in all cases of emergency acquisition under section 17, the requirement of payment under section 17(3A) must be complied with. As the provision of section 17(1) and section 17(2) cannot be worked out without complying with requirement of payment under section 17(3A) which is in the nature of condition precedent. If section 17(3A) is not complied with, the vesting under section 17(1) and section 17(2) cannot take place. Therefore, emergency acquisition without complying with section 17(3A) is illegal. This is the plain intention of the statute which must be strictly construed. Any other construction, in my opinion, would lead to diluting the Rule of Law. - In view of the divergence of opinion on conclusions and also on various legal questions discussed in two separate judgments by us, the matter is required to be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for reference to a larger Bench to resolve the divergent views expressed in both the judgments and to answer the questions of law framed.

                                                            REPORTABLE


               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                   CIVIL APPEAL NO.24 OF 2009




M/s. Delhi Airtech Services

Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.                                      ... Appellants


                                    Versus


State of U.P. & Anr.                                  ... Respondents




                                J U D G M E N T




Swatanter Kumar, J.




1.    I had the advantage of reading the well-written judgment



of   my   learned   brother,   A.K.   Ganguly,   J.     Regretfully   but



respectfully,   I   am   unable   to   persuade   myself   to   concur   with



the   findings   recorded   and   the   exposition   of   law   expressed   by



my learned brother.  In order to discernly state the reasons for



my  expressing   a  contrary   view   and  dismissing   the   appeals  of



the   appellants   on   merits,   it   has   become   necessary   for   me   to



state the facts as well as the law in some detail.   It has been



necessitated for the reason that complete facts, as they appear


                                         2



from the record and the facts which were brought to the notice



of the Court during the course of hearing by the respondents,



supported by the official records, duly maintained by them in



normal   course   of   their   business,   have   not,   in   their   entirety,



and correctly been noticed  in the judgment.   I am also of the



considered   view   that,   in   fact,   the   questions   framed



(particularly   question   `D')   in   the   judgment   by   my   learned



brother  neither   so   comprehensively   arise   in   the   facts   and



circumstances   of   the   present   case   nor   were   argued   in   that



manner   and   to   that   extent   before   the   Court.     Be   that   as   it



may,   I   consider   it   necessary   to   restate   the   facts,   deal   with



different   legal   aspects   of   the   case   and   then   record   the



conclusions   which   would   even   provide   answers   to   the



questions framed by my learned brother at the very beginning



of his judgment.   Before I proceed to do so, let me briefly but,



inter   alia,   state   the   reasons   for   my   taking   a   view   contrary   to



the one recorded in the judgment of my learned brother:




I.          I have already stated that complete and correct facts,


           in   their   entirety,   as   they   emerge   from   the   records


                                    3



       produced   before   the   Court   (including   the   trial   court



       record)   as   well   as   the   documents   referred   to   during



       the course of arguments by the respondents have not



       been   correctly   noticed.     The   records   referred  to   have



       been   maintained   by   the   authorities   in   the   normal



       course   of   their   business   and   their   authenticity   can



       hardly   be   questioned.     These   documents   have   been



       executed  inter   se  various   institutions/departments,



       including the Collector's office, who discharges quasi-



       judicial functions under the Act.  




II.      The  judgment  of this  court  in the  case  of  Satendra



       Prasad   Jain   &   Ors.   v.  State   of   U.P.   &   Ors.  [AIR   1993



       SC   2517   =   (1993)   4   SCC   369],   in   my   humble   view,



       cannot   be   ignored   and   the   principle   stated   therein



       cannot   be   avoided   on   the   ground   that   the   judgment



       was  sub silentio.   This I say so, for the reason that it



       is   not   a   decision   in   which   the   point   was   not   raised,



       argued and perceived by the Court.   On the contrary,



       the   issue   in   relation   to   the   consequences   of   non-


                                    4



        payment   flowing   from   Section   17(3A)   of   the   Land



        Acquisition   Act   (for   short,   the   `Act')   was   specifically



        noticed by the three-Judge Bench in paragraph 11 of



        the judgment.   It was discussed in some detail and a



        definite   finding   was   recorded   thereby   bringing   the



        judgment   well   within   the   dimensions   of   good



        precedent.     Thus,   I,   with   respect,   would   prefer   to



        follow the larger Bench judgment rather than ignoring



        the same for the reasons stated by my learned brother



        in   his   judgment   do   not   apply   in   the   facts   of   the



        present case.




III.      The ratio decidendi of the judgment of this Court in


        the   case   of  Satendra   Prasad   Jain  (supra)   is   squarely



        applicable to the present case, on facts and law.




IV.       It   has   not   been   correctly   noticed   in   the   judgment


        that 80 per cent of due compensation, which even the



        appellants   did   not   dispute   during   the   course   of



        hearing,   had   not   been   tendered   or   paid   to   the



        claimants,   as   contemplated   under   Section   17(3A)   of


                                  5



      the   Act.     From   the   facts   recorded   hereinafter,   it   is



      clear that within the prescribed period, the payments



      were   deposited   with   the   State   office   of   the



      Collector/competent authority and it was for the State



      to   distribute   the   money   in   accordance   with   the



      provisions of the Act.  It is not only the scheme of the



      Act but also an established practice that the amounts



      are   disbursed   by   the   Collector   to   the   claimants   and



      not   directly   by   the   beneficiary,   for   whose   benefit   the



      land   had   been   acquired.     The   beneficiary   had



      discharged   its   obligation   by   depositing,   in   fact,   in



      excess   of   80   per   cent   of   due   compensation   with   the



      competent authority.   De hors  the approach that one



      may   adopt   in   regard   to   the   interpretation   of   Section



      17(3A),  on  facts  the notification is  incapable of being



      invalidated for non-compliance of the said Section.




V.      The   doctrine   of   strict   construction   does   not  per   se


      mandate   that   its   application   excludes   the



      simultaneous   application   of   all   other   principles   of


                                     6



        interpretation.     It   is   permissible   in   law   to   apply   the



        rule of strict construction while reading the provisions



        of   law   contextually   or   even   purposively.     The   golden



        rule   of   interpretation   is   the   rule   of   plain   language,



        while preferring the interpretation which furthers the



        cause   of   the   Statute   rather   than   that   which   defeats



        the objects or purposes of the Act.




VI.        Non-providing   of   consequences   under   Section



        17(3A)   of   the   Act,   in   contradistinction   to   Sections   6



        and   11   of   the   same   Act,   in   my   considered   view   is



        largely the determinative test for proper and judicious



        interpretation of Section 17(3A).




VII.       The   judgment   by   my   learned   brother   does   not


        consider   the   judgments   of   the   Constitution   Bench,



        the   larger   Bench   and   even   the   equi-Bench,   which



        have to some extent a direct bearing on the matters in



        issue before us.  In this regard, reference can be made



        to   the   Constitution   Bench   judgment   of   this   Court   in



        the   case   of  Offshore   Holdings   Pvt.   Ltd.  v.  Bangalore


                             7




Development Authority & Ors.  [(2011) 3 SCC 139], the



three-Judge Bench judgment in the case of Tika Ram



& Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., [(2009) 10 SCC 689] and



particularly   the   judgment   of   another   equi-Bench   of



this   Court   in   the   case   of    Banda   Development



Authority, Banda  v.  Moti Lal Agarwal  & Ors.  [2011 (5)



SCALE   173],   to   which   my   learned   brother   (Ganguly,



J.)   was   a   member.     The   latter   case,  inter   alia,   dealt



with   a   question   of   lapsing   of   proceedings   under



Section 11A on the ground that the possession of the



property   had   not   been   taken   as   required   under   that



provision.     While   rejecting   such   a   contention   in   that



case, the Court observed that if the beneficiary of the



acquisition   is   an   agency   or   instrumentality   of   the



State   80   per   cent   of   the   total   compensation   is



deposited   in   terms   of   Section   17(3A)   and   substantial



portion   of   the   acquired   land   has   been   utilized   in



furtherance of the particular public purpose, it could



reasonably   be   presumed   that   the   possession   of   the



acquired land had been irrevocably taken.  The Court


                                      8



          then   held   that   relief   to   the   appellants   (like   the



          appellants   in   the   present   case)   of   invalidating   the



          acquisition   proceedings   and   restoring   the   land   could



          not be granted.




VIII.         The   44th  Constitutional   Amendment,   on   the   one


          hand,   omitted   Article   19(1)(f)   and   Article   31   while



          introducing Articles 31A and 300A to the Constitution



          of  India  on  the   other.     Right   to   property   was  deleted



          as   a   fundamental   right   in   the   Constitution.     Thus,



          this   right   cannot   be   placed   on   equi   terms,



          interpretatively or otherwise, to the pre-constitutional



          amendments.     The   right   to   eminent   domain   would



          operate   on   a   different   sphere,   interpretation   and



          effect,   pre   and   post   constitutional   repealments   of



          these Articles and introduction of Article 300A of the



          Constitution.     Even   on   this   aspect,   I   respectfully



          disagree with the conclusions recorded by my learned



          brother (Ganguly, J.).




FACTS:


                                        9



2.    Appellant No.1 is a company duly incorporated under the



provisions of the Indian Companies Act, 1956 and is alleged to



be   the   owner   of   the   land   sought   to   be   acquired   by   the



respondents.  The land of the appellant, admeasuring about 2-



06-1/3-0   Bighas   situated   in   Village   Haldauni,   Tehsil   and



Pargana   Dadri,   District   Gautam   Budh   Nagar,   which   is   an



abadi  land,   was   sought   to   be   acquired   by   the   appropriate



Government under a notification dated 17th April, 2002 issued



under   Section   4(1)   read   with   Sections   17(1)   and   17(4)   of   the



Act.   This   land   was   acquired   for   the   planned   industrial



development in District Gautam Budh Nagar through the New



Okhla   Industrial   Development   Authority   (NOIDA).   The



notification also stated that the provisions of Section 5A of the



Act   shall   not   apply.     In   pursuance   to   the   said   notification,   a



declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published on 22nd



August,   2002,   declaring   the   area   which   was   required   by   the



Government.     It  also  stated  that  after   expiry   of  15  days   from



the date of the publication of the notification possession of the



acquired land shall be taken under sub-section (1) of Section 9



of   the   Act.     The   appellants   have   alleged   that   they   did   not


                                        10



receive any notice under Section 9(1) of the Act but possession



of   the   land   was   nevertheless   taken   on   4th  February,   2003.



According   to   the   appellants,   even   after   lapse   of   more   than



three   and   a   half   years   after   publication   of   declaration   under



Section   6   of   the   Act,   the   award   had   not   been   made   and



published.




      The   appellants   also   alleged   in   the   petition   that,   despite



inordinate   delay,   they   were   neither   paid   80   per   cent   of   the



estimated compensation in terms of Section 17(3A) of the Act



at   the   time   of   taking   of   possession,   nor   had   the   Collector



passed   an   award   within   two   years   of   making   the   declaration



under Section 17(1), as required by Section 11A of the Act. It



was the case of the appellants in the writ petition that this has



the effect of vitiating the entire acquisition proceedings.   Non-



payment of the compensation and conduct of the Government



compelled   the   petitioners   to   file   a   writ   petition   in   the   High



Court   of   Allahabad   praying   for   issuance   of   an   order   or



direction   in   the   nature   of  certiorari  or   any   other   writ,   not   to



create   any   encumbrance   or   interest   on   the   land   of   the


                                       11



petitioners.   Further,   they   prayed   that   the   acquisition



proceedings,   in   so   far   as   they   relate   to   the   land   of   the



petitioner, be declared void  ab initio  and that the respondents



be   directed   to   return   the   land   from   the   possession   of   the



Government to the owners. Lastly, the petitioners prayed that



the   respondents/Government   be   directed   to   pay   damages   for



use and occupation of the land.




      To this writ petition, the respondents had filed a counter



affidavit in the High Court, denying that the acquired land was



in fact a part of the abadi land.  The respondent-authority has



also stated that 80 per cent compensation in terms of Section



17(3A) of the Act had been deposited with the authorities.  The



land   had   been   acquired   for   planned   development   of   NOIDA



and   was   in   the   physical   possession   of   the   said   authority.



Possession of the land had been taken on 4th  February, 2003



and   no  right   had   survived   in   favour   of   the   petitioners   as   the



land vested in the Government.




      The   High   Court,   vide   its   judgment   dated   28th  August,



2006, dismissed the writ petition. The High Court relied upon


                                     12



the judgment of this Court in the case of Satendra Prasad Jain



(supra) and dismissed the petition holding that the provisions



of  Section  11A of  the Act are  not attracted  to proceedings for



acquisition taken by the Government under Section 17 of the



Act.  However, liberty was granted to the petitioners to pray for



grant   of   appropriate   compensation   in   accordance   with   law



before the competent forum.




      Aggrieved   by   the   said   order   of   the   High   Court,   the



appellants   have   filed   the   present   appeal   impugning   the



judgment dated 28th August, 2006.




      In   the   counter   affidavit   filed   by   respondent   No.2   before



this Court, the submissions made before the High Court have



been   reiterated   with   an   additional   fact   that   the   sector   in



question   was   designated   as   industrial   area   and   after   the



development activity was completed, allotment has been made



and possession of these industrial plots has also been handed



over   to   such   entrepreneurs/allottees.   This   land   falls   under



Sector 88 of the NOIDA City. The rest of the allegations made


                                        13



in   the   writ   petition,   except   the   dates   in   question,   have   been



disputed.




