Sec.5 of the Limitation Act not applies before the statutory Authorities - We, however, are not expressing any opinion with regard to exercise of suo motu by the Commissioner under Section 69(2) in the present case and it is for the Commissioner to invoke his power under Section 69(2) if he is so satisfied.= Whether applicability of Section 29(2) of Limitation Act is with regard to different limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application to be filed only in a Court or Section 29(2) can be pressed in service with regard to filing of a suit, appeal or application before statutory authorities and tribunals provided in Special or authorities and tribunals provided in Special or Local Laws?Whether the statutory scheme of Act 1959 indicate that Section 5 of Limitation Act is applicable to proceedings before its authorities? = only computation of limitation has been made applicable to the proceedings under Act, 1959. Section 115 cannot be read in a manner as to providing applicability of Section 5. There is no other provision in the scheme from which it can be inferred that Act, 1959 intended applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to proceedings of appeal before the Commission. We, thus, conclude that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable as per the scheme of Act, 1959. but We, however, are not expressing any opinion with regard to exercise of suo motu by the Commissioner under Section 69(2) in the present case and it is for the Commissioner to invoke his power under Section 69(2) if he is so satisfied.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4582 OF 2019
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(CIVIL) NO. 30365 OF 2018)
GANESAN REP BY ITS POWER
AGENT G. RUKMANI GANESAN … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE COMMISSIONER, THE TAMIL NADU
HINDU RELIGIOUS AND CHARITABLE
ENDOWMENTS BOARD & ORS.         … RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN,J.
This appeal has been filed against the judgment dated
04.12.2017   of   Madurai   Bench   of   Madras   High   Court
dismissing   the   writ   appeal   filed   by   the   Appellant.   The
appellant had filed the writ appeal against the judgment
of   learned   single   Judge   dated   22.08.2014   by   which
judgment writ petition filed by the appellant challenging
the   judgment   and   order   dated   31.07.2013   of   the
Commissioner   Tamil   Nadu   Hindu   Religious   Endowment   Board
has been dismissed.
2
2. Brief facts of the case necessary to be noticed for
deciding the appeal are: ­
2.1 The appellant filed an application under Section
63 of Hindu Religious endowment charitable Act,
1959   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   Act   1959)
claiming   his   Ambalam   right.   The   Joint
Commissioner   of   Hindu   Religious   &   charitable
endowment Board after holding an inquiry passed
an order dated 21.12.2010 holding that appellant
to be entitled for Ambalam Right and to receive
first   respect   as   an   Ambalam   in   the   village,
Tirupathartalu, Shiv Gangi District, Tamil Nadu.
2.2 Two writ petitions were filed in the High Court
challenging   the   order   dated   31.12.2010   being
W.P.M.D.   No.   14382   of   2011   filed   by   Radha
Krishnan   and   W.P.   No.185   of   2012   filed   by
Madhavan. Both the writ petitions were dismissed
by   the   High   Court   vide   its   judgment   dated
10.01.2012. A W.P.M.D. No. 379 of 2012 was filed
by   one   Laxmanan   in   which   initially   an   interim
3
order   dated   12.01.2012   was   passed.   The   third
respondent   P.R.   Ramanathan   filed   an   appeal
No.2007   OF   2012   against   the   order   dated
31.12.2010   passed   by   Joint   Commissioner.   The
appeal   filed   by   third   respondent   was   under
Section   69   of   Act,   1959.   W.P.M.D.   No.3379   of
2013   was   filed   by   P.R.   Ramanathan,   third
respondent,   seeking   a   direction   to   decide   his
statutory appeal filed under Section 69 of Act
1959. The High Court vide its judgment and order
dated   07.03.2013   directed   the   commissioner   to
dispose of the appeal expeditiously and in any
case within a period of four months to the date
of the copy of the order.
2.3 A delay condonation application dated 30.04.2013
was filed by third respondent in his appeal no.
2007 of 2012 praying for condonation of delay of
266   days.   The   cause   for   delay   shown   was   that
appellant was ill for 7­8 months and was unable
to travel to Chennai to instruct his counsel. A
counter   affidavit   was   filed   by   the   appellant
objecting the application filed by the appellant
4
for   condonation   of   delay.   In   his   counter
affidavit appellant took a plea that Section 5
of the Limitation Act is not applicable.
2.4 Learned   commissioner   passed   an   order   dated
31.07.2013   condoning   the   delay   of   266   days   in
filing   the   appeal.   Against   the   order   dated
31.07.2013,   writ   petition   was   filed   by   the
appellant   being   W.P.M.D.   No.   13804   of   2013.
Learned   single   Judge   referring   to   certain
provision   of   the   Act   1959   as   well   as   few
decisions   of   this   Court   and   Madras   High   Court
held   that   in   appeal   proceedings   before   the
Commissioner Section 5 of the Limitation Act is
fully   applicable   and   there   is   sufficient   cause
and the delay has rightly been condoned by the
Commissioner. Aggrieved against the judgment of
learned single Judge, writ appeal has been filed
by the appellant which has been dismissed by the
impugned judgment.
2.5 The   Division   Bench   of   the   Madras   High   Court
placed   reliance   on   several   judgments   of   this
5
Court and after referring to various provisions
of the Act, 1959, held that Act 1959 does not
exclude the applicability of the Limitation Act,
1963.   The   appellant   aggrieved   by   the   Division
Bench judgment dated 04.12.2017 has come up in
this appeal.
3. We have heard Shri M. Ajmal Khan, senior Advocate for
the   appellant   and   Shri   S.Nagvathu,   senior   Advocate
appearing   for   the   third   respondent,   as   well   as   learned
counsel appearing for the State.
4. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   submits   that   the
commissioner has no jurisdiction to consider application
filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act. It is submitted
that   the   commissioner   who   is   empowered   to   decide   the
appeal under Section 69 of Act 1959 is not a court. He
submits   that   Section   6(6)   defines   the   commissioner
whereas   Section   6(7)   defines   the   Court,   which   clearly
indicate   that   commissioner   is   not   the   court.   It   is
submitted   that   Section   5   of   the   Limitation   Act   is
applicable only in application filed before a Court. The
6
commissioner   being   not   a   Court,   there   was   no
applicability   of   Section   5   of   the   Limitation
Act.
5. He further submits that by virtue of Section 115 of
Act 1959, the only provision of the Limitation Act which
has been made applicable is that the time requisite for
obtaining   certified   copy   of   order   or   decree   shall   be
excluded.   He   submits   that   specifically   applying
provisions of Section 12(2) of Limitation Act, indicates
that   other   provisions   have   not   been   made   applicable   to
the Act 1959. He submits that in event the limitation Act
was to  be  applicable  to the proceeding  of  appeal  under
1959   Act,   there   was   no   occasion   of   Section   115   of   Act
1959. Limitation Act has been applied only to the extent
as   mentioned   in   Section   115,   other   provisions   are   not
applicable.
6. Learned   counsel   for   the   respondent   refuting   the
submissions of learned counsel for the appellant submits
that although Commissioner is not a Court as defined in
Act 1959, but it is a court for the purposes of Section 5
of the Limitation Act. Relying on Section 110, he submits
7
that   procedure   provided   for   hearing   of   appeal   is   as
nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure under
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to the trial of suits
or   the   hearing   of   the   appeals   as   the   case   may   be.   The
Commissioner has thus all powers of the Court for hearing
the appeal. The authorities under Act 1959 had trappings
of   the   court.   Commissioner   decide   the   appeal   in   a
judicial manner. The scheme of Act 1959 does not indicate
that   it   never   intended   to   exclude   Section   5   of   the
Limitation Act. Reliance has been placed on Section 29(2)
of   the   Limitation   Act   and   it   is   submitted   that   there
being no express exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is fully attracted
in hearing of an appeal by the commissioner.
7. Learned   counsel   for   both   the   parties   have   placed
reliance on various judgments of this court which shall
be   referred   to   while   considering   their   submissions   in
detail.
8. After   hearing   learned   counsel   for   both   the   parties
and   perusal   of   the   record,   following   are   the   questions
which arises for consideration in this appeal:­
8
1)  Whether the Commissioner while hearing the appeal
under Section 69 of Act, 1959, is a Court?
2) Whether   applicability   of   Section   29(2)   of
Limitation   Act   is   with   regard   to   different
limitation   prescribed   for   any   suit,   appeal   or
application to be filed only in a Court or Section
29(2)   can   be   pressed   in   service   with   regard   to
filing   of   a   suit,   appeal   or   application   before
statutory   authorities   and   tribunals   provided   in
Special or Local Laws?
3) Whether the Commissioner while hearing the appeal
under   Section   69   of   Act   1959   is   entitled   to
condone a delay in filing an appeal applying the
provisions   of   Section   5   of   the   Limitation   Act,
1963?
4) Whether the statutory scheme of Act 1959 indicate
that Section 5 of Limitation Act is applicable to
proceedings before its authorities?
Question No.1
9. The above question has to be answered in reference to
9
the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments
Act, 1959. Both the “Commissioner” and “Court” has been
defined under the Act, 1959. The Commissioner is defined
under Section 6(6) which is to the following effect:
“Section   6(6)   “Commissioner"   means   the
Commissioner appointed under section 9;”
10. The Court is defined in Section 6(7) in the following
manner:
“Section 6(7) “Court" means­ (i) in relation to
a   math   or   temple   situated   in   the   Presidency
town, the Chennai City Civil Court;
(ii) in relation to a math or temple situated
elsewhere, the Subordinate Judge's Court having
jurisdiction over the area in which the math or
temple   is   situated,   or   if   there   is   no   such
Court,   the   District   Court   having   such
jurisdiction;
(iii)   in   relation   to   a   specific   endowment
attached to a math or temple, the Court which
would   have   jurisdiction   as   aforesaid   in
relation to the math or temple;
(iv)   in   relation   to   a   specific   endowment
attached to two or more maths or temples, any
Court   which   would   have   jurisdiction   as
aforesaid in relation to either or any of such
maths or temples;”
11. Section 8 of the Act, 1959 enumerates the authorities
10
under the Act. Section 8 is as follows:­
“Section   8.Authorities   under   the   Act.­  There
shall be the following classes of authorities
under this Act, namely.­
(a) The Commissioner;
(aa)Additional Commissioner;
(b) Joint Commissioner;
(c) Deputy Commissioners; and
(d) Assistant Commissioners.”
