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Saturday, September 3, 2011

The respondent no. 2, Shri. Raghav Chandra, who is a Commissioner of M.P. Housing Board, Bhopal along with respondent no. 3, Shri. Shahjad Khan, posted as the then Collector, Katni, Jabalpur and respondent no. 4, Shri. Ram Meshram, posted as the Land Acquisition Officer, M.P. Housing Board, Bhopal, whilst, discharging their functions, had allegedly entered into conspiracy and made a secret plot with Shri. B.D. Gautam, the Director of Olphert Company and, subsequently, purchased the land belonging to Olphert Company at higher rates for the M.P. Housing Board, thereby, caused a financial loss of over `4 Crores to the Government. The appellant reported this alleged transaction of purchase of land by the M.P. Housing Board, alleging financial loss to the Government, to the Lokayukta, Bhopal. Subsequently, the Special Police Establishment (Lokayukta), Jabalpur (hereinafter referred to as “the Lokayukta Police”) registered an FIR No. 165 of 2002 against accused respondent nos. 2 to 4, as the alleged act or conduct of the accused respondents, all working as Government Servants, amounts to an offence under Section 13 (1-d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of 2


                                                              REPORTABLE


                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

              CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION



          CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1706-1708 OF 2011

      (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 364-366 of 2010)





Arun Kumar Aggarwal                                    ........ Appellant



                                   versus



State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.                      ........Respondents





                             J U D G M E N T



H.L. Dattu, J.



1.    Leave granted.



2.    These   appeals,   by   special   leave,   are   directed   against   the


      Judgment   and   Order   dated   22.4.2009   passed   by   the   High


      Court   of   Madhya   Pradesh   in   Criminal   Revision   No.   821   of


      2005,   Criminal   Revision   Petition     No.   966   of   2005   and


      Criminal Case No. 3403 of 2005, whereby the High Court has


      allowed   the   revision   application   and  inter   alia  quashed   the


      Order dated 26.4.2005 in case diary of Crime No. 165 of 2002


      passed   by   the   First   Additional   Sessions   Judge   and   Special


      Judge,   Katni   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   "learned   Special


      Judge").



3.    The  brief   factual   matrix  relating  to  this  appeal  is  as  follows:


      The   respondent   no.   2,   Shri.   Raghav   Chandra,   who   is   a


      Commissioner   of   M.P.   Housing   Board,   Bhopal   along   with


      respondent   no.   3,   Shri.   Shahjad   Khan,   posted   as   the   then


      Collector,   Katni,   Jabalpur   and   respondent   no.   4,   Shri.   Ram


      Meshram,   posted   as   the   Land   Acquisition   Officer,   M.P.


      Housing   Board,   Bhopal,   whilst,   discharging   their   functions,


      had allegedly entered into conspiracy and made a secret plot


      with Shri. B.D. Gautam, the Director of Olphert Company and,


      subsequently,   purchased   the   land   belonging   to   Olphert


      Company at higher rates for the M.P. Housing Board, thereby,


      caused a financial loss of over  `4 Crores to the Government.


      The appellant reported this alleged transaction of purchase of


      land by the M.P. Housing Board, alleging financial loss to the


      Government,   to   the   Lokayukta,   Bhopal.   Subsequently,   the


      Special   Police   Establishment   (Lokayukta),   Jabalpur


      (hereinafter referred to as "the Lokayukta Police") registered


      an FIR No. 165 of 2002 against accused respondent nos. 2 to


      4, as the alleged act or conduct of the accused respondents,


      all working as Government Servants, amounts to   an offence


      under   Section   13   (1-d)   and   13(2)   of   the   Prevention   of





                                                                             2


Corruption   Act,   1988   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   "the   PCA")


and   Section   120-B   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code   (hereinafter


referred to as "the IPC"). Accordingly a Criminal Case No. 165


of 2002 was registered against respondent nos. 2 to 4 in the


Court of learned Special Judge. However, the sanction of the


Government was necessary as mandated by Section 19 of the


PCA   in   order   to   prosecute   the   said   accused   respondents.


