Merely because the accused Ramavtar caused the injury on the head by the blunt side of Farsa, the High Court is not justified in altering the conviction to Section 304 Part II of the IPC. As held by this Court in catena of decisions, even in a case of a single blow, but on the vital part of the body, the case may fall under Section 302 of the IPC and the accused can be held guilty for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly that it was a case of free fight, considering the fact that the weapon used by the accused Ramavtar was Farsa and he caused the injury on the vital part of the body i.e. head which proved to be fatal, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the High Court has committed a grave error in altering the conviction of the accused Ramavtar from Sections 302/149 of the IPC to Section 304 Part II of the IPC.

1
NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1411 OF 2013
State of Madhya Pradesh .. Appellant
Versus
Kalicharan & Ors. .. Respondents
J U D G M E N T
M. R. Shah, J.
1. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
judgment and order dated 18.11.2008 passed by the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh, Judicature at Jabalpur, Bench at Gwalior in
Criminal Appeal No. 43 of 1997 whereby the High Court has
partly allowed the said appeal preferred by the original accused
and set aside the judgment and order of conviction and sentence
dated
2
16.01.1997   passed   by   the   learned   Trial   Court,   whereby   the
learned Trial Court convicted the respondent­original accused for
commission   of   the   offence   under   Sections   148,   302/149,
325/149, 323/149 of the IPC and altered the conviction of the
accused­Ramavtar from Section 302/149 of the IPC to Section
304 Part II of the IPC and sentenced him to five years R.I. with
fine of Rs.5000/­ and set aside his conviction for the offence
under   Sections   148   and   302/149   of   the   IPC;   altered   the
conviction of the accused­Kalicharan to offences under Sections
323 and 325 of the IPC and reduced the sentence to the period
already undergone; set aside the conviction of the accused­Amar
Singh,   Kedar,   Abhilakh   and   Ramgopal   under   Sections   148,
302/149, 325/149 and 323/149 of the IPC and acquitted them
from the charges levelled against them; set aside the conviction of
the accused­Tejsingh, Gangaram and Vedari under Sections 148,
302/149   and   325/149   of   the   IPC   and   convicted   them   for
commission of the offence under Section 323 of the IPC and
reduced the sentence to the period already undergone by them,
the State has preferred the present appeal.
2. We have heard the learned advocates appearing on behalf of
the   respective   parties   at   length.       Having   heard   the   learned
3
counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties, the findings
recorded by the  High Court and considering the evidence on
record, we are of the opinion that the impugned judgment and
order passed by the High Court, insofar as accused Kalicharan,
Amar Singh, Kedar, Abhilakh, Ramgopal, Tejsingh, Gangaram
and Vedari are concerned, is not required to be interfered with.
In the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the
fact that there was a free fight and the role attributed to the
aforesaid   accused,   the   High   Court   has   rightly   acquitted   the
aforesaid accused for the offences under Sections 148, 302/149
and 325/149 of the IPC.  The same is absolutely in consonance
with the decision of this Court in the case of Kanwarlal v. State
of M.P. (2002) 7 SCC 152.  Therefore, the present appeal qua the
aforesaid accused (except the accused­Ramavtar) deserves to be
dismissed. 
3. Now, so far as the impugned judgment and order passed by
the High Court altering the conviction of the accused­Ramavtar
from   Sections   302/149   to   Section   304   Part   II   of   the   IPC   is
concerned, it is required to be noted that the fatal blow was
caused by the said accused­Ramavtar.   The deceased Kalyan
sustained   the   injury   on   his   head   which   was   caused   by   the
4
accused   Ramavtar.     The   said   injury   caused   by   the   accused
Ramavtar was on the vital part of the body i.e. head and proved
to be fatal.   Merely because the accused Ramavtar caused the
injury on the head by the blunt side of Farsa, the High Court is
not justified in altering the conviction to Section 304 Part II of the
IPC.  As held by this Court in catena of decisions, even in a case
of a single blow, but on the vital part of the body, the case may
fall under Section 302 of the IPC and the accused can be held
guilty for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC.  However, in
the facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly that it
was a case of free fight, considering the fact that the weapon
used by the accused Ramavtar was Farsa and he caused the
injury on the vital part of the body i.e. head which proved to be
fatal, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the
opinion   that  the   High  Court   has  committed  a   grave  error  in
altering the conviction of the accused Ramavtar from Sections
302/149 of the IPC to Section 304 Part II of the IPC.    In the
facts and circumstances of the case and considering the evidence
on   record,   more   particularly,   the   medical   evidence   and   the
manner in which the incident took place, we are of the opinion
that the accused Ramavtar should have been held guilty for the
5
offence under Section 304 Part I of the IPC.  To that extent, the
impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court deserves
to be quashed and set aside.     The conviction of the accused
Ramavtar is to be altered from Section 304 Part II to Section 304
Part I of the IPC.
3.1 In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the
present appeal succeeds in part.   The impugned judgment and
order passed by the High Court insofar as altering the conviction
of the accused Ramavtar from Sections 302/149 of the IPC to
Section 304 Part II of the IPC and sentencing him to undergo five
years R.I. with fine of Rs.5,000/­ for the offence under Section
304 Part II of the IPC is hereby quashed and set aside.   The
conviction of the accused Ramavtar (respondent No. 2 herein) is
altered from Section 302 of the IPC to Section 304 Part I of the
IPC and is sentenced to undergo eight years R.I. with a fine of
Rs.5000/­ and in default to further undergo R.I. for six months.
Four weeks’ time is granted to the accused Ramavtar (respondent
No. 2 herein) to surrender to serve out the remaining portion of
his sentence.   Rest of the judgment and order of the High Court
is hereby confirmed. 
6
……………………………….J.
   [M. R. SHAH]
NEW DELHI,    ……………………………….J.
MAY 31, 2019.            [A.S. BOPANNA]   

Section 148 of the N.I. Act as amended, we are of the opinion that Section 148 of the N.I. Act as amended, shall be applicable in respect of the appeals against the order of conviction and sentence for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, even in a case where the criminal complaints for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act were filed prior to amendment Act No. 20/2018 i.e., prior to 01.09.2018

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.917­944     OF 2019
(Arising out of SLP(Criminal) Nos. 4948­4975/2019
Surinder Singh Deswal @ Col. S.S.Deswal
and others …Appellants
versus
Virender Gandhi …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
M.R. SHAH, J.
Leave granted.
2. As common question of law and facts arise in this group of
appeals   and,   as   such,   all   these   appeals,   arise   out   of   the
impugned   common   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   High
Court,   are   being   decided   and   disposed   of   together   by   this
common judgment and order.
3. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
common order passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
at   Chandigarh,   by   which   the   High   Court   has   dismissed   the
respective   revision   applications   and   has   confirmed   the   order
passed by the first appellate court – learned Additional Sessions
Judge,   Panchkula,   directing   the   appellants   herein   –   original
1
appellants – original accused to deposit 25% of the amount of
compensation, in view of the provisions of amended Act No. 20 of
2018 in Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘N.I. Act’), the original appellants –
original accused have preferred the present appeals.
4. The facts leading to the present appeals in nutshell are as
under:
That criminal complaints were filed against the appellants
herein – original accused for the offence under Section 138 of the
N.I. Act.   That the said criminal complaints were filed prior to
2.8.2018. That the learned trial Court vide judgment and order
dated 30.10.2018 convicted the appellants for the offence under
Section   138   of   the   N.I.   Act   and   sentenced   them   to   undergo
imprisonment of two years and to pay cheque amount + 1% as
interest and litigation expenses as fine.
4.1 Feeling  aggrieved  and  dissatisfied   with   the   order  of
conviction   passed   by   the   learned   trial   Court,   convicting   the
appellants – original accused for the offence under Section 138 of
the N.I. Act and the sentence imposed by the learned trial Court,
the appellants – original accused have preferred criminal appeals
before the  first appellate  Court  – learned Additional  Sessions
2
Judge, Panchkula.  In the said appeals, the appellants – original
accused submitted application/s under Section 389 of the Cr.
P.C.   for   suspension   of   sentence   and   releasing   them   on   bail,
pending appeal/s.