12. Section   9(1)   provides   that   the   Government   shall
appoint   the   Commissioner   as   it   may   think   fit.   Section
9(2) provides various modes of appointment to the post of
Commissioner.
13. The definition of the Court refers to the Civil Court
constituted   by   Legislature   in   the   State   for
administration of justice. The conventional definition of
the   Court   as   mentioned   in   Advanced   Law   Lexicon   by   P.
Ramanatha Aiyer, Third Edition is:
“A Court is defined in Coke on Littleton as a
place   wherein   justice   is   judicially
administered.   “In every Court, there must be
at   least   three   constituent   parts­   the  actor,
reus  and  judex:   the  actor,  or   plaintiff,   who
complains   or   an   injury   done;   the  reus,   or
defendant,   who   is   called   upon   to   make
satisfaction for it; and the judex, or judicial
power,   which   is   to   examine   the   truth   of   the
fact,   and   to   determine   the   law   arising   upon
that fact, and if any injury appears to have
11
been done, to ascertain, and b its officers to
apply,   the   remedy,”   (3   Steph.   Comm.   6th  Ed.,
pp.383, 385). See also 30 M. 326: 2 MLT 267,
Court is a body in the government to which the
public administration of justice is delegated;
an organised body, with defined powers, meeting
at certain times, and places, for the hearing
and   decision   of   causes   and   other   matters
brought   before   it,   and   aided   in   this,   its
proper business, by its proper officers, viz.,
attorneys and counsels, to present and manage
the business, clerks to record and attest its
acts and decisions, and ministerial officers to
execute   its   commands   and   secure   order   in   its
proceedings.”
14. The constitution of Court in this country has been
by legislative enactments. For constituting Civil Courts,
the   Bengal,   Agra   and   Assam   Civil   Courts   Act,   1887 was
enacted   which   provided   classes   of   civil   courts   and
provided for constitution of courts of District Judges,
Sub­ordinate   Judges   and   Munsifs.   Similarly   for   civil
courts in the town of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras, the
Presidency Small Causes Act, 1882 was enacted.
15. The definition of Court as contained in Section 6(7)
as noted above, thus, clearly indicates that what Act,
1959 refers to a Court is a civil court created in the
State.   The   scheme   of   the   Act   clearly   indicates   that
Commissioner is an authority under the Act who is to be
12
appointed   by   the   Government.   The   Commissioner   is
entrusted with various functions under the Act and one of
the functions entrusted to the Commissioner is hearing of
the   appeal   under   Section   69   of   the   Act,   1959.   In   the
present case we are concerned with Section 69 which is to
the following effect:
“Section 69.Appeal to the Commissioner.­(1)
Any   person   aggrieved   by   any   order   passed   by
1[the   Joint   Commissioner   or   the   Deputy
Commissioner, as the case may be], under any of
the   foregoing   sections   of   this   chapter,   may
within   sixty   days   from   the   date   of   the
publication   of   the   order   or   of   the   receipt
thereof by him as the case may be, appeal to
the Commissioner and the Commissioner may pass
such order thereon as he thinks fit.
(2)   Any   order   passed   by  1[the   Joint
Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner, as the
case may be], in respect of which no appeal has
been preferred within the period specified in
sub­section   (1)   may   be   revised   by   the
Commissioner suo motu and the Commissioner may
call   for   and   examine   the   records   of   the
proceedings   as   to   satisfy   himself   as   to   the
regularity   of   such   proceedings   or   the
correctness,   legality   or   propriety   of   any
decision   or   order   passed   by  1[the   Joint
Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner, as the
case   may   be].   Any   such   order   passed   by   the
Commissioner in respect of an order passed by
1[the   Joint   Commissioner   or   the   Deputy
Commissioner,   as   the   case   may   be],   shall   be
deemed to have been passed by the Commissioner
on an appeal preferred to him under sub­section
(1).
(3)   Any   order   passed   by   the   Commissioner   on
such appeal against which no suit lies to the
13
Court under the next succeeding section or in
which no suit has been instituted in the Court
within the time specified in sub­section (1) of
section 70 may be modified or cancelled by the
Commissioner   if   the   order   has   settled   or
modified a scheme for the administration of a
religious institution or relates to any of the
matters specified in section 66.”
16. Section   70   of   the   Act   further   provides   that   any
party   aggrieved   by   an   order   of   the   Commissioner   under
sub­section (1) or sub­section (2) of Section 69 can file
a suit in the Court against such order. Section 70 is as
follows:
“Section   70.   Suits   and   appeals.­  (1)   Any
party   aggrieved   by   an   order   passed   by   the
Commissioner"­
(i) under sub­section (1) or sub­section (2) of
section 69 and relating to any of the matters
specified in section 63, section 64 or section
67; or
(ii) under section 63, section 64 or section 67
read   with   sub­section   (1)(a),   2   or   (4)(a)   of
section   22   or   under   section   65   may,   within
ninety   days   from   the   date   of   the   receipt   of
such   order   by   him,   institute   a   suit   in   the
Court   against   such   order,   and   the   Court   may
modify or cancel such order, but it shall have
no power to stay of order of the Commissioner
pending the disposal of the suit.
(2)   Any   party   aggrieved   by   a   decree   of   the
Court under sub­section (1), may, within ninety
days from the date of the decree, appeal to the
High Court.”
14
17. When an appeal is provided against the order of the
Commissioner   under   Section   69   to   the   Court   which   is
defined   under   Section   6(7),   there   is   no   question   of
treating the Commissioner as a Court under the statutory
scheme of Act, 1959. We, thus, conclude that Commissioner
is not a Court within the meaning of Act, 1959.
18. We may, however, notice a judgment of this Court in
S. Parthy vs. State of Bank of India, (2000) 5 SCC 355.
In the above case Deputy Commissioner of Labour(Appeals)
was an authority constituted under Section 41(2) of Tamil
Nadu   Shops   and   Establishments   Act,   1947   to   hear   and
decide appeal. The appellant, an official of the State
Bank of India was removed by an order dated 11.01.1983
after   holding   regular   departmental   proceedings.   The
appellant had filed an appeal under Section 41(2) of the
Tamil   Nadu   Shops   and   Establishments   Act,   1947   which
appeal   was   dismissed   holding   that   provisions   of   Tamil
Nadu   Shops   and   Establishments   Act,   1947   are   not
applicable to nationalized Banks. After the dismissal of
the   said   appeal   the   orders   of   Deputy   Commissioner   of
15
Labour(Appeals) dated 01.09.1987 was challenged in this
Court which too are rejected. It was thereafter appellant
instituted a regular suit in the City Civil Court where
the   question   came   for   consideration   regarding
applicability   of   Section   14   of   Limitation   Act.   In   the
above   case   in   paragraph   3   the   issue   was   noted   to   the
following effect:
“3.  In order to bring a suit within the period
of limitation, the appellant claimed benefit of
Section 14 of the Limitation Act on the ground
that he had represented to the Local Board and,
thereafter, filed an appeal under Section 41(2)
of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act,
1947   and   was,   therefore,   prosecuting   “civil
proceedings” in a court with due diligence. It
is claimed that the entire period during which
those   proceedings   were   pending   has   to   be
excluded and if this is done, the suit will be
well within limitation.”
19. In the above context, this Court in paragraphs 12 to
15 laid down following:
“12. It will be noticed that Section 14 of the
Limitation   Act   does   not   speak   of   a   “civil
court” but speaks only of a “court”. It is not
necessary that the court spoken of in Section
14 should be a “civil court”. Any authority or
tribunal having the trappings of a court would
be   a   “court”   within   the   meaning   of   this
section.
15.  Applying   the   above   principles   in   the
instant case, we are of the opinion that the
Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Appeals), which
was   an   authority   constituted   under   Section
16
41(2)   of   the   Tamil   Nadu   Shops   and
Establishments   Act,   1947   to   hear   and   decide
appeals,   was   a   “court”   within   the   meaning   of
Section   14   of   the   Limitation   Act   and   the
proceedings   pending   before   him   were   civil
proceedings.   It   is   not   disputed   that   the
appellant could file an appeal before the Local
Board   of   the   Bank,   which   was   purely   a
departmental   appeal.   In   this   view   of   the
matter, the entire period of time from the date
of   institution   of   the   departmental   appeal   as
also the period from the date of institution of
the   appeal   under   Section   41(2)   before   the
Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Appeals) till it
was   dismissed   will,   therefore,   have   to   be
excluded for computing the period of limitation
for filing the suit in question. If the entire
period   is   excluded,   the   suit,   it   is   not
disputed, would be within time.”
20. There are two reasons due to which the above case is
not applicable in the present case. Firstly, in the above
case this Court was considering applicability of Section
14   of   Limitation   Act   for   excluding   time   (civil
proceeding). The present is a case where applicability of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act has to be examined. Thus,
the   above   judgment   is   distinguished.   The   second   reason
for not relying the above judgment is three­Judge Bench
judgment of this Court in The Commissioner of Sales Tax,
U.P. Lucknow vs. M/s. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur,
(1975) 4 SCC 22. In the above case under the U.P. Sales
Tax   Act,   1948   the   appellate   authority   has   been
17
constituted. The question arose as to whether the period
taken   in   pursuing   the   appellate   proceedings   can   be
excluded by applying Section 14 of the Limitation Act for
purposes   of   filing   revision   before   the   Revisional
Authority   under   Section   10(3­B)   of   the   U.P.   Sales   Tax
Act,   1948.   In   the   above   context,   this   Court   held   that
appellate   authority   and   the   Judge(Revisions)   are   not
courts, hence, Section 14 of the Limitation Act shall not
be   applicable.   In   paragraph   9   following   has   been   laid
down:
“9.  The   above   observations   were   quoted   with
approval   by   this   Court   in  Jagannath   Prasad
case1 and it was held that a Sales Tax Officer
under U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 was not a court
within the meaning of Section 195 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure although he is required
to   perform   certain   quasi­judicial   functions.
