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Saturday, September 24, 2011

BLACK MONEY LIES IN SWISS BANK- In view of the above, with utmost respect, it would not be possible to agree with the order passed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Altamas Kabir. In my opinion, the applicant Union of India has failed to make out a case to enable this Court to treat the modification application as application for review and proceed to hear the same in open Court. In my opinion, the present application is wholly misconceived. It is, therefore, dismissed. Union of India is, however, at liberty to take recourse to any other legal remedy that may be available to it.-Since we have differed in our views regarding the maintainability of I.A. No.8 of 2011 filed in W.P. No.176 of 2009, let the matter be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India, for reference to a third Judge.


                                   1







                                                  REPORTABLE










                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA






                      ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION






                            I.A. NO.8 OF 2011






                                        IN






                WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.176 OF 2009










Ram Jethmalani & Ors.                         ... Petitioners






      Vs.






Union of India & Ors.                         ... Respondents










                               O R D E R










1.    Writ   Petition   (Civil)   No.176   of   2009   was   filed   by   Shri 






Ram   Jethmalani   and   five   others   against   the   Union   of   India, 






the   Reserve   Bank   of   India,   the   Securities   Exchange   Board   of 






India,   the   Director,   Directorate   of   Enforcement   and   the 






Chairman,   Central   Board   of   Direct   Taxes,   Department   of 



                                    2




Revenue,   Ministry   of   Finance,   Government   of   India,   against 






the   purported   inaction   of   the   Government   to   arrange   for 






recovery of large sums of money deposited by Indian citizens 






in   foreign   banks   and,   in   particular,   in   Swiss   Banks.     In 






that   context   the   Petitioners,  inter   alia,  prayed   for   the 






following reliefs :-










      "(a) that   this   Hon'ble   Court   may   be   pleased   to   issue 


             notice   to   all   the   Respondents   calling   upon   them   to 


             disclose   all   the   facts   which   have   come   to   their 


             knowledge   so   far   pertaining   to   the   aforementioned 


             issues and the steps taken by them in this regard; 






      (b)    to make orders from time to time to ensure that the 


             outcome   of  the   investigations  are   not  suppressed   or 


             even unduly delayed; 






      (c)    the   suitable  directions   be  issued   to  the   Respondent 


             No.1   to   apply   to   the   Foreign   Banks,   more 


             particularly   the   UBS   Bank   for   freezing   the   amounts 


             in   the   said   foreign   banks,   particularly,   the   UBS 


             Bank   which   as   stated   above   is   holding,   inter   alia, 


             the Khan and Tapurias' assets." 


       








2.    On   4th  July,   2011,   on   I.A.   No.1   of   2009   in   the   Writ 






Petition   several   directions   were   given.     In   fact,   the   said 






order   was   divided   into   three   parts.     The   first   part   of   the 






order   dealt   with   the   alleged   failure   of   the   Central 



                                    3




Government   to   recover   the   large   sums   of   money   kept   in   such 






foreign   banks   and   in   tax   havens   having   strong   secrecy   laws 






with   regard   to   deposits   made   by   individuals.     The   second 






part dealt with the unlawful activities allegedly funded out 






of   such   deposits   and   accounts   which   were   a   threat   to   the 






security   and   integrity   of   India.     The   amounts   deposited   in 






such   tax   havens   in   respect   of   one   Shri   Hassan   Ali   Khan   and 






Shri   Kashinath   Tapuria   and   his   wife   Chandrika   Tapuria   were 






alleged   to   be   in   billions   of   dollars   in   UBS   Bank   in   Zurich 






alone.  Income Tax demands were made to Shri Hassan Ali Khan 






for   Rs.40,000  crores   and  a   similar  demand   was  served   on  the 






Tapurias   amounting   to   Rs.20,580   crores.     On   being   convinced 






that,   in   the   absence   of   any   known   source   of   income,   the 






large   sums   of   money   involved   in   the   various   transactions   by 






Hassan Ali Khan and the Tapurias were the proceeds of crime, 






which required a thorough investigation, this Court felt the 






necessity   of   appointing   a   Special   Investigation   Team   to   act 






on behalf and at the behest of the directions of this Court. 






It   was   noted   by   this   Court   that   the   issues   involved   were 






complex   and   would   require   expertise   and   knowledge   of 



                                    4




different   departments   and   the   coordination   of   efforts 






between   various   agencies   and   departments.     It   was   also 






recorded   that   on   behalf   of   the   Union   of   India,   it   had   been 






submitted   that   a   High   Level   Committee   had   recently   been 






formed   under   the   initiative   of   the   Department   of   Revenue   in 






the Ministry of Finance, composed of :










  (i)      Secretary, Department of Revenue, as the Chairman;




  (ii)     Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India; 






  (iii)    Director (IB);






  (iv)     Director, Enforcement;






  (v)      Director, CBI;






  (vi)     Chairman, CBDT;






  (vii)    DG, Narcotics Control Bureau;






  (viii) DG, Revenue Intelligence;






  (ix)     Director, Financial Intelligence Unit; and 






  (x)      JS(FT & TR-I), CBDT.










with   powers   to   co-pt,   as   necessary,   representatives   not 






below   the   rank   of   Joint   Secretary   such   as            the   Home 






Secretary,   Foreign   Secretary,   Defence   Secretary   and   the 



                                    5




Secretary,   Cabinet   Secretariat.     It   was   further   recorded 






that   the   Union   of   India   had   claimed   that   such   a   multi-






disciplinary group and committee would enable the conducting 






of   an   efficient   and   a   systematic   investigation   into   the 






matters   concerning   allegations   against   Hassan   Ali   Khan   and 






the   Tapurias   and   would   also   be   able   to   take   appropriate 






steps   to   bring   back   the   monies   deposited   in   foreign   banks. 






In   the   light   of   such   submission   made   on   behalf   of   Union   of 






India   and   citing   the   judgments   of   this   Court   in   (1)  Vineet 






Narain  Vs.  Union   of   India  [(1996)   2   SCC   199],(2)  NHRC  Vs. 






State   of   Gujarat  [(2004)   8   SCC   610],   (3)  Sanjiv   Kumar  Vs. 






State   of   Haryana  [(2005)   5   SCC   517]   and   (4)  Centre   for   PIL 






Vs.  Union  of   India  [(2011)   1  SCC   560],  this   Court  completed 






the second part of the order by directing as follows :-  






    


        49. In light of the above we herewith order:






        (i)    That   the   High   Level   Committee   constituted   by 


               the   Union   of   India,   comprising   of   (i) 


               Secretary,  Department of  Revenue; (ii)  Deputy 


               Governor,   Reserve   Bank   of   India;   (iii) 


               Director   (IB);   (iv)   Director,   Enforcement; 


               (v)   Director,   CBI;   (vi)   Chairman,   CBDT; 


               (vii)DG,   Narcotics   Control   Bureau;   (vii)   DG, 


               Revenue         Intelligence;         (ix)         Director, 



                                      6




         Financial Intelligence Unit; and (x) JS (FT & 


         TR-I),   CBDT   be   forthwith   appointed   with 


         immediate   effect   as   a   special   Investigation 


         Team;






(ii)     That   the   Special   Investigation   Team,   so 


         constituted,  also include   Director,  Research 


         and Analysis Wing;






(iii)    That the above Special Investigation Team, so 


         constituted,   be   headed   by   and   include   the 


         following   former   eminent   judges   of   this 


         Court:   (a)   Hon'ble   Mr.   Justice   B.P.   Jeevan 


         Reddy   as   Chairman;   and   (b)   Hon'ble   Mr. 


