burden lies on the plaintiff to prove execution and payment of consideration. The defendant is not required to prove the negative.
(Paras 27–29)
Order XLI Rule 31 CPC – First appellate judgment
Non-repetition of trial court reasoning does not vitiate the appellate judgment if there is substantial compliance with Order XLI Rule 31 CPC and the appellate court records points for consideration, concurs with findings, and assigns its own reasons.
(Paras 14–16, 19–21)
Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960 – Section 32(c)
Jurisdiction – Civil Court
Jurisdiction of the Civil Court is to be determined on the basis of plaint averments. Where the rent pleaded is below the statutory threshold, the bar under Section 32(c) of the Act is not attracted.
(Paras 17–18)
Landlord and tenant – Eviction and specific performance – Parallel proceedings
Where suit for specific performance filed by tenant is found to be an afterthought following eviction proceedings and is based on a forged agreement, dismissal of the specific performance suit and decree of eviction are justified.
(Paras 3, 10–11, 31–32)
Equitable relief – Grant of time to vacate
Even while dismissing second appeals, the High Court may grant reasonable time to the tenant to vacate the premises on equitable considerations.
(Paras 33–35)
ANALYSIS (ISSUE-WISE)
1. Background and nature of litigation
Two suits were tried together:
• an eviction suit filed by the owner, and
• a suit for specific performance filed by the tenant.
The Trial Court dismissed the suit for specific performance and decreed eviction. Both first appeals were dismissed, leading to the present second appeals.
(Paras 1–5)
2. Findings of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court
The Trial Court held that:
-
the tenant failed to prove execution of the agreement of sale,
-
readiness and willingness were not established,
-
the alleged agreement was forged and an afterthought, and
-
the tenant approached the Court with unclean hands.
These findings were affirmed by the First Appellate Court.
(Paras 10–11)
3. Substantial questions raised in second appeal
The principal grounds urged were:
-
alleged non-compliance with Order XLI Rule 31 CPC, and
-
alleged bar of civil court jurisdiction under Section 32(c) of the AP Rent Control Act.
(Para 12)
4. Order XLI Rule 31 CPC
The High Court held that the First Appellate Court framed points for consideration, concurred with the Trial Court, and assigned reasons. Substantial compliance was found, and no infirmity was made out.
(Paras 14–16, 19–21)
5. Jurisdiction under Rent Control Act
The Court held that jurisdiction depends on plaint averments. Since rent pleaded was Rs.1,100/- per month, the statutory bar under Section 32(c) was not attracted.
(Paras 17–18)
6. Readiness and willingness & burden of proof
Applying Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and binding precedents, the Court held that:
-
mere pleading of readiness and willingness is insufficient,
-
conduct of the plaintiff is decisive, and
-
failure to issue notice or tender balance consideration is fatal.
The plaintiff failed to discharge the burden of proving execution and consideration.
(Paras 22–29)
7. Scope of Section 100 CPC
The Court reiterated that it cannot re-appreciate evidence or disturb concurrent findings of fact in the absence of perversity or a substantial question of law. None was found.
(Paras 17–21, 28–32)
8. Final relief
Both second appeals were dismissed. However, considering equities, the appellant was granted six months’ time to vacate the shop.
(Paras 32–35)
RATIO DECIDENDI
-
Specific performance cannot be granted unless the plaintiff proves continuous readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act; mere assertion without supporting conduct is insufficient.
-
Where execution of an agreement of sale is denied, the burden lies entirely on the plaintiff to prove execution and payment of consideration; the defendant is not required to prove the negative.
-
Concurrent findings of fact dismissing a suit for specific performance and decreeing eviction, based on appreciation of evidence, are not open to interference in second appeal in the absence of a substantial question of law.
-
Substantial compliance with Order XLI Rule 31 CPC is sufficient; non-elaborate repetition of trial court reasoning does not vitiate an appellate judgment.
-
Civil court jurisdiction under the AP Rent Control Act is determined on plaint averments; where rent pleaded is below the statutory threshold, the bar under Section 32(c) does not apply.
-
Even while dismissing second appeals, the High Court may grant reasonable time to vacate on equitable considerations.