The decision in Jagannath Prasad case it seems,
was   not   brought   to   the   notice   of   the   High
Court. In view of these pronouncements of this
Court, there is no room for argument that the
Appellate  Authority  and  the  Judge  (Revisions)
Sales   tax   exercising   jurisdiction   under   the
Sales   Tax   Act,   are   “courts”.   They   are   merely
Administrative   Tribunals   and   “not   courts”.
Section   14,   Limitation   Act,   therefore,   does
not, in terms apply to proceedings before such
tribunals.”
21. There  being three­Judge Bench  judgment  having  held
that appellate authority under U.P. Sales Tax Act is not
18
a Court, we are not persuaded to follow the judgment of
two­Judge Bench in P Sarthy (supra).
Question Nos.2 and 3
22. Both  the  above  questions  being  inter­connected  are
taken together. The main question to be answered in this
appeal is as to; whether the Commissioner while hearing
appeal under Section 69 of the Act, 1959 is entitled to
condone   the   delay   in   filing   an   appeal   by   applying   the
provision   of   Section   5   of   the   Limitation   Act,   1963?
Whether   on   the   strength   of   Section   29(2)   of   the
Limitation   Act,   1963   provisions   of   Sections   4   to   24
(inclusive   of   the   Limitation   Act)   shall   apply   in   the
proceedings of appeal before Commissioner under Section
69   of   the   Act,   1959?   When   by   special   or   local   law   a
different   period   of   limitation   is   prescribed   for   any
suit,   appeal   or   application,   the   suit,   appeal   or
application   contemplated   under   Section   29(2)   are   suit,
appeal or application in a Court or Section 29(2) shall
also cover suit, appeal or application which are to be
filed before the statutory authorities or quasi­judicial
authorities and tribunals also?
19
23. The   Limitation   Act,   1963   is   an   Act   to   consolidate
and amend the law for the limitation of suits and other
proceedings and for purposes connected therewith. The law
of Limitation before enactment of Act, 1963 was governing
by   the   law   of   limitation   under   Indian   Limitation   Act,
1908.   The   different   provisions   of   Limitation   Act,   1963
refers   to   ‘Court’.   Section   4   provides   where   the
prescribed   period   for   any   suit,   appeal   or   application
expires   on   a   day   when   the   court   is   closed,   the   suit,
appeal   or   application   may   be   instituted,   preferred   or
made   on   the   day   when   the   court   reopens.   Similarly,
Section 5 provides that any appeal or any application,
other than an application under any of the provisions of
Order XXI of the  Code of  Civil  Procedure, 1908  may be
admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or
the applicant satisfies the court that he has sufficient
cause   for   not   preferring   the   appeal   or   making   the
application   within   such   period.   Section   6   refers   to
institution of a suit or making of application for the
execution of a decree by a minor or insane, or an idiot
who may institute the suit or make the application within
the same period after the disability has ceased.
20
24. Sections 9,10 and 11 refer to suit. Section 12 deals
with   computation   of   period   of   limitation.   The   section
refers   to   computation   of   period   of   limitation   for   an
appeal   or   an   application   for   leave   to   appeal   or   for
revision or for review of a judgment, obviously was meant
for   judgment   of   a   court.   Section   13   again   refers   to
Court.   Section   14   specifically   refers   to   the   Court.
Section 14 of the Act is as follows:
“Section  14.   Exclusion   of   time   of
proceeding   bona   fide   in   court   without
jurisdiction. –(1) In computing the period of
limitation for any suit the time during which
the   plaintiff   has   been   prosecuting   with   due
diligence another civil proceeding, whether in
a court of first instance or of the appeal or
revision,   against   the   defendant   shall   be
excluded, where the proceeding relates to the
same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good
faith   in   a   court   which,   from   defect   of
jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature,
is unable to entertain it.
(2) In computing the period of limitation for
any   application,   the   time   during   which   the
applicant   has   been   prosecuting   with   due
diligence another civil proceeding, whether in
a   court   of   first   instance   or   of   appeal   or
revision, against the same party for the same
relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding
is prosecuted in good faith in a count of first
instance or of appeal or revision, against the
same   party   for   the   same   relief   shall   be
excluded,  where  such   proceeding  is  prosecuted
in good faith in a court which, from defect of
21
jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature,
is unable to entertain it.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule
2   of   Order   XXIII   of   the   Code   of   Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of
sub­section   (1)   shall   apply   in   relation   to   a
fresh suit instituted on permission granted by
the court under rule of that Order, where such
permission   is   granted   on   the   ground   that   the
first suit must fail by reason of a defect in
the jurisdiction of the court of other cause of
a like nature.
Explanation   ­  For   the   purpose   of   this
section, ­
(a)   in   excluding   the   time   during   which   a
former   civil   proceeding   was   pending,   the
day on which that proceeding was instituted
and the day on which it ended shall both be
counted;
(b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting
an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting
a proceeding;
(c)misjoinder   of   parties   or   of   causes   of
action shall be deemed to be a cause of a
like nature with defect of jurisdiction.”
21. Subsequent   Sections   16   and   17   refer   to   suits.
Sections   18   to   21   again   contain   different   provisions
pertaining to computation of limitation. Thereafter comes
Section 29, which is a saving provision. Section 29 is as
follows:
22
“Section 29. Savings. – (1) Nothing in this
Act,   shall   affect   section   25   of   the   Indian
Contract Act,1872.
(2)   Where   any   special   or   local   law
prescribes for any suit, appeal or application
a   period   of   limitation   different   from   the
period   prescribed   by   the   Schedule,   the
provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such
period   were   the   period   prescribed   by   the
Schedule and for the purpose of determining any
period   of   limitation   prescribed   for   any   sit,
appeal or application by any special or local
law, the provisions contained in section 5 to
24 (inclusive shall apply only in so far, as
and   to   the   extent   to   which,   they   are   not
expressly   excluded   by   such   special   or   local
law.
(3) Save as otherwise provided in any law
for   the   time   being   in   force   with   respect   to
marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall
apply to any suit or other proceeding under any
such law.
(4) Sections 25 and 26 and the definition
of "easement" in section 2 shall not apply to
cases arising in the territories to which the
Indian   Easements   Act,1882   may   for   the   time
being extend.
22. The   Schedule   of   the   Act   provides   for   “Periods   of
Limitation”. First Division deals with different kinds of
suits.   Second   Division   deals   with   appeals   and   Third
Division deals with applications. The suits, appeals and
applications which have been referred to in the Schedule
obviously   mean   suits,   appeals   and   applications   to   be
23
filed in Court as per the provisions referred to in the
Act noted above.
23. Section   29(2)   provides   that   where   any   special   or
local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application
a   period   of   limitation   different   from   the   period
prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3
shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed
by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any
period   of   limitation   and   the   provisions   contained   in
Sections 4 to 21 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far
as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly
excluded   by   such   special   or   local   law.   Whether
prescription   of   appeal   of   limitation   of   any   suit   or
application in any special or local law relates to suit,
application   or   appeal   to   be   filed   in   Court   or   it   may
refer to statutory authorities and tribunals also, is the
question to be answered. Different special or local laws
have   been   enacted   by   Legislature   covering   different
subjects,  different rights  and  liabilities, methodology
of establishing, determining rights and liabilities and
remedies provided therein. Special or local law may also
provide   remedy   by   institution   of   suits,   appeals   and
24
applications in the Courts, i.e., civil court and to its
normal   hierarchy   and   also   create   special   forum   for
determining rights and liabilities and provide remedies.
Most common example of creating statutory authorities for
determining rights, liabilities and remedies are taxing
statutes where assessing authorities have been provided
for with hierarchy of authorities. The remedy of appeal
and   revision   is   also   provided   in   the   taxing   statutes
which authorities are different from normal civil courts.
Section 29(2) in reference to different special or local
laws came for consideration before this Court in large
number of cases. This Court had occasion to consider the
provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, in reference to
different   statutes   which   contain   provisions   of   suits,
appeals   or   applications   to   the
courts/authorities/tribunals.   There   are   series   of
judgments of this Court holding that provisions of the
Limitation   Act   are   directed   only   when   suit,   appeal   or
application are to be filed in a Court unless there are
express provisions in a special or local law.
24. Section   29(2)   also   came   for   consideration   before
this   Court   in   several   cases.   There   is   another   set   of
25
cases   where   it   was   held   that   the   provisions   of   the
Limitation   Act,   1963   is   to   be   applied   even   for   suit,
appeal or application under special/local law is to be
filed before statutory authorities and the tribunal. We
shall notice  both sets of cases to  find out the ratio
which need to be applied in the present case.