         Justice   M.B.   Shah   as   Vice-Chairman;   and   that 


         the  Special Investigation  Team function  under 


         their guidance and direction;






(iv)     That   the   Special   Investigation   Team,   so 


         constituted,   shall   be   charged   with   the 


         responsibilities                   and         duties                          of 


         investigation,   initiation   of   proceedings,   and 


         prosecution,   whether   in   the   context   of 


         appropriate     criminal   or   civil     proceedings 


         of:   (a)   all   issues   relating   to   the   matters 


         concerning   and   arising   from   unaccounted 


         monies   of   Hassan   Ali   Khan   and   the   Tapurias; 


         (b)         all         other           investigations                  already 


         commenced   and   are   pending,   or   awaiting   to   be 


         initiated,   with   respect   to   any   other   known 


         instances       of   the   stashing     of   unaccounted 


         monies in foreign bank accounts by Indians or 


         other   entities   operating       in   India;   and   (c) 


         all   other                    matters   with   respect   to 


         unaccounted   monies   being   stashed   in   foreign 


         banks   by   Indians   or   other   entities   operating 


         in India that may     arise     in the course of 


         such   investigations   and   proceedings.   It   is 


         clarified   here   that   within   the   ambit   of 



                                 7




        responsibilities   described     above,   also   lie 


        the   responsibilities   to       ensure   that   the 


        matters   are   also   investigated,   proceedings 


        initiated   and   prosecutions   conducted   with 


        regard   to   criminality   and/or   unlawfulness   of 


        activities   that   may       have   been   the   source 


        for   such   monies,   as   well   as   the   criminal 


        and/or unlawful means that are     used to take 


        such   unaccounted       monies     out     of   and/or 


        bring   such monies back into the country, and 


        use   of   such   monies   in   India   or       abroad. 


        The   Special   Investigation   Team   shall   also   be 


        charged   with   the   responsibility   of   preparing 


        a   comprehensive   action   plan,   including   the 


        creation          of          necessary                      institutional 


        structures that can enable and strengthen the 


        country's         battle           against              generation            of 


        unaccounted   monies,   and   their   stashing   away 


        in   foreign   banks   or   in   various   forms 


        domestically.






(v)     That   the   Special   Investigation   Team   so 


        constituted report and be responsible to this 


        Court,   and   that   it   shall   be   charged   with   the 


        duty to keep this Court informed of all major 


        developments by the filing of periodic status 


        reports,   and   following   of   any   special   orders 


        that this Court may issue from time to time;






(vi)    That   all   organs,   agencies,   departments   and 


        agents   of   the   State,   whether   at   the   level   of 


        the   Union                of   India,   or   the   State 


        Government,               including but not limited 


        to   all   statutorily   formed   individual   bodies, 


        and   other   constitutional   bodies,   extend   all 


        the   cooperation       necessary   for   the   Special 


        Investigation            Team           so         constituted           and 


        functioning;



                                               8




      (vii)    That   the   Union   of   India,   and   where   needed 


               even   the   State   Governments,   are   directed   to 


               facilitate  the conduct  of the  investigations, 


               in   their   fullest   measure,   by   the   Special 


               Investigation              Team                      so         constituted                        and 


               functioning,   by   extending   all   the   necessary 


               financial,   material,   legal,   diplomatic   and 


               intelligence               resources,                                     whether                 such 


               investigations                       or               portions                    of              such 


               investigations   occur   inside   the   country   or 


               abroad.






      (viii) That   the   Special   Investigation   Team   also   be 


               empowered   to   further   investigate   even   where 


               charge-sheets  have been  previously filed;  and 


               that       the   Special   Investigation   Team   may 


               register         further                             cases,                and          conduct 


               appropriate           investigations                                       and         initiate 


               proceedings, for the purpose of bringing back 


               unaccounted       monies   unlawfully   kept   in   bank 


               accounts abroad.










3.    The third part of the order deals with the disclosure of 






various   documents   referred   to   by   the   Union   of   India   in 






relation   to   the   names   and   particulars   of   various   bank 






accounts   of   Indian   citizens   in   the   Principality   of 






Liechtenstein,   a   small   landlocked   sovereign   nation-state   in 






Europe, which is generally acknowledged as a tax haven.  






4.    The third part of the order is not of relevance at this 






stage, since an application, being IA No.8 of 2011, has been 



                                    9




filed by the Union of India in the Writ Petition, purporting 






to   be   an   application   under   Article   142   of   the   Constitution 






read with Order 47 Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, 






seeking   modification   of   the   aforesaid   order   dated   4th  July, 






2011.   










5.    Before   the   Application   could   be   moved   by   the   learned 






Attorney General, Mr. Anil B. Divan, learned Senior Advocate 






appearing   for   the   Writ   Petitioners,   took   a   preliminary 






objection   that   the   interlocutory   application   was   not 






maintainable   on   several   counts.     It   was   firstly   urged   that 






in   effect,   in   the   guise   of   an   application   for   modification, 






the   Respondents/Applicants   were   wanting   either   a   re-hearing 






and/or   review   of   the   order   passed   on   4th         July,   2011, 






disposing   of   I.A.No.1   of   2009.     Mr.   Divan   pointed   out   that 






it   was   the   Government   itself   which   had   set   up   a   High   Level 






Committee   consisting   of   senior   officers   of   different 






departments   to   take   steps   for   retrieving   the   black   money 






which had been deposited in banks in tax havens all over the 






world   and,   in   particular,   in   Swiss   Banks     and   it   did   not, 



                                  10




therefore,   lie   in   the   mouth   of   the   Government   to   take   a 






different   stand   when   the   same   Committee   had   been   converted 






into   a   Special   Investigation   Team   with   two   former   Judges   of 






the   Supreme   Court   to   monitor   the   progress   of   the   recovery 






proceedings.










6.    Mr. Divan also contended that the formation of a Special 






Investigation Team to monitor the investigation is not a new 






concept   and   has   been   resorted   to   on   different   occasions   in 






order   that  justice   is  done   between  the   parties  and   the  rule 






of   law   is   not   obstructed   either   by   the   investigating   agency 






or otherwise.  Mr. Divan urged that once the matter had been 






decided   on   merits   and   a   direction   had   been   given   for   the 






formation   of   a   Special   Investigation   Team   composed   of   the 






very   officers  who   had  been   appointed  as   members  of   the  High 






Level Committee for the very same purpose, the Government is 






not   justified   in   objecting   to   the   investigation   being 






monitored   by   such   Committee   headed   by   two   retired   Judges   of 






the   Supreme   Court   with   impeccable   credentials.   Mr.   Divan 






submitted   that   the   contention   of   the   Respondents   in   I.A. 



                                  11




No.8 of 2011 was as if by appointing a Special Investigation 






Team,   the   Supreme   Court   had   taken   over   the   executive   powers 






of   the   Union.       It   was   submitted   that   although   a   case 






against   the   accused   was   pending   since   2007,   no   attempt   had 






been   made   to   interrogate   the   accused   in   regard   to   the 






allegations made against them.













7.    Mr.   Divan   submitted   that   possibly   other   fora   were 






available to the Respondents, but the present I.A. would not 






provide any remedy to the Respondents.  Mr. Divan urged that 






it   was   on   account   of   the   complete   inertia   of   the 






investigating   authority   that   in   spite   of   huge   sums   of 






unaccounted   money   deposited   in   tax   havens   abroad,   little   or 






no   action   was   taken   to   proceed   with   the   investigation   or 






even   to   interrogate   the   persons   accused   of   having   been 






involved   in   money   laundering   and   acting   against   the 






interests   of   the   country   and   its   citizens.     Mr.   Divan 






submitted   that   the   remedy   available   to   the   Respondents   lay 






in a review petition under the provisions of Order 47 of the 



                                  12




Supreme   Court   Rules,   1966,   and   not   by   an   interlocutory 






application and that too in a disposed of matter.  










