2026 INSC 692
Sagar v. State of Haryana
HEAD NOTES
A. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 — Sections 15, 18 & 19 — Heinous offence by child above 16 years — Duty of Children's Court — Mandatory determination under Section 19(1).
(Paras 8–10.8)
Held, after receiving the preliminary assessment of the Juvenile Justice Board under Section 15, the Children's Court is under a mandatory obligation to independently determine under Section 19(1) whether the child should be tried as an adult or as a child. Such determination is a jurisdictional prerequisite and cannot be dispensed with before proceeding with the trial.
B. Interpretation of Statute — Word "may" — Construed as "shall".
(Paras 10.3–10.4)
Held, although Section 19(1) employs the expression "may", the legislative scheme, the serious consequences flowing from the decision, and Rule 13 of the Juvenile Justice Model Rules, 2016 require the expression to be construed as mandatory. The Children's Court must record a reasoned order deciding whether the child is to be tried as an adult or as a child.
C. Juvenile Justice Act — Children's Court — Jurisdiction — Distinction between adult trial and child inquiry.
(Paras 10.3–10.5)
Held, jurisdiction of the Children's Court to conduct a Sessions trial arises only after a reasoned determination under Section 19(1)(i). Where it concludes that trial as an adult is unnecessary, it must itself function as the Juvenile Justice Board and conduct an inquiry in accordance with Sections 18 and 19(1)(ii). The two procedures are fundamentally distinct and cannot be interchanged.
D. Non-compliance with Section 19(1) — Effect.
(Paras 11–14)
Held, failure of the Children's Court to pass an order under Section 19(1) strikes at the root of jurisdiction and vitiates the entire trial. Conviction and sentence rendered without complying with the mandatory statutory safeguard cannot be sustained.
E. Juvenile Justice Act — Heinous offences — Protective scheme.
(Paras 9–10.5)
Held, the Act creates a carefully structured mechanism balancing child rehabilitation with criminal accountability. The preliminary assessment under Section 15 and independent scrutiny under Section 19 constitute substantive safeguards ensuring that no child is subjected to an adult criminal trial without judicial determination.
F. Remand — Refusal — Passage of time.
(Paras 12–14)
Held, where the accused has already crossed the age of 24 years and has undergone substantial incarceration, remanding the matter for fresh determination under Section 19 would serve no meaningful purpose since an effective assessment of the child's mental capacity at the time of the offence is no longer feasible.
G. Practice Direction — Children's Courts.
(Para 15)
Held, every Children's Court, immediately upon receipt of a case transferred under Section 18(3), must first pass a reasoned order under Section 19(1) before proceeding further. Compliance with this statutory mandate is obligatory.
Analysis of Facts
The appellant, aged about 16½ years on the date of the alleged offence, was accused of committing murder along with other assailants. The Juvenile Justice Board conducted the mandatory preliminary assessment under Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 and concluded that he possessed sufficient mental and physical capacity to be tried as an adult. Accordingly, the case was transferred to the Children's Court under Section 18(3).
The Children's Court, however, proceeded directly to conduct a Sessions trial, convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC, and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for fourteen years with directions regarding detention in a place of safety. The High Court affirmed the conviction.
Before the Supreme Court, it was noticed that although the Juvenile Justice Board had complied with Section 15, the Children's Court had never independently passed the mandatory order contemplated by Section 19(1) determining whether the appellant should indeed be tried as an adult.
The Supreme Court held that omission to pass such an order was a jurisdictional defect which vitiated the entire trial. Since the appellant had already attained the age of twenty-four years and had undergone more than six years of incarceration, remanding the matter for a fresh assessment would be futile. Consequently, the conviction and sentence were set aside.
Analysis of Law
The Supreme Court laid down the following principles:
Section 19(1) of the Juvenile Justice Act is mandatory and not merely procedural.
The expression "may" occurring in Section 19(1) must be interpreted as "shall" because the determination directly affects the forum of trial, procedure, punishment and rehabilitation.
The Children's Court must independently apply its mind even after receiving the Juvenile Justice Board's preliminary assessment under Section 15.
Trial as an adult and inquiry as a child involve entirely different statutory procedures and consequences.
The Children's Court acquires jurisdiction to conduct a Sessions trial only after recording a reasoned determination under Section 19(1)(i).
Failure to comply with Section 19(1) renders the entire criminal trial void and vitiates the conviction.
Where remand has become impracticable because of passage of time and attainment of adulthood, the conviction cannot be sustained merely by modifying the sentence.
Ratio Decidendi
The determination contemplated under Section 19(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is a mandatory jurisdictional safeguard. After receiving the Juvenile Justice Board's preliminary assessment under Section 15, the Children's Court must independently decide, by a reasoned order, whether the child should be tried as an adult or as a child. In the absence of such determination, the Court lacks jurisdiction to conduct an adult criminal trial, rendering the entire proceedings, conviction and sentence legally unsustainable.