      It   has   also   been   stated   at   the   Bar,   on   the   basis   of   the



record   maintained   in   regular   course   of   its   business   by   the



respondent-authority,   that   10   per   cent   of   the   estimated



compensation   was   deposited   by   the   Authority   with   the   State



Government   even   prior   to   the   date   of   the   notification   under



Section  4(1)  read with Section  17(4) of the Act, issued   by  the



Government, i.e., 17th  April, 2002. The remaining 70 per cent



of   the   estimated   compensation   had   allegedly   been   deposited



vide   cheque   dated   8/14th                July,   2002   amounting   to



approximately  `6,66,00,000/-.   As   such,   there   is   complete


compliance with the provisions of Section 17(3A) of the Act by



the   authority   concerned.     The   Award   was   made   on   9th  June,



2008, which has been accepted by a large number of owners,



i.e., 97.6 per cent of all owners. Some of these facts have also



been   averred   in   the   counter   affidavit   filed   before   the   High



Court.


                                      14



      From   the   above   pleadings   of   the   parties,   the   admitted



facts   that   emerge   from   the   record   can   be   usefully



recapitulated.   The Governor of the State of Uttar Pradesh on



17th April, 2002, issued a notification under Section 4(1) of the



Act, expressing the intention of the Government to acquire the



land   stated   in   the   said   Notification   for   a   public   purpose,



namely,   for   the   planned   industrial   development   in   District



Gautam   Budha   Nagar   through   NOIDA.   Vide   the   same



notification the emergent provisions contained in Section 17 of



the   Act,   specifically   Section   17(4),   were   also   invoked,



intimating the public at large that the provisions of Section 5A



of   the   Act   shall   not   be   applicable.   After   issuance   of   the



declaration   under   Section   6   of   the   Act,   admittedly   the



possession of the land in question was taken on 4th  February,



2003.  However, it remains a matter of some dispute before the



Court   as   to   whether   80   per   cent   compensation,   which   is



deposited by the beneficiary with the State, had actually been



received   by   the   land   owners/claimants,   if   so,   to   what   extent



and by how many.


                                       15



      The Collector had not made or published the award even



at   the   time   of   pronouncement   of   the   judgment   of   the   High



Court,   in   Writ   Petition   No.   22251   of   2006,   on   28th  August,



2006.   The   High   Court,   in   the   impugned   judgment,   has



directed the respondent No.1 to ensure that the Award is made



as early as possible, preferably within a period of three months



from the date of production of the certified copy of that order.



In   the   counter   affidavit   filed   before   this   Court,   it   has   been



stated by the State of Uttar Pradesh that the Award was finally



made   and   published   on   9th  June,   2008.     According   to   the



appellant, given the fact that the declaration under  Section  6



of   the   Act   was   dated   22nd  August,   2002,   then   in   terms   of



Section 11A of the Act, the acquisition proceedings had lapsed



as the award ought to have been pronounced on or before 21st



August, 2004.




Discussion on objects and reasons of the Act




      With   the   enormous   expansion   of   the   State's   role   in



promoting   public   welfare   and   economic   development   since



independence, the acquisition of land for public purposes, like


                                        16



industrialization, building of institutions, etc., has become far



more   numerous   than   ever   before.     This   not   only   led   to   an



increase   in   exercise   of   executive   powers,   but   also   to   various



legislative amendments to the Act.  The 1870 Act abolished the



system   of   uncontrolled   direction   by   arbitrators   and   in   lieu



thereof, required the Collector, when unable to come to terms



with   the   persons   interested   in   the   land   which   it   desired   to



acquire,   to   refer   these   differences   to   the   Civil   Courts.   It   was



also felt necessary by the framers, to restructure the legislative



framework for acquisition of land so that it is more adequately



informed   by   this   objective   of   servicing   the   interests   of   the



community   in   harmony   with   the   rights   of   the   individual.



Various   amendments   were   made   and   certain   new   provisions



added  to the  Act by Amendment  Act,  68 of 1984,  which took



effect   from   24th  September,   1984.     Amongst   others,   Sections



11A and 17(3A) of the Act were new provisions added by this



enactment.     The   objects   and   reasons   for   amending   the   Act



were   to   bring   a   greater   degree   of   harmony   between   the



interests of the owners of the land, on the one hand, and the



acquiring authority on the other.  In its recommendations, the


                                      17



Law   Commission   also   expressed   a   view   that   individuals   and



institutions,   who   are   unavoidably   deprived   of   their   property



rights,   need   to   be   adequately   compensated   for   their   loss



keeping   in   view   the   sacrifice   they   have   had   to   make   in   the



larger interests of the community. The pendency of acquisition



proceedings   for   long   periods   causes   hardship   to   the   affected



parties;   so   steps   were   required   to   be   taken   to   truncate   the



procedural aspect of acquisition proceedings on the one hand,



and  to  pay  adequate   compensation  to  the  owners  of the  land



on the other.   By introducing the provisions of Section 11A of



the   Act   to   the   normal   course   of   acquisition   proceedings,



greater   responsibility   was   intended   to   be   fastened   upon   the



concerned authorities, whereby they were obliged to make an



award within two years of the declaration made under Section



6   of   the   Act.     The   other   obvious   purpose   of   the   amendment



was that before emergency provisions are invoked by the State



and possession is taken in terms of Section 17(1) of the Act, as



opposed to the normal procedure of acquisition of land where



possession is taken after the making of an award, it was to be



obligatory   upon  the   authorities  concerned  to  pay   80  per  cent


                                       18



of   the   estimated   compensation   to   the   land   owners,   prior   to



taking possession of the land in terms of Section 17(3A) of the



Act.  Despite the fact that Right to Property in terms of Article



19(1)(f)   of   the   Constitution   stood   deleted   from   Chapter   III   of



the   Constitution,   vide   44th  Constitutional   Amendment,   1978,



Article   300A   of   the   Constitution   was   added   by   the   same



Constitutional   Amendment,   mandating   that   `no   person   shall



be   deprived   of   his   property   save   by   authority   of   law'.     This



indicates   that   the   Constitution   still   mandates   two   aspects   in



relation   to   acquisition   of   land   by   the   exercise   of   power   of



eminent domain vested in the State.   Firstly, such acquisition



has to be by the authority of law; in other words, it has to be



in   accordance   with   the   law   enacted   by   the   competent



legislature and not by mere executive action.   Secondly, there



has   to   be   a   public   purpose   for   acquisition   of   land   and   the



person   interested   in   such   land   would   be   entitled   to



compensation.




      The   objects   and   reasons   for   introducing   the   Bill   leading



to   the   Amendment   Act   68   of   1984,   have   explained   the


                                       19



amendments   made   to   the   Act.     It   is   not   necessary   for   us   to



dwell upon all the amendments carried out in the Act. Suffice



it to refer to the amendment made in the definition of `public



purpose' under Section 3(f) of the Act and to the provisions of



Sections   11A   and   17(3A),   with   which   this   Court   is   primarily



concerned in the present case.  If I may put it in rather simple



language,   the   object   of   the   legislation   was   to   create   greater



balance   between   the   exercise   of   power   of   eminent   domain   by



the State and the owner's deprivation of his property by way of



compulsory   acquisition   and   the   greater   acceptability   of



acquisition proceedings amongst land owners.  This balance is



sought to be created  by introducing higher  responsibility and



statutory   obligations   upon   the   acquiring   authority.



Expeditious   and   proper   payment   of   fair   market   value   for   the



acquired   land   to   the   claimants   is   required   in   the   light   of



sacrifice made by them in the larger public interest.




      In the case of Devinder Singh & Others v. State  of Punjab



and Others  [(2008)1 SCC 728],  a Bench of this Court took the



view   that   the   provisions   of   the   Act   should   be   strictly


                                        20



construed.   Referring   to   the   provisions   of   the   Act,   it   spelt   out



the ingredients of valid acquisition to be, (a) the existence of a



public   purpose;   and   (b)   the   payment   of   requisite



compensation.   In   cases   of   acquisition   of   land   for   a   private



company,   the   existence   of   a   public   purpose   is   not   necessary



but   all   other   statutory   requirements   were   held   to   remain



imperative in character, requiring strict compliance.




Whether the provisions of Sections 17(3A) and 11A of the

Act are mandatory or directory and to what effect?



      Let   us   first   examine   the   general   principles   that   could



help   the   Court   in  determining   whether   a   particular   provision



of a statute is mandatory or directory.




      In   `Principles   of   Statutory   Interpretation',   12th  Edition,



2010, Justice G.P. Singh, at page 389 states as follows:




             "As approved by the Supreme Court: "The

             question   as   to   whether   a   statute   is

             mandatory of directory depends upon the

             intent of the Legislature and not upon the

             language   in   which   the   intent   is   clothed.

             The   meaning   and   intention   of   the

             legislation must govern, and these are to

             be   ascertained   not   only   from   the

             phraseology  of  the   provision,   but  also  by


                          21



considering its nature, its design and the

consequences   which   would   follow   from

construing   it   the   one   way   or   the   other"

"For ascertaining the real intention of the

Legislature", points out Subbarao, J, "the

court may consider inter alia, the nature

and   design   of   the   statute,   and   the

consequences   which   would   follow   from

construing   it   the   one   way   or   the   other;

the   impact   of   the   other   provisions

whereby   the   necessity   of   complying   with

the provisions in question is avoided; the

circumstances,   namely,   that   the   statute

provides   for   a   contingency   of   the   non-

compliance   with   the   provisions;   the   fact

that   the   non-compliance   with   the

provisions   is   or   is   not   visited   by   some

penalty;   the   serious   or   the   trivial

consequences,   that   flow   therefrom;   and

above   all,   whether   the   object   of   the

legislation   will   be   defeated   or   furthered".

If object of the enactment will be defeated

by   holding   the   same   directory,   it   will   be

construed   as   mandatory,   whereas   if   by

holding   it   mandatory,   serious   general

inconvenience will be created to innocent

persons without very much furthering the

object   of   enactment,   the   same   will   be

construed as directory.   But all this does

not mean that the language used is to be

ignored,   but   only   that   the   prima   facie

inference   of   the   intention   of   the

Legislature   arising   from   the   words   used

may   be   displaced   by   considering   the

nature   of   the   enactment,   its   design   and

the consequences flowing from alternative

construction.  Thus, the use of the words

`as   nearly   as   may   be'   in   contrast   to   the

words `at least' will prima facie indicate a


                                      22



            directory   requirement,   negative   words   a

            mandatory   requirement   `may'   a   directory

            requirement   and   `shall'   a   mandatory

            requirement."




      Maxwell,   in   Chapter   13   of   his   12th  Edition   of   `The



Interpretation   of   Statutes',   used   the   word   `imperative'   as



synonymous with `mandatory' and drew a distinction between



imperative   and   directory   enactments,   at   pages   314-315,   as



follows:




            "Passing   from   the   interpretation   of   the

            language   of   statutes,   it   remains   to

            consider   what   intentions   are   to   be

            attributed to the legislature on questions

            necessarily   arising   out   of   its   enactments

            and on which it has remained silent."


            The first such question is: when a statute

            requires that something shall be done, or

            done   in   a   particular   manner   or   form,

            without expressly declaring what shall be

            the   consequence   of   non-compliance,   is

            the   requirement   to   be   regarded   as

            imperative   (or   mandatory)   or   forms

            prescribed   by   the   statute   have   been

            regarded   as   essential   to   the   act   or   thing

            regulated   by   it,   and   their   omission   has

            been  held   fatal  to  its  validity.     In  others,

            such   prescriptions   have   been   considered

            as   merely   directory,   the   neglect   of   them

            involving nothing more than liability to a

            penalty,   if   any   were   imposed,   for   breach


                                           23



             of         the         enactment.         "An         absolute

             enactment   must   be   obeyed   or   fulfilled

             exactly,   but   it   is   sufficient   if   a   directory

             enactment   be   obeyed   or   fulfilled

             substantially".


             It   is   impossible   to   lay   down   any   general

             rule   for   determining   whether   a   provision

             is   imperative   or  directory.     "No   universal

             rule,"   said   Lord   Campbell   L.C.,   "can   be

             laid down for the construction of statutes,

             as   to   whether   mandatory   enactments

             shall   be   considered   directory   only   or

             obligatory with an implied nullification for

             disobedience.     It  is  the  duty  of Courts  of

             Justice   to  try  to   get  at  the  real  intention

             of   the   Legislature   by   carefully   attending

             to   the   whole   scope   of   the   statute   to   be

             construed."   And   Lord   Penzance   said:   "I

             believe,   as   far   as   any   rule   is   concerned,

             you cannot safely go further than that in

             each   case   you   must   look   to   the   subject

             matter;   consider   the   importance   of   the

             provision that has been disregarded, and

             the   relation   of   that   provision   to   the

             general   object   intended   to   be   secured  by

             the Act; and upon a review of the case in

             that   aspect   decide   whether   the   matter   is

             what   is   called   imperative   or   only

             directory."




      In a recent judgment of this Court, May George v. Special



Tehsildar   and   Ors.  [(2010)   13   SCC   98],   the   Court   stated   the



precepts,   which   can   be   summed   up   and   usefully   applied   by



this Court, as follows:


                                          24



(a)     While   determining   whether   a   provision   is   mandatory   or



        directory,     somewhat   on   similar   lines   as   afore-noticed,



        the   Court   has   to   examine   the   context   in   which   the



        provision is used and the purpose it seeks to achieve;




(b)     To   find   out   the   intent   of   the   legislature,   it   may   also   be



        necessary   to   examine   serious   general   inconveniences   or



        injustices   which   may   be   caused   to   persons   affected   by



        the application of such provision;




(c)     Whether the provisions are enabling the State to do some



        things and/or whether they prescribe the methodology or



        formalities for doing certain things;




(d)     As a factor to determine legislative intent, the court may



        also   consider,  inter   alia,   the   nature   and   design   of   the



        statute   and   the   consequences   which   would   flow   from



        construing it, one way or the other;




(e)     It   is   also   permissible   to   examine   the   impact   of   other



        provisions   in   the   same   statute   and   the   consequences  of



        non-compliance of such provisions;


                                        25



(f)     Physiology   of   the   provisions   is   not   by   itself   a



        determinative   factor.     The   use   of   the   words   `shall'   or



        `may', respectively would ordinarily indicate imperative or



        directory character, but not always.




