IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
I A Nos 4-6, 7-9, 10-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25-27, 28-30, 31-
33, 34-36, 37-39, 40-42
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NOS 12164-12166 OF 2016
THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU REP.BY SEC.
AND ORS ..Appellants
VERSUS
K. BALU AND ANR. ..Respondents
WITH I A NOS 5, 6 AND 7 IN C A NO 12169 OF 2016
WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO 12170 OF 2016
AND OTHER UNREGISTERED I.A.s ON BOARD
O R D E R
Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J
On 15 December, 2016, this Court delivered judgment in a batch of Civil
Appeals originating from the State of Tamil Nadu and the States of Punjab
and Haryana. The decision of this Court is reported as ‘State of Tamil Nadu
represented by its Secretary, Home, Prohibition and Excise Department Vs.
K.Balu[1] . The issue which the Court addressed was the presence of liquor
vends on national and state highways across the country. Official figures
of road accidents, with their attendant fatalities and injuries provided
the backdrop for the intervention of this Court. This Court adverted to
the consistent policy of the Union Government to curb drunken driving and,
as an incident of the policy, to remove liquor vends on national highways.
The judgment of this Court concludes that there is no justification to
allow liquor vends on state highways (while prohibiting them on national
highways) having due regard to drunken driving being one of the significant
causes of road accidents in India.Hence, by the judgment of this Court, the
following directions have been issued for stopping the grant of licences
for the sale of liquor along national and state highways and over a
distance of 500 metres from the outer edge of the highway or a service lane
alongside. 1 April 2017 is fixed as the date for phasing out existing
licences. The directions are set out below:
All states and union territories shall forthwith cease and desist from
granting licences for the sale of liquor along national and state highways;
The prohibition contained in (i) above shall extend to and include
stretches of such highways which fall within the limits of a municipal
corporation, city, town or local authority;
The existing licences which have already been renewed prior to the date of
this order shall continue until the term of the licence expires but no
later than 1 April 2017;
All signages and advertisements of the availability of liquor shall be
prohibited and existing ones removed forthwith both on national and state
highways;
No shop for the sale of liquor shall be (i) visible from a national or
state highway; (ii) directly accessible from a national or state highway
and (iii) situated within a distance of 500 metres of the outer edge of the
national or state highway or of a service lane along the highway.
All States and Union territories are mandated to strictly enforce the above
directions. The Chief Secretaries and Directors General of Police shall
within one month chalk out a plan for enforcement in consultation with the
state revenue and home departments. Responsibility shall be assigned inter
alia to District Collectors and Superintendents of Police and other
competent authorities. Compliance shall be strictly monitored by calling
for fortnightly reports on action taken.
These directions issue under Article 142 of the Constitution. “
This clutch of applications, nearly 68 of them, have been filed basically
for (i) extension of time for compliance, in certain cases; or (ii)
modification or, as the case may be, recalling the judgment delivered by
this Court.
We may at the outset indicate that having regard to the nature and
importance of the issue which finds reflection in the judgment delivered by
this Court and the significant element of public interest that is involved
in dealing with road accidents caused due to drunken driving on the
highways of the nation, we have heard arguments extensively on 29 and 30
March, 2017 so that the matter can be addressed before the deadline of 1
April 2017. Some States and private parties who were not before the Court
in the course of the original proceedings urged that their submissions in
regard to the directions issued by this Court should be taken into account.
Hence, we were of the view that in the interest of fairness it would be
appropriate to enable a dispassionate consideration of their perspectives
in order to determine whether any modification is required and if so, the
nature of the modification that may be warranted in the final judgment of
this Court. We have, therefore, not been trammelled by the technicality of
whether these ‘Interlocutory Applications’ would be maintainable in a
proceeding which has been disposed of. Having regard to the importance of
the issues which have been addressed in the judgment and order, we were of
the considered view that this Court should have the benefit of the
assistance rendered by States who have moved this Court and of parties with
diverse perspectives so as to facilitate an outcome which is both just and
is arrived at after a fair hearing. We have accordingly proceeded to
follow that line of action and have been assisted over the previous two
dates of hearing by learned counsel who have brought to bear on their task
a considerable degree of industry on the subject.
