LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws

WELCOME TO LEGAL WORLD

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Friday, September 2, 2011

cheque bounce case should be tried and heard by the same magistrate and not by his successor= From the language of Section 326(3) of the Code, it is plain that the provisions of Section 326(1) and 326(2) of the new Code are not applicable to summary trial. Therefore, except in regard to those cases which fall within the ambit of Section 326 of the Code, the Magistrate cannot proceed with the trial placing reliance on the evidence recorded by his predecessor. He has got to try the case de novo.


                                                 Reportable




               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA




              CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION




        CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1703  OF 2011


         (Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 723 of 2011)








Nitinbhai Saevatilal Shah & Another              ... Appellant






                             Versus






Manubhai Manjibhai Panchal & Another             ... Respondents










                         J U D G M E N T










J.M. PANCHAL, J.








       Leave Granted.








2.    This appeal by grant of special leave, is directed against 






      judgment dated August 9, 2010, rendered by the learned 






      Single Judge of   High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in 






      Criminal Revision Application No. 529 of 2003, by which 










                                                                1



      the   conviction  of  the   appellants   recorded  by   the   learned 






      Metropolitan   Magistrate,   Ahmedabad   in   Summary   Case 






      No.   2785   of   1998   under   Section   138   of   Negotiable 






      Instruments   Act,   1881   and   confirmed   by   the   learned 






      Additional   City   Sessions   Judge,   Court   No.   13, 






      Ahmedabad   is   maintained   but   the   sentence   imposed 






      upon the appellants for commission of said offence is set 






      aside   and   matter   is   remanded  to   the   learned   Magistrate 






      for passing appropriate order with regard to sentence and 






      compensation, if any under Section 357 of Cr. P.C. within 






      three   months,   after   giving   the   parties   reasonable 






      opportunity of being heard.










3.    The respondent No.1 herein is original complainant.   He 






      was doing business in the name of Navkar Steel Pvt. Ltd. 






      The   Complainant   is   known   to   the   appellant   No.1.     The 






      appellant No.1 is the Director of appellant No.2 which is 






      a   private   limited   company.     It   is   the   case   of   the 






      complainant that the appellant No.1 had borrowed hand 






      loan   from   him   and   in   order   to   pay   the   legal   dues,   the 










                                                                             2



appellant   No.1   had   given   a   cheque   dated   October   13, 






1998 for  the  sum of Rs.11,23,000/-  drawn  on the  State 






Bank  of India.   The  cheque was signed  by the appellant 






No.1   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   No.2.     The   complainant 






presented the cheque for realization in the Central Bank 






of India.   The cheque was dishonoured and sent back to 






the complainant with a memorandum dated October 15, 






1998   mentioning   that   the   cheque   was   dishonoured 






because   of   insufficiency   of   funds.     Thereupon,   the 






complainant   served   a   demand   notice   dated   October   28, 






1998   which   was   returned   unserved   as   unclaimed   on 






November 5, 1998.   Therefore another notice was served 






by post under Postal Certificate.   The appellants failed to 






pay  the  amount  mentioned  in the notice  within  15 days 






from   the   date   of   receipt   of   notice.     Therefore,   the 






complainant   filed   complaint   in   the   Court   of   learned 






Metropolitan   Magistrate,   Court   No.2,   Ahmedabad   on 






December 15, 1998 and prayed to convict the appellants 






under   Section   138   of   the   Act.     On   the   basis   of   the 






complaint,   Summary   Case   No.   2785   of   1998   was 








                                                                   3



      registered   and   after   recording   verification,   the   learned 






      Magistrate had issued process. 








4.    The   complainant   examined   himself   and   his   witnesses 






      and   also   produced   documentary   evidence   in   support   of 






      his case set up in the complaint.   The appellants did not 






      lead any defence evidence.   However, the appellant  No.1 






      in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code 






      stated   that   his   signature   was   obtained   on   the   blank 






      paper   by   kidnapping   him   and   writing   was   written   on   it 






      and   that   false   complaint   was   lodged   by   misusing   the 






      signed blank cheque.