(g)     The   test   to   be   applied   is   whether   non-compliance   with



        the provision would render the entire proceedings invalid



        or not.




(h)     The   Court   has   to   give   due   weightage   to   whether   the



        interpretation   intended   to   be   given   by   the   Court   would



        further   the   purpose   of   law   or   if   this   purpose   could   be



        defeated by terming it mandatory or otherwise.




        Reference   can   be   made   to   the   following   paragraphs   of



May George (supra) :




              "16.   In  Dattatraya  Moreshwar   v.   The

              State   of   Bombay   and   Ors.  [AIR   1952   SC

              181], this Court observed that law which

              creates public duties is directory but if it

              confers   private   rights   it   is   mandatory.

              Relevant   passage   from   this   judgment   is

              quoted below:


                     `7........It   is   well   settled   that

                     generally   speaking  the   provisions   of


                           26



      the   statute   creating   public   duties

      are   directory   and   those   conferring

      private   rights   are   imperative.   When

      the   provisions   of   a   statute   relate   to

      the   performance   of   a   public   duty

      and   the   case   is   such   that   to   hold

      null and void acts done in neglect of

      this   duty   would   work   serious

      general inconvenience or injustice to

      persons   who   have   no   control   over

      those   entrusted   with   the   duty   and

      at the same time would not promote

      the main object of legislature, it has

      been   the   practice   of   the   Courts   to

      hold such provisions to be directory

      only,   the   neglect   of   them   not

      affecting   the   validity   of   the   acts

      done.'


17. A Constitution Bench of this Court in

State   of   U.P.   and   Ors.   v.   Babu   Ram

Upadhya  [AIR   1961   SC   751]   decided   the

issue observing:


      `29.....For   ascertaining   the   real

      intention   of   the   Legislature,   the

      Court   may   consider,   inter   alia,   the

      nature and the design of the statute,

      and   the   consequences   which   would

      follow   from   construing   it   the   one

      way or the other, the impact of other

      provisions   whereby   the   necessity   of

      complying   with   the   provisions   in

      question            is          avoided,                  the

      circumstance,   namely,   that   the

      statute provides for a contingency of

      the         non-compliance              with              the

      provisions,   the   fact   that   the   non-

      compliance with the provisions is or


                         27



      is   not   visited   by   some   penalty,   the

      serious   or   trivial   consequences   that

      flow   therefrom,   and,   above   all,

      whether  the object  of the legislation

      will be defeated or furthered.'


22.   In     B.S.   Khurana        and   Ors.   v.

Municipal   Corporation   of   Delhi   and   Ors.

[(2000) 7 SCC 679], this Court considered

the   provisions   of   the   Delhi   Municipal

Corporation Act, 1957, particularly those

dealing   with   transfer   of   immovable

property   owned   by   the   Municipal

Corporation.   After   considering   the

scheme   of   the   Act   for   the   purpose   of

transferring the property belonging to the

Corporation,   the   Court   held   that   the

Commissioner could alienate the property

only   on   obtaining   the   prior   sanction   of

the   Corporation   and   this   condition   was

held to be mandatory for the reason that

the   effect   of   non-observance   of   the

statutory   prescription   would   vitiate   the

transfer   though   no   specific   power   had

been   conferred   upon   the   Corporation   to

transfer the property.


23.   In  State   of   Haryana   and   Anr.   v.

Raghubir   Dayal  [(1995)   1  SCC   133],   this

Court has observed as under:


      `5.   The   use   of   the   word   `shall'   is

      ordinarily   mandatory   but   it   is

      sometimes   not   so   interpreted   if   the

      scope   of   the   enactment,   or

      consequences   to   flow   from   such

      construction   would   not   so   demand.

      Normally,   the   word   `shall'   prima

      facie   ought   to   be   considered


                                          28



                    mandatory   but   it   is   the   function   of

                    the   Court   to   ascertain   the   real

                    intention   of   the   legislature   by   a

                    careful   examination   of   the   whole

                    scope   of   the   statute,   the   purpose   it

                    seeks to serve and the consequences

                    that         would          flow         from         the

                    construction   to   be   placed   thereon.

                    The word `shall', therefore, ought to

                    be   construed   not   according   to   the

                    language   with   which   it   is   clothed

                    but   in   the   context   in   which   it   is

                    used   and   the   purpose   it   seeks   to

                    serve.   The   meaning   has   to   be

                    described   to   the   word   `shall;   as

                    mandatory             or          as          directory

                    accordingly. Equally, it is settled law

                    that when a statute is passed for the

                    purpose   of   enabling   the   doing   of

                    something   and   prescribes   the

                    formalities which are to be attended

                    for   the   purpose,   those   prescribed

                    formalities   which   are   essential   to

                    the  validity   of  such  thing,  would  be

                    mandatory.   However,   if   by   holding

                    them   to   be   mandatory,   serious

                    general   inconvenience   is   caused   to

                    innocent   persons   or   general   public,

                    without   very   much   furthering   the

                    object of the Act, the same would be

                    construed as directory.' "




      The Legislature in Sections 11A and 17(3A) of the Act has



used   the   word   `shall'   in   contradistinction   to   the   word   `may'



used   in   some   other   provisions   of   the   Act.     This   also   is   a


                                        29



relevant   consideration   to   bear   in   mind   while   interpreting   a



provision.




      The   distinction   between             mandatory   and   directory



provisions   is   a   well   accepted   norm   of   interpretation.   The



general   rule   of   interpretation   would   require   the   word   to   be



given   its own  meaning  and  the  word  `shall'  would   be  read  as



`must' unless it was essential to read it as `may' to achieve the



ends   of  legislative   intent   and  understand   the  language  of  the



provisions.   It   is   difficult   to   lay   down   any   universal   rule,   but



wherever   the   word   `shall'   is   used   in   a   substantive   statute,   it



normally   would   indicate   mandatory   intent   of   the   legislature.



Crawford   on   `Statutory   Construction'   has   specifically   stated



that language of the provision is not the sole criteria; but the



Courts   should   consider   its   nature,   design   and   the



consequences which could flow from construing it one way or



the other.




      Thus,   the   word   `shall'   would   normally   be   mandatory



while the word `may' would be directory. Consequences of non-



compliance   would   also   be   a   relevant   consideration.   The   word


                                        30



`shall'   raises   a   presumption   that   the   particular   provision   is



imperative   but   this  prima   facie  inference   may   be   rebutted   by



other   considerations   such   as   object   and   scope   of   the



enactment   and   the   consequences   flowing   from   such



construction.   Where   a   statute   imposes   a   public   duty   and



proceeds to lay down the manner and timeframe within which



the   duty   shall   be   performed,   the   injustice   or   inconvenience



resulting from a rigid adherence to the statutory prescriptions



may not be a relevant factor in holding such prescription to be



only directory. For example, when dealing with the provisions



relating   to   criminal   law,   legislative   purpose   is   to   be   borne   in



mind for its proper interpretation. It is said that the purpose of



criminal law is to permit everyone to go about their daily lives



without   fear   of   harm   to   person   or   property   and   it   is   in   the



interests   of   everyone   that   serious   crime   be   effectively



investigated   and   prosecuted.   There   must   be   fairness   to   all



sides. (Attorney General's Reference (No. 3 of 1999) (2001) 1 All



ER   577   Reference   :   Justice   G.P.   Singh   on   `Principles   of



Statutory   Interpretation',   11th   Edition   2008).   In   a   criminal



case,   the   court   is   required   to   consider   the   triangulation   of


                                      31



interests taking into consideration the position of the accused,



the victim and his or her family and the public.




      The basic purpose of interpretation of statutes is further



to aid in determining either the general object of the legislation



or the meaning of the language in any particular provision. It



is   obvious   that   the   intention   which   appears   to   be   most   in



accordance   with   convenience,   reason,   justice   and   legal



principles   should,   in   all   cases  of   doubtful   interpretation,   be


presumed   to   be   the   true   one.   The   intention   to   produce   an



unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a statute. On the



other hand, it is not impermissible, but rather is acceptable, to



adopt a more reasonable construction and avoid anomalous or



unreasonable construction. A sense of the possible injustice of



an interpretation ought not to induce Judges to do violence to



the well settled rules of construction, but it may properly lead



to   the   selection   of   one,   rather   than   the   other,   of   the   two



reasonable interpretations. In earlier times, statutes imposing



criminal   or   other   penalties   were   required   to   be   construed



narrowly   in   favour   of   the   person   proceeded   against   and   were


                                        32



more rigorously applied. The Courts were to see whether there



appeared any reasonable doubt or ambiguity in construing the



relevant   provisions.   Right   from   the   case   of  R.   v.   Jones,   ex   p.



Daunton  [1963(1)   WLR   270],   the   basic   principles   state   that



even statutes dealing with jurisdiction and procedural law are,



if they relate to infliction of penalties, to be strictly construed;



compliance   with   the   procedures   will   be   stringently   exacted



from   those   proceedings   against   the   person   liable   to   be



penalized   and   if   there   is   any   ambiguity   or   doubt,   it   will   be



resolved   in   favour   of   the   accused/such   person.   These



principles have been applied with approval by different courts



even in India. Enactments relating to procedure in courts are



usually construed as imperative. A kind of duty is imposed on



court   or   a   public   officer   when   no   general   inconvenience   or



injustice is caused from different construction. A provision of a



statute   may   impose   an   absolute   or   qualified   duty   upon   a



public   officer   which   itself   may   be   a   relevant   consideration



while understanding the provision itself. (See `Maxwell on The



Interpretation of Statutes', 12th Edition by P. St. J. Langan and



R. v. Bullock, [(1964)1 QB 481])


                                        33



      One school of thought has accepted that the word `shall'



raises   a   presumption   that   the   particular   provision   is



imperative,   while   the   other   school   of   thought   believes   that



such presumption is merely prima facie, subject to rebuttal by



the   other   considerations   mentioned   above.     For   example,   in



M/s.   Sainik   Motors,   Jodhpur   &   Others   v.   The   State   of



Rajasthan  [AIR 1961 SC 1480], the word `shall' has been held



to be merely directory.




      G.P.   Singh   in   the   same   edition   of   the   above-mentioned



book, at page 409, stated that the use of the word `shall' with



respect   to   one   matter   and   use   of   word   `may'   with   respect   to



another  matter in the same  section of  a statute will  normally



lead   to   the   conclusion   that   the   word   `shall'   imposes   an



obligation,   whereas   the   word   `may'   confers   a   discretionary



power.     But   that   by   itself   is   not  decisive   and   the   Court   may,



having   regard   to   the   context   and   consequences,   come   to   the



conclusion   that   the   part   of   the   statute   using   `shall'   is   also



directory.     It is primarily the context in which the words are


                                      34



used   which   will   be   of   significance   and   relevance   for   deciding



this issue.




      Statutes which encroach upon rights, whether as regards



person   or   property,   are   subject   to   strict   construction   in   the



same   way   as   penal   Acts.   It   is   a   recognized   rule   that   they



should be interpreted, if possible, so as to respect such rights



and   if   there   is   any   ambiguity,   the   construction   which   is   in



favour of the freedom of the individual should be adopted. (See



`Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes', 12th  Edition by P.



St. J. Langan)




      This Court in the case of Devinder Singh (supra) held that



the   Land   Acquisition   Act   is   an   expropriatory   legislation   and



followed the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation v. Darius



Shapur   Chennai   and   Ors.  [(2005)   7   SCC   627].   Therefore,   it



should   be   construed   strictly.   The   Court   has   also   taken   the



view that even in cases of directory requirements, substantial



compliance with such provision would be necessary.


                                       35



      If   I   analyze   the   above   principles   and   the   various



judgments of this Court, it is clear that it may not be possible



to   lay   down   any   straitjacket   formula,   which   could



unanimously   be   applied   to   all   cases,   irrespective   of



considering   the   facts,   legislation   in   question,   object   of   such



legislation, intendment of the legislature and substance of the



enactment.     In  my   view,   it  will   always  depend  upon  all  these



factors   as   stated   by   me   above.     Still,   these   precepts   are   not



exhaustive   and   are   merely   negative.     There   could   be   cases



where the word `shall' has been used to indicate the legislative



intent   that   the   provisions   should   be   mandatory,   but   when



examined   in   light   of   the   scheme   of   the   Act,   language   of   the



provisions, legislative intendment and the objects sought to be



achieved, such an interpretation may defeat the very purpose



of   the   Act   and,   thus,   such   interpretation   may   not   be



acceptable in law and in public interest.   Keeping in mind the



language   of   the   provision,   the   Court   has   to   examine   whether



the   provision   is   intended   to   regulate   certain   procedure   or



whether   it   vests   private   individuals   with   certain   rights   and



levies   a   corresponding   duty   on   the   officers   concerned.     The


                                         36



Court   will   still   have   to   examine   another   aspect,   even   after



holding  that a  particular  provision   is  mandatory  or  directory,



as the case may  be, i.e., whether the effect or impact of such


non-compliance   would   invalidate   or   render   the   proceedings



void   ab   initio  or   it   would   result   in   imposition   of   smaller



penalties   or   in   issuance   of   directions   to   further   protect   and



safeguard  the  interests  of  the  individual   against  the  power   of



the   State.     The   language   of   the   statute,   intention   of   the



legislature   and   other   factors   stated   above   decide   the   results



and impacts of non-compliance in the facts and circumstances



of   a   given   case,   before   the   Court   can   declare   a   provision



capable   of   such   strict   construction,   to   term   it   as   absolutely



mandatory or directory.