For convenience of reference, we may indicate that eight States (besides
the Union Territory of Pondicherry) have moved this Court in the present
proceedings. The States which are before the Court are :
Andhra Pradesh
Himachal Pradesh
Karnataka
Kerala
Sikkim
Telangana
Meghalaya
Tamil Nadu
We may indicate that the following States have not filed any applications :
Arunachal Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Chhattisgarh
Goa
Gujarat
Haryana
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Manipur
Mizoram
Nagaland
Odisha
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tripura
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
During the course of the proceedings, an affidavit has been filed by the
Chief Secretary of the Government of Madhya Pradesh stating that the
judgment rendered by this Court has been accepted by the State Government,
following a resolution by the Council of Ministers on 16 January 2017. The
Chief Secretary informs the Court that :
“In compliance of the order of 15 December, 2016 passed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India, New Delhi, in Civil Appeal No.12164-12166/2016, the
Council of Ministers of Madhya Pradesh, in its meeting at 16th January has
ensured to comply in the Excise Policy Year 2017-18 that there shall be no
Liquor Shop situated within a distance of 500 Metre from the service lane
of the National/State Highways. No Liquor Shop shall be visible or
accessible directly from the National/State Highways. Any signage or Board
or advertisement depicting the availability of the liquor in any form shall
be prohibited.
The Government of Madhya Pradesh, Commercial Tax Department, has issued
order of aforesaid intent regarding to the location of Liquor Shops at
National/State Highways in point No.4 of its order No.F.B.-01-
01/2017/2/Five, dated 17th January 2017. (Copy of the order is attached)
For general information of the said provisions to the Public instructions
of aforesaid intent have been issued in respect to disposal of retail sale
shops of country/foreign liquor, Arrangements year 2017-18, which have been
published in Madhya Pradesh Gazette (Extra Ordinary) No.27 dated 18 January
2017”.
On behalf of the Delhi Tourism Development Corporation it has been stated
that out of the 547 vends for liquor, 14 are in breach of the 500 metre
norm. A Committee was constituted for the shifting of these liquor vends,
and the process has begun. An extension of six months has been sought.
During the course of the hearing, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the State of Andhra Pradesh informed the Court that the State Government
has accepted the judgment and is accordingly withdrawing the Interlocutory
Application filed by it. I.A.D.No. 11840 is accordingly dismissed as
withdrawn.
The State of Telangana has similarly informed the Court that under its
excise policy, the excise year is to end on 30 September. The limited
prayer before the Court is an extension of time for compliance so as to
facilitate the expiry of the current licences at the end of the excise year
on 30 September 2017.
Besides the States listed earlier, the Court has also been seized of
Interlocutory Applications instituted by individual licencees of liquor or,
as the case may be, of associations representing the interests of the
trade.
The principle line of submission addressed before this Court by the learned
Attorney General for India (appearing on behalf of the State of Tamil Nadu)
is that the judgment rendered by this Court has transgressed the
limitations on the constitutional power conferred by Article 142. The
basis on which this submission has been urged is that the excise rules
which are framed by different States under their enabling legislative
powers prescribe distances for the location of liquor shops with reference
to the highways. For instance, it has been stated that the distance
prescribed in certain state excise rules is 220 metres. Similarly an
exemption is available for municipal and local areas through which a
segment of a highway passes. It has been urged that the prescription of
distance under the state excise rules is interfered with by the directions
issued by this Court which prohibit shops for the sale of liquor within a
distance of 500 metres from the outer edge of national or state highways
or of a service lane along the highway. The learned Attorney General
submits that topographic and geographical conditions of each State are
distinct, which is why excise rules across the country prescribe varying
distances from the highways for location of liquor shops. Hence it has
been urged that it is not appropriate for this Court to prescribe a fixed
distance of 500 metres. The Attorney General urge that the Committee
appointed by this Court (chaired by Justice S.Radhakrishnan, a former Judge
of this Court) recommended a distance only of 100 metres. The error, in
the submission of the Attorney General, lies in comparing national and
state highways. Moreover, it is urged that even if the prohibition were to
apply to both national and state highways, an exemption ought to be
provided for the location of liquor shops in municipal areas through which
the state highways traverse. Alternately, it was urged that a smaller
prohibition in terms of distance would be appropriate in relation to state
highways. The Attorney General has confined his submission to the state
highways only.
Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel has urged that the judgment
rendered by this Court is unconstitutional and is in the nature of judicial
policy making.