25. The   first   case   to   be   noticed   is  Town   Municipal
Council, Athani vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Courts,
Hubli,(1969) 1 SCC 873.  In the above case applications
under   Section   33(c)(2)   of   the   Industrial   Disputes   Act,
1947 were filed by various workmen of the appellant. The
question which was considered by this Court in the above
was   as   to   whether   Article   137   of   the   Schedule   of   the
Limitation Act, 1963 governs applications under Section
33(c)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.  Referring
to various articles of Limitation Act, 1963, this Court
laid down following:
“12…………The scope of the various articles in
this division cannot be held to have been so
enlarged as to include within them applications
to bodies other than courts, such as a quasi
judicial   tribunal,   or   even   an   executive
authority. An Industrial Tribunal or a Labour
Court  dealing  with  applications  or  references
under the Act are not courts and they are in no
26
way   governed   either   by   the   Code   of   Civil
Procedure or the Code of Criminal Procedure. We
cannot,  therefore,   accept  the  submission   made
that   this   article   will   apply   even   to
applications made to an Industrial Tribunal or
a Labour Court…………”
26. A three­Judge Bench of this Court in Nityananda, M.
Joshi and others. vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India
and others, (1965) 2 SCC 199,  had occasion to consider
the applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act to
an application filed under Section 33(c)(1) and (2) of
the   Industrial   Disputes   Act,   1947   before   the   Labour
Court.   Three­Jude   bench   categorically   held   that   the
scheme of the Limitation Act is that it only deals with
application   to   Courts,   and   the   Labour   Court   is   not   a
Court   within   Limitation   Act,   1963.   Following   was   laid
down in paragraph 3:
“3.  In our view Article 137 only contemplates
applications to Courts. In the Third Division
of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 all
the other applications mentioned in the various
articles   are   applications   filed   in   a   court.
Further Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
provides   for   the   contingency   when   the
prescribed  period  for  any  application  expires
on   a   holiday   and   the   only   contingency
contemplated   is   “when   the   court   is   closed.”
Again under Section 5 it is only a court which
is   enabled   to   admit   an   application   after   the
27
prescribed period has expired if the court is
satisfied   that   the   applicant   had   sufficient
cause   for   not   preferring   the   application.   It
seems   to   us   that   the   scheme   of   the   Indian
Limitation   Act   is   that   it   only   deals   with
applications   to   courts,   and   that   the   Labour
Court   is   not   a   court   within   the   Indian
Limitation Act, 1963.”
27. Another three­Judge Bench of this Court had occasion
to consider the provisions of U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948
and   the   Limitation   Act,   1963,   in  The   Commissioner   of
Sales Tax Act, 1948, U.P. Lucknow vs. M/s. Parson Tools
and Plants, Kanpur, (1975) 4 SCC 22.  The question which
came for consideration in the above case has been noted
in paragraph 1 which is to the following effect:
“1. The   common   question   of   law   for
determination in these appeals by special leave
is:   Whether   Section   14(2)   of   the   Limitation
Act, in terms, or, in principle, can be invoked
for excluding the time spent in prosecuting an
application under Rule 68(6) of the U.P. Sales
Tax   Rules   for   setting   aside   the   order   of
dismissal of appeal in default, under the U.P.
Sales Tax Act, 1948 (for short, “the Sales Tax
Act”)   from   computation   of   the   period   of
limitation   for   filing   a   revision   under   that
Act?”
28. The assessee’s appeals against assessment order were
dismissed   in   default   on   10.05.1963.   The   assessee   made
applications   for   setting   aside   the   dismissal   order.
28
Revision Petitions under Section 10 of the Sales Tax Act
were filed more than 18 months after the dismissal of the
appeal. Assessee prayed for exclusion of time spent by
him   in   prosecuting   proceedings   for   setting   aside   the
dismissal of appeals in default. The revisional authority
excluded   the   time   spent   by   applying   Section   14   of   the
Limitation Act. The Commissioner made a reference to the
High Court as to “Whether under the circumstances of the
case,   Section   14   of   the   Limitation   Act   extended   the
period   for   filing   of   the   revisions   by   the   time   during
which   the   restoration   applications   remained   pending   as
being prosecuted bona fide”. The High Court answered the
reference   in   affirmative   which   judgment   was   questioned
before   this   Court.   Three­Judge   Bench   held   that   the
appellate authority and the Judge (Revisions) Sales­tax
exercising jurisdiction under the Sales­tax Act are not
courts and hence, Section 14 of the Limitation Act does
not   apply.   Following   was   laid   down   by   this   Court   in
paragraphs 9 and 24:
“9……………In   view   of   these   pronouncements   of
this Court, there is no room for argument that
the   Appellate   Authority   and   the   Judge
(Revisions)   Sales   tax   exercising   jurisdiction
under the Sales Tax Act, are “courts”. They are
merely   Administrative   Tribunals   and   “not
29
courts”. Section 14, Limitation Act, therefore,
does not, in terms apply to proceedings before
such tribunals………”
24. For all the reasons aforesaid, we are of
the   opinion   that   the   object,   the   scheme   and
language of Section 10 of the Sales Tax Act do
not permit the invocation of Section 14(2) of
the   Limitation   Act,   either   in   terms,   or   in
principle,   for   excluding   the   time   spent   in
prosecuting  proceedings  for  setting  aside  the
dismissal   of   appeals   in   default,   from
computation   of   the   period   of   limitation
prescribed   for   filing   a   revision   under   the
Sales   Tax   Act.   Accordingly,   we   answer   the
question referred, in the negative.”
29. In  The   Kerala   State   Electricity   Board,   Trivandrum
vs. T.P. Kunhaliumma, (1976) 4 SCC 634,  this Court had
occasion   to   consider   applicability   of   Article   137   of
Limitation Act, application filed under Section 16 of the
Telegraphs   Act,   1885.   This   Court   in   the   above   case
differing with the view taken by the two­Judge Bench in
Athani’s case held that application under Article 137 of
Limitation   Act   is   not   confined   to   application
contemplated   by   or   under   the   C.P.C.   However,   the
application contemplated under Telegraphs Act has to be
an   application   to   a   Court.   In   paragraphs   18   and   22
following has been laid held:
30
“18. The alteration of the division as well as
the   change   in   the   collocation   of   words   in
Article   137   of   the   Limitation   Act,   1963
compared   with   Article   181   of   the   1908
Limitation   Act   shows   that   applications
contemplated   under   Article   137   are   not
applications   confined   to   the   Code   of   Civil
Procedure. In the 1908 Limitation Act there was
no  division  between  applications  in  specified
cases   and   other   applications   as   in   the   1963
Limitation   Act.   The   words   “any   other
application” under Article 137 cannot be said
on   the   principle   of   ejusdem   generis   to   be
applications   under   the   Civil   Procedure   Code
other   than   those   mentioned   in   Part   I   of   the
third   division.   Any   other   application   under
Article   137   would   be   petition   or   any
application under any Act. But it has to be an
application   to   a   court   for   the   reason   that
Sections   4   and   5   of   the   1963   Limitation   Act
speak of expiry of prescribed period when court
is closed and extension of prescribed period if
applicant or the appellant satisfies the court
that he had sufficient cause for not preferring
the   appeal   or   making   the   application   during
such period.
22.  The conclusion we reach is that Article
137 of the 1963 Limitation Act will apply to
any petition or application filed under any Act
to a civil court. With respect we differ from
the view taken by the two­judge bench of this
Court in Athani Municipal Council case and hold
that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act is
not confined to applications contemplated by or
under the Code of Civil Procedure. The petition
in the present case was to the District Judge
as a court. The petition was one contemplated
by the Telegraph Act for judicial decision. The
petition is an application falling within the
scope   of   Article   137   of   the   1963   Limitation
Act.”
31
30. In   the   above   case   since   the   application   under   the
Telegraphs   Act   was   filed   before   the   Court,   this   Court
held   that   Article   137   of   the   Limitation   Act   was
applicable.   It   is   to   be   noticed   that   in   the   above
mentioned   cases   this   Court   held   that   applications
contemplated   under   Limitation   Act   are   applications   to   a
Court but in the above cases the Court did not refer to
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.
31. A   two­Judge  Bench   judgment   of   this   Court   in  Sakuru
vs. Tanaji, 1985(3) SCC 590, needs to be noticed. In the
above case the question was as to whether delay in filing
appeal before Court under Section 19 is condonable under
Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. This Court held that
the   provisions   of   Limitation   Act,   1963   apply   only   to
proceedings   in   ‘courts’   and   not   to   appeals   or
applications   before   bodies   other   than   courts   such   as
quasi­judicial   tribunals   or   executive   authorities,
notwithstanding the fact that such bodies or authorities
may be vested with certain specified powers conferred on
courts under the Codes of Civil or Criminal Procedure. In
paragraph 3 following has been laid down:
32
“3.  After   hearing   both   sides   we   have
unhesitatingly   come   to   the   conclusion   that
there is no substance in this appeal and that
the   view   taken   by   the   Division   Bench   in
Venkaiah case1 is perfectly correct and sound.
It   is   well   settled   by   the   decisions   of   this
Court   in  town   Municipal   Council  v.  Presiding
Officer, Labour Court,  Nityananda M. Joshi  v.
Life   Insurance   Corporation   of   India  and
Sushila   Devi  v.  Ramanandan   Prasad  that   the
provisions   of   the   Limitation   Act,   1963   apply
only   to   proceedings   in   “courts”   and   not   to
appeals   or   applications   before   bodies   other
than courts such as quasi­judicial tribunals or
executive authorities, notwithstanding the fact
that such bodies or authorities may be vested
with   certain   specified   powers   conferred   on
courts   under   the   Codes   of   Civil   or   Criminal
Procedure. The Collector before whom the appeal
was   preferred   by   the   appellant   herein   under
Section 90 of the Act not being a court, the
Limitation Act, as such, had no applicability
to the proceedings before him…………”.
32. This   Court,   however,   further   held   that   relevant
special   statute   may   contain   an   express   provision
conferring   on   the   appellate   authority,   such   as   the
Collector, to extend the prescribed period of limitation
which needs to be examined looking to the scheme of the
special statute. Section 93 of the Act was a provision
pertaining   to   the   applicability   of   the   Limitation   Act.