Acting   upon   the   complaint   of   the   appellant,   the   Lokayukta


Police,   after   conducting   the   investigation,   had   exonerated


respondent nos. 2 to 4 of all the charges leveled against them


and submitted final closure report, under Section 169 of the


Criminal   Procedure   Code   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   "the  Cr.


P.C."),   to   the   learned   Special   Judge,   Katni   as   no   case   had


been   made   out   to   prosecute   respondents.   Thereafter,   the


learned   Special   Judge,   Katni   after   hearing   the   respondents,


appreciating   the   evidence   on   record   and   perusing   the   case


diary,   had   rejected   the   closure   report  vide  his   Order   dated


26.4.2005.   The   operative   portion   of   the   order   dated


26.4.2005   passed   by   the   learned   Special   Judge   is   extracted


below:



       "31.  In this way from above record produced,

       even prima facie, it is evident that the accused

       had   made   secrete   plot   (durabhi   sandhi)   with

       Shri   B.D.   Gautam   the   Director   of   Olphert

       Company   with   conspiracy   and   purchased   land

       of Olphert Company on higher rate and caused





                                                                          3


             financial   loss   over   four   crores   to   the

             Government which there are sufficient grounds

             for   taking   cognizance   against   the   accused

             persons.


             32.    Accused   person   Shri   Raghav   Chandra   is

             posted as Commissioner of M.P. Housing Board

             and   Shri   Ram   Meshram   is   posted   as   Land

             Acquiring   Officer   in   M.P.   Housing   Board   and

             Shri Shahjaad Khan while remaining posted as

             Collector,   all   above   accused   persons   working

             as Government servant, while discharging their

             government   duties,   committed   above   crime-

             under section 19 of Anti Corruption Act 1988, it

             is   necessary   to   obtain   sanction   to   prosecute

             Government Servant U/S 13 of Anti-Corruption

             Act. Therefore matter may be taken up seeking

             necessary   sanction   to   prosecute   the   accused

             persons   Raghav   Chandra,   Shri   Ram   Meshram

             and   Shahjaad   Khan   to   prosecute   them   under

             Section   13   (1-d),   13   (2)   Anti   Corruption   Act

             and   under   Section   120-B   I.P.C.   and   for

             necessary further action, case be registered in

             the criminal case diary."





4.    Aggrieved by the above observation, respondent nos. 2   to 4


      preferred Criminal Revision Petitions under Section 482 of the


      Cr.P.C.   before   the   High   Court.   The   High   Court   allowed   the


      revision petitions and quashed the Order dated 26.4.2005 of


      the learned Special Judge on the ground that the Order of the


      learned   Special   Judge   is   illegal   and   without   jurisdiction,   in


      view of the decision of this Court in Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh


      Mishra,  AIR  1968  SC 117,  as   the  Magistrate  cannot   impinge


      upon the jurisdiction of the police by directing them to change


      their opinion when the closure report had been submitted by


      the police under Section 169 of the Cr.P.C. The reliance is also




                                                                               4


      placed on the observation made by this Court in the case of


      Mansukh Lal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat  AIR 1997


      SC 3400 wherein it is observed that:



            "19.   Since   the   validity   of   "Sanction"   depends

            on the applicability of mind by the sanctioning

            authority   of   the   facts   of   the   case   as   also   the

            material   and   evidence   collected   during

            investigation   it   necessarily   follows   that   the

            sanctioning   authority   has   to   apply   its   own

            independent   mind   for   the   generation   of

            genuine   satisfaction   whether   prosecution   has

            to   be   sanctioned   or   not.     The   mind   of   the

            sanctioning   authority   should   not   be   under

            pressure   from   any   quarter   nor   should   any

            external   force   be   acting   upon   it   to   take   a

            decision   one   way   or   the   other.   Since   the

            discretion   to   grant   or   not   to   grant   sanction

            vests   absolutely   in   the   sanctioning   authority,

            its   discretion   should   be   shown   to   have   not

            been affected by any extraneous consideration.