      Having          analysed         the          principles         of         statutory



interpretation,   I   will   now   refer   to   the   provisions   of   Section



17(3A) of the Act.   Section 17 of the Act vests the appropriate



Government   with   special   powers   to   be   exercised   in   cases   of



urgency.   This provision falls within Part II of the Act.   Part II



of  the Act deals  with the  entire  scheme of  acquisition of  land


                                       37



by the State, right from the stage of issuance of a notification



under   Section   4   of   the   Act   till   making   of   an   award   taking



possession   of   acquired   land   and   its   consequential   vesting   in



the State.   However, to some extent, the provisions of Section



17 of the Act are an exception to the provisions under Sections



4   to   16   of   the   Act.     The   distinguishing   features   of   normal



acquisition   are   that   after   the   issuance   of   notification   under



Section 4 of the Act, the State must provide an opportunity to



the owners of the land to object to the acquisition in terms of



Section   5A   of   the   Act,   issue   a   declaration   under   Section   6  of



the Act, issue notice under Section 9 of the Act and determine



compensation   by   making   an   award   under   Section   11   of   the



Act.   However, under the scheme of Section 17 of the Act, the



Government   can   take   possession   of   the   property   on   the



expiration of 15 days from publication of notice mentioned in



Section 9(1) of the Act.  Furthermore, the provisions of Section



5 of the Act, i.e., the right of the owner to file objection can be



declared   to   be   inapplicable.     Besides   these   two   significant



distinctions,   another   important   aspect   that   the   land   vests   in



the   Government   under   Section   16   of   the   Act   only   after   the


                                       38



award   is   made   and   possession   of   the   land   is   taken,   while



under Section 17(1), at the threshold of the acquisition itself,



the land could vest absolutely in the Government free from all



encumbrances.     The   possession   of   the   acquired   property   has



to   be   taken   by   the   Collector   in   terms   of   Sections   17(2)   and



17(3) of the Act.  Section 17(3A) of the Act, as already noticed,



was   introduced   by   the   Amendment   Act   68   of   1984   for   the



purposes   of   safeguarding   the   interests   of   the   claimants   and



required   the   payment   of   80   per   cent  of   the   estimated



compensation before taking possession.   At this stage itself, it



will be useful to refer to the relevant provisions of Section  17



of the Act.




      Section 17 reads as under:




               "17. Special powers in case of urgency. -

               (1)   In   cases   of   urgency   whenever   the

               appropriate   Government,   so   directs,   the

               Collector,   though   no   such   award   has

               been   made,   may,   on   the   expiration   of

               fifteen   days   from   the   publication   of   the

               notice   mentioned   in   section   9,   sub-

               section   (1)   take   possession   of   any   land

               needed   for   a   public   purpose.   Such   land

               shall   thereupon   vest   absolutely   in   the

               Government, free from all encumbrances.


                                  39





(2)             xxxxxx



(3)            xxxxxx



(3A) Before taking possession of any land

under   sub-section   (1)   or   sub-section   (2),

the   Collector   shall,   without   prejudice   to

the provisions of sub-section (3)(a) tender

payment   of   eighty   per   centum   of   the

compensation for such land as estimated

by   him   to   the   person   interested   entitled

thereto,   and   (b)   pay   it   to   them,   unless

prevented   by   some   one   or   more   of   the

contingencies   mentioned   in   section   31,

sub-section (2),and where the Collector is

so   prevented,   the   provisions   of   section

31,   sub-section   (2),   (except   the   second

proviso thereto), shall apply as they apply

to   the   payment   of   compensation   under

that section.



(3B) The amount paid or deposited under

section   (3A),   shall   be   taken   into   account

for         determining                 the         amount           of

compensation   required   to   be   tendered

under section 31, and where the amount

so   paid   or   deposited   exceeds   the

compensation   awarded   by   the   Collector

under section 11, the excess may, unless

refunded   within   three   months   from   the

date of Collector's award, be recovered as

an arrear of land revenue.


(4)   In   the   case   of   any   land   to   which,   in

the         opinion         of           the             appropriate

Government,   the   provisions   of   sub-

section   (1)   or   sub-section   (2)   are

applicable,   the   appropriate   Government


                                       40



             may   direct   that   the   provisions   of   section

             5A   shall   not   apply,   and,   if   it   does   so

             direct,  a declaration  may  be made under

             section   6   in   respect   of   the   land   at   any

             time   after   the   date   of   the   publication   of

             the   notification   under   section   4,   sub-

             section (1)."





      Section 17(3A) of the Act makes it obligatory on the part



of   the   authority   concerned   to   tender/pay   80   per   cent   of   the



compensation   for   the   acquired   land,   as   estimated   by   the



Collector,   to   the   persons   interested   and   entitled   thereto;



unless prevented by any of the contingencies mentioned under



Section 31(2) of the Act.  The use of the word `shall' in Section



17(3A)   indicates   that   the   enactors   of   law   desired   that   the



above   mentioned   procedure   should   be   complied   with   by   the



authority   concerned   prior   to   taking   of   possession.       That   is



why   the   legislature   has   even   taken   care   to   make   a   provision



for   deposit   of   due   compensation   in   court   in   terms   of   Section



31(2)   of   the   Act,   where   an   authority   is   prevented   from



tendering   the   amount   to   the   claimants   for   reasons   stated   in



Section   31(1)   of   the   Act.     80   per   cent  of   the   estimated



compensation   is   to   be   deposited   in   the   Court   to   which


                                             41



reference   under   Section   18  of  the   Act  would  lie.     This  clearly



shows   that   there   is   statutory   obligation   upon   the   authorities



concerned   to   tender   to   the   interested   persons,   compensation



in   accordance   with   law.     Deposit   of   money,   certainly,   is   the



condition   precedent to   taking  of  possession   as  is  amply   clear



from the language `before taking possession of any land'.   The



amount so deposited or paid in  terms of Section 17(3A) of the


Act  will  be  taken  into  account  for   determining  the  amount  of



compensation required to be tendered under Section 31 of the



Act and provides for the recovery of amounts if it exceeds the



awarded   amount.     Section   17(3A)   unambiguously   provides   a



complete   mechanism   of   taking   possession   and   the



requirement   of   payment   of   80   per   cent                   of   estimated



compensation to the claimants.




      Now,         I         would         examine     WHAT         ARE         THE


CONSEQUENCES of default in compliance to the provisions of


Section 17(3A) of the Act.  The said Section is completely silent



on such consequences. Where the Legislature has, in specific



terms,   provided   for   the   extent   of   payment,   mode   of   payment


                                         42



and even the difficulties which are likely to arise, i.e, where a



person may  not be entitled  to  receive the compensation  or in



any other eventuality such as where the compensation cannot



be paid for the reasons stated in Section 31(1) of the Act, there



the   Legislature   in   its   wisdom   has   provided   no   contingencies



and/or consequences of non-deposit of this money.  This is in



complete   contradistinction   to   the   provisions   contained   in



Sections   6   and   11A   of   the   Act.     Section   6   provides   that   no



declaration   shall   be   issued   where   the   period   specified   in   the



first   proviso   to   Section   6(1)   of   the   Act   has   expired.     In   other



words,   it   spells   out   the   consequences   of   failure   to   do   an   act



within the stipulated period. Similarly, Section 11A of the Act



provides that the acquisition proceedings shall lapse where the



Collector fails to make an award within a period of two years



from the date of publication of declaration under Section 6 of



the Act.




       Thus,   the   legislative   intent   is   very   clear.     Keeping   the



objects   and   reasons   for   amendment   in   mind,   the   Act   strives



for a fair balance between the rights of private individuals and


                                      43



the power of eminent domain of the State and also attempts to



ensure   expeditious   disbursement   of   compensation,   as



determined   in   accordance   with   law,   to   the   claimants.   The



legislature   has   provided   for   every   contingency   for   tendering



payment,   while   remaining   silent   about   consequences   flowing



from default under some other provisions.    Sections  11A  and



17(3A) of the Act are clear illustrations of clarity and purpose



in   legislative   intent.     When   the   framers   of   law   have   not



provided for any penal consequences for default in compliance



to Section 17(3A), then it will be uncalled for to provide such



consequences by judicial interpretation. While interpreting the



provisions   for   compensation,   the   Court   can   provide   such



interpretation   as   would   help   to   bridge   the   gaps   left   by   the



Legislature,  if  any, in  implementation of  the provisions  of the



Act.     But   it   will   hardly   be   permissible   for   the   Court   to



introduce   such   consequences   by   way   of   judicial   dicta,   like



requiring   lapse   of   acquisition   proceedings.     This   is   not   a



matter covered by the principles of judicial interpretation.


                                        44



       It is a well  settled canon  of statutory  interpretation  that



the   courts   would   neither   add   nor   subtract   from   the   plain



language of the statutory provision.   In the present case also,



there   is   hardly   any   justification   for   the   courts   to   take   any



contrary   view.     Once   the   land   has   vested   in   the   State   and



there being no provision for re-vesting the land in the original



owners   under   the   provisions   of   the   Act,   then   it   will   be   in



consonance with the scheme of the Act and legislative intent to



give   an   interpretation   that   would   allow   provisions   of   Section



17(1)   to   operate   without   undue   impediment   and   keep   the



vesting of land in the State intact.   Otherwise, in some cases



the purpose for which such lands were  acquired  might stand



frustrated,   while   in   other   cases   the   purpose   of   acquisition



might   have   already   been   achieved   and,   therefore,   divesting



State   of   its   title   and   possession   in   the   acquired   land   will   be



incapable   of   performance.     Under   such   circumstances,   then,



to interpret Section 17(3A) of the Act to be so mandatory in its



absolute terms that the non-payment of money would result in



vitiating   or   lapsing   entire  acquisition   proceedings,  can   hardly


be   justified   on   the   strength   of   any   known   principle   of


                                        45



interpretation of statutes.   This question arises more often, as



the provisions of Section 17 of the Act are being invoked by the



Union of India and State Governments very frequently, so, the



consequences of this default, within the framework of law and



anything   short   of   invalidation   of   the   acquisition   proceedings



should be stated  by the court with reference to the  facts  and



circumstances   of   each   case.     It   is   a   complete   safeguard



provided   to   the   land   owner   inasmuch   as   the   compensation



stipulated   under   Section   17(3A)   of   the   Act   should   be   paid   in



terms   of   the   provisions   of   the   Act   so   that   the   owner   is   not



made to suffer on both counts i.e. he is deprived of his land as



well   as   compensation.     It   will   be   unfair   for   the   authorities



concerned   not   to   pay   the   compensation   as   contemplated



under   the   provisions   of  the   Act.    It   would   be   just  and   fair   to



read into the provisions of the Section 17(3A) as imposing an



obligation   on   the   part   of   the   authorities   concerned/the



Collector   to   pay   the   compensation   within   the   time   specified



under   Section   17(3A).     Of   course,   no   specific   time,   within



which   the   payment  has   to  be  made   in  terms   of  Section  17(1)



has been stated in the provision.   But, it is a settled principle


                                       46



of   law   that   wherever   specific   limitations   are   not   stated,   the



concept   of   `reasonable   time'   would   become   applicable.     So,



even if it is argued that there is no specific time contemplated



for   payment/deposit   of   80   per   cent             of   the   estimated



compensation,   even   then   the   claimants   would   be   entitled   to



receive the amount expeditiously and in any case within very



reasonable   time.   If   the   authorities   are   permitted   to   take



possession   of   the   land   without   payment   of   the   amounts



contemplated   under   Section   17(3A)   of   the   Act,   then   it   would



certainly amount to abuse of power of  eminent domain  within



its known legal limitations.  The authorities should discern the



distinction   spelt   out   under   Section   16   of   the   Act   on   the   one



hand and Section 17(1) read with Section 17(3A) of the Act on



the other.




      Let me examine the judgment of this Court dealing with



the provisions of Section 17(3A) of the Act.   The judgments of



different  High  Courts   have   been brought  to   the   notice   of  this



Court,   taking   divergent   views   on   the   question   whether   the



provisions of Section 17(3A) are mandatory or directory.  Some


                                       47



of   these   judgments,   I   would   shortly   refer   to,   if   necessary.



However,   I   may   notice   that   none   of   these   judgments   have



specifically   discussed   the   consequences   of   non-adherence   to



the provisions of Section 17(3A) of the Act.   A Bench of Delhi



High   Court   in   the   case   of  Banwari   Lal   &   Sons   Pvt.   Ltd.   vs.



Union   of   India   &   Ors.,   [1991   (1)   DRJ   (Suppl.)   317   (Delhi



Reported   Journal)],  whilst   quashing   the   notification   issued



under   Section   4   read   with   Section   17(1)   of   the   Act   on   the



ground   of   factual   lack   of   urgency   for   acquisition,   held   that



there  was non-compliance  to the provisions  of Section  17(3A)



of  the  Act.    Of  course,   the  High  Court   took  the   view  that  the



notification issued under Section 4 read with Section 17(1) of



the   Act   was   not   maintainable   and   while   quashing   the   said



notification, it also held that there was violation of provisions



of Section 5A of the Act and, in fact, no urgency existed.  There



was   no   direct   discussion   as   to   whether   the   provisions   of



Section 17(3A) of the Act are mandatory or directory. However,



this   judgment   neither   provides   any   reasoning   nor   actually



states the consequences of non-compliance with the provisions



of   Section   17(3A).     For   these   reasons,   this   judgment   is   of   no


                                       48



help to the parties appearing in the present appeal.     Against



the judgment of Delhi High Court in  Banwari  Lal  (supra), the



Special   Leave   Petition   preferred   before   this   Court   was



dismissed at the admission stage itself.




      In the case of Union of India & Ors. v. Krishan Lal Arneja



&   Ors.,   [(2004)   8   SCC   453],   a   part   of   the   acquisition   was



challenged  and writ  petitions  had  been filed for  quashing  the



notification dated 6th March, 1987 issued under Section 4 and



Section   17(1)   of   the   Act   by   Banwari   Lal   and   other   owners   of



the   acquired   lands.   These   writ   petitions   were   allowed   by   a



learned Single Judge of the High Court, appeal against which



was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court. While



considering the appeal against the order of the Division Bench,



this Court also dismissed the same. In the appeal, arguments



had also been advanced that since the Government before this



Court had not made the payment of 80 per cent of estimated



compensation   in   terms   of   Section   17(3A)   of   the   Act,   the



acquisition   had   lapsed.   However,   in   paragraph   36   of   that



judgment,   this   Court   declined   to   deal   with   these   contentions


                                          49



as   it   had   dismissed   the   appeal   on   other   grounds.   The   Court



incidentally  observed  that it was not  a  fair  stand to be  taken



by  the   State   before  the  Court  to  argue   that  it could  de-notify



the acquired land on the plea that it had failed to comply with



the  statutory  provisions  of the  Act.    In  short, the  question  in



controversy   in   the   present   case   was   not  actually   pronounced



upon by the Court in that case.