5.      After   the   evidence   was   recorded   by   the   learned 






      Metropolitan   Magistrate   as   stated   above,   he   came   to   be 






      transferred and therefore, ceased to exercise jurisdiction 






      in   the   case.     He   was   succeeded   by   another   learned 






      Metropolitan Magistrate who had and who exercised such 






      jurisdiction.     On   August   03,   2001,   a   pursis   was   filed 






      before   the   learned   Metropolitan   Magistrate   by   the 






      appellants   as   well   as   the   original   complainant   i.e.   the 










                                                                         4



      respondent No.1 herein, declaring that the parties had no 






      objection   to   proceed   with   the   matter   on   the   basis   of 






      evidence recorded by predecessor in office of the learned 






      Metropolitan   Magistrate   in   terms   of   Section   326   of   the 






      Code.     On   the   basis   of   said   pursis   the   learned 






      Metropolitan   Magistrate   considered   the   evidence   led   by 






      the   complainant   and   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the 






      parties. 








6.    The   learned   Metropolitan   Magistrate   by   judgment   dated 






      February 13, 2003, delivered in Summary Case No. 2785 






      of 1998, convicted both the appellants under Section 138 






      of   the   Act   and   sentenced   each   of   them   to   suffer   simple 






      imprisonment   for   three   months   with   fine   of   Rs.3,000/- 






      i/d simple imprisonment for 15 days. 








7.    Feeling   aggrieved,   the   appellants   preferred   Criminal 






      Appeal   No.19   of   2003   in   the   Court   of   the   learned 






      Additional   City   Sessions   Judge   at   Ahmedabad.     The 






      learned   Judge   found   that   conviction   of   the   appellants 






      recorded under Section 138 of the Act was perfectly just 










                                                                            5



      but   noticed   that  the   appellant   No.   2   is   a   private   limited 






      company and therefore, could not have been sentenced to 






      simple   imprisonment   for   three   months.     Therefore,   the 






      learned   Additional   City   Sessions   Judge,   Court   No.13, 






      Ahmedabad   by   judgment   dated   October   16,   2003 






      dismissed   the   appeal   but   set   aside   sentence   of   simple 






      imprisonment   of   three   months   imposed   upon   the 






      appellant No.2 and maintained the full sentence imposed 






      upon   appellant   No.1   as   well   as   sentence   of   fine   of 






      Rs.3,000/- imposed upon the appellant No.2.  








8.    Dissatisfied   with   the   judgment   of   the   First   Appellate 






      Court,   the   appellants   preferred   Criminal   Revision 






      Application No.529 of 2003 in the High Court of Gujarat 






      at   Ahmedabad.     The   learned   Single   Judge   by   judgment 






      dated   August   09,   2010,   maintained   conviction   of   the 






      appellants   under   Section   138   of   Negotiable   Instrument 






      Act,   but   set   aside   final   order   of   sentence   imposed   upon 






      the   appellants   and   remanded   the   matter   to   the   learned 






      Magistrate for passing appropriate order of sentence and 










                                                                              6



       compensation,   if   any   payable   under   Section   357   of   the 






       Code,   within   three   months,   after   giving   to   the   parties 






       reasonable   opportunity   of   being   heard,   which   has   given 






       rise to the instant appeal.








9.     This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties 






       and   considered   the   documents   forming   part   of   the 






       appeal. 








10.    Section   326   of   the   Code   deals   with   the   procedure   to   be 






       followed   when   any   Magistrate   after   having   heard   and 






       recorded   the   whole   or   any   part   of   the   evidence   in   an 






       enquiry   or  a  trial,   ceases  to   exercise   jurisdiction   therein 






       and   is   succeeded   by   another   Magistrate   who   exercises 






       such   jurisdiction.     Section   326   of   the   Code   reads   as 






       under :-








             "326. Conviction or commitment on evidence 


             partly recorded by one Magistrate and partly 


             by   another:-            (1)     Whenever   any   Judge   or 


             Magistrate   after   having   heard   and   recorded   the 


             whole  or  any  part of  the  evidence  in an  inquiry 


             or a trial, ceases to exercise jurisdiction therein 


             and   is   succeeded   by   another   Judge   or 


             Magistrate   who   has   and   who   exercises   such 


             jurisdiction,   the   Judge   or   Magistrate   so 


             succeeding may act on the evidence so recorded 










                                                                               7



             by   his   predecessor,   or   partly   recorded   by   his 


             predecessor and partly recorded by himself :




                            Provided   that   if   the   succeeding 


             Judge   or   Magistrate   is   of   opinion   that   further 


             examination   of   any   of   the   witnesses   whose 


             evidence has already been recorded is necessary 


             in   the   interests   of   justice,   he   may   re-summon 


             any   such   witness,   and   after   such   further 


             examination,           cross-examination           and         re-


             examination,   if   any,   as   he   may   permit,   the 


             witness shall be discharged. 