            It is shown that the sanctioning authority was

            unable   to   apply   its   independent   mind   for   any

            reason whatsoever or was under an obligation

            or   compulsion   or   constraint   to   grant   the

            sanction,   the  order  will  be  bad  for  the  reason

            that   the   discretion   of   the   authority   "not   to

            sanction"   was   taken   away   and   it   was

            compelled   to   act  mechanically   to   sanction   the

            prosecution."





5.    Being aggrieved, the appellant is before us in this appeal.



6.    The issue involved in the present appeal for our consideration


      is:   Whether   the   High   Court   is   justified   in   treating   the


      operative portion of the Order of the learned Special Judge as


      a direction issued to the sanctioning authority to sanction the


      prosecution of the accused respondent Nos. 2 to 4.




                                                                                 5


7.      We have heard the learned counsel for the parties to the lis


      and perused the record.



8.    The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Special


      Judge, vide his Order dated 26.4.2005, refused to accept the


      closure report submitted before him by the Lokayukta Police


      as he found it to be not reasonable and finally rejected it. The


      other portion of the Order, wherein the learned Special Judge


      observed   particularly   about   the   initiation   of   Challan


      proceedings,   is   a   mere   observation   or   passing   remark.   In


      other words, the learned counsel submits that this portion of


      the Order, dealing with Challan proceedings, can, at the most,


      be   treated   as   expression   of   his   personal   opinion.   He  further


      submits   that   wholistic   reading  of  this   Order  clearly   suggests


      that the learned Special Judge's remark pertaining to Challan


      proceedings   is   in   the   nature   of   mere   obiter   dicta   and   could


      not qualify to be treated as a direction of the Court even by


      any stretch of imagination. The learned counsel contends that


      the Order of the learned Special Judge cannot be treated as


      direction issued to the sanctioning authority to prosecute the


      respondents   as   this   Order   nowhere   addresses   sanctioning


      authority   and   moreover,   nowhere   directs   sanctioning


      authority   to   do  any   affirmative   action   or   abstain   from  doing


      anything.     Therefore,   the   High   Court   is   not   justified   in





                                                                                 6


       quashing the Order of the learned Special Judge and treating


       it   to   be   a   direction   issued   to   the   sanctioning     authority   to


       prosecute   the  accused  respondent nos.2 to 4.



9.     Per  contra,  the  learned  counsel   for  the  respondents  submits


       that the Order of the learned Special Judge is in the nature of


       command   and   amounts   to   a   direction   to   the   sanctioning


       authority to prosecute respondent nos. 2 to 4.  Therefore, this


       Order   of   the   learned   Special   Judge   is   illegal   and   without


       jurisdiction.   The   learned   counsel   further   supported   the


       impugned Order and Judgment of the High Court.



10.    We have heard the learned counsel for the parties before us.


       The short point in issue before us is based on the nature of


       the   Order   passed   by   the   learned   Special   Judge   whether   it


       amounts to a direction issued by the Court to the concerned


       authority or mere observation of the Court.



11.    We   will  first  discuss   the  nature  and   scope   of  the  expression


       `direction'   issued   by   the   Court.   This   Court   in  Rameshwar


       Bhartia   v.   The   State   of   Assam,  1953   SCR   126  whilst


       distinguishing   the   expression   `Sanction'   from   the   `Direction',


       for the purpose of initiating the prosecution has held:



              "15.   But   where   a   prosecution   is   directed,   it

              means   that   the   authority   who   gives   the

              direction   is   satisfied  in  his   own mind  that  the

              case   must   be   initiated.   Sanction   is   in   the




                                                                                    7


              nature of  a permission,  while  a  direction is in

              the   nature   of   a   command."   (Emphasis

              supplied).