8.    Mr.   Shekhar   Naphade,   learned   Senior   Advocate   who 






appeared   for   the   Petitioner   in   Writ   Petition   (Civil)   No.136 






of   2011,   supported   the   submissions   made   by   Mr.   Anil   Divan 






with   regard   to   the   maintainability   of   the   Interlocutory 






Application   No.8   of   2011   filed   by   the   Union   of   India.     It 






was   contended   that   neither   the   provisions   of   Article   142   of 






the   Constitution   nor   Order   47   Rule   6   of   the   Supreme   Court 






Rules were attracted in the facts of this case, inasmuch as, 






the   said   provisions   conferred   power   and   not   jurisdiction   on 






this   Court   in   respect   of   a   matter   which   was   pending   before 






it.     Mr.   Naphade   submitted   that   Article   142   very   clearly 






vested   the   Supreme   Court   with   jurisdiction   to   pass   such 






decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete 






justice   in   any   case   or   matter   pending   before   it.     Mr. 






Naphade also contended that, as had been held by this Court, 






in  Saurav   Chaudhary  Vs.  Union   of   India  [(2004)   5   SCC   618], 






this Court could exercise its jurisdiction under Article 142 



                                   13




of the Constitution at the time of rendition of the judgment 






and   not   thereafter.     It   was   further   observed   that   once 






judgment   had   been   delivered   by   the   Court,   it   could   not 






recall   the  same   and  could   only  exercise   its  power   of  review 






in   case   it   intended   to   take   a   different   view   from   the   one 






rendered   in  the   main  judgment.     Mr.   Naphade  also   urged  that 






even the provisions of Order 47 Rule 6 of the Supreme Court 






Rules   were   of   no   assistance   to   the   Union   of   India.     It   was 






submitted   that   the   Rules   framed   under   Article   145(1)   of   the 






Constitution only empowered the Supreme Court to frame Rules 






to   regulate  its   practice  and   procedure  and   does  not   take  in 






its   sweep   the   power   to   create   a   new   jurisdiction   to 






entertain a cause or matter.










9.    Reference was also made to the decision of this Court in 






Raja Soap Factory & Ors. Vs. S.P. Shantharaj & Ors.[(1965) 2 






SCR   800],   wherein   it   was   observed   that   by   jurisdiction   what 






is   meant   is   the   extent   of   power   which   is   conferred   upon   a 






Court by its Constitution to try a matter or a cause.   Such 



                                          14




power   is   not   capable   of   being   enlarged   because   an 






extraordinary situation requires the Court to exercise it.  










10.    Mr.         Naphade         submitted         that         by         virtue         of         this 






application,   the   Union   of   India   was   seeking   to   review   a 






final order passed by this Court, treating the same to be an 






application   for   recalling   the   order.     Mr.   Naphade   repeated 






and reiterated his submissions that the application filed on 






behalf   of   the   Union   of   India   and   its   authorities   was   not 






maintainable and could only be dismissed.










11.    Replying   to   the   submissions   made   by   Mr.   Divan   and   Mr. 






Naphade,   the   learned   Attorney   General   submitted   that   in 






earlier   cases   also   this   question   had   been   raised   and 






considered   by   this   Court.     Referring   to   the   decision   of   a 






Bench   of   Seven   Judges   in   the   case   of  A.R.   Antulay  Vs.  R.S. 






Nayak   &   Anr.  [(1988)   2   SCC   602],   the   learned   Attorney 






General   submitted   that   by   a   majority   judgment   this   Court 






held   that   directions,   if   given   in   violation   of   the 






principles of natural justice, if subsequently questioned in 






another   appeal  instead   of  by   way  of   a  Review   Petition  under 



                                       15




Article 137, the same could be set aside by another Bench of 






the   Court  ex   debito   justitiae  in   exercise   of   its   inherent 






powers.     The   majority  amongst   the  Judges   held  that   the  want 






of   jurisdiction   could   be   addressed   solely   by   a   superior 






Court   and,   in   practice,   no   decision   could   be   reviewed 






collaterally   by   any   inferior   Court,   but   the   superior   Court 






could   always   correct   its   error   either   by   way   of   a   petition 






or  ex debito justitiae.   In fact, it was also observed that 






in certain situations, the Supreme Court could always invoke 






its power of review in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction 






in   any   proceeding   pending   before   it,   without   insisting   on 






the   formalities   of   a   review   application.   The   learned 






Attorney   General   submitted   that   by   appointing   two   retired 






Judges   of   the   Supreme   Court,   Justice   B.P.   Jeevan   Reddy   as 






the Chairman and Justice M.B. Shah as the Vice-Chairman, and 






directing that the Special Investigation Team would function 






under   their   guidance   and   directions,   would   amount   to 






interference   with   the   executive   authority   of   the   different 






officials         representing          different         sections         of         the 






administration which would lead to a chaotic situation.   The 



                                   16




direction given to include the Director, Research & Analysis 






Wing, was also improper, since the said authority functioned 






under strict rules of secrecy, which could be jeopardized if 






its   Director   were   to   be   included   in   the   Special 






Investigation Team.










12.    The   learned   Attorney   General   submitted   that,   in   the 






event   there   was   any   doubt   as   to   whether   the   powers   of   the 






Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution could be 






invoked for doing complete justice in a matter which was not 






pending   before   it,   the   present   application   could   always   be 






treated   as   a   Review   Petition   under   Article   137   of   the 






Constitution   read  with   Order  47   Rule  6   of  the   Supreme  Court 






Rules, 1966.   The learned Attorney General submitted that in 






view   of   the   magnitude   of   the   transactions   involved   and   that 






too   without   any   accounting   of   the   monies   used,   this   Court 






should   cut   across   technicalities   and   consider   the   matter 






pragmatically.   The   learned   Attorney   General   submitted   that 






the   present   application   may,   therefore,   be   treated   as   a 






Review   Petition   under   Article   137   of   the   Constitution   read 



                                   17




with Order 47 Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 and be 






proceeded   with   accordingly,   notwithstanding   the   objection 






taken   on   behalf   of   the   Petitioners   in   regard   to   the 






different   procedure   to   be   adopted   in   respect   of   a   review 






application.     It   was   also   submitted   that   as   indicated   in 






A.R.   Antulay's   case   (supra),   the   Supreme   Court   can   grant 






relief in exercise of its inherent powers as the guardian of 






the Constitution.  










13.    Reference   was   also   made   by   the   learned   Attorney   General 






to the decision of this Court in S. Nagaraj & Ors. Vs. State 






of   Karnataka   &   Anr.  [(1993)   Supp.   (4)   SCC   595],   which   was 






heard   along   with   several   other   cases   by   a   Bench   of   three 






Judges.   In the said cases an order had been passed on oral 






mentioning   which   ultimately   resulted   in   several   contempt 






petitions   being   filed.     Two   of   the   Hon'ble   Judges,   after 






considering   the   anomalous   circumstances   which   had   resulted 






from   the  passing   of  the   order  on   oral  mentioning,   held  that 






justice   is   a   virtue   which   transcends   all   barriers   and 






neither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can 



                                         18




stand in its way.  It was further observed that the order of 






the   Court   should   not   be   prejudicial   to   anyone   and   if   the 






Court found that the order was passed under a mistake and it 






would   not   have   exercised   the   jurisdiction,   but   for   the 






erroneous   assumption   which   in   fact   did   not   exist,   and   its 






perpetration would result in miscarriage of justice, then it 






would   not   on   any   principle   be   precluded   from   rectifying   the 






order.     Mistake   is   accepted   as   a   valid   reason   to   recall   an 






order.              Their         Lordships         emphasized         the         fact         that 






rectification   of   an   order   stems   from   the   fundamental 






principles   that   justice   is   above   all.     It   is   exercised   to 






remove   the   error   and   not   for   disturbing   finality.     In   the 






judgment it was also observed that the Supreme Court has the 






inherent   power   to   make   such   orders   as   may   be   necessary   for 






the   interest   of   justice   or   to   prevent   the   abuse   of   process 






of   Court.   The   Court   is,   therefore,   not   precluded   from 






recalling   or   reviewing   its   own   order,   if   it   is   satisfied 






that   it   is   necessary   to   do   so   for   the   sake   of   justice.     It 






was   pointed  out   that  even   the  learned   third  Judge   held  that 






while   the   Government   was   mainly   responsible   for   the 



                                   19




unfortunate   state   of   affairs   that   should   not   desist   the 






Supreme   Court   from   revising   or   reviewing   the   said   orders 






which   had   serious   consequences.     The   learned   third   Judge 






also   observed   that   it   is   the   duty   of   the   Court   to   rectify, 






revise   and   recall   its   orders   as   and   when   it   is   brought   to 






its notice that certain of its orders were passed on a wrong 






or   mistaken   assumption   of   facts   and   that   implementation   of 






those orders will have serious consequences.  