4.2 That considering the provisions of amended Section 148 of
the N.I. Act, which has been amended by Amendment Act No.
20/2018,   which   came   into   force   w.e.f.   1.9.2018,   the   first
appellate Court, while suspending the sentence and allowing the
application/s   under   Section   389   of   the   Cr.P.C,   directed   the
appellants to deposit 25% of the amount of compensation/fine
awarded by the learned trial Court.
4.3 Feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the learned first
appellate Court – learned Additional Sessions Judge, Panchkula
directing the appellants – original accused – original appellants to
deposit 25% of the amount of compensation/fine awarded by the
learned   trial   Court,   pending   appeal   challenging   the   order   of
conviction and sentence imposed by the learned trial Court, the
appellants approached the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
Chandigarh by way of revision application/s.
4.4 It was the case on behalf of the appellants that Section 148
of the N.I. Act, as amended by Act No. 20/2018, shall not be
3
applicable with respect to criminal proceedings already initiated
prior to the amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act.
4.5 The High Court by a detailed judgment and order has not
accepted the aforesaid contention and has dismissed the revision
application/s and has confirmed the order passed by the learned
first   appellate   Court   –   learned   Additional   Sessions   Judge,
Panchkula directing the appellants ­ original appellants­original
accused to deposit 25% of the amount of compensation awarded
by the learned trial Court considering Section 148 of the N.I. Act,
as amended.
4.6 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
common   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   in
dismissing the revision application/s and confirming the order/s
passed   by   the   learned   first   appellate   Court   directing   the
appellants – original appellants – original accused to deposit 25%
of  the   amount  of  compensation  awarded  by  the  learned  trial
Court under Section 148 of the N.I. Act, as amended, the original
appellants – original accused have preferred the present appeals.
5. Shri Vijay Hansaria, learned Senior Advocate has appeared
on   behalf   of   the   appellants   –   original   appellants   –   original
4
accused and Shri Alok Sangwan, learned Advocate has appeared
on behalf of the original complainant.
5.1 Shri Vijay Hansaria, learned Senior Advocate appearing on
behalf of the appellants has vehemently submitted that in the
present case, both, the High Court as well as the learned first
appellate Court have materially erred in directing the appellants
to deposit 25% of the amount of compensation as per Section 148
of the N.I. Act, as amended.
5.2 It is vehemently submitted by the learned Senior Advocate
appearing on behalf of the appellants that in the present case as
the criminal proceedings were initiated and the complaints were
filed against the accused for the offence under Section 138 of the
N.I. Act, prior to the amendment Act came into force, Section 148
of the N.I.Act, as amended shall not be applicable. 
5.3 It   is   further   submitted   by   the   learned   Senior   Advocate
appearing on behalf of the appellants that the legal proceedings,
whether civil or criminal, are to be decided on the basis of the law
applicable   on   the   date   of   the   filing   of   the   suit   or   alleged
commission of offence by the trial Court or the appellate Court,
unless the law is amended expressly with retrospective effect,
subject to the provisions of Article 20(1) of the Constitution of
5
India.     In   support   of   his   above   submission,   learned   Senior
Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has heavily relied
upon   the   decisions   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of  Garikapatti
Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury, reported in AIR 1957 SC 540;
and  Videocon  International Limited  v. Securities  and  Exchange
Board of India, reported in (2015) 4 SCC 33.
5.4 It   is   further   submitted   by   the   learned   Senior   Advocate
appearing on behalf of the appellants that even otherwise in the
present case, the first appellate Court has interpreted the word
“may” as “shall” in Section 148 of the N.I. Act and proceeded on
the basis that it is mandatory for the appellate Court to direct
deposit of minimum of 25% of the fine or compensation awarded
by the trial Court for suspension of sentence.
5.5 It   is   further   submitted   by   the   learned   Senior   Advocate
appearing on behalf of the appellants that the first appellate
Court heavily relied upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana
High Court in the case of M/s Ginni Garments and another v. M/s
Sethi Garments (CRR No. 9872 of 2018, decided on 04.04.2019),
in which it was held that the appellate Court continues to have
discretion as to the condition to be imposed or not to be imposed
6
for suspension of sentence and it was further held that however
in case discretion is exercised to suspend the sentence subject to
payment of compensation/fine, such order must commensurate
with Section 148 of the N.I. Act.  It is submitted, however, in the
present case, the appellate Court did not exercise discretion and
proceeded on the assumption that it is mandatory to deposit 25%
of the fine or compensation as a condition for suspension of
sentence. It is submitted that therefore the High Court ought to
have remanded the matter back to the appellate Court to decide
on the question of suspension of sentence as per the decision in
the case of M/s Ginni Garments (supra).
5.6 It   is   further   submitted   by   the   learned   Senior   Advocate
appearing on behalf of the appellants that a similar view is taken
by the Bombay High Court in the case of  Ajay Vinodchandra
Shah v. The State of Maharashtra (Criminal Writ Petition No. 258
of 2019).   It is submitted that in the said decision, the Bombay
High Court has also observed and held that as per Section 148 of
the N.I. Act as amended, the appellate Court has the discretion to
direct deposit the sum pending appeal, but if at all such direction
is given, that sum shall not be less than 20% of the amount of
fine or compensation awarded by the trial Court.  It is submitted
7
that in the present case, the appellate Court wrongly presumed
that the requirement under Section 148 of the N.I. Act is the
deposit of 25% of the fine or compensation.
5.7 It   is   further   submitted   by   the   learned   Senior   Advocate
appearing on behalf of the appellants that in the present case the
learned trial Court imposed the fine under Section 138 of the N.I.
Act, equal to the amount of cheque plus 1%.  It is submitted that
as per Section 357(2) of the Cr.P.C., no such fine is payable till
the decision of the appeal.  It is submitted that therefore also the
first appellate Court ought not to have passed any order directing
the   appellants   to   deposit   25%   of   the   amount   of
fine/compensation, pending appeal/s.   In support of his above
submission, learned Senior Counsel has heavily relied upon the
decision of this Court in the case of Dilip S. Dhanukar v. Kotak
Mahindra Bank, reported in (2007) 6 SCC 528.
5.8 Making   the   above   submissions   and   relying   upon   the
aforesaid decisions, it is prayed to allow the present appeals and
quash and set aside the impugned order passed by the first
appellate   court,   confirmed   by   the   High   Court,   by   which   the
appellants   are   directed   to   deposit   25%   of   the   amount   of
8
compensation   considering   Section   148   of   the   N.I.   Act   as
amended.
6. While opposing the present appeals, Shri Alok Sangwan,
learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original complainant
has  vehemently  submitted  that  the  order passed by  the first
appellate Court directing the appellants to deposit 25% of the
amount   of   compensation/fine   pending   appeal   and   while
suspending the sentence imposed by the learned trial Court is
absolutely in consonance   with the Statement of Objects and
Reasons of the amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act.  It is
submitted that having found that because of delay tactics   of
unscrupulous drawers of dishonoured cheques due to easy filing
of appeals and obtaining stay on proceedings, the object and
purpose of N.I. Act was being frustrated and having found that
due to such delay tactics, injustice is caused to the payee of a
dishonoured cheque who has to spend considerable time and
resources in court proceedings to realize the value of the cheque,
the Parliament thought it fit to amend Section 148 of the N.I. Act,
which confers powers on the first appellate court to direct the
appellant (the convict for the offence under Section 138 of the
N.I. Act) to deposit such sum which shall be minimum of 20% of
9
the   fine   or   compensation   awarded   by   the   trial   court.     It   is
submitted that therefore the High Court has rightly refused to
interfere with the order passed by the first appellate court, which
was just in consonance with the provisions of Section 148 of the
N.I. Act as amended.
6.1 It is further submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on
behalf of the original complainant that the submission on behalf
of the appellants – original accused that Section 148 of the N.I.