                            (2)     When   a   case   is   transferred 


             under   the   provisions   of   this   Code   from   one 


             Judge  to  another   Judge  or   from  one   Magistrate 


             to   another   Magistrate,   the   former   shall   be 


             deemed to cease to exercise jurisdiction therein, 


             and   to   be   succeeded   by   the   latter,   within   the 


             meaning of sub-section (1). 




                            (3)             Nothing   in   this   section 


             applies   to   summary   trials   or   to   cases   in   which 


             proceedings have been stayed under section 322 


             or in which proceedings have been submitted to 


             a superior Magistrate under section 325." 




        






11.    Section   326   is   part   of   general   provisions   as   to   inquiries 






       and trials contained in Chapter XXIV of the Code.     It is 






       one   of   the   important   principles   of   criminal   law   that   the 






       Judge   who   hears   and   records   the   entire   evidence   must 






       give   judgment.     Section   326   is   an   exception   to   the   rule 






       that   only   a   person   who   has   heard   the   evidence   in   the 






       case   is   competent   to   decide   whether   the   accused   is 






       innocent   or   guilty.     The   Section   is   intended   to   meet  the 






                                                                                   8



case of transfers of Magistrates from one place to another 






and to prevent the necessity of trying from the beginning 






all   cases   which   may   be   part-heard   at   the   time   of   such 






transfer.        Section   326   empowers   the   succeeding 






Magistrate   to   pass   sentence   or  to   proceed  with  the   case 






from   the   stage   it   was   stopped   by   his   preceding 






Magistrate.   Under Section 326 (1), successor Magistrate 






can   act   on   the   evidence   recorded   by   his   predecessor 






either in whole or in part.  If he is of the opinion that any 






further   examination   is   required,   he   may   recall   that 






witness and examine him, but there is no need of re-trial. 






In   fact   Section   326   deals   with   part-heard   cases,   when 






one   Magistrate   who   has   partly   heard   the   case   is 






succeeded by another Magistrate either because the first 






Magistrate is transferred and is succeeded by another, or 






because   the   case   is   transferred   from   one   Magistrate   to 






another   Magistrate.     The   rule   mentioned   in   Section   326 






is that second Magistrate need not re-hear the whole case 






and he can start from the stage the first Magistrate left it. 






However, a bare perusal of sub Section (3) of Section 326 








                                                                     9



       makes   it   more   than   evident   that   sub   Section   (1)   which 






       authorizes   the   Magistrate   who   succeeds   the   Magistrate 






       who  had recorded the whole or any part  of the evidence 






       in   a   trial   to   act   on   the   evidence   so   recorded   by   his 






       predecessor,   does   not   apply   to   summary   trials.     The 






       prohibition contained in sub Section (3) of Section 326 of 






       the Code is absolute and admits of no exception.   Where 






       a   Magistrate   is   transferred   from   one   station   to   another, 






       his   jurisdiction   ceases   in   the   former   station   when   the 






       transfer takes effect.  








12.    Provision   for   summary   trials   is   made   in   chapter   XXI   of 






       the   Code.     Section   260   of   the   Code   confers   power   upon 






       any   Chief   Judicial   Magistrate   or   any   Metropolitan 






       Magistrate  or  any  Magistrate  of  the  First  Class   specially 






       empowered   in   this   behalf   by   the   High   Court   to   try   in   a 






       summary   way   all   or   any   of   the   offences   enumerated 






       therein.    Section   262   lays  down   procedure   for   summary 






       trial and sub Section (1) thereof inter alia prescribes that 






       in summary trials the procedure specified in the Code for 










                                                                               10



       the   trial   of   summons-case   shall   be   followed   subject   to 






       condition   that   no   sentence   of   imprisonment   for   a   term 






       existing three months is passed in case of any conviction 






       under the chapter. 