The Union of India is represented in these proceedings (as in the
proceedings which led to the judgment dated 15 December 2016) by Shri
Panda. Shri Panda has unequivocally asserted that the Union government
stands by the judgment rendered by this Court on 15 December 2016. Shi
Panda has submitted that the judgment is supported by the consistent policy
and advisories of the Union government to the states to curb drunken
driving and to prohibit the sale of liquor along national highways.
In dealing with these submissions, we must at the outset notice that this
Court while exercising its jurisdiction has neither formulated policy nor
(as we shall indicate) has it assumed a legislative function. The basis
and foundation of the judgment delivered on 15 December 2016 is (i) the
policy of the Union Government, formulated by the Union Ministry of Road
Transport and Highways (MoRTH); (ii) the decision of the National Road
Safety Council (NRSC), which is an apex body for road safety established
under Section 215 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; (iii) advisories issued
by the Union Government to the states over a period of one decade; and (iv)
the Parliamentary mandate of zero tolerance for driving under the influence
of alcohol, evident in Section 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The
judgment of this Court extensively reproduced the statistics on road
accidents from official data released by MoRTH in its Transport Research
Wing, the decisions of NRSC and the advisories issued over the previous
decade by the Union Government. The judgment of this Court has inter alia
adverted to the decision taken in a meeting held thirteen years ago by NRSC
to the effect that licences for liquor shops should not be given along the
national highways. Besides this, the Court has also relied upon advisories
issued by MoRTH to the States and Union Territories on 26 October 2007, 1
December 2011, 18 March 2013 and 21 May 2014. Section 185 of the Motor
Vehicles Act is indicative of a Parliamentary intent to penalise driving
under the influence of alcohol. The conclusions which have been drawn by
this Court in paragraph 9 of its judgment, which we extract below are hence
based, on the considered policy of the Union Government :
“9. The material which has been placed on record indicates that :
India has a high rate of road accidents and fatal road accidents – one of
the advisories states that it is the highest in the world with an accident
occurring every four minutes;
There is a high incidence of road accidents due to driving under the
influence of alcohol;
The existence of liquor vends on national highways is in the considered
view of the National Road Safety Council and Mo RTH – expert authorities
with domain knowledge – a cause for road accidents on national highways;
Advisories have been issued to the State Governments and Union Territories
to close down liquor vends on national highways and to ensure that no fresh
licences are issued in the future…”
Having said this the Court observed that there is no logical basis to
distinguish between national and state highways. The menace of drunken
driving and the resultant fatalities or injuries are not confined only to
national highways. Hence, the judgment of this Court is neither an
exercise of the court having formulated a policy or of having embarked upon
a legislative exercise.
15. The submission of the Attorney General (representing the State of
Tamil Nadu) and of other learned senior counsel who adopted the same line
of argument, which is based on the state excise rules is lacking in
substance. The state excise rules contain enabling provisions. They
provide for a discretion for the grant of liquor licences. No individual
has a vested right to obtain a licence. There is no fundamental right to
carry on business in liquor since as a matter of constitutional doctrine,
Article 19(1)(g) does not extend to trade in liquor which is consistently
regarded as res extra commercium. Where an excise rule which has been
formulated by a state government provides for the maintenance of a
specified distance from an institution or amenity, what this postulates is
that no licence can be granted at all by the State Government within that
distance. The state has a discretion on whether a licence should be
granted under its enabling powers. No individual can assert a right to the
grant of a licence : trading in liquor is a privilege conferred by the
state. The directions which have been issued by this Court do not breach
any norm in the nature of a prohibition nor do they operate to lift a
prohibition imposed by law. The effect and purport of the directions is
that in the interest of public safety and public health, the distance from
the outer edge of national or state highways or a service lane along the
highway is to be maintained of 500 metres. This does not amount to the
assumption of a legislative function by the Court. In fact the requirement
of maintaining a distance from the highway (which even according to the
submission of counsel is adopted in a large number of states) ensures that
the prohibition on the grant of licences along the highway is not defeated
by the presence of outlets in close proximity to the highway. The
maintenance of an adequate buffer is a necessary incident of the principle,
which is to prevent ready availability of liquor to users of a highway. In
any event, no private individual can be heard to make a grievance of the
prescription of 500 metres which is manifestly in public interest.