Act would not be made applicable retrospectively and shall not be
applicable to the appeals arising out of the criminal proceedings
which were initiated much prior to the amendment in Section
148 of the N.I. Act is concerned, it is vehemently submitted that
the aforesaid submission has no substance.  It is submitted that
first of all amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act is procedural
in nature and therefore there is no question of applying the same
retrospectively.   It is submitted that as such no vested right of
the appeal of the appellants has been taken away or affected by
amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act.  It is submitted that in
the present case, admittedly, the appeals were preferred after the
amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act came into force and
therefore   Section   148   of   the   N.I.   Act,   as   amended,   is  rightly
10
invoked/applied   by   the   learned   first   appellate   Court.     It   is
submitted that therefore the amendment so brought in the Act by
insertion of Section 148   of the N.I. Act is purely procedural in
nature and not substantive and does not affect the vested rights
of the appellants, as such, the same can have a retrospective
effect and can be applied in the present case also.
6.2 Now so far as the reliance placed on Section 357(2) of the
Cr.P.C.   and   the   submission   of   the   learned   Senior   Advocate
appearing on behalf of the appellants that in view of Section
357(2) of the Cr.P.C., fine during the pendency of the appeal is
not recoverable is concerned, it is vehemently submitted that in
the present case in Section 148 of the N.I. Act as amended, it is
specifically stated that “Notwithstanding anything contained in
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973…..”.  It is submitted that
therefore   Section   148   of   the   N.I.   Act   as   amended   shall   be
applicable and it is always open for the appellate court to direct
deposit of such sum, but not less than 20% of the amount of
compensation/fine imposed by the learned trial court.
6.3 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the
present appeals.
11
7. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties
at length.
7.1 The short question which is posed for consideration before
this Court is, whether the first appellate court is justified in
directing   the   appellants   –   original   accused   who   have   been
convicted for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act to
deposit 25% of the amount of compensation/fine imposed by the
learned   trial   Court,   pending   appeals  challenging  the   order   of
conviction   and   sentence   and   while   suspending   the   sentence
under Section 389 of the Cr.P.C., considering Section 148 of the
N.I. Act as amended?
7.2 While   considering   the   aforesaid   issue/question,   the
Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amendment in Section
148 of the N.I. Act, as amended by way of Amendment Act No.
20/2018   and   Section   148   of   the   N.I.   Act   as   amended,   are
required to be referred to and considered, which read as under:
“The   Negotiable  Instruments   Act,   1881   (the   Act)
was enacted to define and amend the law relating
to   Promissory   Notes,   Bills   of   Exchange   and
Cheques.   The   said   Act   has   been   amended   from
time to time so as to provide, inter alia, speedy
disposal   of   cases   relating   to   the   offence   of
dishonour   of   cheques.   However,   the   Central
Government   has   been   receiving   several
representations from the public including trading
12
community   relating   to   pendency   of   cheque
dishonour cases. This is because of delay tactics of
unscrupulous drawers of dishonoured cheques due
to   easy   filing   of   appeals   and   obtaining   stay   on
proceedings. As a result of this, injustice is caused
to the payee of a dishonoured cheque who has to
spend   considerable   time   and   resources   in   court
proceedings   to   realize   the   value   of   the   cheque.
Such   delays   compromise   the   sanctity   of   cheque
transactions.
2. It is proposed to amend the said Act with a view
to   address   the   issue   of   undue   delay   in   final
resolution   of   cheque   dishonour   cases   so   as   to
provide   relief   to   payees   of   dishonoured   cheques
and   to   discourage   frivolous   and   unnecessary
litigation which would save time and money. The
proposed   amendments   will   strengthen   the
credibility of cheques and help trade and commerce
in   general   by   allowing   lending   institutions,
including banks, to continue to extend financing to
the productive sectors of the economy.
3.   It   is,   therefore,   proposed   to   introduce   the
Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Bill, 2017 to
provide, inter alia, for the following, namely:—
(i)       to insert a new section 143A in the said Act
to provide that the Court trying an offence under
section 138, may order the drawer of the cheque to
pay interim compensation to the complainant, in a
summary   trial   or   a   summons   case,   where   he
pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the
complaint; and in any other case, upon framing of
charge. The interim compensation so payable shall
be such sum not exceeding twenty per cent of the
amount of the cheque; and
(ii) to insert a new section 148 in the said Act
so as to provide that in an appeal by the drawer
against conviction under Section 138, the Appellate
13
Court may order the appellant to deposit such sum
which shall be a minimum of twenty per cent of the
fine or compensation awarded by the trial court.
4. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objectives.”
‘‘148. Power   to   Appellate   Court   to   order
payment   pending   appeal   against   conviction....
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code
of   Criminal   Procedure,   1973   (2   of   1974),   in   an
appeal   by   the   drawer   against   conviction   under
section   138,   the   Appellate   Court   may   order   the
appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a
minimum   of   twenty   per   cent   of   the   fine   or
compensation awarded by the trial Court:
Provided that the amount payable under this
sub­section   shall   be   in   addition   to   any   interim
compensation paid by the appellant under section
143A.
(2) The amount referred to in sub­section (1)
shall be deposited within sixty days from the date
of   the   order,   or   within   such   further   period   not
exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the
Court   on   sufficient   cause   being   shown   by   the
appellant.
(3) The Appellate Court may direct the release
of the amount deposited by the appellant to the
complainant at any time during the pendency of
the appeal:
Provided that if the appellant is acquitted, the
Court shall direct the complainant to repay to the
appellant the amount so released, with interest at
the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of
India, prevalent at the beginning of the relevant
financial year, within sixty days from the date of
the   order,   or   within   such   further   period   not
14
exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the
Court   on   sufficient   cause   being   shown   by   the
complainant.’’
8. It is the case on behalf of the appellants that as the criminal
complaints against the appellants under Section 138 of the N.I.
Act were lodged/filed before the amendment Act No. 20/2018 by
which   Section   148   of   the   N.I.   Act   came  to   be  amended   and
therefore amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act shall not be made
applicable.  However, it is required to be noted that at the time
when the appeals against the conviction of the appellants for the
offence   under   Section   138   of   the   N.I.   Act   were   preferred,
Amendment Act No. 20/2018 amending Section 148 of the N.I.
Act came into force w.e.f. 1.9.2018.  Even, at the time when the
appellants   submitted   application/s   under   Section   389   of   the
Cr.P.C. to suspend the sentence pending appeals challenging the
conviction and sentence, amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act
came   into   force   and   was   brought   on   statute   w.e.f.   1.9.2018.
Therefore, considering the object and purpose of amendment in
Section 148 of the N.I. Act and while suspending the sentence in
exercise of powers under Section 389 of the Cr.P.C., when the
first appellate court directed the appellants to deposit 25% of the
15
amount of fine/compensation as imposed by the learned trial
Court, the same can be said to be absolutely in consonance with
the Statement of Objects and Reasons of amendment in Section
148 of the N.I. Act.
8.1 Having observed and found that because of the delay tactics
of unscrupulous drawers of dishonoured cheques due to easy
filing of appeals and obtaining stay on proceedings, the object
and purpose of the enactment of Section 138 of the N.I. Act was
being   frustrated,   the   Parliament   has   thought   it   fit   to   amend
Section 148 of the N.I. Act, by which the first appellate Court, in
an appeal challenging the order of conviction under Section 138
of the N.I. Act, is conferred with the power to direct the convicted
accused   –   appellant   to   deposit   such   sum   which   shall   be   a
minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial
Court.   By the amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act, it
cannot be said that any vested right of appeal of the accused –
appellant   has   been   taken   away   and/or   affected.     Therefore,
submission   on   behalf   of   the   appellants   that   amendment   in
Section   148   of   the   N.I.   Act   shall   not   be   made   applicable
retrospectively   and   more   particularly   with   respect   to
cases/complaints filed prior to 1.9.2018 shall not be applicable
16
has no substance and cannot be accepted, as by amendment in
Section 148 of the N.I. Act, no substantive right of appeal has
been taken away and/or affected.  Therefore the decisions of this
Court in the cases of  Garikapatti Veeraya (supra) and Videocon
International Limited (supra),  relied upon by the learned senior
counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellants   shall   not   be
applicable   to   the   facts   of   the   case   on   hand.     Therefore,
considering   the   Statement   of   Objects   and   Reasons   of   the
amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act stated hereinabove, on
purposive   interpretation   of   Section   148   of   the   N.I.   Act   as
amended, we are of the opinion that Section 148 of the N.I. Act as
amended, shall be applicable in respect of the appeals against the
order of conviction and sentence for the offence under Section
138 of the N.I. Act, even in a case where the criminal complaints
for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act were filed prior to
amendment Act No. 20/2018 i.e., prior to 01.09.2018. If such a
purposive interpretation is not adopted,  in that case, the object
and purpose of amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act would
be frustrated.  Therefore, as such, no error has been committed
by the learned first appellate court directing the appellants to
deposit 25% of the amount of fine/compensation as imposed by
17
the learned trial Court considering Section 148 of the N.I. Act, as
amended.
9. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the appellants
that even considering the language used in Section 148 of the
N.I.   Act   as   amended,   the   appellate   Court   “may”   order   the
appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of 20%
of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial Court and the
word used is not “shall” and therefore the discretion is vested
with the first appellate court to direct the appellant – accused to
deposit such sum and the appellate court has construed it as
mandatory, which according to the learned Senior Advocate for
the appellants would be contrary to the provisions of Section 148
of   the   N.I.   Act   as   amended   is   concerned,   considering   the
amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act as a whole to be read with
the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amending Section
148 of the N.I. Act, though it is true that in amended Section 148
of the N.I. Act, the word used is “may”, it is generally to be
construed as a “rule” or “shall” and not to direct to deposit by the
appellate court is an exception for which special reasons are to
be   assigned.   Therefore   amended   Section   148   of   the   N.I.   Act
confers   power   upon   the   Appellate   Court   to   pass   an   order
18
pending appeal to direct the Appellant­Accused to deposit the
sum   which   shall   not   be   less   than   20%   of   the   fine   or
compensation   either   on   an   application   filed   by   the   original
complainant or even on the application filed by the AppellantAccused   under   Section   389   of   the   Cr.P.C.   to   suspend   the
sentence.  The aforesaid is required to be construed considering
the fact that as per the amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act, a
minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial
court is directed to be deposited and that such amount is to be
deposited within a period of 60 days from the date of the order, or
within such further period not exceeding 30 days as may be
directed by the appellate court for sufficient cause shown by the
appellant.   Therefore, if amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act is
purposively  interpreted  in  such  a  manner  it  would   serve  the
Objects and Reasons of not only amendment in Section 148 of
the N.I. Act, but also Section 138 of the N.I. Act.   Negotiable
Instruments Act has been amended from time to time so as to
provide, inter alia, speedy disposal of cases relating to the offence
of the dishonoured of cheques. So as to see that due to delay
tactics by the unscrupulous drawers of the dishonoured cheques
due   to   easy   filing   of   the   appeals   and   obtaining   stay   in   the
19
proceedings,   an   injustice   was   caused   to   the   payee   of   a
dishonoured cheque who has to spend considerable time and
resources in the court proceedings to realise the value of the
cheque and having observed that such delay has compromised
the   sanctity   of   the   cheque   transactions,   the   Parliament   has
thought it fit to amend Section 148 of the N.I. Act.   Therefore,
such a purposive interpretation would be in furtherance of the
Objects and Reasons of the amendment in Section 148 of the N.I.
Act and also Sec 138 of the N.I. Act.
10. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the appellants,
relying upon Section 357(2) of the Cr.P.C. that once the appeal
against the order of conviction is preferred, fine is not recoverable
pending appeal and therefore such an order of deposit of 25% of
the fine ought not to have been passed and in support of the
above reliance placed upon the decision of this Court in the case
of Dilip S. Dhanukar (supra)  is concerned, the aforesaid has no
substance.  The opening word of amended Section 148 of the N.I.
Act is that “notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure…..”. Therefore irrespective of the provisions
of Section 357(2) of the Cr.P.C., pending appeal before the first
appellate court, challenging the order of conviction and sentence
20
under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, the appellate court is conferred
with   the   power   to   direct   the   appellant   to   deposit   such   sum
pending appeal which shall be a minimum of 20% of the fine or
compensation awarded by the trial Court.
In view of the above and for the reasons stated herein above,
impugned Judgment and Order passed by the High Court does
not call for any interference.
11. At this stage, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf
of the appellants has requested to grant the appellants some
more time (three months’ time) to deposit the amount as per the
order passed by the first appellate court, confirmed by the High
Court.     The   said   prayer   is   opposed   by   the   learned   Advocate
appearing on behalf of the original complainant.  It is submitted
that as per amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act, the appellants –
accused have to deposit the amount of compensation/fine as
directed by the appellate court within a period of 60 days which
can be further extended by a further period of 30 days as may be
directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the
appellants.  However, in the facts and circumstances of the case
and considering the fact that the appellants were   bonafidely
litigating before this Court challenging the order passed by the
21
first appellate court, in exercise of powers under Article 142 of
the   Constitution   of   India   and   in   the   peculiar   facts   and
circumstances of the case and the amount to be deposited is a
huge amount, we grant further four weeks’ time from today to the
appellants to deposit the amount as directed by the first appellate
court, confirmed by the High Court and further confirmed by this
Court.
12. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we
see no reason to interfere with the impugned common judgment
and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   dismissing   the   revision
application/s, confirming the order passed by the first appellate
court directing the appellants to deposit 25% of the amount of
fine/compensation pending appeals.
The   instant   appeals   are   accordingly   dismissed   with   the
aforesaid observations and appellants are now directed to deposit
the amount directed by the first appellate court within extended
period of four weeks from today.
…………………………………….J.
[M.R. SHAH]
NEW DELHI; ……………………………………J.
MAY 29, 2019. [A.S. BOPANNA]
22

Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 = mere abuses are not sufficient to attract section 3[1]1[x] = Going by the version of the complainant Deshiram himself, the expressions used by the appellant during the course of vertical altercation, did not refer to the caste or tribe that the complainant belonged though such assertion finds place in the testimony of the other witnesses. the appellant abused the complainant Deshiram is quite clear and as such his conviction and sentence recorded under Section 294 IPC was fully justified. However, going by the version of the complainant Deshiram according to which there was no reference to the caste or tribe of the complainant, there is a doubt as regards charge under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. In the circumstances, while affirming the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 294 IPC, we grant him benefit of doubt and acquit him of the charge under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. …. OF 2019 @ SLP(CRL.) NO. 1907 OF 2019
NARAD PATEL VS. SATE OF CHHATTISGARH
1
Non-Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 883 OF 2019
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.1907 of
2019)
NARAD PATEL …Appellant
VERSUS
STATE OF CHHATTISGARH …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Uday Umesh Lalit, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal challenges the correctness of the final Judgment
and Order dated 27.11.2018 passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh
at Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal No.1101 of 2002.
3. The appellant was tried in Special Case no.13 of 2002 on the
file of the Special Judge, Raigarh, Chhattisgarh for having
committed offences punishable under Sections 294, 506-B of IPC and
under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (“the Act”, for short). It
was alleged that during the night intervening 30.09.2001 and
01.10.2001 the appellant had cut the hedge (Medh) of the paddy
field of complainant Deshiram as a result of which the field of
Deshiram went without any water. A Panchayat was called on the
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. …. OF 2019 @ SLP(CRL.) NO. 1907 OF 2019
NARAD PATEL VS. SATE OF CHHATTISGARH
2
next day i.e. on 01.10.2001 in which the appellant allegedly abused
complainant Deshiram and his brother Shyam Sunder and threatened to
kill them. It was alleged that appellant abused said complainant
Deshiram and his brother who were members of a Scheduled Tribe and
thereby committed offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. During
the trial, certain witnesses who had attended the Panchayat Meeting
were examined and the Special Judge, Raigarh by his judgment and
order dated 23.09.2002 found the appellant guilty of the offences
under Section 294 IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. The
appellant was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three
months on the first count and for six months under the second count
with further imposition of fine and default sentence. The appellant
was however acquitted of the charge under Section 506 IPC.