       The question of the provisions of Section 17(3A) of the Act



being mandatory or directory again fell for consideration before



this   Court   in   the   case   of  Tika  Ram   &   Ors.   v.   State   of   U.P.   &



Ors.   [(2009)   10   SCC   689].   In   this   case,   challenge   to   the



constitutional validity of the provisions of Section 17 was also



made.     The   Court,   while   holding   that   the   said   provisions   are



constitutional,   also   declared   that   the   provisions   of   Section



17(3A)   were   not   mandatory   and   their   non-compliance   would



not   vitiate   the   whole   acquisition   proceedings.   The   following



paragraphs of the judgment are relevant:




              "91. However, the question is as to what

              happens when such payment is not made


                                     50



and   the   possession   is   taken.   Can   the

whole acquisition be set at naught?


92.     In   our   opinion,   this   contention   on

the   part   of   the   appellants   is   also

incorrect.   If   we   find   fault   with   the   whole

acquisition   process   on   account   of   the

non-payment                    of          80%               of         the

compensation,   then   the   further   question

would be as to whether the estimation of

80% of compensation is correct or not. A

further controversy can then be raised by

the landlords that what was paid was not

80% and was short of 80% and therefore,

the   acquisition   should   be   set   at   naught.

Such   extreme   interpretation   cannot   be

afforded because indeed under Section 17

itself,   the   basic   idea   of   avoiding   the

enquiry   under   Section   5-A   is   in   view   of

the   urgent   need   on   the   part   of   the   State

Government   for   the   land   to   be   acquired

for   any   eventuality   discovered   by   either

sub-section   (1)   or   sub-section   (2)   of

Section 17 of the Act.


93.


The   only   question   that   would   remain   is

that         of         the          estimation              of         the

compensation.   In   our   considered   view,

even if the compensation is not paid or is

short   of   80%,   the   acquisition   would   not

suffer.            One         could            imagine                 the

unreasonableness   of   the   situation.   Now

suppose,   there   is   state   of   emergency   as

contemplated   in   Section   17(2)   of   the   Act

and the compensation is not given, could

the   whole   acquisition   come  to  a   naught?

It would entail serious consequences.


                              51



94.


This   situation   was   considered,   firstly,   in

Satendra   Prasad   Jain  v.   State   of   U.P.  It

was held therein that once the possession

is   taken   as   a   matter   of   fact,   then   the

owner is divested of the title to the land.

The   Court   held   that   there   was   then   no

question   of   application   of   even   Section

11-A.   Commenting   upon  Section   11-A,   it

was  held  that  that  the   Section   could  not

be   so   construed   as   to   leave   the

Government   holding   title   or   the   land

without   an   obligation   to   determine   the

compensation, make an award and pay to

the   owner   the   difference   between   the

amount   of  the   award  and   the   amount   of

the   80%   of   the   estimated   compensation.

The three-Judge Bench of the Court took

the   view   that   even   where   80%   of   the

estimated   compensation   was   not   paid   to

the landowners, it did not mean that the

possession was taken illegally or that the

land   did   not   vest   in   the   Government.   In

short,   this   Court   held   that   the

proceedings   of   acquisition   are   not

affected         by         the          nonpayment         of

compensation.   In   that   case,   the   Krishi

Utpadan   Mandi   Samiti,   for   which   the

possession   was   made,   sought   to   escape

from   the   liability   to   make   the   payment.

That was not allowed. The Court, in para

17, held as under : (Satendra Prasad Jain

case, SCC p. 375, para 17)


       "17.   In   the   instant   case,   even   that

       80%   of   the   estimated   compensation

       was   not   paid   to   the   appellants

       although   Section   17   (3-A)   required


                                52



       that it should have been paid before

       possession   of   the   said   land   was

       taken   but   that   does   not   mean   that

       the possession was taken illegally or

       that the said land did not thereupon

       vest in the first respondent. It is, at

       any   rate,   not   open   to   the   third

       respondent, who, as the letter of the

       Special   Land   Acquisition   Officer

       dated   27.6.1990   shows,   failed   to

       make         the          necessary         monies

       available   and   who   has   been   in

       occupation   of   the   said   land   ever

       since   its   possession   was   taken,   to

       urge   that   the   possession   was   taken

       illegally and that, therefore, the said

       land   has   not   vested   in   the   first

       respondent and the first respondent

       is   under   no   obligation   to   make   an

       award."


95.    Further, in a judgment of this Court

in Pratap v. State of Rajasthan, a similar

view was reported. That was a case under

the   Rajasthan   Urban   Improvement   Act,

1987,   under   which   the   acquisition   was

made   using   Section   17   of   the   Act.   The

Court   took   the   view   that   once   the

possession was taken under Section 17 of

the   Act,   the   Government   could   not

withdraw   from   that   position   under

Section   18   and   even   the   provisions   of

Section 11-A were not attracted. That was

of course a case where the award was not

passed under Section 11-A after taking of

the   possession.   A   clear-cut   observation

came   to   be   made   in   that   behalf   in   para

12, to the effect that the non-compliance

with   Section   17   of   the   Act,   insofar   as


                                      53



             payment   of   compensation   is   concerned,

             did   not   result   in   lapsing   of   the   land

             acquisition   proceedings.   The   law   laid

             down   by   this   Court   in   Satendra   Prasad

             Jain   v.   State   of   U.P.   was   approved.   The

             Court   also   relied   on   the   decision   in   P.

             Chinnanna   v.   state   of   A.P.   and   Awadh

             Bihari   Yadav   v.   State   of   Bihar,   where

             similar view was taken regarding the land

             acquisition   proceedings   not   getting

             lapsed. The only result that may follow by

             the   non-payment   would   be   the   payment

             of interest, as contemplated in Section 34

             and   the   proviso   added   thereto   by   the

             1984 Act. In that view, we do not wish to

             further   refer  the   matter,  as  suggested   by

             Shri  Trivedi,   learned  Senior   Counsel   and

             Shri   Qamar   Ahmad,   learned   counsel   for

             the   appellants.   Therefore,   even   on   the

             sixth   question,   there   is   no   necessity   of

             any reference."




      As   is   obvious   from   the   above   paragraphs,   there   is   an


indefeasible obligation on the part of the Government to make



the   payment   in   terms   of   Section   17(3A)   of   the   Act   but   non-



compliance   thereto   could   not   result   in   vitiation   of   the



acquisition proceedings. The observations made by this Court



in the case of  Satendra Prasad  Jain  (supra), in paragraph 17,



suggest  that the Government was required to hold title to the



acquired   land   coupled   with   its   obligation   to   determine   the


                                        54



compensation,  make the award and then to pay to the owner



the   difference   between   the   amount   of   80   per   cent   of   the



estimated   compensation   and   the   amount   finally   determined.



The   Court   even   went   to   the   extent   of   observing   that   non-



payment of 80 per cent of the estimated compensation  per se



does not mean that possession was taken illegally or that the



said   land   did   not   thereupon   vest   in   the   Government.   This



decision   does   provide   any   reasoning   and   conclusions   which



support   the   view   that   Section   17(3A)   of   the   Act   is   not   a



mandatory provision. Following this judgment, another Bench



of this Court in the case of Pratap & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan



[(1996) 3 SCC 1] took the same view.




       However,   another   Bench   of   this   Court,   in   the   case   of



Rajender   Kishan   Gupta  v.  Union   of   India  [(2010)   9   SCC   46],



had made certain observations which were at some variance to



the   dicta   of   this   Court   in   the   cases   referred   above.     In   that



case,   neither   the   validity   nor   the   effects   of   non-compliance



with   Section   17(3A)   of   the   Act   were   directly   in   issue.   The



challenge was to a notification issued under Section 4(1) of the


                                       55



Act for the land which was subsequently needed for the Metro



Project   in   Delhi.   The   challenge   was   primarily   based   on   the



ground that the land could only be acquired under the Metro



Rail Construction Works Act, 1978 and the emergency clause



could   not   be   used   as   a   way   to   dispense   with   enquiry   under



Section 5A of the Act. The Court, while dismissing the appeal



preferred   by   the   claimants   and   rejecting   the   contentions   in



paragraph 29, made the following observations :




             "In   the   light   of   the   above   discussion,   we

             are   satisfied   that   the   existence   of   public

             purpose   and   urgency   in   executing   the

             project before the Commonwealth Games,

             the   adjoining   land   belonging   to   DDA

             being   forest   land   as   per   the   notification

             and also of the fact that the respondents

             have   fully   complied   with   the   mandatory

             requirements including deposit of 80% of

             the   compensation   amount,   we   are   in

             entire agreement with the stand taken by

             the respondents as well as the conclusion

             of the High Court."




      The   Bench,   dealing   with   the   matter,   did   use   the



expression   `mandatory   requirements,   including   deposit   of   80



per   cent   of   the   compensation   amount',   but   there   was   no



discussion   or   reasoning   of   the   effects   and   consequences   of


                                       56



such   default,   anywhere   in   the   judgment,   before   it   has   been



concluded   that   the   said   provisions   are   mandatory.         Thus,



these observations do not come to the aid of the appellants in



challenging the entire acquisition proceedings on this ground.




      Consistent   with   the   view   expressed  by  this  Court   in  the



cases   referred   (supra),   I   am   of   the   considered   view   that   the



provisions   of   Section   17(3A)   of   the   Act   are   not   mandatory.



Such a conclusion can safely be arrived at, even for the reason



that   the   Court   would   have   to   read   into   the   provisions   of



Section   17(3A)   consequences   and   a   strict   period   of   limitation



within which amount should be deposited, which has not been



provided   by   the   Legislature   itself   in   that   section.     The



consequences and contingencies arising from non-compliance



of   the   said   provisions   have   not   been   stated   in   the   Act.   Once



the land  has vested  in the Government, non-compliance  with



the   obligation   of   payment   of   80   per   cent   of   estimated



compensation   would   not   render   the   possession   taken   under



Section   17(1)   as   illegal.   The   land   cannot   be   re-vested   or



reverted back to the claimants as no provisions under the Act


                                      57



so prescribe. Furthermore, if the interpretation put forward by



the   appellants   is   accepted,   it   would   completely   frustrate   the



objects   and   purpose   of   the   Act,   rather   than   advancing   the



same. The expression `shall' used in Section 17(3A) has to be



understood   in   its   correct   perspective   and   is   not   to   be



construed   as   suggestive   of   the   provisions   being   absolutely



mandatory   in  its  application.  Inter  alia  for   these   reasons   and



as   per   the   above   discussions,   I   hold   that   the   provisions   of



Section   17(3A)   are   not   mandatory.   They   are   directive



provisions,   though   their   compliance   is   necessary   in   terms   of



the Act.




      Having held as above, I hasten to add that the obligation



on   the   part   of   the   Government   or   concerned   authority   to



deposit   the   amount   prior   to   taking   possession   under   Section



17(1)   of   the   Act   should   essentially   be   complied   with.   The



amount of 80 per cent of the estimated compensation in terms



of   Section   17(3A)   should   be   deposited.   Once     we   read   the



provisions   of   Sections   17(1)   and   17(3A)   conjunctively,   it



implies   that  the   amounts   are   to   be   deposited  within   15   days


                                        58



from   the   publication   of   the   notice   in   terms   of   Section   9(1)   of



the  Act and  before  taking  of  possession  of  the  acquired land.



The Legislature has sufficiently indicated that the payment of



the   due   80   per   cent   of   compensation   should   be   made   at   the



earliest   and,   particularly,   before   possession   is   taken.   Non-



compliance   of   the   provisions   of   Section   17(3A)   would   not



vitiate the acquisition proceedings, but depending on the facts



of a given case, the payment should be made within the time



indicated   and   in   any   case   within   a   reasonable   time,   and   the



claimant   should   then   be   entitled   to   additional   benefits   for



such   non-compliance.   The   Court   would   fill   a   part   of   the   gap



which has remained unfilled by the Legislature.