Referring to the said provision this Court held that 1958
Act does not indicate that Section 5 of the Limitation
33
Act   is   applicable.   Following   was   further   laid   down   in
paragraph 3:
“3…………But   even   in   such   a   situation   the
relevant special statute may contain an express
provision   conferring   on   the   Appellate
Authority, such as the Collector, the power to
extend the prescribed period of limitation on
sufficient   cause   being   shown   by   laying   down
that   the   provisions   of   Section   5   of   the
Limitation   Act   shall   be   applicable   to   such
proceedings.   Hence   it   becomes   necessary   to
examine   whether   the   Act   contains   any   such
provision entitling the Collector to invoke the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act
for condonation of the delay in the filing of
the appeal. The only provision relied on by the
appellant in this connection is Section 93 of
the   Act   which,   as   it   stood   at   the   relevant
time, was in the following terms:
93.  Limitations.—Every   appeal   and
every   application   for   revision   under
this   Act   shall   be   filed   within   sixty
days   from   the   date   of   the   order
against   which   the   appeal   or
application   is   filed   and   the
provisions   of   the   Indian   Limitation
Act, 1908 shall apply for the purpose
of the computation of the said period.
On   a   plain   reading   of   the   section   it   is
absolutely   clear   that   its   effect   is   only   to
render applicable to the proceedings before the
Collector, the provisions of the Limitation Act
relating   to   “computation   of   the   period   of
limitation”.   The   provisions   relating   to
computation   of   the   period   of   limitation   are
contained in Sections 12 to 24 included in Part
III of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5 is
not   a   provision   dealing   with   “computation   of
the period of limitation”. It is only after the
process of computation is completed and it is
34
found   that   an   appeal   or   application   has   been
filed after the expiry of the prescribed period
that   the   question   of   extension   of   the   period
under Section 5 can arise. We are, therefore,
in complete agreement with the view expressed
by   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   in
Venkaiah case1  that Section 93 of the Act did
not have the effect of rendering the provisions
of   Section   5   of   the   Limitation   Act,   1963
applicable   to   the   proceedings   before   the
Collector.”
33. This   Court   in  Officer   on   Special   Duty   (Land
Acquisition) and another vs. Shah Manilal Chandulal and
others, (1996) 9 SCC 414,  the Land Acquisition Officer
has rejected the application for reference under Section
18 on the ground that it was barred by limitation. A writ
petition was filed contending that provision of Section 5
of the Limitation Act applies to the proceedings before
the Collector. The High Court accepted the argument and
condoned   the   delay   against   which   judgment   appeal   was
filed before this Court. This Court held that Section 5
of the Limitation Act cannot be applied for extension of
the period of limitation prescribed under proviso to subsection   (2)   of   Section   18.   Following   was   held   in
paragraph 18:
“18.  Though hard it may be, in view of the
specific   limitation  provided   under   proviso  to
Section   18(2)   of   the   Act,   we   are   of   the
35
considered view that sub­section (2) of Section
29   cannot   be   applied   to   the   proviso   to   subsection (2) of Section 18. The Collector/LAO,
therefore,   is   not   a   court   when   he   acts   as   a
statutory   authority   under   Section   18(1).
Therefore,   Section   5   of   the   Limitation   Act
cannot be applied for extension of the period
of limitation prescribed under proviso to subsection   (2)   of   Section   18.   The   High   Court,
therefore,   was   not   right   in   its   finding   that
the Collector is a court under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act.”
34. Another   judgment   which   needs   to   be   noticed   is
Consolidated   Engineering   Enterprises   vs.   Principal
Secretary, Irrigation Department and others, (2008) 7 SCC
169. The question which was posed, in the above case, for
consideration   before   this   Court   has   been   mentioned   in
paragraph 18 which is to the following effect:
“18.  The   question   posed   for   consideration
before   the   Court   is   whether   the   provision   of
Section   14   of   the   Limitation   Act   would   be
applicable   to   an   application   submitted   under
Section 34 of the Act of 1996 for setting aside
the award made by the arbitrator………”
35. The provision of sub­section (3) of Section 34 has
been noticed in paragraph 19 which is to the following
effect:
“19.  A   bare   reading   of   sub­section   (3)   of
Section   34   read   with   the   proviso   makes   it
36
abundantly   clear   that   the   application   for
setting   aside   the   award   on   the   grounds
mentioned in sub­section (2) of Section 34 will
have to be made within three months. The period
can   further   be   extended,   on   sufficient   cause
being shown, by another period of 30 days but
not   thereafter.   It   means   that   as   far   as
application   for   setting   aside   the   award   is
concerned, the period of limitation prescribed
is   three   months   which   can   be   extended   by
another period of 30 days, on sufficient cause
being shown to the satisfaction of the court.”
36. Section   29(2)   of   the   Limitation   Act   as   well   as
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act was referred to. This
Court after noticing the provisions of Section 34 opined
that   Section   5   of   the   Limitation   Act   is   excluded.   In
paragraph 20 following has been laid down:
“20.  Section   29(2)   of   the   Limitation   Act
inter alia provides that where any special or
local   law   prescribes   for   any   suit,   appeal   or
application   a   period   of   limitation   different
from the period of limitation prescribed by the
Schedule,   the   provisions   of   Section   3   shall
apply   as   if   such   period   was   the   period
prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose
of   determining   any   period   of   limitation
prescribed for any suit, appeal or application
by   any   special   or   local   law,   the   provisions
contained in Sections 4 to 24 shall apply only
insofar   as,   and   to   the   extent,   they   are   not
expressly   excluded   by   such   special   or   local
law.   When   any   special   statute   prescribes
certain   period   of   limitation   as   well   as
provision for extension up to specified timelimit,   on   sufficient   cause   being   shown,   then
the period of limitation prescribed under the
37
special   law   shall   prevail   and   to   that   extent
the   provisions   of   the   Limitation   Act   shall
stand   excluded.   As   the   intention   of   the
legislature   in   enacting   sub­section   (3)   of
Section 34 of the Act is that the application
for   setting   aside   the   award   should   be   made
within   three   months   and   the   period   can   be
further   extended   on   sufficient   cause   being
shown   by   another   period   of   30   days   but   not
thereafter, this Court is of the opinion that
the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act   would   not   be   applicable   because   the
applicability   of   Section   5   of   the   Limitation
Act stands excluded because of the provisions
of   Section   29(2)   of   the   Limitation   Act.
However, merely because it is held that Section
5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to an
application filed under Section 34 of the Act
for   setting   aside   an   award,   one   need   not
conclude that provisions of Section 14 of the
Limitation Act would also not be applicable to
an   application   submitted   under   Section   34   of
the Act of 1996.”
37. The   three­Judge   Bench   noticed   earlier   judgment   of
this Court in CST v. Parson Tools and Plants. The threeJudge Bench held that proceedings initiated for setting
aside the arbitral award are not “courts” and three­Judge
Bench held that in  CST v. Parson Tools and Plants  the
appellate authority and the revisional court were not the
courts hence this case was distinguished. Following was
laid down in paragraph 26:
“26.  From the judgment of the Supreme Court
in  CST,   (1975)   2   SCC   22,  it   is   evident   that
38
essentially   what   weighed   with   the   Court   in
holding that Section 14 of the Limitation Act
was   not   applicable,   was   that   the   appellate
authority and the revisional authority were not
“courts”. The stark features of the revisional
powers   pointed   out   by   the   Court,   showed   that
the  legislature  had  deliberately  excluded  the
application   of   the   principles   underlying
Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act. Here
in this case, the Court is not called upon to
examine scope of revisional powers. The Court
in this case is dealing with Section 34 of the
Act which confers powers on the court of the
first instance to set aside an award rendered
by   an   arbitrator   on   specified   grounds.   It   is
not the case of the contractor that the forums
before   which   the   Government   of   India
undertaking   had   initiated   proceedings   for
setting   aside   the   arbitral   award   are   not
“courts”.   In   view   of   these   glaring
distinguishing features, this Court is of the
opinion that the decision rendered in  CST  did
not   decide   the   issue   which   falls   for
consideration of this Court and, therefore, the
said decision cannot be construed to mean that
the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation
Act   are   not   applicable   to   an   application
submitted under Section 34 of the Act of 1996.”
38. Three­Judge   Bench   held   that   Section   14   of   the
Limitation Act was applicable to application filed under
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. R.V. Raveendran,
J. in his concurring opinion has held that Sections 3 and
29(2) of the Limitation Act will not apply to proceedings
before   the   tribunal,   to   appeals   or   applications   before
39
the tribunals, unless expressly provided. In paragraph 44
following was laid down:
“44.  It may be noticed at this juncture that
the Schedule to the Limitation Act prescribes
the period of limitation only to proceedings in
courts   and   not   to   any   proceeding   before   a
tribunal   or   quasi­judicial   authority.
Consequently   Sections   3   and   29(2)   of   the
Limitation   Act   will   not   apply   to   proceedings
before   the   tribunal.   This   means   that   the
Limitation   Act   will   not   apply   to   appeals   or
applications   before   the   tribunals,   unless
expressly provided.”
39. The   most   elaborate   judgment   holding   that   the
Limitation   Act   applies   only   to   courts   and   not   to   the
tribunals   is   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in  M.P.   Steel
Corporation vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, 2015(7)
SCC 58, Rohinton Fali Nariman, J. speaking for the Court
reviewed   all   earlier   judgments   of   two­Judge   and   threeJudge Benches of this Court. In paragraphs 11 to 35 all
earlier judgments have been considered. In the above case
Commissioner   of   Customs(Appeals)   dismissed   the   appeal
filed   by   the   appellant   on   the   ground   that   appeal   is
barred by time and the Commissioner(Appeals) had no power
to condone delay beyond the period specified in Section
128 of the  Customs Act. In the  above  case,  benefit of
40
Section   14   of   the   Limitation   Act   was   sought.   It   was
contended before this Court that while Section 2 of the
Limitation Act, Section 14 of the Limitation Act was also
applied   to   criminal,   special   or   local   law.   This   Court
noticed the ingredients of applicability of Section 14.