14.    On   a   careful   consideration   of   the   submissions   made   on 






behalf   of   the   respective   parties   in   regard   to   the 






maintainability   of  I.A.   No.8  of   2011  filed   on  behalf   of  the 






Union   of  India,   wherein,  inter  alia,  a  prayer   has  been   made 






to   modify   the   order   dated   4th  July,   2011   and   to   delete   the 






directions   relating   to   the   Special   Investigation   Team   in 






paragraphs 49 and 50 of the said order, it appears that the 






I.A.   is   maintainable.     In   view   of   the   preliminary   objection 






relating   to   the   maintainability   of   the   interlocutory 






application   filed  on   behalf  of   the  Union   of  India,   the  said 



                                   20




issue regarding the maintainability of I.A. No.8 of 2011 has 






been taken up first.  










15.    From   the   arguments   advanced   on   behalf   of   the   respective 






parties, it appears at first blush that Mr. Anil B. Divan is 






technically   correct   in   submitting   that   since   there   was   no 






matter   pending   before   this   Court,   the   provisions   of   Article 






142 of the Constitution would not be attracted and that even 






the   inherent   powers   of   this   Court   preserved   under   Order   47 






Rule 6 of the Rules framed by the Supreme Court in exercise 






of   its   powers   under   Article   145   of   the   Constitution   would 






not   be   applicable.     However,   this   Court   has   preserved   its 






inherent   powers  to   make  such   orders  as   may  be   necessary  for 






the ends of justice in Order 47 Rule 6 of the Supreme Court 






Rules,   1966,   framed   under   Article   145   of   the   Constitution. 






As   has   been   held   in  A.R.   Antulay's   case   (supra)   and   in  S. 






Nagaraj's   case   (supra),   such   a   power   was   not   only   inherent 






in   the   Supreme   Court,   but   the   Supreme   Court   was   also 






entitled   to   and   under   an   obligation   to   do   justice   to 






exercise   such   powers   as   the   guardian   of   the   Constitution. 



                                              21




Justice   transcends   all   barriers   and   neither   rules   of 






procedure   nor   technicalities   can   stand   in   its   way, 






particularly          if         its         implementation         would         result         in 






injustice.     In   addition   to   the   decision   rendered   by   this 






Court   in  A.R.   Antulay's   case   (supra)   and   in  S.   Nagaraj's 






case   (supra),   reference   may   also   be   made   to   another   equally 






important   pronouncement   of   this   Court   in  Vineet   Narain's 






case (supra), wherein the concept of continuing mandamus was 






introduced   in   order   to   maintain   the   credibility   of   the 






investigation being conducted.  










16.    Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court 






in  Manganese   Ore   (India)   Ltd.  Vs.  Chandi   Lal   Saha  [(1991) 






Supp. 2 SCC 465], wherein this Court extended the benefit of 






its   judgment   to   persons   who   were   not   even   in   appeal   before 






it.










17.    Even   if   the   present   application   was   to   be   dismissed   as 






being not maintainable under Article 142 of the Constitution 






read with Order 47 Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, 






it   would   not   preclude   the   Applicants   from   filing   an 



                                          22




application         for         review          under         Article         137         of         the 






Constitution.           As   the   very   working   of   the   Special 






Investigation   Team   appointed   under   the   order   of   4th  July, 






2011,   is   in   question,   it   is   necessary   to   cut   across   the 






technical   tapes   sought   to   be   invoked   on   behalf   of   the 






Petitioners   and   hold   that   in   view   of   the   inherent   powers 






vested   in  the   Supreme  Court   of  India,   preserved  in   Order  47 






Rule   6   of   the   Supreme   Court   Rules,   1966,   and   having   regard 






to   the   fact   that   the   Supreme   Court   is   the   guardian   of   the 






Constitution, I.A. No.8 of 2011, even in its present form is 






maintainable   in   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case, 






which include threats to the security of the country.  










18.    The objections raised by Mr. Anil B. Divan and supported 






by   Mr.   Shekhar   Naphade,   regarding   the   maintainability   of 






I.A.   No.8   of   2011,   are,   therefore,   rejected   and   the   said 






application may therefore be proceeded with for hearing.










                                                  ............................................................J.


                                                   (ALTAMAS KABIR)


New Delhi,


Dated: 23.09.2011.



                                   23










                                                       REPORTABLE






              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA




                 CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION








                          I.A. NO.8 OF 2011




                                   IN




            WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.176 OF 2009






RAM JETHMALANI & ORS.                            ....PETITIONERS








             VERSUS








UNION OF INDIA & ORS.              ....RESPONDENTS










                            O R D E R 






1.    I have had the opportunity, and the benefit of reading, in draft, the 




learned opinion of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Altamas Kabir.   However, with 




all humility and with due respect, I would not be able to concur with the 



                                             24










view taken by my Learned Brother.     My Learned Brother has rejected 




the   preliminary   objections   raised   by   Mr.   Anil   Divan   and   Mr.   Shekhar 




Naphade, appearing for the writ petitioners and directed the application 




to   proceed   for   hearing.     In   my   opinion,   the   application   is   not 




maintainable for a number of reasons.  








2.     The application clearly states that the order passed by this Court in 




I.A. No. 1 on 4th July, 2011 impinges upon the doctrine of separation of 




powers.  The application thereafter sets out the facts leading to the filing 




of the writ petition invoking Article 32 of the Constitution of India.  The 




application sets out the prayers made in the writ petition.  Thereafter, it is 




stated that the writ petition, as originally filed, did not contain any prayer 




for appointment of a Special Investigation Team.   The application also 




points   out   that   in   the   counter   affidavit   filed   on   behalf   of  the   Union   of 




India, it had been clearly  stated  that the Central  Government had been 




alive   to   the   need   to   be   able   to   retrieve   information   about   the   alleged 




money   lying   deposited   in   the   foreign   accounts   and   highlighting   steps 



                                       25










taken by it in his behalf.   It further points out that it was on account of 




such   an   initiative,   tax   haven   countries,   including   countries   like 




Switzerland,   made   solemn   attempts   to   enter   into   effective   tax 




information   exchange   agreements   with   various   countries.     The 




application   proceeds   to   delineate   the   steps   taken   and   the   strategy 




formulated to eradicate the menace of "Black Money".  It states that the 




Government had joined the global crusade against Black Money.  It had 




decided to create an appropriate legislative framework by incorporating 




various   tax   evasion   measures   in   existing   Acts.     Thereafter,   the 




application   gives   the   details   of   the   proposed   new   legislation   for 




unearthing Black Money.  After enumerating all the efforts made by the 




Government at national and international level, it is stated that above all 




the Government has constituted a Committee  on 27th  May, 2011 under 




the Chairman, C.B.D.T. to examine ways to strengthen laws to stop the 




generation of Black Money in the country, its legal transfer abroad and 




its recovery.   The Committee also examined various other issues which 




are  enumerated  in the  application.   The  application further proceeds  to 



                                          26










tabulate   the   efforts   to   create   further   legislative   and   administrative 




framework   to   obtain   information   about   illicit   money   of   Indian   citizens 




already parked outside the country.   Thereafter, the application sets out 




the efforts already made and the results thereof.  On the basis of that, it is 




stated that the Government has achieved substantial success not only in 




getting information on illicit money parked outside the country but also 




in stopping the transfer of illicit money outside the country.  Thereafter, 




the details are given of the illicit money detected.  