       Irrespective   of   whether   the   provision   is   held   to   be



mandatory   or   directory,   compliance   with   its   substance   is



equally important.  In either case, the authority entrusted with



a duty is not absolved of its obligation to perform the specified



duty or obligation in the manner stated in law.  It is primarily



the consequences which result from non-performance of duty,



which   are   of   significance   in   determining   the   impact   of


                                         59



mandatory   or   directory   nature   of   a   provision.   Normally,   in



both   cases,   some   consequences   should   flow   from   non-



performance.     Even   if   the   provisions   of   Section   17(3A)   are



directory,   as   held   by   me   above,   the   deposit   of   80   per   cent   of



estimated compensation within the period of limitation i.e. 15



days   and   prior   to   taking   possession   of   the   land,   has   to   be



made.     There   is   no   ambiguity   in   this   requirement.     Thus,   it



shall   be   the   duty   of   the   Court   to   fill   the   lacuna   (i.e.,   the



consequences   of   non-payment   of   compensation)   to   complete



the chain of the legislative scheme contained in Section 17 of



the   Act.     Having   taken   recourse   to   the   emergency   provisions



and having taken possession of the land, the Government and


its authorities cannot be permitted to defer the payment of the



requisite   amount,   in   terms   of   Section   17(3A)   of   the   Act,



indefinitely   or   for   an   unduly   long   period.   A   responsibility   is



cast upon the authorities concerned to make payments within



time and not unduly cause inconvenience and harassment to



persons interested in the compulsorily acquired land and who



have been deprived  of possessory benefits also.   Persons who



are  so  deprived  of their   land and possessory  benefits thereof,


                                      60



are not in a position to carry out agricultural activity or derive



any   other   benefit   as   they   might   have   been   deriving   prior   to



compulsory   acquisition/taking   possession   of   the   land.     In



other words, it is a case of deprivation of property and to some



extent   deprivation   of   sources   of   income.     Without   hesitation,



the   claimants/owners   of   land   should   be   and   ought   to   be



entitled   to   certain   additional   benefits   within   the   legislative



framework of the Act.  Certain additional and interest benefits



are   provided   under   Sections   23(1A),   23(2),   28   and   34   of   the



Act.   The   legislature   has   even   taken   care   of   providing   higher



rates of interest where the possession of the land has already



been taken and compensation has not been paid or deposited



within   the   specified   time   or   in   the   manner   prescribed   under



Section 34 of the Act.  Proviso to this Section states that where



the   compensation   payable,   or   any   part   thereof,   has   not   been



paid or deposited within a period of one year from the date on



which possession is taken, interest at the rate of 15 per cent



per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said



period of one year, calculated on the amount of compensation



or   part   thereof   which   has   not   been   paid   or   deposited   before


                                       61



the date of such expiry, until the time such payment is finally



made.   We   have   to   read   the   provisions   of   Section   34   together



with   the   provisions   of   Sections   17(1)   and   17(3A)   of   the   Act.



They have to be construed harmoniously, keeping in mind the



object   sought   to   be   achieved   by   a   conjoint   reading   of   these



provisions.   The   expression   `before   taking   possession   of   the



land'  has   been   used   in   Section   17   read   with   Section   17(3A)



and in Section 34 as well.   Once the Government has invoked



the   emergency   provisions,   it   is   pre-supposed   that   the



Government   needs  the   land   urgently   and,   in   its   wisdom,   has



decided   that   it   is   not   in   public   interest   to   go   through   the



normal   procedure   prescribed   for   acquisition   and   payment   of



compensation under Part II of the Act.   It requires immediate



possession   of   the   land   for   achievement   of   the   purpose   for



which   land   was   required.     As   the   Government   would   take



possession   by   depriving   the   land   owners   of   some   of   their



rights,   as   would   have   been  available   to   them   under   normal


acquisition   procedure,   the   Legislature   has   created   special



safeguards   in   their   favour.     Firstly,   they   would   be   given   15



days   notice   prior   to   taking   of   possession   of   the   land   (Section


                                       62



9(1)   of   the   Act).   Secondly,   80   per   cent   of   the   estimated



compensation shall be paid to them in terms of Section 17(3A)



of   the   Act,   before   the   possession   is   taken.     Thus,   the



Legislature   has   balanced   the   rights   and   obligations   between



the   parties.     Section   34,   therefore,   cannot   be   read   so   as   to



destroy   the   protections   or   safeguards   provided   to



claimants/owners   of   the   land   under   Section   17   of   the   Act.



These   provisions   must   be   read   harmoniously.                    These



provisions   should   be   construed   so   as   to   give   benefit   to   the



owners   of   the   land   against   compulsory   acquisition,   rather



than   accepting   an   interpretation   which   would   defeat   the



benefits intended by the Legislature.  The Legislature was fully



aware of the provisions of Section 34 while introducing Section



17(3A) into the Act, as both the provisions were introduced by



the   same   Amending   Act   of   1984.     This   clearly   demonstrates



the   legislative   intent   that   the   protections   specified   under



Section   17(1)   would   operate   in   their   own   field   and   the



provisions of Section 34 would also apply in its own sphere.  It



will   be   unfair,   if   the   Government   takes   possession   of   the



property within 15 days of the notice issued under Section 9(1)


                                      63



(as   is   contemplated   under   Section   17(1)   of   the   Act)   and   does



not make payment of compensation for a long period, with no



additional liability whatsoever. It appears to me that this is not



the legislative intent that the Government would not be liable



to pay higher rate of interest where it has taken possession of



the land in exercise of its powers under Section 17 of the Act.



It will be unfair if the liability to pay higher rate of interest in



terms of Section 34 would arise only after a period of one year



from   the   date   of   possession   even   in   cases   of   emergent



acquisition.     Such  an  interpretation  may   result  in  frustrating



the balance sought to be created by the Legislature. For these



reasons, I am of the considered view that the statutory benefit



contained in Section 34 of the Act should be made applicable



to  the  provisions  of  Section  17(1)  read with Section 17(3A)  in



the   manner   that   it   would   give   the   requisite   benefit   to   the



owners/claimants   of   the   land   rather   than   deprive   them   of



both,   their   land   and   income,   without   any   additional   benefit



despite non-compliance of the provisions of the Act.  Thus, the



owners/claimants   should   be   entitled   to   receive,   on   the



strength   of   these   provisions   and   alike,   the   interest   payable


                                        64



under  the  proviso  to  Section  34  i.e.  interest   at  the  rate  of  15



per cent per annum from the date of expiry of the period of 15



days   as   stated   under   Section   17(1)   and   from   taking   of



possession of the land from the owners/persons interested in



the   land   till   payment   of   compensation   in   terms   of   Section



17(3A) of the Act.




       These   conditions   have   to   be   satisfied   cumulatively   and



not  alternatively,  to  give  rise  to  the  liability  to  pay   interest  of



15  per  cent  from  the  date  afore-stated.    This approach  that  I



am   adopting   is   restricted   in   application   to   the   acquisitions



made by the Government in exercise of its emergency powers



under   Section   17   of   the   Act.     Section   34   would   otherwise



operate in its own sphere and only after the lapse of the period



specified   in   the   proviso.   The   conclusion   of   the   above



discussion   is   that   non-compliance   of   provisions   of   Section



17(1)   read   with   Section   17(3A)   would   not   render   the



acquisition proceedings invalid or void ab initio in law however,



liability   to   pay   interest  at   the   rate   of  15   per   cent   per   annum



would arise from the date and for the period afore-noticed.


                                      65



Do the provisions of Section 11A apply to the acquisition

proceedings commenced by the Government in exercise of

its powers of urgency under Section 17 of the Act?




      I   have   already   noticed   that   Section   11A   of   the   Act   was



introduced into the statute book by the Legislature vide Land



Acquisition (Amendment) Act (68 of 1984).  This provision was



introduced   primarily   to   provide   safeguards   and   to   secure   the



interests   of   owners/persons   interested,   whenever   their   land



was acquired under the provisions of the Act.   Section 11A of



the Act reads as under :




            "11A.   Period   within   which   an   award

            shall   be   made.--(1)   The   Collector   shall

            make an award under section 11 within a

            period   of   two   years   from   the   date   of   the

            publication   of   the   declaration   and   if   no

            award   is   made   within   that   period,   the

            entire   proceedings   for   the   acquisition   of

            the land shall lapse:


            Provided   that   in   a   case   where   the   said

            declaration has been published before the

            commencement   of   the   Land   Acquisition

            (Amendment)   Act,   1984,   the   award   shall

            be made within a period of two years from

            such commencement.


            Explanation.-In   computing   the   period   of

            two   years   referred   to   in   this   section   the

            period   during   which   any   action   or

            proceeding   to   be   taken   in   pursuance   of


                                        66



             the said declaration is stayed by an order

             of a Court shall be excluded."


      A   bare   reading   of   the   above   provision   shows   that   the



Legislature places an obligation upon the Collector to make an



award at the earliest. Wherever the award under Section 11 of



the Act has not been  made within two years from the date of



publication   of   the   declaration,   the   entire   proceedings   for



acquisition of land shall lapse.   Explanation to Section 11A of



the   Act   further   excludes   from   this   period,   any   period   during



which   any   action   or   proceeding,   to   be   taken   in   pursuance   of



the   said   declaration,   is   stayed   by   an   order   of   a   Court   which



had   been   in   force.     Exclusion   of   no   other   period   is



contemplated under this provision.   Thus, a definite intention



of the framers of law is clear that the award should be made at



the earliest and, in any case, within a maximum period of two



years   from   the   declaration   under   Section   6   of   the   Act,   if   the



acquisition proceedings are to survive.   The acquisition under



the Act being compulsory acquisition, a safeguard or right has



been provided to the private party against the State. Thus, the



statute imposes a duty upon the State to act within time and


                                      67



also provides for consequences that shall ensue in the event of



default.     These   consequences   are   of   a   very   serious   nature,



whereby the entire acquisition proceedings shall stand lapsed.



This   would   render   the   land   free   from   acquisition   or   any



restriction and title over the land would stand reverted to the



owners/persons interested.




      I   have   already   discussed   in   some   detail   the   principles



which will  help  the Court in  determining whether  a provision



is directory or mandatory.  It is clear from the substance of the



language   and   from   the   intention   of   the   legislature   that   the



right created in favour of the citizen and the duties imposed on



the State should be construed strictly.  Section 11A of the Act



provides  for  discharge of  obligations  within the specified  time



and   there   are   serious   consequences   of   such   non-fulfillment.



This would clearly lead to the conclusion that the provisions of



Section   11A   of  the   Act   are   capable   of   strict   construction   and



are   mandatory   in   their   application.     In   number   of   cases,



including   the   case   of  Mohan   &   Anr.  v.  State   of   Maharahtra



[(2007)   9  SCC   431],   this   Court   has   already   held   that  Section


                                       68



11A of the Act is mandatory.   This view, with respect, and for



the reasons recorded above, I follow.




      A   three-Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of



Satendra   Prasad   Jain  (supra)   went   further   to   specifically



consider the question  as to whether the provisions  of Section



11A of the Act were attracted and, if so, whether they should



be strictly construed and where the possession of the acquired



land is taken and it is vested in the Government under Section



17 of the Act, whether the acquisition proceedings could lapse



in terms of Section 11A of the Act.  Answering the question in



the negative, the Court stated that the Government could not



withdraw from the acquisition under Section 48 of the Act and



claim   the   benefit   of   its   own   default   in   not   making   an   award



within   the   period   of   two   years.     The   Court   laid   down   the



following dictum:




             "15. Ordinarily, the Government can take
             possession   of   the   land   proposed   to   be

             acquired   only   after   an   award   of

             compensation in respect thereof has been

             made under Section 11. Upon the taking

             of   possession   the   land   vests   in   the

             Government,  that  is  to  say,  the  owner   of

             the land loses to the Government the title


                              69



to it. This is what Section  16 states. The

provisions of Section 11-A are intended to

benefit   the   landowner   and   ensure   that

the award is made within a period of two

years   from   the   date   of   the   Section   6

declaration.   In   the   ordinary   case,

therefore, when Government fails to make

an   award   within   two   years   of   the

declaration under Section 6, the land has

still not vested in the Government and its

title   remains   with   the   owner,   the

acquisition   proceedings   are   still   pending

and, by virtue of the provisions of Section

11-A, lapse. When Section                        17(1)         is

applied          by         reason         of         urgency,

Government takes possession of the land

prior   to   the   making   of   the   award   under

Section   11   and   thereupon   the   owner   is

divested   of   the   title   to   the   land   which   is

vested   in   the   Government.   Section   17(1)

states so in unmistakable terms. Clearly,

Section   11-A   can   have   no   application   to

cases   of   acquisitions   under   Section   17

because the lands have already vested in

the Government and there is no provision

in  the   said  Act  by  which   land  statutorily

vested   in   the   Government   can   revert   to

the owner.


16.  Further,   Section   17(3-A)   postulates
that the owner will be offered an amount

equivalent to 80 per cent of the estimated

compensation   for   the   land   before   the

Government takes possession of it under

Section   17(1).   Section   11-A   cannot  be  so

construed   as   to   leave   the   Government

holding   title   to   the   land   without   the

obligation   to   determine   compensation,

make an award and pay to the owner the

difference   between   the   amount   of   the

award   and   the   amount   of   80   per   cent   of

the estimated compensation."


                                      70



      This   judgment   was   followed   by   another   Bench   of   this



Court   in   the   case   of  Awadh   Bihari   Yadav   &   Ors.  v.  State   of



Bihar  &  Ors.  [(1995) 6 SCC 31],  which held,  "...we,  therefore,



hold that the land acquisition proceedings in the instant case



did not lapse...".




      The   principle   of   law   stated   in  Satendra   Prasad   Jain



(supra)   was   again   followed   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of  P.



Chinnanna   &   Ors.  v.  State   of   A.P.   &   Ors.  [(1994)   5   SCC   486]



and  Pratap  (supra) and in the case of  Allahabad  Development



Authority  v.  Nasiruzzaman   &   Ors.    [(1996)   6   SCC   424],   this



Court held as under :




             "In   the   impugned   judgment,   it   would
             appear that the learned Judges asked the
             counsel to verify whether the award came
             to   be   made   within   two   years,   as
             indicated. The counsel on verification had
             stated   that   the   award   was   not   made
             within two years from the commencement
             of   the   Amendment   Act,   namely,   24-9-
             1984.   Consequently,   the   declaration   was
             given   that   the   notification   under   Section
             4(1)   and   the   declaration   under   Section   6
             stood   lapsed.   This   question   was
             examined   by   this   Court   in  Satendra
             Prasad   Jain  v.  State   of   U.P.  and  Awadh
             Bihari   Yadav  v.  State   of   Bihar  and   held
             that Section 11-A does not apply to cases
             of   acquisitions   under   Section   17   where
             possession   was   already   taken   and   the
             land   stood   vested   in   the   State.   The


                                      71



             notification   under   Section   4(1)   and
             declaration  under  Section  6  do  not lapse
             due   to   failure   to   make   an   award   within
             two   years   from   the   date   of   the
             declaration. The view of the High Court is
             erroneous in law."




      In   a   very   recent   judgment   of   a   Division   Bench   of   this



Court,   (to   which,   one   of   us,   Asok   Kumar   Ganguly,   J.   was   a



member) in the case of Banda Development Authority, Banda v.