4. In Criminal Appeal No.1101 of 2002 arising from the conviction
and sentence as aforesaid, the High Court affirmed the view taken
by the Special Judge and dismissed the appeal by its judgment and
order dated 27.11.2018, which is presently under appeal.
5. We heard Mr. Vikrant Singh Bais, learned Advocate for the
appellant and Mr. Nizam Pasha, learned Advocate for the respondent.
6. It is a matter of record that the appellant has already
completed more than 4 months of imprisonment.
7. It has been found that the appellant was not guilty of the
offence under Section 506 IPC and the case presented by the
prosecution in that behalf was completely rejected. According to
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. …. OF 2019 @ SLP(CRL.) NO. 1907 OF 2019
NARAD PATEL VS. SATE OF CHHATTISGARH
3
the record, following certain acts committed by the appellant a
Panchayat was held in which some abuses were hurled by the
appellant. Going by the version of the complainant Deshiram
himself, the expressions used by the appellant during the course of
vertical altercation, did not refer to the caste or tribe that the
complainant belonged though such assertion finds place in the
testimony of the other witnesses.
8. Thus, the fact that the appellant abused the complainant
Deshiram is quite clear and as such his conviction and sentence
recorded under Section 294 IPC was fully justified. However, going
by the version of the complainant Deshiram according to which there
was no reference to the caste or tribe of the complainant, there is
a doubt as regards charge under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act.
9. In the circumstances, while affirming the conviction and
sentence of the appellant under Section 294 IPC, we grant him
benefit of doubt and acquit him of the charge under Section 3(1)(x)
of the Act.
10. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. The appellant
be set at liberty unless his custody is required in connection with
any other matter.
………..…..……..……J.

(Arun Mishra)
..………….……………J.
 Uday Umesh Lalit)
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. …. OF 2019 @ SLP(CRL.) NO. 1907 OF 2019
NARAD PATEL VS. SATE OF CHHATTISGARH
4
New Delhi
May 10, 2019
.

Whether a common complaint by seeking permission under Section 12(1)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act , can be filed by all the consumers against their common reliefs against the common respondent before the comsumer court ? Apex court held yes

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1676 OF 2019
ANJUM HUSSAIN & ORS. VS. INTELLICITY BUSINESS PARK PVT. LTD. & ORS.
1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1676 OF 2019
ANJUM HUSSAIN & ORS. …Appellant(s)
VERSUS
INTELLICITY BUSINESS PARK PVT. LTD. & ORS. …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Uday Umesh Lalit, J.
1. This appeal under Section 23 of the Consumer Protection Act,
1986 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is directed against the
Judgment and Order dated 10.10.2018 passed by the National Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi (‘the National
Commission’, for short) in Consumer Case No.2241 of 2018 preferred
by the appellants.
2. The appellant no.1 had booked an office space admeasuring
about 440 sq.ft in a project consisting of residential units, shops
and offices launched by the respondent. The Builder – Buyer
Agreement was executed between the appellant no.1 and the
respondent on 02.12.2013, whereunder the respondent was to deliver
possession of the office unit within four years. Similar such
Agreements were entered into between the appellant nos.2 to 44 and
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1676 OF 2019
ANJUM HUSSAIN & ORS. VS. INTELLICITY BUSINESS PARK PVT. LTD. & ORS.
2
the respondent in respect of various units from the same project.
3. Since the respondent had failed to honour its commitments of
delivering possession in four years and as the project was still at
the stage of excavation, Case No.2241 of 2018 was filed by the
appellants 1 to 44 seeking refund of the amounts paid by them to
the respondent along with interest and compensation. An
application under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act was also filed by the
appellants.
4. The first listing of the case before the National Commission
was on 10.10.2018 when the application moved by the appellants
under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act was dealt with by the National
Commission as under:-
1. This complaint has been instituted for
the benefit of entire class of buyers, who
have booked shops/offices in a project
namely “Intellicity” consisting of
residential units, shops and offices at
Greater Noida. The scope of this complaint
is not restricted only to the complainants.
An application seeking permission in terms
of Section 12(1)(c) of the Consumer
Protection Act, to institute this complaint
on behalf of all such buyers of commercial
units, being IA/18734/2018, has also been
filed, along with the complaint. It is
alleged that the complainants are consumers
as they had booked small shops/offices for
the purpose of earing their livelihood by
means of self-employment.
1. As provided in Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer
Protection Act, the term ‘consumer’ excludes from its
ambit, a person hiring or availing services for a
commercial purpose, unless he can bring his case
within the four-corners of the explanation below
Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act. A
person hiring or availing services for the purpose of
earning his livelihood by way of self-employment has
thereby been included in the definition of
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1676 OF 2019
ANJUM HUSSAIN & ORS. VS. INTELLICITY BUSINESS PARK PVT. LTD. & ORS.
3
‘consumer’. Otherwise, a shop/commercial unit is
deemed to be booked for a commercial purpose.
2. Since the scope of the complaint is not restrict only
to the complainants and encompasses all the allottees
of the shops/commercial units, as is specifically
stated in the complaint and is also evident from the
prayers made in the compliant, seeking direction to
the opposite party to refund the amount deposited by
each complainant as well as other allottees along
with interest and compensation, it would be
maintainable as a class action only if it is alleged
and shown that all the allottees of the
shops/commercial units in the above referred project
had booked the same solely for the purpose of the
earning their livelihood by way of self-employment,
meaning thereby that all the allottees intend to work
themselves in these shops/commercial units and the
occupation of the said units by them has to be for
the purpose of earning their livelihood. A careful
perusal of the complaint would show that it is not
even alleged that all the allottees of the commercial
units/shops in the above referred project had booked
the said shops/units solely for the purpose of the
earning their livelihood by way of self-employment.
In the absence of such an averment in the complaint,
no evidence can even be led to prove that not only
the complainants but all the allottees of the
shops/commercial units had booked the same solely for
the purpose of the earning their livelihood by way of
self-employment. Even otherwise, the complainants
cannot know the purpose for which the allottees,
other than the complainants had booked the shops,
commercial units in the aforesaid project. The said
purpose can be in the knowledge only of the concerned
allottees. Therefore, this class action under
Section 12(1)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act on
behalf of not only the complainants but all the
allottees of the shops/commercial units in the
aforesaid project is not maintainable.”
5. The National Commission thus concluded that the case could not
be accepted as class action and dismissed the same. It was however
observed that the dismissal would not come in the way of the
complainants availing such other remedies as would be open to them.
6. The dismissal of the case as class action is questioned in
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1676 OF 2019
ANJUM HUSSAIN & ORS. VS. INTELLICITY BUSINESS PARK PVT. LTD. & ORS.
4
this appeal.
7. We heard Mr. Yash Srivastava, learned Advocate for the
appellants and Mr. Ashutosh Dubey, learned Advocate for the
respondent.
8. Relevant provisions of the Act may be adverted to at the
outset. Sections 2(1)b and 2(1)(d) of the Act define “complainant”
and “consumer” as under:-
 (b) “complainant” means –
(i) a consumer; or
(ii) any voluntary consumer association
registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1
of 1956) or under any other law for the time
being in force; or
(iii) the Central Government or any State
Government; or
(iv) one or more consumers, where there are
numerous consumers having the same interest;
(v) in case of death of a consumer, his
legal heir or representative; who or which
makes a complaint;
(d) "consumer" means any person who
(i) buys any goods for a consideration which
has been paid or promised or partly paid and
partly promised, or under any system of
deferred payment and includes any user of
such goods other than the person who buys
such goods for consideration paid or
promised or partly paid or partly promised,
or under any system of deferred payment when
such use is made with the approval of such
person, but does not include a person who
obtains such goods for resale or for any
commercial purpose; or
(ii) hires or avails of any services for a
consideration which has been paid or
promised or partly paid and partly promised,
or under any system of deferred payment and
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1676 OF 2019
ANJUM HUSSAIN & ORS. VS. INTELLICITY BUSINESS PARK PVT. LTD. & ORS.