12.    In Income Tax Officer, A-Ward, Sitapur v. Murlidhar Bhagwan


       Das,   Lakhimpur   kheri,   (1964)   6   SCR   411,   this   Court   has


       observed that the expression "direction" cannot be construed


       in vacuum,  but must be collated to the directions which the


       Assistant  Appellate  Commissioner  can give under  Section 31


       of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922.



13.    This Court in  Rajinder Nath v. CIT, (1979) 4 SCC 282, while


       considering   the   meaning   of   expression   `finding'   and


       `direction', occurring  in Section 153(3)(ii) of the Income Tax


       Act, 1961, has held:



              "11. ... As regards the expression "direction" in

              Section   153(3)(ii)   of   the   Act,   it   is   now   well

              settled  that   it   must   be   an   express   direction

              necessary   for   the   disposal   of   the   case   before

              the   authority   or   court.   It   must   also   be   a

              direction   which   the   authority   or   court   is

              empowered   to   give   while   deciding   the   case

              before   it.  The   expressions   "finding"   and

              "direction"   in   Section   153(3)(ii)   of   the   Act

              must   be   accordingly   confined."   (Emphasis

              supplied).





14.    In  Kanhiya   Lal   Omar   v.   R.K.   Trivedi   &   Ors.,  (1985)   4   SCC


       628, this Court has observed that "A direction may mean an





                                                                                 8


       order   issued   to   a   particular   individual   or   a   precept   which


       many  may have to follow. It may be a  specific  or a general


       order."



15.    In Giani Devender Singh v. Union of India, (1995) 1 SCC 391,


       this Court, whilst considering the direction issued by the High


       Court   in   a   Public   Interest   Litigation,   has   observed   that   the


       directions   should   not   be   vague,   sweeping   or   affected   by


       sarcasm   which   are   not   capable   of   being   implemented.   It


       should   be   specific,   just   and   proper   in   the   facts   and


       circumstances of the case. This Court further held:



              "10. It appears to us that when the High Court

              was not in a position to precisely discern what

              was   the   complaint   alleged   by   the   petitioner

              and when the High Court was of the view that

              the prayer made by the petitioner was absurd

              and   it   also   held   that   the   officers   who   were

              alleged   to   have   been   carrying   on   nefarious

              activities   were   more   imaginary   than   real,   the

              direction   in   general   and   sweeping   terms   to

              sack erring officers (whomsoever they may be)

              and   overhaul   the   administration   by   recruiting

              only conscientious and devoted people like the

              petitioner in order  to satisfy the vanity of the

              petitioner, should not have been made. If the

              High   Court   intends   to   pass   an   order   on   an

              application presented before it by treating it as

              a public interest litigation, the High Court must

              precisely   indicate   the   allegations   or   the

              statements   contained   in  such   petition   relating

              to public interest litigation and should indicate

              how public interest was involved and only after

              ascertaining   the   correctness   of   the  allegation,





                                                                                 9


              should give specific direction as may deem just

              and proper in the facts of the case.


              11.  It   appears   to   us   that   the   application   was

              disposed   of   by   the   Division   Bench   of   Madhya

              Pradesh   High   Court   in   a   lighter   vein   and   the

              order   dated   27-2-1992   is   couched   in   veiled

              sarcasm.   Such   course   of   action,   to   say   the

              least,   is   not   desirable   and  the   High   Court

              should   not   have   issued   mandate   in   general

              and   sweeping   terms   which   were   not   intended

              to   be   implemented   and   were   not   capable   of

              being implemented because of utter vagueness

              of the mandate and of its inherent absurdity."

              (Emphasis supplied)





16.    The   Blacks   Law   Dictionary   (9th  ed.   2009)   defines   the   term


       `Direction' as an order; an instruction on how to proceed.