Two­Judge   Bench   has   held   that   relying   on   earlier
judgments of this Court that provisions of the Limitation
Act   are   applicable   only   to   suits,   appeals   and
applications   filed   in   Courts.   Section   29(2)   was   also
considered by this Court and following was laid down in
paragraph 33:
“33……Section 29(2) states:
“29. Savings.—(1) * * *
(2)   Where   any   special   or   local   law
prescribes   for   any   suit,   appeal   or
application a period of limitation different
from the period prescribed by the Schedule,
the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if
such period were the period prescribed by the
Schedule and for the purpose of determining
any period of limitation prescribed for any
suit, appeal or application by any special or
local   law,   the   provisions   contained   in
Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only
insofar as, and to the extent to which, they
are not expressly excluded by such special or
local law.”
A bare reading of this section would show that
the   special   or   local   law   described   therein
should   prescribe   for   any   suit,   appeal   or
application   a   period   of   limitation   different
41
from   the   period   prescribed   by   the   Schedule.
This would necessarily mean that such special
or local law would have to lay down that the
suit,   appeal   or   application   to   be   instituted
under   it   should   be   a   suit,   appeal   or
application   of   the   nature   described   in   the
Schedule.   We   have   already   held   that   such
suits, appeals or applications as are referred
to in the Schedule are only to courts and not
to   quasi­judicial   bodies   or   tribunals.   It   is
clear, therefore, that only when a suit, appeal
or   application   of   the   description   in   the
Schedule   is   to   be   filed   in   a   court   under   a
special   or   local   law   that   the   provision   gets
attracted.   This   is   made   even   clearer   by   a
reading of Section 29(3). Section 29(3) states:
“29. Savings.—(1)­(2) * * *
(3) Save as otherwise provided in any law
for the time being in force with respect to
marriage   and   divorce,   nothing   in   this   Act
shall apply to any suit or other proceeding
under any such law.”
When   it   comes   to   the   law   of   marriage   and
divorce, the section speaks not only of suits
but other proceedings as well. Such proceedings
may   be   proceedings   which   are   neither   appeals
nor applications thus making it clear that the
laws relating to marriage and divorce, unlike
the law of limitation, may contain proceedings
other than suits, appeals or applications filed
in courts. This again is an important pointer
to the fact that the entirety of the Limitation
Act including Section 29(2) would apply only to
the three kinds of proceedings mentioned all of
which are to be filed in courts.”
40. Two­Judge   Bench,   however,   held   that   provisions   of
Section 14 would certainly apply. We in the present case
42
are concerned only with applicability of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act.
41. Now, we come to the second set of cases which cases
have applied provisions of Limitation Act on special and
local   law.   A   three­Judge   Bench   judgment   in  The
Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. vs. M/s. Madan Lal Das &
Sons, Bareilly, (1976) 4 SCC 464, has been relied by the
counsel for the respondents. In the above case an appeal
relating to assessment year 1960­61 was decided by the
appellate authority. The copy of the appellate order was
served on the dealer on 02.08.1965. The dealer lost the
copy   of   the   appellate   order   and   on   15.06.1966   made   an
application for obtaining another copy of the order which
was ready on 17.08.1967. Revision under Section 10 of the
U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 was filed by the dealer before
the Judge(Revision) Sales Tax on 09.09.1967. The dealer
claimed that the time taken in obtaining certified copy
needs   to   be   excluded   under   Section   12(2)   of   the
Limitation   Act,   1963.   The   Judge(Revision)   accepted   the
contention   and   decided   revision   on   merits.   At   the
instance of the Commissioner of Sales Tax a question was
referred to the High Court as to whether the time taken
43
by the dealer in obtaining another copy of the appellate
order could be excluded for the purpose of limitation for
filing revision under Section 10(1) of the Act, 1948. The
High Court answered the question in favour of the dealer
and against the Revenue.
42. The   Commissioner   of   Sales   Tax   filed   an   appeal   in
this Court questioning the judgment of the High Court. It
was contended before this Court that U.P. Sales Tax Act
constitutes a complete court in itself and the High Court
committed   an   error   in   relying   on   Section   12(2)   of   the
Limitation   Act,   1963.   In   paragraph   4   of   the   judgment
following was laid down:
“4. There can be no manner of doubt that the
U.P. Sales Tax Act answers to the description
of a special or local law. According to subsection   (2)   of   Section   29   of   the   Limitation
Act,   reproduced   above,   for   the   purpose   of
determining any period of limitation prescribed
for   any   application   by   any   special   or   local
law, the provisions contained in Section 12(2),
inter alia, shall apply insofar as and to the
extent to which they are not expressly excluded
by such special or local law. There is nothing
in the U.P. Sales Tax Act expressly excluding
the   application   of   Section   12(2)   of   the
Limitation   Act   for   determining   the   period   of
limitation prescribed for revision application.
The   conclusion   would,   therefore,   follow   that
the   provisions   of   Section   12(2)   of   the
Limitation Act of 1963 can be relied upon in
computing  the  period   of  limitation  prescribed
44
for filing a revision petition under Section 10
of the U.P. Sales Tax Act.”
43. This Court held that Section 12(2) of the Limitation
Act   can   be   relied   upon   in   computing   the   period   of
limitation   prescribed   for   filing   the   revision.   The
Judge(Revision) before whom revision is filed is not a
Court, it is clear from the scheme of the U.P. Sales Tax
Act,   1948.   Section   10   under   which   revision   is   filed
provides for Revising Authority. Section 10(1) provides
for   appointment   of   Revising   Authority   which   is   as
follows:
“Section   10.   Power   of   revision.­(1)   The
State Government shall appoint as Revising
Authority   a   person   qualified   under   clause
(2) of Article 217 of the Constitution for
appointment as Judge of a High Court.”
44. The above provision makes it clear that revision is
to   be   filed   before   a   Revising   Authority   created   under
Act, 1948 and is  not a Court. We  have already noticed
above   that   a   three­Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   in  The
Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. Lucknow vs. M/s. Parson
Tools   and   Plants,   Kanpur   (supra)  had   considered   the
question of applicability of Limitation Act, 1963 before
Revision Authority under U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. This
45
Court in paragraph 9 of the judgment has categorically
held   that   Judge(Revisions)   Sales   Tax   exercising
jurisdiction   under   Section   10   are   not   courts   but   mere
administrative   tribunals.   In  CST,   U.P.   vs.   M/s.   Parson
Tools and   Plants,   the   question   was   with   regard   to
applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The
three­Judge   Bench   categorically   held   that   the
Judge(Revision)   being   not   a   Court,   Section   14   of   the
Limitation Act does not apply to the proceedings before
such tribunal. Before three­Judge Bench which heard CST,
U.P. vs. M/s. Madan Lal Das & Sons(supra)  unfortunately
the earlier judgment of equal strength i.e. three­Judge
Bench in CST, U.P. vs. M/s. Parson Tools and Plants was
not cited.   CST, U.P. vs. M/s. Parson Tools and Plants
was judgment was on the same issue i.e. applicability of
the   Limitation   Act   in   reference   to   Judge(Revision)
exercising the jurisdiction under the U.P. Sales Tax Act,
CST,   U.P.   vs.   M/s.   Parson   Tools and   Plants(supra)  has
held   that   Limitation   Act   is   not   applicable   to   such
authority. Thus, three­Judge judgment was neither noticed
and a contrary view was expressed in CST, U.P. vs. M/s.
Madan Lal Das & Sons. We have also noticed that there has
46
also   been   earlier   three­Judge   Bench   judgment   in
Nityananda,   M.   Joshi   and   others.   vs.   Life   Insurance
Corporation of India and others(supra) where it was held
that Limitation Act applies only to suits, applications
and appeals filed in Courts. The judgment of this Court
in  CST, U.P. vs. M/s. Madan Lal Das & Sons  having not
referred to earlier judgments of equal strength, we are
persuaded   to   follow   the   earlier   three­Judge   Bench
judgment of this Court in CST, U.P. vs. M/s. Parson Tools
and Plants.
45. The   judgment   on   which   reliance   has   been   placed   by
the learned counsel for the respondent is  Mukri Gopalan
vs. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, (1995) 5 SCC 5.
In the above case, question for consideration was as to
whether   the   appellate   authority   under   Section   18   of
Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 has
power to condone the delay in filing appeal. The issue
which has been noticed in paragraph 1 is to the following
effect:
“1.   In this appeal by special leave a short
but   an   interesting   question   falls   for
determination. It is to the effect “whether the
appellate   authority   constituted   under   Section
18   of   the   Kerala   Buildings   (Lease   and   Rent
47
Control) Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as
the ‘Rent Act’) has power to condone the delay
in   the   filing   of   appeal   before   it   under   the
said   section”.   Majority   of   the   Kerala   High
Court in the case of Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina
Kunhi   Umma,   AIR   1974   Ker   162,  has   taken   the
view that the appellate authority has no such
power. Following the said decision a Division
Bench of the Kerala High Court by its judgment
and   order   under   appeal   has   dismissed   the
revision   application   moved   by   the   appellant
herein   whose   appeal   before   the   appellate
authority was dismissed as time barred and the
application   for   condonation   of   delay   was
treated   to   be   not   maintainable   before   the
appellate authority.”