16. In the teeth of the statistics on road accidents which are made
available to the court by MoRTH, we are not inclined to accept the
submission of Shri K.K.Venugopal, learned senior counsel, that drunken
driving is not the most important cause of road accidents (over-speeding
according to learned counsel being the main cause). Over-speeding can also
occur due to the driver being under influence of alcohol. Learned counsel
urged that even in a ‘dry’ state like Gujarat, accidents occur due to
drunken driving. Apart from the questionable authenticity of a private web-
site on the internet, we have considered it more appropriate to place
reliance on official data of MoRTH. It is also necessary to emphasise that
there is a tendency to under-report drunken driving as a cause of accidents
with a view not to prejudice the claims of victims or their heirs to
compensation. In fact even the data relied upon by Shri Venugopal states
that in 2011, the highest prevalence of accidents due to drunken driving
was in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil
Nadu. We therefore do not find any substance in the submission.
17. The next aspect of the submissions urged before the Court by learned
senior counsel is that state highways traverse across towns, cities and
villages. It has been urged that the application of the prohibitory
distance of 500 metres would cause serious hardship particularly if more
than one state highway is found to intersect a municipal area. The example
of the city of Coimbatore was cited before this Court to urge that where
more than one highway intersects a municipal area the obligation to observe
a distance of 500 metres would operate to cause serious prejudice. The
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the associations representing the
liquor trade or, as the case may be, individual licencees urged that a
graduated solution which exempts those segments of the state highways which
traverse through villages, cities and towns should be adopted. Shri Kapil
Sibal, Shri Harish Salve, Dr A M Singhvi, Shri Jayant Bhushan, learned
senior counsel, as well as other learned counsel suggested the same
approach. As and by way of an example, Shri Devdatt Kamat, learned counsel
appearing for the State of Karnataka informed the Court that under the
state excise rules, an exemption is provided from the application of a
prescribed distance of 220 metres in the case of a municipality with a
population of less than 20,000 people.
18.. To further buttress the submission, it was urged that the direction
which has been issued by the Court will result in a loss of revenue to the
States. The direction, it was submitted, would result in individual
hardship, in cases where the shifting of a liquor shop may not be possible
due to geographical location or topography. Alternately, it was submitted
that the shifting of a liquor shop may encounter other difficulties such as
the presence of residential areas or the requirement of maintaining a
stipulated distance from educational and religious institutions.
19. The judgment delivered by this Court on 15 December 2016 indicates a
rationale and basis for not allowing the exemption for those segments of
national and state highways which fall within the limits of municipal or
local authorities. This Court noted that such an exclusion would defeat
the policy since the availability of liquor along such stretches of
national or state highways would merely allow drivers to replenish the
stock of alcohol, resulting in a situation which the policy seeks to avoid
in the first place the directions which have been issued by this Court
restrain the grant of licences for the sale of liquor along national and
state highways and within a stipulated distance of 500 metres of the outer
edge of a highway or of a service lane along the state highway. Sale of
liquor along the highways is not exhaustive of the broad canvas of areas in
which licences which may be granted by a State. Apart from areas along
the national and state highways (or the stipulated distance of 500 metres),
licences can be granted over other areas of the States and Union
Territories subject to compliance with the other requirements of the excise
rules. No state has placed any data before the Court to indicate that no
licence can be granted at all by it in an area other than along a state
highway or the buffer distance prescribed. It would defy reason to assume
that in municipal areas, availability of liquor is only along the segment
of a highway. It may be attractive to the vendor to sell liquor along the
highway but that is not the touchstone of a norm which protects public
health and seeks to curb fatalities on the highways of the nation. The
states are free to realise revenues from liquor licences in the
overwhelmingly large swathe of territories that lie outside the national
and state highways and the buffer distance of 500 metres.
20. The pernicious nature of the sale of liquor along the national and
state highways cannot be ignored. Drunken driving is a potent source of
fatalities and injuries in road accidents. The Constitution preserves and
protects the right to life as an over-arching constitutional value. The
preservation of public health and of public safety is an instrument of
enhancing the right to life as a constitutionally protected value. Where a
balance has to be drawn between protection of public health and safety and
the need to protect road users from the menace of drunken driving (on the
one hand) and the trade in liquor (on the other hand) the interests of the
latter must be subordinate to the former.