3.     It is stated that in the order dated 4th July, 2011, these efforts have 




neither   been   adverted   to   nor   evaluated   before   rendering   the   finding   in 




Paragraph 46 of the judgment.  








4.     The   application   thereafter   sets   out   various   efforts   made   in   the 




matter   of   investigation   of   the   case   of   Hasan   Ali   Khan   and   Kashinath 




Tapuriah.  The application thereafter reproduces the directions sought in 




I.A. No.1 of 2009, which was filed on 8th September, 2009.  Thereafter, it 




is   submitted   that   even   in   this   application,   no   prayer   was   made   for 



                                           27










appointment   of   a   Special   Investigation   Team   [SIT].     It   is   further 




submitted that such a prayer ought not to have been granted on the basis 




of written  submissions of the  learned  counsel  for  the  petitioners  in  the 




absence of requisite pleadings in the writ petition or in the absence of a 




formal prayer.   The application further proceeds to state  that it is filed 




invoking   the   inherent   power   of   this   Court   under   Article   142(1)   of   the 




Constitution   of   India   for   doing   complete   justice   in   any   case   or   matter 




pending before it.  








5.     In the grounds of the application, it is stated that this Court while 




exercising its jurisdiction would not be pleased to attain to itself, the task 




entrusted to the executive.  It is emphatically submitted in the application 




that   the  order  is  without   jurisdiction  since  the   constitution   of  the   High 




Level Committee is within the realm of a decision on policy matters. It is 




also submitted that formation of a SIT headed by two former Judges of 




this Court not only impinges on the policy decision of the Government 




but   also   impinges   upon   the   doctrine   of   separation   of   powers.     This, 



                                          28










according to the application, would be beyond the jurisdiction conferred 




on this Court under    Article 32 of the Constitution of India, which can 




be exercised for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III and 




for no other purpose.  It is further submitted that the judgment proceeds 




on   admissions,   concessions,   submissions   and   acknowledgments 




attributed to the counsel appearing for the Union of India.   It is pointed 




out   that   such   concessions   and   admissions   do   not   appear   to   have   been 




made.     On   the   basis   of   the   facts   pleaded,   the   prayer   is   made   for 




modification   of   the   order   dated   4th  July,   2011   and   deletion   of   the 




directions relating to SIT in Paragraphs 49 and 50.  Since the directions 




given   in   these   paragraphs   have   been   reproduced   verbatim   by   His 




Lordship,   Justice   Kabir,   the   same   are   not   necessary   to   be   reproduced 




herein again. 








6.     The   aforesaid   facts   have   been   stated   merely   to   indicate   that   the 




application   would   not   be   maintainable,   in   its   present   form,   as   in 




substance, it is more in the nature of a Memorandum of Appeal.   In my 



                                          29










opinion,   the   application   seeks   to   reopen   the   whole   matter   on   merits 




which   would   not   be   permissible   in   an   application   for   modification. 




Therefore, in my opinion, the application deserves to be dismissed at the 




threshold. 








7.     As   the   submissions   made   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the   parties 




have been succinctly noticed by my Learned Brother Altamas Kabir, J. 




in His Lordship's order, the same need not be repeated herein.








8.     In   my   opinion,   an   application   for   clarification/modification 




touching   the   merits   of   the   matter   is   not   maintainable.   The   Court   can 




consider the matter, if at all, only upon a review application on limited 




grounds.   In   considering   the   application   for   review,   the   procedure   laid 




down   under   Order   XL   of   the   Supreme   Court   Rules,   1966   read   with 




Article   137   would   have   to   be   followed.   Review   of   a   judgment   is   a 




serious matter and is, therefore, governed by constitutional and statutory 




provisions. This view of mine will find support from a number of earlier 



                                             30










decisions of this Court. It would, at this stage, be appropriate to make a 




reference to some of the observations made. 








9.        In the case of Ram Chandra Singh Vs. Savit
                                                                     ri Devi & Ors.1   this 




Court   considered   the   issue   as   to   whether   an   application   for 




clarification/modification   would   be   maintainable   in   the   face   of   the 




provisions   contained   in   Article   137   and   Order   XL   Rule   1   of   Supreme 




Court Rules. Upon consideration of the entire issue, it was observed as 




follows:- 




                "It   is   now   well   settled   that   an   application   for  


                clarification   or   modification   touching   the   merit   of   the  


                matter   would   not   be   maintainable.   A   Court   can   rehear  


                the matter upon review of its judgment but, therefore, the  


                procedure   laid  down  in  Order  40  Rules  3  and  5  of  the  


                Supreme   Court   Rules,   1966   as   also   Article   137   of   the  


                Constitution are required to be complied with as review  


                of a judgment is governed by the constitutional as well as  


                statutory provisions.






                ...........................................................................


                .........................................................     "   The   prayer  


                of the applicant is that apart from the corrections which  


                are   required   to   be   made   in   the   judgment,   as   noticed  


                hereinbefore,   the   merit   of   the   matter   may   also   be  


                considered, inter alia, with reference to the pleadings of  




1      2004 (12) SCC 713



                                                    31










                    the   parties.   Such   a   course   of   action,   in   our   opinion,   is  


                    not contemplated in law. If there exist errors apparent on  


                    the face  of the  record, an application  for review  would  


                    be   maintainable   but   an   application   for   clarification  


                    and/or   modification   cannot   be   entertained   unless   it   is  


                    shown   that   the   same   is   necessary   in   the   interest   of  


                    justice.  An  application   which  is  in effect   and substance  


                    an  application  for   review   cannot  be  entertained   dehors  


                    the statutory embargo contained in Order 40 Rules 3 and  


                    5 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966."






10.       I am of the considered opinion that the present application would 




be   an   abuse   of   the   process   of   the   Court   as   it   seeks   to   camouflage   an 




application   for   Review   as   an   application   for   modification.     In   my 




opinion, such a course ought not to be encouraged. It would be relevant 




to   notice   the   observations   made   by   this   Court   in   paragraph   16   of   the 




judgment in the case of Delhi Administration Vs. Gurdip Singh Uban 




& O
        rs.2  . 
               






                    "16. At the outset, we have to refer to the practice of filing  


                    review applications in large numbers in undeserving cases  


                    without   properly   examining   whether   the   cases   strictly  


                    come   within   the   narrow   confines   of   Rule   XL   of   the  


                    Supreme   Court   Rules.   In   several   cases,   it   has   become  


                    almost   everyday   experience   that   review   applications   are  


                    filed mechanically as a matter of routine and the grounds  


                    for   review   are   a   mere   reproduction   of   the   grounds   of  




2      2000 (7) SCC 296



                                             32










              special leave and there is no indication as to which ground  


              strictly   falls   within   the   narrow   limits   of   Rule   XL   of   the  


              Rules. We seriously deprecate this practice. If parties file  


              review petitions indiscriminately, the time of the Court is  


              unnecessarily   wasted,   even   it   be   in   chambers   where   the  


              review petitions are listed. Greater care, seriousness and  


              restraint is needed in filing review applications."