5
includes any beneficiary of such services
other than the person who [hires or avails
of the services for consideration paid or
promised, or partly paid and partly
promised, or under any system of deferred
payments, when such services are availed of
with the approval of the first-mentioned
person; but does not include a person who
avails of such services for any commercial
purpose;
Explanation : For the purposes of this
clause "commercial purpose" does not
include use by a person of goods bought and
used by him and services availed by him
exclusively for the purposes of earning his
livelihood, and services availed by him by
means of self-employment;
9. Section 12 of the Act states:
12. Manner in which complaint shall be made
– (1) A complaint in relation to any goods
sold or delivered or agreed to be sold or
delivered or any service provided or agreed
to be provided, may be filed with a District
Forum, by –
(a) the consumer to whom such goods are sold
or delivered or agreed to be sold or
delivered or such service provided or
agreed to be provided;
(b) any recognised consumers association
whether the consumer to whom the goods
sold or delivered or service provided or
agreed to be provided is a member of such
association or not;
(c) one or more consumers, where there are
numerous consumers having the same
interest, with the permission of the
District Forum, on behalf of, or for the
benefit of, all consumers so interested;
or
(d) the Central Government or the State
Government, as the case may be, either in
its individual capacity or as a
representative of interests of the
consumers in general.”
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1676 OF 2019
ANJUM HUSSAIN & ORS. VS. INTELLICITY BUSINESS PARK PVT. LTD. & ORS.
6
10. Section 13(6) of the Act reads as under:
13. Procedure on admission of complaint –
(1) to (5)……….
(6) Where the complainant is a consumer
referred to in sub-clause (iv) of clause (b)
of subsection (1) of section 2, the
provisions of Rule 8 of Order I of the First
Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (5 of 1908) shall apply subject to the
modification that every reference therein to
a the plaintiff and the defendant shall be
construed as a reference to a complaint or
the opposite party, as the case may be.
11. According to the National Commission, though all the
appellants had a common grievance that the respondent had not
delivered possession of the respective units booked by them and thus
the respondent was deficient in rendering service, it was not shown
how many of the allottees had booked the shops/commercial units
solely for the purchase of earning their livelihood by way of
self-employment.
12. In Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Madras vs. T. N.
Ganapathy1 it was held by this Court that the persons who may be
represented in a Suit under Order 1 Rule 8 of Civil Procedure Code
need not have the same cause of action and all that is required for
application of said provision is that the persons concerned must
have common interest or common grievance. What is required is
sameness of interest. Paragraphs 7 and 9 of the decision were as
under:-
7. On the question of maintainability of the
1 (1990) 1 SCC 608
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1676 OF 2019
ANJUM HUSSAIN & ORS. VS. INTELLICITY BUSINESS PARK PVT. LTD. & ORS.
7
suit in a representative capacity under
Order I, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, it has been contended that since
the injury complained of is in regard to
demand of money and that too by a separate
demand against each of the allottees, giving
rise to different causes of action, Rule 1
has no application. The learned counsel
proceeded to say that it is not known
whether each of the allottees in Ashok Nagar
had been even served with an additional
demand before the suit was filed; and
further emphasised that those who had been
so served are interested in defeating only
the demand individually referable to each of
them. Each one of them is not interested in
what happens to the others. It is,
therefore, suggested that only such of the
allottees who have already been served with
additional demands are entitled to maintain
an action in court, and they also should do
it by filing separate suits. We do not find
any merit in the argument. The provisions of
Order I of Rule 8 have been included in the
Code in the public interest so as to avoid
multiplicity of litigation. The condition
necessary for application of the provisions
is that the persons on whose behalf the suit
is being brought must have the same
interest. In other words either the interest
must be common or they must have a common
grievance which they seek to get redressed.
In Kodia Goundar v. Velandi Goundar (ILR
1955 Mad 339: AIR 1955 Mad 281) a Full Bench
of the Madras High Court observed that on
the plain language of Order I Rule 8, the
principal requirement to bring a suit within
that rule is the sameness of interest of the
numerous persons on whose behalf or for
whose benefit the suit is instituted. The
court, while considering whether leave under
the rule should be granted or not, should
examine whether there is sufficient
community of interest to justify the
adoption of the procedure provided under the
rule. The object for which this provision is
enacted is really to facilitate the decision
of questions, in which a large number of
persons are interested, without recourse to
the ordinary procedure. The provision must,
therefore, receive an interpretation which
will subserve the object for its enactment.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1676 OF 2019
ANJUM HUSSAIN & ORS. VS. INTELLICITY BUSINESS PARK PVT. LTD. & ORS.
8
There are no words in the rule to limit its
scope to any particular category of suits or
to exclude a suit in regard to a claim for
money or for injunction as the present one.
… … …
9. It is true that each of the allottees is
interested individually in fighting out the
demand separately made or going to be made
on him and, thus, separate causes of action
arise in the case, but, that does not make
Order I Rule 8 inapplicable. Earlier there
was some doubt about the rule covering such
a case which now stands clarified by the
Explanation introduced by the Code of Civil
Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, which reads
as follows:
“Explanation.— For the purpose of
determining whether the persons who sue
or are sued, or defend, have the same
interest in one suit, it is not
necessary to establish that such
persons have the same cause of action
as the persons on whose behalf, or for
whose benefit, they sue or are sued, or
defend the suit, as the case may be.”
The objects and reasons for the amendment
were stated below:
“Objects and Reasons: Clause 55;
sub-clause (iv), — Rule 8 of Order I
deals with representative suits. Under
this rule, where there are numerous
persons having the same interest in one
suit, one or more of them may, with the
permission of the court, sue or be
sued, on behalf of all of them. The
rule has created a doubt as to whether
the party representing others should
have the same cause of action as the
persons represented by him. The rule is
being substituted by a new rule and an
explanation is being added to clarify
that such persons need not have the
same cause of action.”
There is, therefore, no doubt that the
persons who may be represented in a suit
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1676 OF 2019
ANJUM HUSSAIN & ORS. VS. INTELLICITY BUSINESS PARK PVT. LTD. & ORS.
9
under Order I, Rule 8 need not have the same
cause of action. The trial court in the
present case was right in permitting the
respondent to sue on behalf of all the
allottees of Ashok Nagar. We, therefore, do
not find any merit in this appeal which is
dismissed with costs. Before closing,
however, we would like to point out that the
plaintiff has represented only those in the
low income group in Ashok Nagar who will be
governed by this judgment, and nothing that
has been said or decided in this case is
applicable to any other group or colony.”
13. Very same issue was dealt with by Full Bench of the National
Commission in Ambrish Kumar Shukla and Ors. vs. Ferrous
Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.2. The National Commission relied upon the
decision of this Court in T.N. Housing Board1. Relevant portion of
the decision of the National Commission was :-
“10. Since by virtue of Section 13(6) of the
Consumer Protection Act, the provisions of
the Order 1 Rule 8 of CPC apply to the
consumer complaints filed by one or more
consumers where there are numerous consumers
having the same interest, the decision of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tamil Nadu
Housing Board (supra) would squarely apply,
while answering the reference. The purpose
of giving a statutory recognition to such a
complaint being to avoid the multiplicity of
litigation, the effort should be to give an
interpretation which would sub serve the
said objective, by reducing the increasing
inflow of the consumer complaints to the
Consumer Forums. The reduction in the number
of consumer complaints will be cost
effective not only for the consumers but
also for the service provider.
11..……As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Tamil Nadu Housing Board (supra), the
interest of the persons on whose behalf the
claim is brought must be common or they must
have a common grievance which they seek to
get addressed. The defect or deficiency in
2 Consumer Case No.97 of 2016, decided on 07.10.2016
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1676 OF 2019
ANJUM HUSSAIN & ORS. VS. INTELLICITY BUSINESS PARK PVT. LTD. & ORS.
10
the goods purchased, or the services hired
or availed of by them should be the same for
all the consumers on whose behalf or for
whose benefit the complaint is filed.