17.    The meaning of expression "Direction" has been discussed in


       Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 26A, at pg. 955-956 as thus:



              "The word "direction" is of common usage, and

              is   defined   as   meaning   the   act   of   governing,

              ordering,   or   ruling;   the   act   of   directing,

              authority   to   direct   as   circumstances   may

              require;            guidance;             management;

              superintendence;   "prescription;"   also   a

              command,   an   instruction,   an   order,   an   order

              prescribed,   either   verbally   or   written,   or

              indicated   by   acts;   that   which   is   imposed   by

              directing,   a   guiding   or   authoritative

              instruction; information as to method."





18.    According to P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon (3rd


       ed. 2005) the word `Direction' means: address of letter, order




                                                                                1


       or instruction as to what one has to do. A direction may serve


       to   direct   to   places   as   well   as   to   persons.   Direction   contains


       most   of   instruction   in   it   and   should   be   followed.   It   is


       necessary   to   direct   those   who   are   unable   to   act   for


       themselves.   Directions   given   to   servants   must   be   clear,


       simple and precise.



19.    According to the Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol.


       12A,   the   term   `Direction'   means   a   guiding   or   authoritative


       instruction, prescription, order, command.



20.    To sum up, the direction issued by the Court is in the nature


       of a command or authoritative instruction which contemplates


       the   performance   of   certain   duty   or   act   by   a   person   upon


       whom   it   has   been   issued.   The   direction   should   be   specific,


       simple,   clear   and   just   and   proper   depending   upon   the   facts


       and circumstances of the case but it should not be vague or


       sweeping.



21.    At this stage, it is pertinent to consider the nature and scope


       of   a   mere   observation   or   obiter   dictum   in   the   Order   of   the


       Court. The expression obiter dicta or dicta has been discussed


       in American Jurisprudence 2d, Vol. 20, at pg. 437 as thus:



              "74. -Dicta


              Ordinarily,   a   court   will   decide   only   the

              questions   necessary   for   determining   the




                                                                                    1


    particular   case   presented.   But   once   a   court

    acquires jurisdiction, all material questions are

    open for  its decision;  it  may properly  decided

    all questions so involved, even though it is not

    absolutely   essential   to   the   result   that   all

    should   be   decided.   It   may,   for   instance,

    determine the question of the constitutionality

    of   a   statute,   although   it   is   not   absolutely

    necessary to the disposition of the case, if the

    issue of constitutionality is involved in the suit

    and its settlement is of public  importance.  An

    expression   in   an   opinion   which   is   not

    necessary   to   support   the   decision   reached   by

    the court is dictum or obiter dictum.


    "Dictum"   or   "obiter   dictum:   is   distinguished

    from the "holding of  the court in that the so-

    called   "law   of   the   case"   does   not   extend   to

    mere   dicta,   and   mere   dicta   are   not   binding

    under the doctrine of stare decisis,


    As applied to a particular opinion, the question

    of whether or not a certain part thereof is or is

    not   a   mere   dictum   is   sometimes   a   matter   of

    argument.   And   while   the   terms   "dictum"   and

    "obiter         dictum"         are         generally         used

    synonymously with regard to expressions in an

    opinion which are not necessary to support the

    decision,   in   connection   with   the   doctrine   of

    stare   decisis,  a   distinction   has   been   drawn

    between   mere   obiter   and   "judicial   dicta,"   the

    latter being an expression of opinion on a point

    deliberately   passed   upon   by   the   court."

    (Emphasis supplied).





Further  at pg. 525 and 526,  the  effect of dictum  has  been


discussed:



    "190. Decision on legal point; effect of dictum





                                                                            1


              ...   In   applying   the   doctrine   of   stare   decisis,   a

              distinction   is   made   between   a   holding   and   a

              dictum. Generally stare decisis does not attach

              to such parts of an opinion of a court which are

              mere   dicta.   The   reason   for   distinguishing   a

              dictum from a holding has been said to be that

              a   question   actually   before   the   court   and

              decided   by   it   is   investigated   with   care   and

              considered   in   its   full   extent,   whereas   other

              principles, although considered in their relation

              to   the   case   decided,   are   seldom   completely

              investigated   as   to   their   possible   bearing   on

              other   cases.   Nevertheless   courts   have

              sometimes   given   dicta   the   same   effect   as

              holdings,   particularly   where   "judicial   dicta"   as

              distinguished from "obiter dicta" are involved."