11.    In my opinion, ten years down the line, the situation is even worst 




than what is depicted by the aforesaid observations. Now we are facing 




an   almost   daily   practice   of   having   to   consider   applications   for 




"modification and clarification". 










12.    In   the   aforesaid   judgment,   this   Court   also   considered   the   nature 




and scope of the jurisdiction to review its own order/judgment. Since the 




application   herein   has   been   described   as   an   application   for 




"modification", it would be necessary to notice the observations made by 




this Court in Paragraph 17   and 18 of the judgment.  The observations of 




this Court are as under:-






              "17.  We   next   come   to   applications   described   as  


              applications   for   "clarification",   "modification"   or  


              "recall"   of   judgments   or   orders   finally   passed.   We   may  


              point out that under the relevant Rule XL of the Supreme  



                               33










Court   Rules,   1966   a   review   application   has   first   to   go  


before the learned Judges in circulation and it will be for  


the   Court   to   consider   whether   the   application   is   to   be  


rejected without giving an oral hearing or whether notice  


is to be issued.






Order XL Rule 3 states as follows:


"3. Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, an application  


for review shall be disposed of by circulation without any  


oral   arguments,   but   the   petitioner   may   supplement   his  


petition   by   additional   written   arguments.   The   Court   may  


either dismiss the petition or direct notice to the opposite  


party...."






In case notice is issued, the review  petition will be listed  


for hearing, after notice is served. This procedure is meant  


to   save   the   time   of   the   Court   and   to   preclude   frivolous  


review   petitions   being   filed   and   heard   in   open   court.  


However,   with   a   view   to   avoid   this   procedure   of   "no  


hearing", we find that sometimes applications are filed for  


"clarification",   "modification"   or   "recall"   etc.   not  


because   any   such   clarification,   modification   is   indeed  


necessary   but   because   the   applicant   in   reality   wants   a  


review and also wants a hearing, thus avoiding listing of  


the   same   in   chambers   by   way   of   circulation.   Such  


applications, if they are in substance review applications,  


deserve   to   be   rejected   straight   away   inasmuch   as   the  


attempt is obviously to bypass Order XL Rule 3 relating to  


circulation   of   the   application   in   chambers   for  


consideration   without   oral   hearing.   By   describing   an  


application  as  one for "clarification"  or  "modification",  


-- though it is really one of review  -- a party cannot be  


permitted   to   circumvent   or   bypass   the   circulation  


procedure   and   indirectly   obtain   a   hearing   in   the   open  


Court. What cannot be done directly cannot be permitted  



                                             34










              to   be   done   indirectly.   (See   in   this   connection   a   detailed  


              order   of   the   then   Registrar   of   this   Court   in  Sone   Lal  v.  


              State of U.P deprecating a similar practice.)






              18.  We,   therefore,   agree   with   the   learned   Solicitor  


              General that the Court should not permit hearing of such  


              an   application   for   "clarification",   "modification"   or  


              "recall" if the application is in substance one for review.  


              In that event, the Court could either reject the application  


              straight away with or without costs or permit withdrawal  


              with leave to file a review application to be listed initially  


              in chambers."








13.    These observations leave no manner of doubt that the Court should 




not   permit   hearing   of   such   an   application   for   "clarification", 




"modification"   or   "recall"   if   the   application   is   in   substance   one   for 




review. It is clearly indicated that in those circumstances the Court could 




either   reject   the   application   straight   away   or   permit   withdrawal   with 




leave to file a review application to be listed initially in chambers.










14.   Examined on the touch stone of the observations made above, I am 




of the considered opinion that the application herein though described as 




an  application  for modification   is  in substance  more in  the  nature  of a 



                                                35










Memorandum of Appeal.  At best, it could be said to be in substance an 




Application for Review. It certainly does not lie within the very narrow 




limits   within   which   this   Court   would   entertain   an   application   for 




modification.








15.       In   yet   another   case   of  Zahira   Habibullah   Sheikh   &   Anr.  Vs. 




State
          of Gujarat & Ors.3   this Court, faced with a similar situation, had 




this to say :  




                 "The petition is in essence and substance seeking for a  


                 review   under   the   guise   of   making   an   application   for  


                 direction and modification apparently being fully aware  


                 of   the   normal   procedure   that   such   applications   for  


                 review are not, unless the Court directs, listed for open  


                 hearing   in   Court,   at   the   initial   stage   at   least,   before  


                 ordering notice to the other side and could be summarily  


                 rejected, if found to be of no prima facie merit. The move  


                 adopted   in   itself   is   unjustified,   and   could   not   be  


                 countenanced also either by way of review or in the form  


                 of   the   present   application   as   well.   The   nature   of   relief  


                 sought,   and   the   reasons   assigned   are   such   that   even  


                 under   the   pretext   of   filing   a   review   such   an   exercise  


                 cannot   be   undertaken,   virtually   for   rehearing   and  


                 alteration of the judgment because it is not to the liking  


                 of the party, when there is no apparent error on record  


                 whatsoever  to  call  for  even   a  review.  The  said   move  is  


                 clearly   misconceived   and   nothing   but   sheer   abuse   of  


                 process,   which   of   late   is   found   to   be   on   the   increase,  


                 more for selfish reasons than to further or strengthen the  




3      (2004 (5) SCC 353)



                                             36










                cause   of   justice.   The   device   thus   adopted,   being  


                otherwise   an   impermissible   move   by   mere   change   in  


                nomenclature   of   the   applications   does   not   change   the  


                basic   nature   of   the   petition.   Wishful   thinking   virtually  


                based on surmises too, at any rate is no justification to  


                adopt  such  undesirable   practices.  If  at  all, it should  be  


                for weighty and substantial reasons and not to exhibit the  


                might   or   weight   or   even   the   affluence   of   the   party  


                concerned or those who represent such parties when they  


                happen to be public authorities and institutions.








16.      This Court approved the observations made in the case of Gurdip  




Singh   Uban  (supra)   and   observed   that   what   cannot   be   done   directly 




cannot be permitted to be done indirectly. The Court should not permit 




hearing   of   such   an   application   for   "clarification",   "modification"   or 




"recall" if the application is in substance a clever move for review. 








17.      These   observations   were   reiterated   in   the   case   of  A.P.   SRTC   &  




Ors.   Vs.  Abdul Kareem  4. This Court observed that the petition was in 




essence and substance seeking for a review under the guise of making an 




application  for direction  and modification  apparently being fully aware 




of the normal procedure that such applications for review are not, unless 








4      2007 (2) SCC 466



                                             37










the Court directs, listed for open hearing in Court, at the initial stage at 




least,   before   ordering   notice   to   the   other   side   and   could   be   summarily 




rejected,   if   found   to   be   of   no   prima   facie   merit.     The   Court   further 




observed that such a move ought not to be countenanced. The move was 




clearly misconceived and nothing but sheer abuse of process, which of 




late   is   found   to   be   on   the   increase,   more   for   selfish   reasons   than   to 




further or strengthen the cause of justice.










18.      To   be   fair,   it   must   be   noticed   that   the   learned   Attorney   General 




appearing for the Union of India had relied on a number of judgments in 




support of his submissions that the Court would have inherent powers to 




modify   its   own   order/judgment.   The   primary   judgment   relied   upon   by 




the  learned  Attorney  General  is  in the  case  of  S.  Nagaraj  & Ors.  Vs. 