Moti   Lal   Agarwal   &   Ors.  [2011   (5)   SCALE   173],   this   Court



followed the aforesaid view with further clarification.  Usefully,



paragraphs 33, 36 and 38 of the said judgment can be referred



to at this stage, which read as under :




             "33.         XXX          XXX          XXX


             ... v) If beneficiary of the acquisition is an

             agency/instrumentality   of   the   State   and

             80%   of   the   total   compensation   is

             deposited   in   terms   of   Section  17(3A)  and

             substantial   portion   of   the   acquired   land

             has   been   utilized   in   furtherance   of   the

             particular public purpose, then the Court

             may reasonably presume that possession

             of the acquired land has been taken.


                          XXX          XXX          XXX


             36. Once it is held that possession of the

             acquired   land   was   handed   over   to   the

             BDA on 30.6.2001, the view taken by the

             High   Court   that   the   acquisition


                                       72



             proceedings   had   lapsed   due   to   non-

             compliance   of   Section   11A   cannot   be

             sustained......


                           XXX          XXX           XXX


             38.    In  the  result,  the   appeal  is   allowed.

             The impugned order is  set aside  and the

             writ petition filed by Respondent No. 1 is

             dismissed   with   cost   quantified   at   Rs.

             1,00,000/-.   Respondent   No.   1   shall

             deposit   the   amount   of   cost   with   the

             Appellant   within   a   period   of   two   months

             from today."





      However, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant



has placed reliance upon a judgment of this Court in the case



of Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat [(1991)



4   SCC   531]   to   contend   that   the   provisions   of   Section   11A   of



the  Act are  applicable  to  the  acquisition  under   Section   17  as



well.     For   non-adherence   to   those   provisions,   the   entire



acquisition proceeding should be declared to have lapsed and



the applicants should be entitled to their lands free from any



encumbrance.  Let me analyze this judgment to appreciate the



contention raised by the counsel appearing for the appellants.



In   this   case,   the   appellants   were   occupants   of   the   lands


                                      73



sought to be acquired by the State of Gujarat for the purposes



of establishing North Gujarat University and notification under



Section 6 of the Act in respect of the said land was issued on



12th  May,   1988.     An   interim   order   restraining   the   State   from



taking   possession   was   granted   by   the   Court.     However,   the



Acquisition   Officer   proceeded   to   issue   a   notice   under   Section



9(1) of the Act and determined the compensation payable.   As



the   award   had   not   been   made,   the   appellants   therein   had



made a representation to the Government that the award had



not been made within the period of two years mentioned under



Section   11A   of   the   Act   and,   therefore,   the   acquisition



proceedings   had   lapsed.     This   plea   was   rejected.     The



appellants   filed   an   application   challenging   the   said   decision,



praying for a declaration that the acquisition proceedings had



lapsed.  The Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court took the



view   that   the   explanation   to   Section   11A   is   not   confined   to



stay   of   making   of   the   award   pursuant   to   notification   under



Section 6, but it is widely worded and covers in its sweep the



entire   period   during   which   any   matter   or   proceedings   due   to



be taken are stayed by a competent Court.   This decision was


                                      74



challenged   before   this   Court.     In   other   words,   this   Court,   in



Yusufbhai      (supra),     was   primarily   concerned   with   the



interpretation   of   Explanation   to   Section   11A   of   the   Act   and



was determining the period which needs to be excluded while



computing   the  limitation   period  of  two   years   provided for   the



making   of   an   award.     While   rejecting   the   view   taken   to   the



contrary   by   a   Single   Judge   of   the   Kerala   High   Court,   this



Court made a reference to taking of possession under Section



17 of the Act and held :




             "In the first place, as held by the learned

             Single   Judge   himself,   where   the   case   is

             covered by Section 17, the possession can

             be taken before an award is made and we

             see   no   reason   why   the   aforesaid

             expression   in   the   Explanation   should   be

             given   a   different   meaning   depending

             upon   whether   the   case   is   covered   by

             Section   17   or   otherwise...   The   benefit   is

             that   the   award   must   be   made   within   a

             period   of   two   years   of   the   declaration,

             failing   which   the   acquisition   proceedings

             would lapse and the land would revert to

             the landholder...".




      It is obvious from a bare reading of the above observation



that the question  of applicability of Section 11A to acquisition


                                      75



proceedings   under   Section   17   was   not   in   issue   before   the



Court.     This   controversy   was   neither   argued   nor   was   it   even



remotely necessary for the adjudication of the dispute between



the   parties.     These   observations   are   merely   an  obiter  of   the



Court, which is made to support its conclusion in paragraph 8



of the judgment and cannot be treated as ratio decidendi of the



judgment   or   a   precedent   for   the   proposition   raised   in   the



present case.  The learned counsel attempted to argue that the



expression   `whether   the   case   is   covered   by   Section   11   or



otherwise'   unequivocally   states   the   principle   of   law   that



Section 11A is applicable to the present case.   I am unable to



accept   this   contention   as   it   is   not   an   authority   for   the



proposition.     This   controversy   was   never   raised   before   the



Bench.     The   argument   raised   on   behalf   of   the   appellants   is,



therefore, misplaced.




      A   half   hearted   attempt   was   also   made   by   the   learned



counsel for the appellants to advance the argument that there



is   difference   of  opinion  by   equi  Benches  of  this   Court,   in  the



case   of  Satendra   Prasad   Jain  (supra)   on   the   one   hand   and


                                        76




Yusufbhai   Noormohmed   Nendolia  (supra)   on   the   other   and,



therefore, this matter should be referred to a larger Bench.   I



am   not   impressed   with   this   contention   at   all.     There   is   no



conflict.   Satendra Prasad  Jain  (supra) lays down the law and



on   true   application   of   the   principle   of  ratio   decidendi,  it   is   a



direct   precedent   for   the   proposition   involved   in   the   present



case.  I can squarely answer the questions of law arising in the



present   case   with   reference   to   the   settled   principles   and,



therefore, have no hesitation in rejecting this request made on



behalf of the appellants.




       Let me also examine the other reasons which will support



the view taken by this Court in  Satendra Prasad  Jain  (supra)



and   followed   in   subsequent   cases   referred   above.     Section



17(1)   of   the   Act   uses   the   expression   `though   no   such   award



has been made'.   This clearly demonstrates that making of an



award   is   not   a  sine   qua   non  for   issuance   of   a   notification



under  Section  4(1)   read with  Section  17(1)   of  the   Act  or even



taking   possession   in   terms   thereof.       After   publication   of   a



notification under Section 4 read with Sections 17(1) and 17(4)


                                        77



of   the   Act,   the   authority   is   obliged   only   to   publish   a   notice



under Section 9(1) of the Act and comply with the provisions of



Section   17(3A)   before   it   can   take   possession   within   the



stipulated   period.    Once   possession   of   the   land   is   taken,   it



shall   thereupon   vest   absolutely   in   the   Government   free   from



all   encumbrances.     In   other   words,   Section   17(4)   itself   is   a



permissible exception to the provisions of Section 11 of the Act



and,   therefore,   the   question   of   enforcing   Section   11A   against



proceedings under Section 17 would not arise.   Under Section



16,   the   land   shall   vest   in   the   Government   free   from   all



encumbrances only after the award is made and possession is



taken.   In   contradistinction   to   this,   under   Section   17(1)   the



land   shall   vest   absolutely   in   the   Government   free   from   all



encumbrances   even   when   no   award   is   made   and   possession



thereof   is   taken   in   terms   of   Sections   17(1)   and   17(3A)   of   the



Act.     We   have   to   give   the   language   of   Section   17(1)   its   plain



meaning, within   the  field  of  its  operation.     Another reason  in



support of taking such a view is that, once such possession is



taken   and   the   land   is   so   vested,   the   Act   does   not   make   any



provision   for   re-vesting   of   land   in   the   owners/persons


                                      78



interested.     Reversion   of   title   or   possession   of   property



acquired,   which   has   vested   in   the   Government   or   in   the



authority   for   whose   benefit   such   lands   are   acquired,   is



unknown   to   the   scheme   of   the   Act.     To   introduce   such   a



concept by interpretative process would neither be permissible



nor proper.




Discussion   on   reverting   back   of   land   to   the   owners   in

terms of Section 48 of the Act




      A   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   (to   which   I   was   a



member)   in   the   recent   judgment   in   the   case   of  Offshore



Holdings   Pvt.   Ltd.  v.  Bangalore   Development   Authority   &   Ors.



[(2011)   3   SCC   139],   while   dealing   with   the   provisions   of



Sections   27   and   36   of   the   Bangalore   Development   Authority



Act   read   with   the   provisions   of  the   Land   Acquisition   Act   and



while referring to non-reversion of property to owners where it



is vested in the Government, held as under :




             "Where,   upon   completion   of   the

             acquisition   proceedings,   the   land   has

             vested  in   the   State  Government   in  terms

             of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act,

             the   acquisition   would   not   lapse   or


                                     79



            terminate   as   a   result   of   lapsing   of   the

            scheme under Section 27 of the BDA Act.

            An   argument   to   the   contrary   cannot   be

            accepted   for   the   reason   that   on   vesting,

            the land stands transferred and vested in

            the   State/Authority   free   from   all

            encumbrances   and   such   status   of   the

            property   is   incapable   of   being   altered   by

            fiction of law either by the State Act or by

            the   Central   Act.     Both   these   Acts  do   not

            contain   any   provision   in   terms   of   which

            property,   once   and   absolutely,   vested   in

            the State can be reverted to the owner on

            any condition.  There is no reversal of the

            title   and   possession   of   the   State.

            However,   this   may   not   be   true   in   cases

            where   acquisition   proceedings   are   still

            pending and land has not been vested in

            the Government in terms of Section 16 of

            the Land Acquisition Act."




      As   already   discussed,   no   award   is   required   to   be   made



before the provisions of Section 17(1) can be invoked.  Such an



approach   is   further   buttressed   by   another   factor   that   is



reflected  under  Section   17(3B)   of  the   Act.    The  amount  of  80



per   cent   of   the   estimated   compensation   deposited   under



Section  17(3A)  of  the  Act  is to  be finally  adjusted   against  the



award made under Section 11 in terms of Section 17(3B) of the



Act.  A cumulative reading of these provisions clearly suggests


                                         80



that provisions of Section 11A of the Act can hardly be applied



to the acquisition under Section 17 of the Act.




       Another   point   which   would   support   the   view   that   I   am



taking is with reference to the provisions of Section  48 of the



Act.   Section  48 empowers the Government to withdraw from



the   acquisition   of  the  land  of   which   possession   has   not  been



taken.   Where   the   Government   withdraws   from   such   an



acquisition,   it   is   its   duty   to   determine   the   amount   of



compensation   for   the   damages   suffered   by   the   owners   as   a



consequence   of   the   notice   or   any   other   proceeding   taken



thereunder, which amounts have to be paid as per provisions



of   Part   III.     Section   48,   thus,   is   a   clear   indication   that   the



power   of   the   Government   to   withdraw   the   acquisition   is



subject   to   the   limitation   stated   under   Section   48   itself.     The



scheme of Section 48 can be summarized as follows:




A. Except in cases provided under Section 36, the Government



   has the power to withdraw from the acquisition of any land;




B. Provided the possession of such land had not been taken;


                                      81



C. Government is liable to pay compensation for the damages



   suffered   by   the   owner   as   a   consequence   of   notice   or   any



   proceeding   thereunder   which   have   to   be   computed   in



   accordance with the provisions of Part III.




      There is no ambiguity in the language of Section 48 of the



Act   to   give   it   any   other   interpretation   except   that   the



Government is not vested with the power of withdrawing from



the acquisition of any land, of which the possession has been



taken.   Where   the   award   has   been   made   and   possession   has



been   taken,   the   land   vests   in   the   Government   in   terms   of



Section   16   of   the   Act.     On   the   contrary,   the   land   vests



absolutely   in   the   Government   free   from   all   encumbrances



where   award   has   not   been   made   and   only   possession   as



contemplated  under   Section   17(1)   of  the   Act  has  been  taken.



If the Government has no power to withdraw from acquisition



of any land, the possession of which has been taken, then by



no stretch of imagination can it be held that the Government



will   have   the   power   to   withdraw   from   the   acquisition   of   any



land where the land has vested in the Government or the land


                                      82



has   been   subsequently   transferred   in   favour   of   an   authority



for   whose   development   activity   the   lands   were   acquired.     In



the   case   of  Lt.   Governor   of   Himachal   Pradesh   and   Anr.   v.



Avinash Sharma [(1970) 2 SCC 149 ], this Court took the view



that   once   the   notification   under   Section   17(1)   of   the   Act   is



issued and land accordingly vested with the Government, the



notification   can   neither   be   cancelled   under   Section   21   of   the



General   Clauses   Act   nor   can   it   be   withdrawn   in   exercise   of



powers conferred by the Government under Section 48 of the



Act.     This   Court   in  Avinash   Sharma's   case  (supra)   held   as



under :




             "But these observations do not assist the

             case   of   the   appellants.   It   is   clearly

             implicit   in   the   observations   that   after

             possession has been taken pursuant to a

             notification   under   Section   17(1)   the   land

             is   vested   in   the   Government,   and   the

             notification   cannot   be   cancelled   under

             Section   21   of   the   General   Clauses   Act,

             nor   can   the   notification   be   withdrawn   in

             exercise   of   the   powers   under   Section   48

             of   the   Land   Acquisition   Act.   Any   other

             view would  enable  the  State  Government

             to   circumvent   the   specific   provision   by

             relying   upon   a   general   power.   When

             possession   of   the   land   is   taken   under

             Section   17(1),   the   land   vests   in   the


                                       83



             Government.   There   is   no   provision   by

             which   land   statutorily   vested   in   the

             Government reverts to the original owner

             by mere cancellation of the notification."