13.    The   manner   in   which   record   in   summary   trials   is   to   be 






       maintained   is   provided   in   Section   263   of   the   Code. 






       Section 264 mentions that in every case tried summarily 






       in   which   the   accused   does   not   plead   guilty,   the 






       Magistrate  shall   record   the   substance   of  evidence  and  a 






       judgment containing a brief statement of the reasons for 






       the   finding.     Thus   the   Magistrate   is   not   expected   to 






       record full evidence which he would have been, otherwise 






       required   to   record   in   a   regular   trial   and   his   judgment 






       should   also   contain   a   brief   statement   of   the   reasons   for 






       the finding and not elaborate reasons which otherwise he 






       would have been required to record in regular trials.  








14.    The   mandatory   language   in   which   Section   326   (3)   is 






       couched, leaves no manner of doubt that when a case is 






       tried as a summary case a Magistrate, who succeeds the 










                                                                             11



Magistrate   who   had   recorded   the   part   or   whole   of   the 






evidence,   cannot act  on  the  evidence so  recorded   by   his 






predecessor.   In   summary   proceedings,   the   successor 






Judge or Magistrate has no authority to proceed with the 






trial   from   a   stage   at   which   his   predecessor   has   left   it. 






The reason why the provisions of sub-Section (1) and (2) 






of Section 326 of the Code have not been made applicable 






to   summary   trials   is   that   in   summary   trials   only 






substance   of   evidence   has   to   be   recorded.     The   Court 






does   not   record   the   entire   statement   of   witness. 






Therefore, the Judge or the Magistrate who has recorded 






such substance of evidence is in a position to appreciate 






the  evidence   led   before   him  and  the  successor   Judge  or 






Magistrate   cannot   appreciate   the   evidence   only   on   the 






basis   of   evidence   recorded   by   his   predecessor.     Section 






326 (3) of the Code does not permit the Magistrate to act 






upon   the   substance   of   the   evidence   recorded   by   his 






predecessor, the obvious reason being that if succeeding 






Judge   is   permitted   to   rely   upon   the   substance   of   the 






evidence   recorded   by   his   predecessor,   there   will   be   a 








                                                                        12



       serious prejudice to the accused and indeed, it would be 






       difficult for a succeeding Magistrate himself to decide the 






       matter effectively and to do substantial justice.








15.    The   High   Court   by   the   impugned   judgment   rejected   the 






       contention   regarding   proceedings   having   been   vitiated 






       under   Section   461   of   the   Code,   on   the   ground   that 






       parties   had submitted pursis dated August 3,  2001 and 






       in view of the provisions of Section 465 of the Code, the 






       alleged   irregularity   cannot   be   regarded   as   having 






       occasioned failure of justice and thus can be cured.   The 






       reliance   placed   by   the   High   Court,   on   the   pursis 






       submitted   by   the   appellants   before   the   learned 






       Metropolitan   Magistrate   declaring   that   they   had   no 






       objection   if   matter   was   decided   after   taking   into 






       consideration   the   evidence   recorded   by   his   predecessor-






       in-office   is   misconceived.     It   is   well   settled   that   no 






       amount of consent by the parties can confer jurisdiction 






       where there exists none, on a Court of law nor can they 










                                                                          13



       divest   a   Court   of   jurisdiction   which   it   possesses   under 






       the law. 








16.     The cardinal principal of law in criminal trial is that it is 




       a right of an accused that his case should be decided by 






       a Judge who has heard the whole of it.  It is so stated by 






       this   Court   in   the   decision   in  Payare   Lal  Vs.  State   of 




       Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 690 : (1962 (1) Crl LJ 688).  This 




       principle   was   being   rigorously   applied   prior   to   the 






       introduction   of   Section   350   in   the   Code   of   Criminal 






       Procedure, 1898.  Section 326 of the new Code deals with 






       what was intended to be dealt with by Section 350 of the 






       old Code.               








       From   the   language   of   Section   326(3)   of   the   Code,   it   is 






plain   that   the   provisions   of   Section   326(1)   and   326(2)   of   the 






new   Code   are   not   applicable   to   summary   trial.         Therefore, 






except in regard to those cases which fall within the ambit of 






Section   326   of   the   Code,   the   Magistrate   cannot   proceed  with 






the   trial   placing   reliance   on   the   evidence   recorded   by   his 






predecessor.   He has got to try the case de novo.   In this view 










                                                                             14



of   the   matter,   the   High   Court   should   have   ordered   de   novo 






trial.  