State of Karnataka & Anr.5.     I am of the considered opinion that the 




aforesaid judgment would be of no assistance to the submissions made 




by the learned Attorney General. The aforesaid judgment was rendered 




in the background of very peculiar facts. It would appear that this Court 




5      1993 (Supp.4) SCC 595



                                           38










had passed an order having far reaching consequences and pre-judicially 




affecting the rights of other groups of employees under         Articles 14 




and 16 of the Constitution  of India.  The  order  had  permitted  backdoor 




entry of thousands of stipendiary graduates because of the negligence of 




the   State   in   putting   correct   facts   before   the   Court.   The   Government 




seemed  to  have  woken  up  after considerable  damage  had  already  been 




done and moved an application for modification/clarification of the order 




dated 30th  October, 1991.   The learned Attorney General placed strong 




reliance on the observations made by this Court in Paragraph 18, 19 and 




36 of the judgment in support of the submission that the Court should not 




decline to review its orders when it is brought to the notice of the Court 




that it would be in the interest of justice to modify the same.  In order to 




appreciate   the   submission   of   learned   Attorney   General,   it   would   be 




appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in Paragraphs 




18, 19 and 36 of the judgment, which are as under:-




              "18.  Justice   is   a   virtue   which   transcends   all   barriers.  


              Neither  the rules of procedure nor technicalities  of law  


              can stand in its way. The order of the Court should not  


              be prejudicial to anyone. Rule of stare decisis is adhered  



                                  39










for   consistency   but   it   is   not   as   inflexible   in  


Administrative   Law   as   in   Public   Law.   Even   the   law  


bends  before   justice.  Entire  concept  of  writ  jurisdiction  


exercised by the higher courts is founded on equity and  


fairness.   If   the   Court   finds   that   the   order   was   passed  


under   a   mistake   and   it   would   not   have   exercised   the  


jurisdiction   but   for   the   erroneous   assumption   which   in  


fact   did   not   exist   and   its   perpetration   shall   result   in  


miscarriage of justice then it cannot on any principle be  


precluded from rectifying the error. Mistake is accepted  


as valid reason to recall an order. Difference lies in the  


nature   of   mistake   and   scope   of  rectification,   depending  


on   if   it   is   of   fact   or   law.   But   the   root   from   which   the  


power flows is the anxiety to avoid injustice. It is either  


statutory   or   inherent.   The   latter   is   available   where   the  


mistake is of the Court. In Administrative Law the scope  


is still wider. Technicalities apart if the Court is satisfied  


of   the   injustice   then   it   is   its   constitutional   and   legal  


obligation to set it right by recalling its order. Here as  


explained, the Bench of which one of us (Sahai, J.) was a  


member   did   commit   an   error   in   placing   all   the  


stipendiary   graduates   in   the   scale   of   First   Division  


Assistants due to State's failure to bring correct facts on  


record. But that obviously cannot stand in the way of the  


Court   correcting   its   mistake.   Such   inequitable  


consequences   as   have   surfaced   now   due   to   vague  


affidavit   filed   by   the   State   cannot   be   permitted   to  


continue.




19.  Review   literally   and   even   judicially   means   re-


examination   or   re-consideration.   Basic   philosophy  


inherent   in   it   is   the   universal   acceptance   of   human  


fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the courts and even the  


statutes   lean   strongly   in   favour   of   finality   of   decision  


legally   and   properly   made.   Exceptions   both   statutorily  


and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental  



                               40










mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was  


no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the  


highest   court   indicating   the   circumstances   in   which   it  


could rectify its order the courts culled out such power to  


avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. In Raja  


Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury  v.  Sukhraj Rai  the Court  


observed   that   even   though   no   rules   had   been   framed  


permitting the highest Court to review its order yet it was  


available   on   the   limited   and   narrow   ground   developed  


by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The Court  


approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council in  


Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Singh that an order  


made by the Court was final and could not be altered:


        "...   nevertheless,   if   by   misprision   in  


        embodying   the   judgments,   by   errors   have  


        been   introduced,   these   Courts   possess,   by  


        Common   law,   the   same   power   which   the  


        Courts   of   record   and   statute   have   of  


        rectifying the mistakes which have crept in ....  


        The House of Lords exercises a similar power  


        of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its  


        own   judgments,   and   this   Court   must   possess  


        the same authority. The Lords have however  


        gone   a   step   further,   and   have   corrected  


        mistakes   introduced   through   inadvertence   in  


        the   details   of   judgments;   or   have   supplied  


        manifest   defects   in   order   to   enable   the  


        decrees   to   be   enforced,   or   have   added  


        explanatory   matter,   or   have   reconciled  


        inconsistencies."




Basis   for   exercise   of   the   power   was   stated   in   the   same  


decision as under:


        "It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence  


        extended in such cases is mainly owing to the  


        natural   desire   prevailing   to   prevent  



                               41










        irremediable injustice being done by a Court  


        of   last   resort,   where   by   some   accident,  


        without   any   blame,   the   party   has   not   been  


        heard   and   an   order   has   been   inadvertently  


        made as if the party had been heard."




Rectification   of   an   order   thus   stems   from   the  


fundamental   principle   that   justice   is   above   all.   It   is  


exercised   to   remove   the   error   and   not   for   disturbing  


finality.   When   the   Constitution   was   framed   the  


substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by  


this Court was specifically provided by Article 137 of the  


Constitution.   Our   Constitution-makers   who   had   the  


practical   wisdom   to   visualise   the   efficacy   of   such  


provision   expressly   conferred   the   substantive   power   to  


review   any   judgment   or   order   by   Article   137   of   the  


Constitution. And clause (c) of Article 145 permitted this  


Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which  


any judgment  or order may be  reviewed. In exercise of  


this power Order XL had been framed empowering this  


Court to review an order in civil proceedings on grounds  


analogous to Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure  


Code. The expression, `for any other sufficient reason' in  


the   clause   has   been   given   an   expanded   meaning   and   a  


decree   or   order   passed   under   misapprehension   of   true  


state   of   circumstances   has   been   held   to   be   sufficient  


ground to exercise the power. Apart from Order XL Rule  


1 of the Supreme Court Rules this Court has the inherent  


power to make such orders  as may be necessary  in the  


interest   of justice  or  to  prevent  the  abuse  of process   of  


Court. The Court is thus not precluded from recalling or  


reviewing   its   own   order   if   it   is   satisfied   that   it   is  


necessary to do so for sake of justice.




36.  There   is   yet   another   circumstance.   The  question   is,  


whether   this   Court   should   enforce   the   1982   Rules   as  



                               42










amended in 1987. The 1987 amendments have the effect  


of   smuggling   in   thousands   of   persons   into   Government  


service   by   a   back-door   --   without   complying   with   the  


requirements of Articles 14 and 16. One can understand  


the rules as framed in 1982, but it is extremely difficult to  


appreciate or understand the reasons for which the 1987  


amendment   was   brought   in.   The   question,   to   repeat,   is  


whether   this   Court   should   extend   its   arm   --   its  


discretionary   power   under   Articles   136   and   32,   as   the  


case   may   be,   to   implement   such   unconstitutional   rules  


and   help   these   persons   to   gain   a   back-door   entry   into  


Government   service   --   that   too   at   the   highest   level   in  


group   `C'   services   straightaway.   It   is   true   that   no   one  


has questioned the 1987 amendments. The petitioners do  


not   question   them   because   they   are   advantageous   to  


them;   they   want   them   to   be   implemented.   The  


Government cannot and does not question them because  


it   has   itself   made   them.   The   parties   who   are   affected  


namely   the   persons   awaiting   employment   under   the  


Government   probably   do   not   even   know   what   is  


happening.   But   where   an   unconstitutional   provision   of  


such   vast   impact   is   brought   to   the   notice   of   this   Court  


and it is asked to enforce it, it is the constitutional duty of  


this Court to refuse to do so. I am, therefore, of the firm  


opinion that this Court should refuse to make any orders  


directing   implementation   of   the   rules   as   amended   in  


1987.   The   proper   direction   would   be   to   direct   the  


absorption   of   the   S.Gs.   in   accordance   with   the   1982  


Rules as originally framed (i.e., without reference to the  


1987 amendments) and to the extent provided therein. Of  


course those S.Gs. who have been absorbed already into  


group `C' service in accordance with the said rules will  


remain unaffected  since disturbing them, without notice  


to   them   and   in   view  of   all   the   circumstances   of   this  


case, may not be advisable. All those S.Gs. who have  


not so far been absorbed in group `C' service shall  



                                           43










               continue   in   the   present   status,   drawing   Rs   960   per  


               month. They will be entitled for absorption in group  


               `C'   posts   only   in   accordance   with   the   1982   Rules,  


               without reference to the 1987 amendments."