22.    According to P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon (3rd


       ed.   2005),   the   expression   "observation"   means   a   view,


       reflection;   remark;   statement;   observed   truth   or   facts;


       remarks   in   speech   or   writing   in   reference   to   something


       observed.



23. The Wharton's Law Lexicon (14th Ed. 1993) defines term `obiter


       dictum'   as   an   opinion   not   necessary   to   a   judgment;   an


       observation as to the law made by a judge in the course of a


       case,   but   not   necessary   to   its   decision,   and   therefore   of   no


       binding   effect;   often   called   as   obiter   dictum,   ;   a   remark   by


       the way.



24.    The Blacks Law Dictionary, (9th ed, 2009) defines term `obiter


       dictum' as a judicial comment made while delivering a judicial




                                                                                   1


      opinion,   but   one   that   is   unnecessary   to   the   decision   in   the


      case   and   therefore   not   precedential   (although   it   may   be


      considered persuasive). -- Often shortened to dictum or, less


      commonly,  obiter.   "Strictly   speaking   an   `obiter  dictum'   is   a


      remark made or opinion expressed by a judge, in his decision


      upon   a   cause,   `by   the   way'   --   that   is,   incidentally   or


      collaterally,   and   not   directly   upon   the   question   before   the


      court; or it is any statement of law enunciated by the judge or


      court   merely   by   way   of   illustration,   argument,   analogy,   or


      suggestion....   In   the   common   speech   of   lawyers,   all   such


      extrajudicial   expressions   of   legal   opinion   are   referred   to   as


      `dicta,'   or   `obiter  dicta,'   these   two   terms   being   used


      interchangeably."



25    The Word and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 29 defines the


      expression `obiter dicta' or `dicta' thus:



             "Dicta   are   opinions   of   a   judge   which   do   not

             embody the resolution or determination of the

             court,   and   made   without   argument   or   full

             consideration   of   the   point,   are   not   the

             professed   deliberate   determinations   of   the

             judge himself; obiter dicta are opinions uttered

             by   the   way,   not   upon   the   point   or   question

             pending, as  if turning  aside  for the time from

             the   main   topic   of   the   case   to   collateral

             subjects; It is mere observation by a judge on

             a legal question suggested by the case before

             him,   but   not   arising   in   such   a   manner   as   to

             require   decision   by   him;   "Obiter   dictum"   is

             made as argument or illustration, as pertinent




                                                                                 1


              to   other   cases   as   to   the   one   on   hand,   and

              which may enlighten or convince, but which in

              no   sense   are   a   part   of   the   judgment   in   the

              particular   issue,   not   binding   as   a   precedent,

              but  entitled   to  receive   the  respect  due   to  the

              opinion   of   the   judge   who   utters   them;

              Discussion   in   an   opinion   of   principles   of   law

              which are not pertinent, relevant, or essential

              to   determination   of   issues   before   court   is

              "obiter dictum"





26.    The   concept   of   "Dicta"   has   also   been   considered   in   Corpus


       Juris Secundum, Vol. 21, at pg. 309-12 as thus:



              "190. Dicta


              a. In General


              A   Dictum   is   an  opinion   expressed   by  a  court,

              but   which,   not   being   necessarily   involved   in

              the case, lacks the force of an adjudication; an

              opinion   expressed   by   a   judge   on   a   point   not

              necessarily arising in the case; a statement or

              holding   in   an   opinion   not   responsive   to   any

              issue and noty necessary to the decision of the

              case; an opinion expressed on a point in which

              the judicial mind is not directed to the precise

              question necessary to be determined to fix the

              rights of the parties; or an opinion of a judge

              which   does   not   embody   the   resolution   or

              determination of the court, and made without

              argument,   or   full   consideration   of   the   point,

              not   the   professed   deliberate   determination   of

              the   judge   himself.   The   term   "dictum"   is

              generally   used   as   an   abbreviation   of   "obiter

              dictum"   which   means   a   remark   or   opinion

              uttered by the way.