Therefore, the oneness of the interest is
akin to a common grievance against the same
person. If, for instance, a number of flats
or plots in a project are sold by a
builder/developer to a number of persons, he
fails to deliver possession of the said
flats/plots within the time frame promised
by him, and a complaint is filed by one or
more such persons, either seeking delivery
of possession of flats/plots purchased by
them and other purchasers in the said
project, or refund of the money paid by them
and the other purchasers to the
developer/builder is sought, the grievance
of such persons being common i.e. the
failure of the builder/developer to deliver
timely possession of the flats/plots sold to
them, they would have same interest in the
subject matter of the complaint and
sufficient community of interest to justify
the adoption of the procedure prescribed in
Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, provided that the complaint is
filed on behalf of or for the benefit of all
the persons having a common grievance
against the same developer/builder, and
identical relief is sought for all such
consumers.
The primary object behind permitting a class
action such as a complaint under Section
12(1)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act
being to facilitate the decision of a
consumer dispute in which a large number of
consumers are interested, without recourse
to each of them filing an individual
complaint, it is necessary that such a
complaint is filed on behalf of or for the
benefit of all the persons having such a
community of interest. A complaint on behalf
of only some of them therefore will not be
maintainable. If for instance, 100 flat
buyers/plot buyers in a project have a
common grievance against the
Builder/Developer and a complaint under
Section 12(1)(c) of the Consumer Protection
Act is filed on behalf of or for the benefit
of say 10 of them, the primary purpose
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1676 OF 2019
ANJUM HUSSAIN & ORS. VS. INTELLICITY BUSINESS PARK PVT. LTD. & ORS.
11
behind permitting a class action will not be
achieved, since the remaining 90 aggrieved
persons will be compelled either to file
individual complaints or to file complaints
on behalf of or for the benefit of the
different group of purchasers in the same
project. This, in our view, could not have
been the Legislative intent. The term
'persons so interested' and 'persons having
the same interest' used in Section 12(1)(c)
mean, the persons having a common grievance
against the same service provider. The use
of the words 'all consumers so interested'
and "on behalf of or for the benefit of all
consumers so interested", in Section 12(1)
(c) leaves no doubt that such a complaint
must necessarily be filed on behalf of or
for the benefit of all the persons having a
common grievance, seeking a common relief
and consequently having a community of
interest against the same service provider.”
14. It was observed by this Court in T.N. Housing Board1 that the
provision must receive an interpretation which would subserve the
object for its enactment. It is in this light that the Full Bench
of the National Commission held that oneness of the interest is
akin to a common grievance against the same person.
15. However, the National Commission in the instant case,
completely lost sight of the principles so clearly laid down in the
decisions referred to above. In our view, the approach in the
instant case was totally erroneous.
16. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the Order under
appeal. The application preferred by the appellants under Section
12(v)(o) of the Act is held to be maintainable. Case No.2241 of
2018 is restored to the file of the National Commission and shall
be proceeded with in accordance with law.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1676 OF 2019
ANJUM HUSSAIN & ORS. VS. INTELLICITY BUSINESS PARK PVT. LTD. & ORS.
12
17. The appeal is allowed in aforesaid terms. No costs.
..…..……………….J.
(Arun Mishra)
..…………………….J.
(Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi;
May 10, 2019.

when civil suit for eviction became final, basing on the permission given by slum Authorities - it can not be questioned byway of writ without pleading his case in civil suit =In Vidarbha part of the State of Maharashtra, before the enactment of Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1989, there had to be two rounds of litigation to seek eviction of a tenant. The first round had to be before the Rent Controller seeking permission to issue a quit notice under Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. If such permission was granted, then only the landlord could issue a notice of termination of tenancy and file a civil suit seeking eviction of a tenant. In the present case the first roundbefore the Rent Controller was gone into. Bona fide need as a ground for eviction may, in a given case, have an additional facet of comparative hardship and whether the tenant has any alternative accommodation or not. In any case, the matter had attained finality. The permission was granted by the Rent Controller and the civil suit was filed only thereafter in which an objection was taken that the premises being governed by the provisions of the Act, the requisite permission of the Slum Authority was mandatory In the proceedings so initiated the Slum Authority granted that permission. The matter was carried in appeal and the issue whether the requirements under Section 22(4) of the Act stood satisfied or not was also considered by the Appellate Authority. It must also be noted that the Civil Suit seeking eviction also attained finality. In the circumstances, the view that weighed with the High Court was not correct. The respondent had opportunity at every stage to present his case and whether the requirements of Section 22(4) of the Act stood satisfied or not was a matter which was dealt with by the Appellate Authority in sufficient detail. In the circumstances there was no reason for the High Court to interfere in its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

Civil Appeal NO. ____ of 2019 @ SLP(C) No. 10469 of 2016
Kumud w/o Mahadeorao Salunke vs. Shri Pandurang
Narayan Gandhewar Through Lrs. & Ors.
1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO._4873__ OF 2019
(Arising out of SLP(C) No.10469 of 2015)
KUMUD W/O MAHADEORAO SALUNKE …Appellant(s)
VERSUS
SHRI PANDURANG NARAYAN GANDHEWAR
THROUGH LRS. & ORS. …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Uday Umesh Lalit, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises out of Judgment and Order dated 19.06.2014
passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench,
Nagpur in Writ Petition No.2199 of 2003.
3. The appellant, landlord of the premises in question sought
permission of the Rent Controller under the provisions of C.P. and
Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 seeking
eviction of the respondent on the grounds that he bona fide
required the premises and that the respondent was habitual
defaulter in paying rent to the appellant. After the Rent
controller granted the permission, the appellant terminated the
Civil Appeal NO. ____ of 2019 @ SLP(C) No. 10469 of 2016
Kumud w/o Mahadeorao Salunke vs. Shri Pandurang
Narayan Gandhewar Through Lrs. & Ors.
2
tenancy by issuing notice under Section 108 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1982. Thereafter, he filed Civil Suit No.334 of 1996
seeking eviction of the respondent. However, an objection was
taken by the respondent that the premises were governed by the
Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, clearance and Re-development)
Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘the Act’) and as such the
requisite permission of the Slum Authority under Section 22 had to
be obtained. The suit was therefore withdrawn by the appellant,
and application was preferred by him before the Slum Authority
seeking required permission.
4. The Slum Authority vide its order dated 28.11.2000 granted the
permission. In an appeal arising therefrom, an order of remand was
passed by the Appellate Authority. The matter was gone into by the
Slum Authority afresh and by its order dated 30.05.2002 the
permission was granted to the appellant to file the suit for
eviction. The appeal preferred by the respondent challenging the
order passed by the Slum Authority was dismissed by the Appellate
Authority on 31.10.2002 after giving opportunity to the parties and
after scrutinising the material on record. While considering the
submission made on behalf of the respondent as regards alternative
accommodation, it was observed by the Appellate Authority as under:
“5-4. U/s 22 (4) of Maharashtra Slum
(Improvement & Re-development Act, 1971 the
competent authority should have seen that
whether the alternative accommodation is
available to the occupied within his means it
does not mean that the competent Authority
should search the accommodation. The wife of
appellant as in service in mentioned in para 15
Civil Appeal NO. ____ of 2019 @ SLP(C) No. 10469 of 2016
Kumud w/o Mahadeorao Salunke vs. Shri Pandurang
Narayan Gandhewar Through Lrs. & Ors.
3
of written notes of arguments. Under the
circumstances whether alternative accommodation
is available and can be made available, the
burden of proof lies with the appellant.
However, the appellant failed to prove the same
and hence there is no substance in the point.
6. On the basis of above discussion and
verifying the record of lower court and
provisions of Maharashtra Slum (Improvement &
Re-development) Act, 1971, therefore I come to
the conclusion that no substantial proof is
presented by the appellant to interfere with the
finding of lower court & hence I pass the
following order.
ORDER
The appeal is rejected and the order passed by
lower court dt.30th May, 2002 is confirmed.”
5. Having secured the permission from the Slum Authority, Civil
Suit No.113 of 2003 was filed by the appellant seeking decree of
eviction of the respondent. The suit was however dismissed by the
Trial Court on 27.09.2007. Regular Civil Appeal No.444 of 2007
arising therefrom was allowed by the Appellate Court and by its
judgment and order dated 17.08.2010 it passed decree for eviction
of the respondent and also passed order as regards payment of
arrears. It is undisputed that the decree passed by the Appellate
Court was not challenged in any manner and has attained finality.