46. One fact which is to be noticed is that appellate
authority   under   the   above   Act   was   District   Judge.   The
notification issued by the State Government conferring on
the District Judge power of the appellate authority has
been   noticed   and   extracted   in   paragraph   5   of   the
judgment.  Relevant part of paragraph No.5 is as follows:
“5.  …………………………At   this   stage   it   will   be
useful to note that the Government of Kerala in
exercise of its power under Section 18(1) has
issued   a   notification   conferring   on   District
Judges   the   powers   of   appellate   authority   for
the   purpose   of   Kerala   Rent   Act.   The   said
notification reads as under:
“Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1965­
Noti.   under   Section   18(1)   conferring   on
District   Judges   powers   of   appellate
authorities
(Published   in   Kerala   Gazette   No.   38   dated
26th September, 1989 : SRO :1631 of 1989)
48
NOTIFICATION
S.R.O. No. 1631 of 1989 In exercise of the
powers conferred by clause (a) of sub­section
(1)   of   Section   18   of   the   Kerala   Buildings
(Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965)
and   in   supersession   of   all   previous
notifications on the subject, the Government of
Kerala   hereby   confers   on   the   District   Judges
having jurisdiction over the areas within which
the   provisions   of   the   said   Act   have   been
extended,   the   powers   of   the   appellate
authorities for the purposes of the said Act,
in the said areas.”
47. This   Court   in   the   above   case   held   that   appellate
authority   was   not   “persona   designata”.   This   Court   in
paragraph   8   held   that   the   appellate   authority   who   was
District Judge would be court and not persona designata.
Following was observed in paragraph 8:
“8…………When the aforesaid well settled tests for
deciding whether an authority is a court or not
are applied to the powers and functions of the
appellate   authority   constituted   under   Section
18 of the Rent Act, it becomes obvious that all
the aforesaid essential trappings to constitute
such an authority as a court are found to be
present. In fact, Mr Nariman, learned counsel
for   respondent   also   fairly   stated   that   these
appellate authorities would be courts and would
not be persona designata…………”
48. Section   29(2)   was   also   considered.   This   Court
further   held   that   Section   29(2)   will   get   attracted   to
appeals filed before appellate authority under Section 18
49
of the Rent Act. In paragraphs 11 and 15 following has
been laid down:
“11. It is also obvious that once the aforesaid
two conditions are satisfied Section 29(2) on
its   own   force   will   get   attracted   to   appeals
filed before appellate authority under Section
18 of the Rent Act. When Section 29(2) applies
to appeals under Section 18 of the Rent Act,
for   computing   the   period   of   limitation
prescribed for appeals under that Section, all
the   provisions   of   Sections   4   to   24   of   the
Limitation Act would apply. Section 5 being one
of   them   would   therefore   get   attracted.   It   is
also obvious that there is no express exclusion
anywhere   in   the   Rent   Act   taking   out   the
applicability   of   Section   5   of   the   Limitation
Act to appeals filed before appellate authority
under Section 18 of the Act. Consequently, all
the   legal   requirements   for   applicability   of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act to such appeals
in the light of Section 29(2) of Limitation Act
can be said to have been satisfied. That was
the view taken by the minority decision of the
learned   Single   Judge   of   Kerala   High   Court   in
Jokkim   Fernandez  v.  Amina   Kunhi   Umma.   The
majority did not agree on account of its wrong
supposition   that   appellate   authority
functioning under Section 18 of the Rent Act is
a persona designata. Once that presumption is
found   to   be   erroneous   as   discussed   by   us
earlier, it becomes at once clear that minority
view in the said decision was the correct view
and the majority view was an erroneous view.”
15.  After   repealing   of   Indian   Limitation
Act,   1908   and   its   replacement   by   the   present
Limitation Act of 1963 a fundamental change was
made   in   Section   29(2).   The   present   Section
29(2)   as   already   extracted   earlier   clearly
indicates   that   once   the   requisite   conditions
50
for   its   applicability   to   given   proceedings
under special or local law are attracted, the
provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 both
inclusive  would  get  attracted  which  obviously
would bring in Section 5 which also shall apply
to such proceedings unless applicability of any
of the aforesaid sections of the Limitation Act
is expressly excluded by such special or local
law.   By   this   change   it   is   not   necessary   to
expressly   state   in   a   special   law   that   the
provisions   contained   in   Section   5   of   the
Limitation Act shall apply to the determination
of   the   periods   under   it.   By   the   general
provision   contained   in   Section   29(2)   this
provision   is   made   applicable   to   the   periods
prescribed under the special laws. An express
mention   in   the   special   law   is   necessary   only
for   any   exclusion.   It   is   on   this   basis   that
when the new Rent Act was passed in 1965 the
provision   contained   in   old   Section   31   was
omitted. It becomes therefore apparent that on
a   conjoint   reading   of   Section   29(2)   of
Limitation Act of 1963 and Section 18 of the
Rent Act of 1965, provisions of Section 5 would
automatically   get   attracted   to   those
proceedings,   as   there   is   nothing   in   the   Rent
Act   of   1965   expressly   excluding   the
applicability   of   Section   5   of   the   Limitation
Act   to   appeals   under   Section   18   of   the   Rent
Act.”
49. This Court in the above case held that Section 5 was
attracted   in   appeal   which   was   to   be   heard   by   the
appellate authority.  It is, further, relevant to notice
that in M.P. Steel Corporation (supra), Mukri Gopalan has
been referred to and has been held to be no longer good
law in view of the earlier three­Judge judgments of this
51
Court. Dealing with Mukri Gopalan’s case two­Judge Bench
in M.P. Steel Corporation had held following in paragraph
29 :
“29.  Quite   apart   from  Mukri   Gopalan   case
being out of step with at least five earlier
binding   judgments   of   this   Court,   it   does   not
square   also   with   the   subsequent   judgment   in
Consolidated   Engg.   Enterprises  v.  Irrigation
Deptt.  A   three­Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   was
asked   to   decide   whether   Section   14   of   the
Limitation Act would apply to Section 34(3) of
the   Arbitration   and   Conciliation   Act,   1996.
After discussing the various provisions of the
Arbitration   Act   and   the   Limitation   Act,   this
Court held:…………”
32.  Obviously,   the   ratio   of  Mukri   Gopalan
does   not   square   with   the   observations   of   the
three­Judge   Bench   in  Consolidated   Engg.
Enterprises. In the latter case, this Court has
unequivocally   held   that  Parson   Tools  is   an
authority   for   the   proposition   that   the
Limitation Act will not apply to quasi­judicial
bodies or tribunals. To the extent that  Mukri
Gopalan  is   in   conflict   with   the   judgment   in
Consolidated Engg. Enterprises case, it is no
longer good law.”
50. Learned counsel for the respondent relied on threeJudge   Bench   judgment   of   this   Court   in  State   of   Madhya
Pradesh and another vs. Anshuman Shukla, (2014) 10 SCC
814.  In  the above case this  Court  was examining as to
whether delay in filing revision before the High Court
under   M.P.   Madhyastham   Adhikaran   Adhiniyam,   1983   was
52
condonable   applying   Section   5   of   the   Limitation   Act,
Section 29(2) as well as Mukri Gopalan case was referred
to by three­Judge Bench. In paragraph 20 following was
laid down:
“20. Section 19 of the Act confers the power of
revision   on   the   High   Court.   It   provides   that
the aggrieved party may make an application for
revision   before   the   High   Court   within   three
months of the date of the award. This section
was amended in 2005, to confer the power on the
High   Court   to   condone   the   delay.   Since   this
dispute   pertains   prior   to   2005,   thus,   the
provision of the unamended Act shall apply in
the present case.”
51. After   considering   the   legislative   scheme   of   Act,
1983 following was laid down in paragraph 32 and 33:
“32.  Section   19   of   the   1983   Act   does   not
contain any express rider on the power of the
High   Court   to   entertain   an   application   for
revision   after   the   expiry   of   the   prescribed
period   of   three   months.   On   the   contrary,   the
High Court is conferred with suo motu power, to
call for the record of an award at any time. It
cannot, therefore, be said that the legislative
intent   was   to   exclude   the   applicability   of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act to Section 19
of the 1983 Act.
33.  In   our   opinion,   it   is   unnecessary   to
delve   into   the   question   whether   the   Arbitral
Tribunal constituted under the Act is a court
or not for answering the issue in the present
case as the delay in filing the revision has
occurred   before   the   High   Court,   and   not   the
Arbitral Tribunal.”
53
52. It is relevant to notice that this Court from the
scheme of Act, 1983, itself found that legislative intent
was not to exclude the applicability of Section 5 of the
Limitation   Act.   There   cannot   be   any   dispute   to   the
proposition that if the legislative scheme of special or
local law indicate that enactment intended applicability
of Section 5. Section 5 shall be applicable independent
with   operation   of   Section   29(2).   However,   in   paragraph
33,   the   Court   did   not   delve   into   the   question   as   to
whether Arbitral  Tribunal is  a  court  or not.  Due to a
reason that revision was filed before the High Court and
there cannot be any issue as to the High Court is not a
Court, thus, when revision application was filed before a
Court   Section   29(2)   was   clearly   attracted   applying
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The said judgment cannot
be   said   to   be   authority   for   the   proposition   that   in
appeals filed before statutory authorities which are not
Court,   Section   5   of   the   Limitation   act   shall   be
attracted. Another judgement relied by the respondent is
Syed   Zalil   Akhtar   vs.   Zila   Sahkari   Krishi   Avam   Gramn
Vikas Bank, Mydt., (2016) 12 SCC 365.  This Court in the
54
above case was considering the power of condonation of
delay   in   filing   appeal   under   Section   55(2)   of   M.P.
Cooperative   Societies   Act,   1960.   The   High   Court   has
upheld   the   decision   of   the   M.P.   State   Cooperative
Tribunal,   appellant’s   application   filed   under   Section
55(2) was belated and since there being no provision for
condoning the delay in filing of the appeal and Section 5
of the Limitation Act was also not applicable. Two­Judge
Bench has referred to  Mukri Gopalan (supra).  Relying on
Mukri Gopalan and Anshuman Shukla,  two­Judge Bench held
that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable.