              Such   an   expression   or   opinion,   as   a   general

              rule,   is   not   binding   as   authority   or   precedent

              within   the   stare   decisis   rule,   even   on   courts




                                                                                1


                inferior   to   the   court   from   which   such

                expression   emanated,   no   matter   how   often   it

                may   be   repeated.   This   general   rule   is

                particularly   applicable   where   there   are   prior

                decisions   to   the   contrary   of   the   statement

                regarded   as   dictum;   where   the   statement   is

                declared,   on   rehearing,   to   be   dictum;   where

                the   dictum   is   on   a   question   which   the   court

                expressly   states   that   it   does   not   decide;   or

                where   it   is   contrary   to   statute   and   would

                produce an inequitable result. It has also been

                held that a dictum is not the "law of the case,"

                nor res judicata."





27.    The concept of "Dicta" has been discussed in Halsbury's Laws


       of   England,   Fourth   Edition   (Reissue),   Vol.   26,   para.   574   as


       thus:



                "574.   Dicta.   Statements   which   are   not

                necessary   to   the   decision,   which   go   beyond

                the   occasion   and   lay   down   a   rule   that   it   is

                unnecessary   for   the   purpose   in   hand   are

                generally termed "dicta". They have no binding

                authority on another court, although they may

                have   some   persuasive   efficacy.   Mere   passing

                remarks   of   a   judge   are   known   as   "obiter

                dicta",   whilst   considered   enunciations   of   the

                judge's   opinion   on   a   point   not   arising   for

                decision, and so not part of the ratio decidendi,

                have been termed "judicial dicta". A third type

                of   dictum   may   consist   in   a   statement   by   a

                judge as to what has been done in other cases

                which have not been reported.


                ...   Practice   notes,   being   directions   given

                without argument, do not have binding judicial

                effect. Interlocutory observations by members

                of   a   court   during   argument,   while   of

                persuasive           weight,         are         not         judicial

                pronouncements and do not decide anything."



                                                                                           1


28.    In  Municipal   Corporation   of   Delhi   v.   Gurnam   Kaur,  (1989)   1


       SCC   101  and  Divisional   Controller,   KSRTC   v.   Mahadeva


       Shetty, (2003) 7 SCC 197, this Court has observed that "Mere


       casual  expressions  carry no weight at all. Not every passing


       expression of a judge, however eminent, can be treated as an


       ex cathedra statement, having the weight of authority."



29.    In  State of Haryana v. Ranbir, (2006) 5 SCC 167, this Court


       has discussed the concept of the obiter dictum thus:



              "A decision, it is well settled, is an authority for

              what   it  decides   and  not   what  can   logically   be

              deduced therefrom.  The distinction between a

              dicta and obiter  is well known.  Obiter  dicta is

              more   or   less   presumably   unnecessary   to   the

              decision.   It   may   be   an   expression   of   a

              viewpoint or sentiments which has  no binding

              effect. See ADM, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla.

              It   is   also   well   settled   that   the   statements

              which   are   not   part   of   the   ratio   decidendi

              constitute   obiter   dicta   and   are   not

              authoritative.   (See           Divisional   Controller,

              KSRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty)"




30.    In Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 7 SCC 555,


       this Court has held:



              "Thus, observations of the Court did not relate

              to any of the legal questions arising in the case

              and, accordingly, cannot be considered as the

              part   of   ratio   decidendi.   Hence,   in   light   of   the

              aforementioned   judicial   pronouncements,

              which   have   well   settled   the   proposition   that




                                                                                   1


              only the ratio decidendi can act as the binding

              or  authoritative   precedent,  it  is   clear   that  the

              reliance   placed   on   mere   general   observations

              or   casual   expressions   of   the   Court,   is   not   of

              much avail to the respondents."