21. Another submission which has been urged on behalf of the applicants is
that the expert committee appointed by this Court (chaired by Justice S
Radhakrishnan, a former Judge of this Court) has recommended a distance of
100 metres with reference to highways. In view of this recommendation it
has been submitted that this Court ought not to have fixed the minimum
distance at 500 metres. We find no merit in the submission. The
recommendation of the Committee cannot be placed on a higher footing than
what it purports to be namely, a recommendation. The opinion of the Expert
Committee was duly cited before this Court during the course of the
proceedings leading upto the judgment dated 15 December 2016. We are of
the view that a distance of 100 metres with reference to the highway is not
adequate to ensure that users of the highway do not seek access to the
sale of liquor in close proximity to the highway. A distance of merely 100
metres will not serve the purpose which is sought to be achieved. Hence, we
have not accepted that part of the recommendation of the Committee but have
considered it appropriate to enhance the minimum distance.
22. After considering the submissions which have been urged before this
Court, we are of the view that there are three areas where the rigors of
the directions which have been issued by this Court may require to be
suitably modulated without affecting the basic principle underlying the
judgment. . The first is in relation to limits of local bodies with a
population of less than 20,000 people. In such areas, it has been urged
before this Court that a state highway is the main thoroughfare area along
which the township has developed in small clusters of 20,000 or less.
Hence, the requirement of maintaining a distance of 500 metres from the
outer edge of the highway or service lane may result in a situation where
the entire local area may fall within the prohibited distance. We find
some substance in the submission. We must emphatically clarify that even in
such areas falling under local bodies with a population of less than
20,000, no licence for the sale of liquor should be issued along either a
national or state highway or a service lane along the highway.
Similarly, the sale of liquor should be from a point which is neither
visible from a national or state highway or which is directly accessible
from a national or state highway. However, in such a situation, the
prohibited distance should in our view be restricted to 220 metres from the
outer edge of the national or state highway or of a service lane along the
highway. We accordingly direct that the following paragraph shall be
inserted, after direction (v) in paragraph 24 of the operative directions
of this Court in the judgment dated 15 December 2016 namely :
“In the case of areas comprised in local bodies with a population of
20,000 people or less, the distance of 500 metres shall stand reduced to
220 metres”.
23. The second area upon which we propose to issue a relaxation is in
respect of direction (iii) contained in paragraph 24 of the judgment of
this Court. This Court has directed that existing licences which have been
renewed prior to the date of the order shall continue only until the term
of the licence expires but not later than 1 April 2017. This was on the
basis that the excise year ends on 31 March with the end of the financial
year. This Court has been apprised during the course of hearing, that
different states have different periods of operation for their excise
years. Shri P.P.Rao, learned senior counsel, urged that the implementation
of the directions should be carried out so as to inflict ‘minimum pain’ on
the trade, which is not illegal. For instance, our attention has been
drawn to the fact that the excise year in Telangana commences on 1 October
and ends on 30 September of the following year. In the State of Andhra
Pradesh, the excise year is stated to end on 30 June. Licencees to whom
licences have been allotted prior to the date of the judgment would have
made their investments. The cut-off date of 1 April 2017 was intended to
protect such individuals. However, some modification is warranted due to
the prevalence of varying excise years. In our view, the ends of justice
would be met by issuing the following direction in continuation of
direction (iii) in paragraph 24 of the judgment of this Court :
“In the case of those licences for the sale of liquor which have been
renewed prior to 15 December 2016 and the excise year of the concerned
state is to end on a date falling on or after 1 April 2017, the existing
licence shall continue until the term of the licence expires but in any
event not later than 30 September 2017”.
In other words, no licence shall either be granted or renewed or shall
remain in operation in violation of the direction of this Court beyond 30
September 2017.
24. In the State of Tamil Nadu, liquor vends are operated by TASMAC which
is a state owned entity. In the judgment of this Court, time until 1 April,
2017 was granted on the request of the State. Hence, we decline to grant
any further extension to the State of Tamil Nadu.
25. The third area is in relation to the States of Sikkim (argued by Shri
A.K.Ganguly, learned senior counsel) and Meghalaya which have moved this
Court for a suitable modification of the judgment having regard to the
nature of the hilly terrain. In relation to the State of Sikkim, this Court
has been apprised on behalf of the State Government that nearly 82 per cent
of the area of the state is forested and 92 per cent of the shops will have
to be closed as a result of the directions of this Court. Similarly, the
State of Meghalaya has placed before this Court peculiar conditions
prevailing in the State as a result of the hilly terrain. We are of the
view that insofar as the States of Meghalaya and Sikkim are concerned, it
would suffice if the two states are exempted only from the application of
the 500 metre distance requirement provided in paragraph 24(v)(iii) of the
judgment of this Court on 15 December 2016.