In paragraphs 11 and 12 following has been held:
“11.  Having   noted   the   said   view   expressed   in
para   34,   as   compared   to   a   detailed   analysis
made in the earlier decision of this Court made
in Mukri Gopalan case we are of the considered
view that in the light of the subsequent larger
Bench   decision   of   this   Court   in  Anshuman
Shukla   case  which   has   given   its   seal   of
approval to the decision in Mukri Gopalan case,
the   latter   decision   can   be   followed   in   all
respects   and   the   one   held   in  Noharlal   Verma
case cannot be said to be good law.
12.  Therefore,   applying   the   law   thus   laid
down by this Court in  Mukri Gopalan case  and
Anshuman   Shukla   case  we   are   convinced   that
Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply in
all force to the case on hand and consequently
when we consider the extent of delay involved,
we   find   that   the   last   date   for   filing   the
application   was   8­9­1995,   application   was
presented   on   11­9­1995,   in   between   two   days,
55
namely,   9­9­1995   and   10­9­1995   were   second
Saturday and Sunday. Therefore, it must be held
that   there   was   every   justification   and
sufficient cause for the appellant in his claim
for condoning the said two days in filing the
application   before   the   original   authority.
Consequently,  we  ourselves  hereby  condone  the
said delay of two days and since the Tribunal
by its order dated 18­3­2009 merely dismissed
the appeals of the appellant as well as that of
the   respondent   on   the   sole   ground   of   delay
caused   by   the   appellant   in   preferring   the
original application, the said order cannot be
sustained.”
53. We have already noticed that Mukri Gopalan was held
to be not a good law by this Court in M.P. Steel on the
ground that it has not noticed earlier three­Judge Bench
judgments and also in view of the subsequent three­Judge
Bench judgment, the said case is not a good law. As far
as  Anshuman Shukla’s case  is concerned we have already
noticed the issue, in the said case, of applicability of
Section 5 of Limitation Act in the revision filed in the
High Court, High Court being a Court, Limitation Act was
fully applicable and the said judgment does not support
the proposition that in application before not a Court,
Section 5 shall automatically be applicable.
56
54. The   ratio   which   can   be   culled   from   above   noted
judgments, especially judgment of three­Judge Benches, as
noted above, is as follows:
(1) The suits, appeals and applications referred to
in the Limitation Act, 1963 are suits, appeals
and   applications   which   are   to   be   filed   in   a
Court.
(2) The suits, appeals and applications referred to
in   the   Limitation   Act   are   not   the   suits,
appeals and applications which are to be filed
before a statutory authority like Commissioner
under Act, 1959.
(3) Operation   of   Section   29(2)   of   the   Limitation
Act   is   confined   to   the   suits,   appeals   and
applications referred to in a special or local
law   to   be   filed   in   Court   and   not   before
statutory   authorities   like   Commissioner   under
Act, 1959.
(4) However,   special   or   local   law   vide   statutory
scheme can make applicable any provision of the
Limitation  Act  or  exclude  applicability of  any
provision of Limitation Act which can be decided
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only   after   looking   into   the   scheme   of
particular, special or local law.
55. We,   thus,   answer   question   Nos.2   and   3   in   the
following manner:
(i) The applicability of Section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act is with regard to different
limitations   prescribed   for   any   suit,
appeal or application when to be filed in
a Court.
(ii) Section 29(2) cannot be pressed in service
with   regard   to   filing   of   suits,   appeals
and   applications   before   the   statutory
authorities   and   tribunals   provided   in   a
special   or   local   law.   The   Commissioner
while hearing of the appeal under Section
69   of   the   Act,   1959   is   not   entitled   to
condone the delay in filing appeal, since,
provision   of   Section   5   shall   not   be
attracted by strength of Section 29(2) of
the Act.
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Question No.4
56. A   special   or   local   law   can   very   well   provide   for
applicability   of   any   provision   of   Limitation   Act   or
exclude applicability of any provision of Limitation Act.
The provisions of Limitation Act including Section 5 can
very well be applied in deciding an appeal by statutory
authority which is not a Court by the statutory scheme of
special   or   local   law.   We,   thus,   need   to   notice   the
provisions of Act, 1959 as to whether the scheme under
Act, 1959 shows that enactment intended to apply Section
5 of the Limitation Act.
57. Section   110   provides   for   procedure   and   powers   at
inquiries under Chapters V and VI. The Commissioner hears
appeals under Section 69 which is under Chapter V of the
Act. Section 110 of the Act is as follows:
“Section 110. Procedure and powers at inquiries
under   Chapters   V   and   VI.­  (1)   Where   a
Commissioner   or   a   Joint   Commissioner   or   a
Deputy Commissioner makes an inquiry or hears
an appeal under Chapter V or Chapter VI, the
inquiry shall be made and the appeal shall be
heard, as nearly as may be, in accordance with
the   procedure   applicable   under   the   Code   of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act V of 1908)
to   the   trial   of   suits   or   the   hearing   of
appeals, as the case may be.
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(2) The provisions of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872(Central Act I of 1872) and the Indian
Oaths Act, 1873 (Central Act X of 1873), shall
apply to such inquiries and appeals.
(3)   The   Commissioner  1[or   a   Joint
Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner] holding
such inquiry or hearing such an appeal shall be
deemed to be a person acting judicially within
the meaning of the Judicial Officers Protection
Act, 1850 (Central Act XVIII of 1850).”
58. The   mere   fact   that   a   statutory   authority   is
empowered   to   follow   the   procedure   as   nearly   may   be   in
accordance with procedure under C.P.C. to the trial of
suits   or   hearing   of   appeals,   the   statutory   authority
shall not become a Court. There is nothing under Section
110   which   indicates   that   Limitation   Act   is   also   made
applicable in hearing of the appeal.
59. Section 115 deals with limitation. It only provides
that   in   computing   the   period   of   limitation   prescribed
under   Act,   1959   for   any   proceeding,   suit,   appeal   or
application   for   revision   against   any   order   or   decree
passed under this Act, the time requisite for obtaining a
certified copy of such order or decree shall be excluded.
60. The   provision   of   Section   69   of   Act,   1959   also
indicates   that   Legislature   never   contemplated
applicability   of   Section   5   of   the   Limitation   Act   in
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proceedings   before   Commissioner.   Section   69(2)   noted
above   provides   that   any   order   passed   by   the   Joint
Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may,
in respect of which no appeal has been preferred within
the period specified in sub­section (1) may be revised by
the Commissioner  suo motu  and the Commissioner may call
for and examine the records of the proceedings to satisfy
himself as to the regularity of such proceedings or the
correctness,   legality   or   propriety   of   any   decision   or
order   passed   by   the   Joint   Commissioner   or   the   Deputy
Commissioner, as the case may be.
61. Thus,   Section   69(2)   gives  suo   motu  power   to   the
Commissioner to call for and examine the records of the
proceedings   of   Joint   Commissioner   or   the   Deputy
Commissioner   in   respect   of   which   no   appeal   has   been
preferred within the period specified in sub­section (1).
Thus,   in   a   case   appeal   is   not   filed   within   60   days
against   the   order   of   Joint   Commissioner   or   the   Deputy
Commissioner,   the   Commissioner   is   vested   with  suo   motu
power to call for and examine the records. The  suo motu
power has been given to the Commissioner to correct the
orders of Joint Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner
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even if no appeal has been filed within 60 days. Giving
of  suo motu  power to the Commissioner is with object to
ensure that an order passed by the Joint Commissioner or
the Deputy Commissioner may be corrected when appeal is
not filed within time under Section 69(1). The scheme of
Section   69   especially   sub­section   (2)   also   re­enforces
our   conclusion   that   Legislature   never   contemplated
applicability of Section 5 in Section 69(1) for condoning
the delay in filing an appeal by applying Section 5 of
the Limitation Act.
62. Learned counsel for the respondent has referred to
two Rules framed under Section 116 of 1959, Act, namely,
the Application and Appeal Rules dated 30.08.1961 and the
Holding   of   Inquiries   Rules   dated   30.08.1961.   The
Application and Appeal Rules provide for procedures and
details of filing application, affidavits, memorandum of
appeal, application for revision, etc. The said Rules, in
no manner, support the contention of the learned counsel
for the respondent that Section 5 of the Limitation Act
is   applicable.   Similarly,   Holding   of   Inquiries   Rules
provide for procedure of holding of inquiries, issue of
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notice, etc. The above Rules also do not throw any light
on the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
63. The above provision clearly indicates that provision
for   only   computation   of   limitation   has   been   made
applicable   to   the   proceedings   under   Act,   1959.   Section
115   cannot   be   read   in   a   manner   as   to   providing
applicability of Section 5. There is no other provision
in  the scheme from which it can be inferred that  Act,
1959   intended   applicability   of   Section   5   of   the
Limitation   Act   to   proceedings   of   appeal   before   the
Commission.   We,   thus,   conclude   that   Section   5   of   the
Limitation   Act   is   not   applicable   as   per   the   scheme   of
Act, 1959.
64. In view of the foregoing discussions, we allow the
appeal,   set   aside   the   impugned   judgment   of   the   High
Court. The order of the Commissioner dated 31.07.2013 is
set aside and the appeal filed by respondent No.3 stands
dismissed.
65. We   may,   however,   observe   that   dismissal   of   the
appeal   filed   by   respondent   No.3   as   above   shall   not
preclude   the   Commissioner   in   exercising   his  suo   motu
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power under Section 69(2) of the Act, 1959. We, however,
are not expressing any opinion with regard to exercise of
suo motu  by the Commissioner under Section 69(2) in the
present case and it is for the Commissioner to invoke his
power under Section 69(2) if he is so satisfied. Further,
this will be without prejudice to any other remedy open
to the respondent No.3 in law.
66. The parties shall bear their own costs.
 ......................J.
 ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
......................J.
 ( K.M. JOSEPH )
New Delhi,
May 03, 2019