17.    The next question that arises is as to from what stage the 




       learned   Metropolitan   Magistrate   Ahmedabad,   should 






       proceed with the trial de novo.   As it has been seen that 






       Section   326   of   the   new   Code   is   an   exception   to   the 






       cardinal   principle   of   trial   of   criminal   cases,   it   is   crystal 






       clear   that   if   that   principle   is   violated   by   a   particular 






       Judge or a Magistrate, he would be doing something not 






       being   empowered   by   law   in   that   behalf.     Therefore, 






       Section   461   of   the   new   Code   would   be   applicable. 






       Section 461 of the new Code narrates irregularities which 






       vitiate  proceedings.     The  relevant  provision  is   Clause  (l). 




       It reads as follows:-






                 "461.              Irregularities              which         vitiate 


            proceedings:-   If   any   Magistrate,   not   being 


            empowered by law in this behalf, does any of the 


            following things, namely;




                          x         x     x    x           x




            (l)  tries an offender;




                     x    x         x     x    x










                                                                                          15



          his proceedings shall be void."








A   plain   reading   of   this   provision   shows   that   the   proceedings 






held  by  a  Magistrate,   to  the  extent  that  he  is  not  empowered 






by   law,   would   be   void   and   void   proceedings   cannot   be 






validated under Section 465 of the Code.   This defect is not a 






mere irregularity and the conviction of the appellants cannot, 






even if  sustainable  on the  evidence,   be upheld  under   Section 






465 of the Code.   In regard to Section 350 of the old Code, it 






was said by Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya Vs.  Emperor, 




AIR 1947 P.C. 67 that "when a trial is conducted in a manner 




different from that prescribed by the Code, the trial is bad, and 






no question of curing an irregularity  arises; but  if  the trial is 






conducted   substantially   in   the   manner   prescribed,   but   some 






irregularity   occurs   in   the   course   of   such   conduct,   the 






irregularity can be cured under Section 537".  








18. This is not a case of irregularity but want of competency. 






Apart   from   Section   326   (1)   and   326   (2)   which   are   not 






applicable   to   the   present   case   in   view   of   Section   326   (3),   the 






Code does not conceive of such a trial.  Therefore, Section 465 










                                                                                16



of  the  Code  has  no  application.   It  cannot  be  called  in  aid  to 






make   what was  incompetent,  competent.     There  has  been  no 






proper trial of the case and there should be one. 








19.     For   the   foregoing   reasons   the   appeal   succeeds.     The 






judgment   dated   August   09,   2010   rendered   by   the   learned 






Single   Judge   of   the   High   Court   of   Gujarat   at   Ahmedabad   in 






Criminal   Revision   Application   No.   529   of   2003   upholding 






conviction of the appellants for the offence under Section 138 






of the Act is hereby set aside.   The matter is remanded to the 






learned Metropolitan Magistrate for retrial in accordance with 






law.  The record shows that the appellant No.1 has resorted to 






dilatory   tactics   to   delay   the   trial.     The   appellant   No.1   is 






directed   to   remain   present   before   the   learned   Metropolitan 






Magistrate  when  required without fail.    If the appellant  No.  1 






fails   to   remain   present   before   the   learned   Metropolitan 






Magistrate,   it   would   be   open   to   the   learned   Metropolitan 






Magistrate to take necessary steps including issuance of non-






bailable   warrant   for   securing   his  presence.     Having  regard   to 






the   facts   of   the   case   the   learned   Metropolitan   Magistrate   is 










                                                                          17



directed   to  complete   the   trial  of  the   case   as  early   as  possible 






and   preferably   within   five   months   from   the   date   of   receipt   of 






the   writ   from   this   Court.     Subject   to   above   mentioned 






observations the appeal stands disposed of. 










                                                      .............................J.


                                                                (J.M. PANCHAL)










                                                      .............................J.


                                                               (H.L. GOKHALE)




NEW DELHI


SEPTEMBER 01, 2011.  


       










                                                                             18



19