6. In the meantime, Writ Petition No.2199 of 2003 was filed by
the respondent challenging the permission granted by the Slum
Authority as confirmed by the Appellate Authority vide its order
dated 31.10.2002. This Writ Petition was allowed by the High
Court by its judgment and order dated 19.06.2014. It was observed
that the Slum Authority had not considered the relevant factors
Civil Appeal NO. ____ of 2019 @ SLP(C) No. 10469 of 2016
Kumud w/o Mahadeorao Salunke vs. Shri Pandurang
Narayan Gandhewar Through Lrs. & Ors.
4
enumerated in Clauses (a) to (c) of Section 22(4) of the Slum Act,
1971 and consideration of those factors by the Appellate Authority
would not legalize the absence of such consideration by the
competent authority. It was observed as under:-
“7. In the present case, it is undisputed that
he competent authority has not applied its mind
and has not taken into consideration the
relevant factors enumerated in clause (a) to (c)
of section 22(4) of the Slum Act, 1971. The
consideration of these factors by the appellate
authority does not legalize the order passed by
the competent authority. It is settled law that
if anything has to be done according to the
provisions of law, then it should be done in
that manner only. The competent authority has
passed the cryptic order. The appellate order
cannot substitute its reasoning to legalize the
order passed by the fact-finding authority.”
With this view, the writ petition was allowed and the matter
was again remitted to the authority for inquiry.
7. We heard Dr. A. Rajeev B. Masodkar, learned Advocate in
support of the appeal and Mr. Kishor Lambat, learned Advocate for
the respondents.
8. In Vidarbha part of the State of Maharashtra, before the
enactment of Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1989, there had to be
two rounds of litigation to seek eviction of a tenant. The first
round had to be before the Rent Controller seeking permission to
issue a quit notice under Section 108 of the Transfer of Property
Act. If such permission was granted, then only the landlord could
issue a notice of termination of tenancy and file a civil suit
seeking eviction of a tenant. In the present case the first round
Civil Appeal NO. ____ of 2019 @ SLP(C) No. 10469 of 2016
Kumud w/o Mahadeorao Salunke vs. Shri Pandurang
Narayan Gandhewar Through Lrs. & Ors.
5
before the Rent Controller was gone into. Bona fide need as a
ground for eviction may, in a given case, have an additional facet
of comparative hardship and whether the tenant has any alternative
accommodation or not. In any case, the matter had attained
finality. The permission was granted by the Rent Controller and
the civil suit was filed only thereafter in which an objection was
taken that the premises being governed by the provisions of the
Act, the requisite permission of the Slum Authority was mandatory.
9. In the proceedings so initiated the Slum Authority granted
that permission. The matter was carried in appeal and the issue
whether the requirements under Section 22(4) of the Act stood
satisfied or not was also considered by the Appellate Authority.
It must also be noted that the Civil Suit seeking eviction
also attained finality.
10. In the circumstances, the view that weighed with the High
Court was not correct. The respondent had opportunity at every
stage to present his case and whether the requirements of Section
22(4) of the Act stood satisfied or not was a matter which was
dealt with by the Appellate Authority in sufficient detail. In
the circumstances there was no reason for the High Court to
interfere in its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India.
11. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and
Civil Appeal NO. ____ of 2019 @ SLP(C) No. 10469 of 2016
Kumud w/o Mahadeorao Salunke vs. Shri Pandurang
Narayan Gandhewar Through Lrs. & Ors.
6
order dated 19.06.2014 passed by the High Court in Writ Petition
No.2199 of 2003 and restore the order dated 31.10.2002 passed by
the Appellate Authority.
12. This appeal stands allowed. No order as to costs.
…………………………….J.
(Uday Umesh Lalit)
………………………….J.
(Indu Malhotra)
New Delhi;
May 10, 2019.

Mere mentioning of the pleadings , arguments and list of authorities and criptic conclusion - can not be cosidered as reasoned order = The need to remand the case to the High Courthas occasioned because on perusal of the impugned order, we find that paras 1 to 4 contain facts of the case, paras 5 and 6 contain the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, paras 7 to 9 refer to 3 what transpired in the Trial Court, paras 10 and 11 contain quotation from two decisions of this Court and para 12 contains the conclusion, which reads as under: “12. After giving analytical thought to the facts and circumstances of the case, the instant petition is found devoid of merit, consequent thereupon is dismissed.” In the entire impugned order, which consists of 13 paras, we find that the High Court did not assign any reason as to why the petition is liable to be dismissed. In other words, neither there is any discussion and nor the reasoning on the submissions urged by the learned counsel for the parties.

NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 888 OF 2019
(Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No.3502 of 2019)
Jitender Kumar @ Jitender Singh  ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
The State of Bihar       ….Respondent(s)
               
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This   appeal   is   directed   against   the   final
judgment and order dated 28.03.2019 passed by
the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal
Miscellaneous No.5293 of 2019 whereby the High
1
Court dismissed the petition filed by the appellant
herein.
3. A few facts need mention hereinbelow for the
disposal of this appeal, which involves a short point.
4. By   impugned   order,   the   High   Court   (Single
Judge) dismissed the petition filed by the appellant
herein under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure,   1973   (for   short,   “Cr.P.C.)   and,   in
consequence, affirmed the order dated 09.04.2015
passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamui in
connection with P.S. Case No.154 of 2013 whereby
the appellant along  was summoned to face  Session
Trial No.280 of 2016 pending in the Court of First
Additional & Sessions Judge, Jamui for the offences
punishable under Sections 302, 325, 326, 331, 352
read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(for short, “IPC”).
2
5. The   short   question,   which   arises   for
consideration in this appeal, is whether the High
Court   was   right   in   dismissing   the   appellant's
petition.
6. Heard   Ms.   Anjana   Prakash,   learned   senior
counsel for the appellant and Ms. Hemlata Ranga,
learned counsel for the respondent­State.
7. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
are   inclined   to   allow   this   appeal,   set   aside   the
impugned order and remand the case to the High
Court   (Single   Judge)   for   deciding   the   appellant's
petition afresh on merits in accordance with law.
8. The need to remand the case to the High Court
has occasioned because on perusal of the impugned
order, we find that paras 1 to 4 contain facts of the
case, paras 5  and 6 contain the submissions of the
learned counsel for the parties, paras 7 to 9 refer to
3
what transpired in the Trial Court, paras 10 and 11
contain quotation from two decisions of this Court
and para 12 contains the conclusion, which reads
as under:
“12.   After   giving   analytical   thought   to   the
facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case,   the
instant   petition   is   found   devoid   of   merit,
consequent thereupon is dismissed.”
9. In the entire impugned order, which consists
of 13 paras, we find that the High Court did not
assign any reason as to why the petition is liable to
be dismissed. In other words, neither there is any
discussion   and   nor   the   reasoning   on   the
submissions urged by the learned counsel for the
parties.
10. In our view, such approach of the High Court
while   disposing   of   the   petition   cannot   be
countenanced.   Time   and   again,   this   Court   has
emphasized   the   necessity   of   giving   reasons   in
4
support of the conclusion because it is the reason,
which   indicates   the   application   of   mind.   It   is,
therefore,   obligatory   for   the   Court   to   assign   the
reasons as to why the petition is allowed or rejected,
as the case may be.
11. As mentioned above, para 12 only records the
conclusion. It is for this reason, we feel that the
matter must go back to the High Court for deciding
the  petition  afresh  on merits  in accordance  with
law.
12. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal
succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned
order is set aside.  The matter is remanded to the
High Court for deciding the petition, out of which
this appeal arises, afresh on merits in accordance
with   law   keeping   in   view   the   observations   made
above.
5
13. We, however, make it clear that we have not
expressed any opinion on the merits of the issues
arising   in   the   case   having   formed   an   opinion   to
remand the case to the High Court for deciding it
afresh on the ground mentioned above. The High
Court will, therefore, decide the matter on its merits
uninfluenced by any of our observations made in
this order.
14. The parties are granted liberty to mention the
matter in the High Court for its early hearing.
         ………...................................J.
  [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
         
                       
....……..................................J.
        [DINESH MAHESHWARI]
New Delhi;
May 10, 2019.
6