31.    In view of above, it is well settled that obiter dictum is a mere


       observation   or   remark   made   by   the   court   by   way   of   aside


       while   deciding   the   actual   issue   before   it.   The   mere   casual


       statement   or   observation   which   is   not   relevant,   pertinent   or


       essential to decide the issue in hand does not form the part of


       the   judgment   of   the   Court   and   have   no   authoritative   value.


       The expression of the personal view or opinion of the Judge is


       just   a   casual   remark   made   whilst   deviating   from   answering


       the   actual   issues   pending   before   the   Court.   These   casual


       remarks are considered or treated as beyond the ambit of the


       authoritative or operative part of the judgment.



32.    In the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of


       the opinion that the refusal of the learned Special Judge, vide


       its Order dated  26.4.2005,  to accept  the final closure  report


       submitted   by   Lokayukta   Police   is   the   only  ratio   decidendi  of


       the Order.  The  other  part  of the Order which  deals  with the


       initiation   of   Challan   proceedings   cannot   be   treated   as   the


       direction   issued   by   the   learned   Special   Judge.   The   relevant


       portion of the Order of the learned Special Judge dealing with





                                                                                 1


       Challan Proceeding reads as  "Therefore matter may be taken


       up   seeking   necessary   sanction   to   prosecute   the   accused


       persons   Raghav   Chandra,   Shri   Ram   Meshram   and   Shahjaad


       Khan to prosecute them under Section 13 (1-d), 13 (2) Anti


       Corruption   Act   and   under   Section   120-B   I.P.C   and   for


       necessary   further   action,   case   be   registered   in   the   criminal


       case diary."  The wordings of this Order clearly suggest that it


       is   not   in   the   nature   of   the   command   or   authoritative


       instruction. This Order is also not specific or clear in order to


       direct or address any authority or body to perform any act or


       duty. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, this Order can


       be   considered   or   treated   as   the   direction   issued   by   the


       learned   Special   Judge.     The   wholistic   reading   of   this   Order


       leads   to   only   one   conclusion,   that   is,   it   is   in   the   nature   of


       `Obiter Dictum' or mere passing remark made by the learned


       Special   Judge,   which   only   amounts   to   expression   of   his


       personal   view.   Therefore,   this   portion   of   the   Order   dealing


       with   Challan   proceeding,   is   neither   relevant,   pertinent   nor


       essential, while deciding the actual issues which were before


       the learned Special Judge and hence, cannot be treated as the


       part of the Judgment of the learned Special Judge.



33.    In   the   light   of   the   above   discussion,   we   are   of   the   opinion


       that,   the   portion   of   the   Order   of   the   learned   Special   Judge





                                                                                        1


       which   deals   with   the   Challan   proceedings   is   a   mere


       observation or remark made by way of aside.  In view of this,


       the High Court had grossly erred in considering and treating


       this   mere   observation   of   the   learned   Special   Judge   as   the


       direction of the Court.   Therefore, there was no occasion for


       the   High   Court   to   interfere   with   the   Order   of   the   learned


       Special Judge.



34.    In   the   result,   the   appeals   are   allowed.   The   impugned   Order


       and Judgment of the High Court in Criminal Revision No. 821


       of   2005,   Criminal   Revision   Petition   No.   966   of   2005   and


       Criminal Case No. 3403 of 2005 dated 22.4.2009 is set aside.


       We   restore   the   Order   of   the   learned   Special   Judge   dated


       26.4.2005.



35.    We direct the respondents to comply with the order passed by


       the Trial Court within two months from this date.  





                                                                  ........................

                                                                                  ...J.

                                                                       [G.S. SINGHVI]





                                                                          ........................

                                                                                  ...J.

                                                                         [H.L. DATTU]

New Delhi,

September 02, 2011.      





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