26.. Insofar as the State of Himachal Pradesh is concerned, we are of the
view that the exemption which has been granted earlier in respect of areas
falling under local bodies with a population of 20,000 will sufficiently
protect the interests of the State. No further relaxation is granted over
and above what has already been stated in that regard.
27. Finally we clarify that we are not inclined to issue a direction in
terms as sought by Shri Aryama Sundaram, learned senior counsel and other
counsel that the judgment of this Court should be clarified so as to apply
only to shops involving sale of liquor. Since the object of the direction
is to prevent drunken driving, no such relaxation can be made which would
defeat the object which is sought to be achieved. Consequently, the
directions issued by this Court cannot be read down, as suggested. The
directions shall be read, as they stand.
28. We accordingly dispose of this batch of Interlocutory applications in
terms of the above. The Civil Appeal shall stand disposed of in terms of
the judgment dated 15 December 2016 and the order passed today.
...........................................CJI
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR]
...........................................J
[Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD]
...........................................J
[L NAGESWARA RAO]
New Delhi
MARCH 31 2017
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
REVIEW PETITION (CIVIL) D.NO. 6688 OF 2017
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 12164-12166 OF 2016
STATE OF U.P. … Petitioner
THR.PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, EXCISE
versus
K. BALU & ORS. … Respondents
O R D E R
Permission to file Review Petiton is granted. Objection raised
by the office is waived.
In view of the order passed by this Court on 31 March 2017 in
I.A.Nos.4 to 6 etc.etc. in C.A.Nos.12164-12166 of 2016 and also the
judgment of this Court dated 15 December 2016 in Civil Appeal Nos.12164-
12166 of 2016 etc, this Review Petition is also disposed of.
.....…………..……………….…....…CJI.
(Jagdish Singh Khehar)
………………...…………………….…J.
(Dr D Y Chandrachud)
………………...…………………….…J.
New Delhi; (L. Nageswara Rao)
March 31, 2017.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) D.NO. 9250 OF 2017
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 12164-12166 OF 2016
V M SUDHEERAN … Petitioner
versus
PINARAYI VIJAYAN AND ORS. … Respondents
O R D E R
In view of the order passed by this Court on 31 March 2017 in
I.A.Nos.4 to 6 etc.etc. in C.A.Nos.12164-12166 of 2016 and also the
judgment of this Court dated 15 December 2016 in Civil Appeal Nos.12164-
12166 of 2016 etc, this Contempt Petition is also disposed of.
.....…………..……………….…....…CJI.
(Jagdish Singh Khehar)
………………...…………………….…J.
(Dr D Y Chandrachud)
………………...…………………….…J.
New Delhi; (L. Nageswara Rao)
March 31, 2017.
ITEM NO.32(For Orders) COURT NO.1 SECTION XII
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
I.A.Nos.4-6 & 7-9, 10-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25-27, 28-30, 31-33,
34-36, 37-39, 40-42 in Civil Appeal No(s).12164-12166/2016
THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU REP. BY SEC.&ORS Appellant(s)
VERSUS
K. BALU & ANR. Respondent(s)
WITH
I.A.Nos.5, 6 and 7 In C.A. No.12169/2016
C.A. No.12170/2016
[HEARD BY HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE, HON'BLE DR. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD AND
HON'BLE L.NAGESWARA RAO, JJ.]
Date : 31/03/2017 These applications/appeal were called on for
orders today.
For Appearing Mr. Subramonium Prasad, Sr. Adv.(AAG)
Parties Mr. B. Balaji, Adv.
Mr. Muthuvel Palani, Adv.
Mr. S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Adv.
Mr. Mrityunjai Singh, Adv.
Mr.R.Venkata Ramani, Sr.Adv.
Mr.V. G. Pragasam, Adv.
Mr.Prabu Ramasubramanian, Adv.
Mr. Yashraj Singh Bundela, Adv.
Mr. Ankur Talwar, Adv.
Dr.Rajeev Dhawan, Sr.Adv.
Mr.N.K.Perumal, Adv.
Mr.H.D.Kumaravel, Adv.
Ms.V.S.Lakshmi, Adv.
Mr.A.Venayagan Balan, Adv.
Dr.Rajeev Dhawan, Sr.Adv.