Relying   on   these   observations,   learned   Attorney   General,   submits   that 




the Court should regardless of any technical objections proceed to hear 




the present application without insisting that the applicant should seek its 




relief in an application for review. 










19.    I   am   of   the   considered   opinion   that   the   facts   and   circumstances 




highlighted in the present application would not enable the applicant to 




satisfy   the   conditions   under   which   this   Court   exercised   its   inherent 




jurisdiction in the S. Nagaraj's case (supra).  A perusal of the judgment 




would   clearly   show   that   the   Court   was   anxious   to   "even   the   balance". 




On   the   one   side,   there   were   orders   of   the   Court   passed   on   vague   and 




incomplete affidavit, creating rights and hopes in favour of five thousand 




stipendiary graduates to be absorbed as First Division Assistant, and on 




the other hand, there were others, the likely injustice to whom had been 




highlighted   in   the   affidavit   filed   by   the   Government   and   in   the   writ 



                                          44










petition  filed by different  sections of the employees. The  Court  in fact 




emphasised   the   principle   of   finality   of   orders   and   binding   nature   of 




directions issued by the Court which could only be overridden, if there is 




injustice inherent in the situation (see Page 615, Para 14 e & f).    A little 




later in the judgment, in Paragraph 16, the Court observed as follows:-




              "16.     "Mere   eligibility   was   not   sufficient   unless  


              availability of posts was also established. In absence of  


              posts   and   due   to   equitable   considerations   arising   in  


              favour   of   other   employees   the   practical   difficulty   in  


              appointing all the five thousand stipendiary graduates as  


              First Division Assistants appears to be insurmountable.  


              Even so we have no hesitation in saying that we would  


              have   refused   to   modify   our   order   dated   October   30,  


              1991 at the instance of the Government but the Court  


              cannot
                          be   unjust   to   other   employees."    (emphasis  


              supplied)










20.    These   observations   make   it   abundantly   clear   that   the   Court   was 




dealing with a particularly unsavory situation created by the Government 




which   had   led   to   insurmountable   difficulties   and   possible   injustice   to 




both   the   stipendiary   Magistrates   and   other   employees.     The   Court, 




therefore,   observed   that   but   for   this   unique   situation,   it   would   have 




refused to modify the order   dated 30th October, 1991.  In Paragraph 18, 



                                               45










the Court makes it clear that the order was passed under a mistake.  The 




Court   would   not   have   exercised   its   jurisdiction   but   for   the   erroneous 




assumption,   which   in   fact   did   not   exist.     In   Paragraph   36,   again,   it   is 




reiterated by the Court that it would be the duty of the Court to rectify, 




revise   and   recall   its   orders   as   and   when   it   is   brought   to   its   notice   and 




certain   of   its   orders   were   based   on   wrong   or   mistaken   assumption   of 




facts   and   that   implementation   of   those   orders   would   have   serious 




consequences.  










21.     In my opinion, in the present case, there is no question of mistaken 




facts, being presented by anyone to the Court.  The application also fails 




to indicate any miscarriage of justice or injustice which would be caused 




to   any   particular   class.       The   other   authorities   cited   by   the   learned 




Attorney   General   followed   the   judgment   in  S.   Nagaraj's   case  (supra) 




and would not advance the cause of the applicant or Union of India any 




further. 



                                               46










22.          The   judgment   in  Gurdip   Singh   Uban's   case  (supra)   rather 




supports   the   writ   petitioner   as   noticed   in   the   earlier   part   of   this   order. 




The learned Attorney General further submitted that this Court would be 




fully justified in passing the orders in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction 




under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. It can always correct its 




non errors brought to its notice either by way of a review petition or  ex  




debito  justitiae.  In   support   of   the   submission,   the   learned   Attorney 




general has relied on judgment of this Court in the case of A.R. Antulay 




Vs. R.S. 
                Nayak & Anr.6  










23.          In my opinion, the aforesaid judgment was also delivered in view 




of the peculiar circumstances of the case.   The Court therein set out the 




circumstances   in   which   this   Court   can   pass   the   appropriate   orders 




unhindered by technical rules.   The observations made in paragraph 48, 




which are of relevance, are as under :






                   "48.  According   to   Shri   Jethmalani,   the   doctrine   of  per  


                   incuriam  has no application in the same proceedings. We  


                   are unable to accept this contention. We are of the opinion  




6     1988 (2) SCC 602



                                             47










              that this Court is not powerless to correct its error which  


              has   the   effect   of   depriving   a   citizen   of   his   fundamental  


              rights and more so, the right to life and liberty. It can do  


              so in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction in any proceeding  


              pending before it without insisting on the formalities of a  


              review application. Powers of review can be exercised in a  


              petition filed under Article 136 or Article 32 or under any  


              other provision of the Constitution if the court is satisfied  


              that  its  directions   have  resulted  in  the  deprivation   of  the  


              fundamental   rights   of   a   citizen   or   any   legal   right   of   the  


              petitioner.   See   the   observations   in  Prem   Chand   Garg  v.  


              Excise Commissioner."








24.    In my opinion, the aforesaid observations would not be applicable 




in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The application herein 




is   not   moved   by   an   individual,   who   had   been   deprived   of   his 




fundamental rights by an order dated 4th  July, 2011. The application is 




filed   by  the   Union  of  India  challenging   the  order  on  various   legal   and 




factual issues. In  Antulay's case  (supra), one of the grounds taken was 




that the directions have been issued by the Court without following the 




principle of  audi alteram partem. In the present case, the directions had 




been issued after hearing the learned counsel for the parties at length and 




on numerous dates. These directions, in my opinion, cannot be recalled 



                                       48










in an application seeking only modification of the order. At this stage, it 




would   also   not   be   possible   to   treat   the   present   application   for 




modification as an application for review.




   




25.    In view of the above, with utmost respect, it would not be possible 




to agree with the order passed by Hon'ble  Mr. Justice Altamas Kabir.  In 




my opinion, the applicant Union of India has failed to make out a case to 




enable this Court to treat the modification application as application for 




review and proceed to hear the same in open Court.  In my opinion, the 




present application is wholly misconceived.   It is, therefore, dismissed. 




Union of India is, however, at liberty to take recourse to any other legal 




remedy that may be available to it. 










                                                  ...................................J.


                                                    [Surinder Singh Nijjar]




New Delhi;


September 23, 2011.



                                     49






                                                                  REPORTABLE


                   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                    CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION






                             I.A. NO.8 OF 2011


                                           IN


                 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.176 OF 2009






RAM JETHMALANI & ORS.                         Petitioner(s)


                 VERSUS


UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                         Respondent(s)



                                O R D E R 






       Since   we   have   differed   in   our   views   regarding   the 


maintainability  of I.A.  No.8 of  2011 filed  in W.P.  No.176 


of 2009, let the matter be placed before Hon'ble the Chief 


Justice of India, for reference to a third Judge.








                                                              
                                                 ......................J. 
                                                 (ALTAMAS KABIR)








                                                  ......................J.
                                                 (SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR)


New Delhi;                                               
September 23, 2011.