Mr.D.Das, Adv.
Mr.R.B.Phookan, Adv.
Ms.Neha T.Phookan, Adv.
Mr.Ishan Das, Adv.
Mr.Shailesh Madiyal, Adv.
Mr.D.K.Thakur, AAG
Mr.Shariq Ahmed, Adv.
Mr.Varinder Kumar Sharma, Adv.
Mr.M. Ram Babu, Adv.
Mr.Ashok Bannidinni, Adv.
Mr.P.V.Saravana Raja, Adv.
Mr.Meka Venkata Rama Krishna, Adv.
Mr.Vamshi Rao, Adv.
Mr. Rayala Subba Rao, Adv.
Mr.Subodh Kr.Pathak, Adv.
Mr.Abhijeet Chatterjee, Adv.
Ms.Shashi Ranjan, Adv.
Mr.Adil Alvi, Adv.
Ms.Devahuti Tamuli, Adv.
Ms. Barnati Basak, Adv.
Mr.Avijit Patnaik, Adv.
Mr.Srisatya Mohanty, Adv
Mr. P.V. Dinesh, Adv.
Ms. Sindhu T.P., Adv
Mr. Bineesh K, Adv.
Mr. Rajendra Beniwal, Adv.
Mr. Arushi Singh, Adv.
Mr.Raghavendra S.Srivatsa, Adv.
Mr.Venkita Subramoniam, Adv.
Mr.Rahat Bansal, Adv.
Mr.G.Prakash, Adv.
Mr.Jishnu ML, Adv.
Mrs. Priyanka Prakash, Adv.
Mrs. Beena Prakash, Adv.
Mr. Manu Srinath, Adv.
Mr.Ram Sankar, Adv.
Mr.P.Jegan, Adv.
Mr. Arun Singh, Adv.
Mr. Surya Narayana Patro, Adv.
Mr. Y. Lokesh, Adv.
for Mr. R.V. Kameshwaran, AOR
Mr. Amol N. Suryawanshi, Adv.
Mr. Prashant Kenjale, Adv.
Mr.Abhijit Chattopadhyay, Adv.
Mr.Sandeep Lamsa, Adv.
Mr. Sanjay Kumar Lal Das, Adv.
Ms. Priyanka Das, Adv.
Ms.Nandini Sen, Adv.
Mr.Suman Sengupta, Adv
Mr.Venkateshwar Rao Anumulu, Adv.
Mr.Prabhakar Parnam, Adv.
Mr.Arun Singh, Adv.
Mr.R.V.Kameshwaran, Adv.
Mr. Ajit Kr. Sinha, Sr. Adv.
Mr.A.K.Panda, Sr.Adv.
Ms.Binu Tamta, Adv.
Mr.S.S.Rawat, Adv.
Mr.G.S.Makker, Adv.
Ms. Somya Rathore, Adv.
Mr. Ansh Singh Luthra, Adv.
Mr.Dhruv Dewan, Adv.
Mr.Vikshit Arora, Adv.
Ms.Reena Choudhary, Adv.
Mr.Koshubh Devmani, Adv.
Ms.Ananya Ghosh, Adv.
Mr.Mahesh Agarwal, Adv.
Mr.Abhinav Agrawal, Adv.
Ms. Sadapuria Mukherjee, Adv.
Mr. Munjal Bhatt, Adv.
Mr.Ashutosh Dubey, Adv.
Mr.Krishnendu Sarkar, Adv.
Mr.Abhishek Chauhan, Adv.
Mr.V.S.Rawat, Adv.
Ms. Rajshri Dubey, Adv.
Mr. Sushil Pandey, Adv.
Mr.A.Mariarputham, AG
Ms.Aruna Mathur, Adv.
Mr.Avneesh Arputham, Adv.
Ms.Anuradha Arputham, Adv.
Mr.Amit Arora, Adv.
Mr.P.V.Yogeshwaran, Adv.
Mr.Ashish Kr.Upadhyay, Adv.
Mr.Suresh Ch.Tripathy, Adv.
Mr.Prasenjit Keswani, Adv.
Mr.Satyajit Saha, Adv.
for Mrs. V.D. Khanna, AOR
Mr.Aashish Gupta, Adv.
Mr.Dushyant Manocha, Adv.
Mr.Ishan Gaur, Adv.
Mr.Aditya Mukherjee, Adv.
Ms.Taruna Dhingra, Adv.
Mr.S.S.Shroff, Adv.
Mr.V.N.Raghupathy, Adv.
Mr.Parikshit P.Angadi, Adv.
Mr. Chinmay Deshpande, Adv.
Mr.Jayesh K.Unnikrishnan, Adv.
Ms.Manju Das, Adv.
Mr.Aviral Kashyap, Adv.
Ms. Sasmita Tripathy, Adv.
Mr.Aarohi Bhalla, Adv.
Mr.Ardhendumauli Kumar Prasad, Adv.
Mr.S.K.Das, Adv.
Mr.R.Nedumaran, Adv.
Ms.Suvira Lal, Adv.
Mr.M.C.Dhingra, Adv.
Ms.G.N.Rampal, Adv.
Mr.Pijush Kant Roy, Adv.
Mr.Ravi Kamal Gupta, Adv
Mr.Nikunj Dayal, Adv.
Mr. Pramod Dayal, Adv.
Ms. Payal Dayal, Adv.
Mr.Tejaswi Kumar Pradhan, Adv.
Mr.M.Paikaray, Adv.
Mr.Sumanth Nookala, Adv.
Mr.Goli Ramakrishna, Adv.
Mr.Vinay Navare, Adv.
Ms.Abha R.Sharma, Adv.
Mr.Kaleeswaram Raj, Adv.
Mr.Suvidutt M.S., Adv.
Mr.Sai Deepak Iyer, Adv.
Mr.Arnold Harvey, Adv.
Mr. Ashutosh Nagar, Adv.
Mr.Manoj V.George, Adv.
Mr.B.D.Das, Adv.
Ms.Shilpa Liza George, Adv.
Mr.Amit Masih, Adv.
Mr.Tarun Kant Samantray, Adv.
Mr.Roy Abraham, Adv.
Ms.Seema Jain, Adv.
Ms.Rajni Ohri Lal, Adv.
for Mr. Himinder Lal, AOR
Mr.Pankaj Pandey, Adv.
Dr. Gajendra Prasad Singh, Adv.
Mr. S. Thananjayan, Adv.
Mr. Jothimanian, Adv.
Mr. V. K. Biju, Adv.
Mr. Ranjan Mukherjee, Adv.
Mr.V.Balaji, Adv.
Mr.T.Ashok Kumar, Adv
Mr.Prashant Kenjale, Adv.
Mr.Atul Sharma, Adv.
Ms.Sripradha K., Adv
Mr. Rakesh K. Sharma, Adv.
Mr.Yatish Mohan, Adv.
Ms.Reena Yadav, Adv.
Mr.Kedar Nath Tripathy, Adv.
Mr.M.A.Aleem Majid, Adv.
Mr.Sameer Parekh, Adv.
Mr.Sumit Goel, Adv.
Ms.Nandita Bajpai, Adv.
Dr. Rajeev B. Masodkar, Adv.
Mr. Azeem Kalebudde, Adv.
Mr. Ravi Sharma, Adv.
Mr. Sumit Kumar, Adv.
Mr. Sudhir Chand Srivastava, Adv.
Ms. Diksha Rai, Adv.
Mr. Sameer Dawar, Adv.
Mr. Narender Singh Yadav, Adv.
Ms. Hetu Arora Sethi, Adv.
Mr. Yogesh Jagia, Adv.
Mr. Amit Sood, Adv.
Mr. Gopal Sankarnarayan, Adv.
Mr. Zeeshan Diwan, Adv.
Mr. Aman Guta, AOR
Mr. Guntur Prabhakar, Adv.
Ms. Prerna Singh, Adv.
Ms. Suvira Lal, Adv.
for Mr. M.C. Dhingra, AOR
Mr. Parveen Kumar Aggarwal, Adv.
Mr. Sanjay Jain, Adv.
Hon'ble Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud pronounced the order of the Court
comprising Hon'ble the Chief Justice, His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice
L. Nageswara Rao.
All interlocutory applications and the civil appeal stand
disposed of, in terms of the reportable signed order.
Review Petition and Contempt Petition also stand disposed of,
in terms of two separate signed orders.
(Renuka Sadana) (Parveen Kumar)
Assistant Registrar AR-cum-PS
[One reportable signed order and two signed orders in Review and Contempt
Petitions are placed on the file]
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[1]
[2] (2017) 2 SCC 281
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REPORTABLE