      In   another   case   titled  Rajasthan   Housing   Board   and



Others v. Shri Kishan  and Others [(1993) 2 SCC 84], this Court



was   concerned   with   a   notification   issued   under   Section   4   of



the   Act   and   also   a   notification   issued   a   few   days   after   the



issuance   of   the   first   notification,   under   Section   17(4)   of   the



Act.   These   were   challenged   on   the   ground   that   there   was   no



urgency and so, the provisions of Section 5A of the Act could



not   be   dispensed  with   and   that  there   were   structures   on   the



land which could  not have  been  acquired.   An  argument  was



also   raised   that   the   Government   had   intended   and,   in   fact,



issued  letters de-notifying the  lands acquired and, thus,  they



should   be   treated   as   having   been   de-notified   as   per   the



decision   of   the   Government.     In   these   circumstances,   the



Court held as under:




             "26.  We are of the  further opinion that in

             any event the government could not have

             withdrawn   from   the   acquisition   under

             Section   48   of   the   Act   inasmuch   as   the

             Government  had taken  possession  of  the


                                   84



          land.   Once   the   possession   of   the   land   is

          taken it is not open to the government to

          withdrawn from the acquisition. The very

          letter dated 24.2.1990 relied upon by the

          counsel   for   the   petitioner   recites   that

          "before   restoring   the   possession   to   the

          society   the   amount   of   development

          charges will have to be returned back...."

          This   shows   clearly   that   possession   was

          taken over by the Housing Board. Indeed

          the very tenor of the letter  is,  asking  the

          Housing   Board   as   to   what   development

          work   they   had   carried   out   on   the   land

          and   how   much   expenditure   they   had

          incurred   thereon,   which   could   not   have

          been   done   unless   the   Board   was   in

          possession   of   the   land.   The   Housing

          Board   was   asked   to   send   the   full

          particulars of the expenditure and not to

          carry   on   any   further   development   works

          on   that   land.   Reading   the   letter   as   a

          whole,   it'   cannot   but   be   said   that   the

          possession   of   the   land   was   taken   by   the

          government and was also delivered to the

          Housing   Board.   Since   the   possession   of

          the   land   was   taken,   there   could   be   no

          question   of   withdrawing   from   the

          acquisition under Section 48 of the Land

          Acquisition Act, 1894."




     In   the   case   of     Sanjeevanagar   Medical   &   Health



Employees' Cooperative Housing Society v. Mohd. Abdul Wahab



and  Others  [(1996) 3 SCC 600], it was held  that the acquired



land had already been transferred to the society for the benefit


                                      85



of   which   the   lands   were   acquired,   by   invoking   the   urgency



clauses.    The   question   of   reverting   acquired   land   had   not



arisen   in   this   case   directly,  as   the   Court   was   primarily



concerned   with   the   contention   that   the   notification   issued



under   Section   4   was   liable   to   be   quashed.     A   question,   with



regard   to   inconsistency   between   the   Central   and   the   State



Acts,   was   also   raised.   The   Court,   in   paragraph   12   of   the



judgment, held that by operation of Section 16, land had been



vested   in   the   State   free   from   all   encumbrances   and   while



referring   to   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in  Satendra   Prasad



Jain  (supra) reiterated the principle that `Divesting the title to



the   land   statutorily   vested   in   the   Government   and   reverting



the same to the owner is not contemplated under the Act. Only



Section   48  gives   power   to   withdraw  from   acquisition   that  too



before possession is taken.'




      This   principle   was   followed   by   another   Bench   of   this



Court   in   the   case   of  Bangalore   Development   Authority   and



Others   v.   R.   Hanumaiah   and   Others  [(2005)   12   SCC   508]



wherein, it was held as follows:


                                          86



              "46.   The   possession   of   the   land   in

              question was taken in the year 1966 after

              the   passing   of   the   award   by   the   Land

              Acquisition   Officer.   Thereafter,   the   land

              vested in the Government which was then

              transferred   to   CITB,   predecessor-in-

              interest of the appellant. After the vesting

              of the land and taking possession thereof,

              the   notification   for   acquiring   the   land

              could   not   be   withdrawn   or   cancelled   in

              exercise   of   powers   under   Section   48   of

              the   Land   Acquisition   Act.   Power   under

              Section   21   of   the   General   Clauses   Act

              cannot   be   exercised   after   vesting   of   the

              land         statutorily          in         the         State

              Government."



       Similarly,   even   in   the   case   of  National   Thermal   Power



Corporation Limited v.  Mahesh Dutta and Others [(2009) 8 SCC



339],   the   Government   had   desired   to   withdraw   lands   from



acquisition   after   the   lands   had   vested   in   it,   in   exercise   of   its



power under Section 48 of the Act.  Rejecting the contention of



the   State   in   paragraph   16   of   the   judgment,   the   Court   stated



that `it is a well settled proposition of law that in the event the



possession   of   the   land,   in   respect   whereof   a   notification   had



been issued, had been taken over, the State would be denuded



of   its   power   to   withdraw   from   the   acquisition   in   terms   of



Section   48  of  the   Act.'    The   Court   then   went   to   the   extent  of


                                       87



expressing   the   view   that   the   possession   taken   may   be



symbolic or actual.




      I must notice that in the case of U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow



through   its   Chairman   and   Another   v.   Kalra   Properties   (P)   Ltd.,



Lucknow & Others  [(1996) 3 SCC 124], a Bench of this Court



had   made   a   passing   observation   in   paragraph   3   of   the



judgment:




             "It   is   further   settled   law   that   once

             possession   is   taken   by   operation   of

             Section 17(2), the land vests in the State

             free   from   all   encumbrances   unless   a

             notification   under   Section   48(1)   is

             published   in   the   Gazette   withdrawing

             from   the   acquisition.     Section   11A,   as

             amended   by   the   Act   of   68   of   1984,

             therefore,   does   not   apply   and   the

             acquisition does not lapse".




      The   aforesaid   observations   that   the   State   may   issue   `a



notification   under   Section   48(1)'   and   this   notification   may   be



`published   in   the   Gazette   withdrawing   from   the   acquisition',



are nothing but an  obiter  of the Court without any discussion



thereto.     The   question   whether   the   acquisition   proceedings



lapse   or   that   the   notification   cancelling   acquisition   could   be


                                       88



issued after the possession is taken, where the land has vested



in the Government did not arise in that case.   The Court was



primarily concerned with three main questions:




1. What   was   the   effect   of   possession   of   land   subsequent   to



   notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act?




2. Whether   the   provisions   of   Section   11A   of   the   Act   would



   apply   to   the   acquisition   under   Section   17(1)   read   with



   Section 17(4) of the Act? and




3. How the market value should be determined?




      Firstly,   if   the   said   interpretation   is   given,   it   shall   be



contrary   to   the   specific   language   of   Section   48   of   the   Act.



Secondly, the learned Judges did not refer to any judgment of



this   Court   while   making   the   observation   that   `it   is   further



settled   law'.     I   have   referred   to   the   consistent   view   of   this



Court   right   from   the   year   1970   till   2011   and  no  judgment   to



the   contrary   has   been   brought   to   the   notice   of   the   Court.



Thus, I must hold that the observations made in paragraph 3,


                                       89



as   reproduced,   are   merely   an  obiter  and   not   a   binding



precedent.




      The lands which have been acquired under the provisions



of Section 17 of the Act are incapable of being reverted to the



owners/persons interested.   The Act does not make any such



provision and, thus, the Court is denuded of any such power.



The   Court   must   exercise   its   power   within   the   framework   of



law, i.e., the provisions of the Act.




      In   the   case   of   an   ordinary   acquisition,   if   the   land   has



vested  in the State Government then neither  the Government



nor   the   court   can   take   recourse   to   the   provisions   of   Section



48(1) of the Act, there the question of applying Section 11A of



the Act to acquisition proceedings under Section 17 of the Act



cannot   arise,   as  it   would   tantamount   to   achieving   something



indirectly   which   would   be   impermissible   to   be   achieved



directly.   For all the above reasons, I hold that Section 11A of



the   Act   has   no   application   to   the   acquisition   proceedings



under the provisions of Section 17 of the Act.


                                      90



      There   is   no   dispute   in   the   present   case   that   the



provisions   of   Section   11A   of   the   Act   have   not   been   complied



with.  Admittedly, the notification under Section 4(1) read with



Section   17(4)   was   published   on   17th  April,   2002,   declaration



under   Section   6   was   made   on   22nd  August,   2002   and   the



possession   of   the   property   was   taken   on   4th  February,   2003.



The award has been made on 9th  June, 2008, much after the



expiry of the prescribed period of two years under Section 11A



of the Act.  There being an admitted violation of the provisions



of Section 11A of the Act, the natural consequence is that its



rigours   would   be   attracted.   However,   the   most   pertinent



question   that   arises   for   consideration   is:   whether   the



provisions   of   Section   11A   of   the   Act   are   applicable   to   the



acquisition of land under Section 17 of the Act?




      The   main   thrust   of   submissions   on   behalf   of   the



appellants   is   that   the   provisions   of   Section   11A   of   the   Act



would   be   attracted   even   to   the   acquisition   proceedings



undertaken   by   the   appropriate   Government   in   exercise   of



powers   vested   in   it   under   Section   17   of   the   Act.     It   is


                                        91



contended that Section 17 in the scheme of the Act is at parity



to the normal and ordinary process of acquisition except that



it   is   a   power   to   be   exercised   in   urgent   basis.     The   other



provisions   like   publication   of   notification   under   Section   4,



declaration   under   Section   6,   notice   under   Sections   9   and   12



and passing of award under Section 11 of the Act are argued



to be essential features of an acquisition made under Section



17 of the Act as well.  Thus, it is submitted that the provisions



of   Section   11A   of   the   Act   would   also   apply   to   an   acquisition



made   under   Section   17   of   the   Act.     If   an   award   is   not   made



within two years from the date of declaration under Section 6



of   the   Act,   the   acquisition   proceedings   should   lapse



irrespective of whether the acquisition had commenced under



Section   4   by   invoking   powers   of   urgency   or   otherwise.     It   is



argued that there is no justification, whatsoever, for excluding



the   application   of   Section   11A   of   the   Act   from   acquisitions



made   under   Section   17   of   the   Act.     On   the   contrary,   the



contention   on   behalf   of   the   respondents   is   that   provisions   of



Section 11A of the Act have no application to the provisions of



Section   17   of   the   Act.     In   fact,   there   is   an   apparent,   though


                                        92



limited,   conflict   between   these   provisions.     The   very   purpose



and   object   of   the   Act   would   stand   defeated   if   provisions   of



Section   11A   of   the   Act   are   applied   to   the   acquisitions   under



Section 17 of the Act.




      I may now examine the scheme of the Act, with particular



reference to the  difference between acquisitions in exercise of



emergent   powers   under   Section   17   of   the   Act   and   the



acquisitions   made   otherwise.     In   both   the   cases,   notification



under Section 4(1) has to be published in accordance with the



provisions   of   the   Act.     Notification   under   Section   4   is   a  sine



qua non for commencement of the acquisition proceedings and



this has been the consistent view of this Court right from the



case of Narender Jeet Singh v. State of U.P. [(1970) 1 SCC 125]



wherein  the  Court   clearly   held   that  issuance   of  a  notification



under sub-section (1) of Section 4 is a condition precedent to



exercise   of   any   further   powers   under   the   Act   and   the



notification   issued   under   that   provision   should   comply   with



the   essential   requirements   of   law   under   that   provision.



Thereafter, the owners/persons interested have to be given an


                                         93



opportunity   to   file   objections   as   contemplated   under   Section



5A   of   the   Act   and   after   granting   them   hearing,   a   declaration



under Section 6 of the Act has to be published.  Subsequent to



the   publication   of   such   a   declaration,   notice   under   Section



9(1)   of   the   Act   has   to   be   issued   stating   the   intention   of   the



Government to take possession of the land and that claims for



compensation and for all interests in such land may be made



to   the   competent   authority.                Following   the   procedure



prescribed, an award has to be made under Section 11 of the



Act awarding compensation for acquisition of the land with its



complete details.  Under the scheme of the Act, in the event of



an   ordinary   acquisition   in   contradistinction   to   acquisition   in



exercise of emergent powers, if the award is not made within a



period  of two  years  from  publication  of  the  declaration  under



Section   6,   the   acquisition   proceedings   would   lapse.     In  these



proceedings,   the   possession   of   the   land   remains   with   the



claimant/owners   of   the   land   and   it   is   only   when   the   award



becomes final in terms of Section 12 of the Act, possession of



the   land   is   taken   and   the   acquired   land   vests   in   the



Government   free   from   all   encumbrances   under   Section   16   of


                                      94



the Act.




      Where   the   lands   are   acquired   in   exercise   of   emergent



powers of the State under Section 17 of the Act, a notification



under   Section   4(1)   of   the   Act   is   issued   and   the   notification



itself refers to the provisions of Section 17(1) as well as Section



17(4) of the Act.   A specific power is vested in the appropriate



Government to declare that provisions of Section 5A would not



be   applicable   to   such   acquisition.     Therefore,   there   is   no



obligation   upon   the   Collector/authority   concerned   to   invite



and decide upon objections in terms of Section 5A of the Act,



prior to publication of a declaration under Section 6 of the Act.



However,   notice   under   Section   9(1)   of   the   Act   has   to   be



published to completely and fully invoke the powers vested in



the State for taking possession of the land, in terms of Section



17(1)   of   the   Act.     After   the   expiry   of   15   days   from   such



publication under Section 9(1), the possession of the land can



be   validly   taken   by   the   Government,   whereupon   the   land



would   vest   absolutely   in   the   Government,   free   from   all



encumbrances.  In other words, for proper computation of the


                                       95



specified   period   of   15   days,   issuance   of   notification   under



Section   9(1)   of   the   Act   would   be   necessary,   but   it   cannot   be



held   to   be   mandatory   in   its   operation   so   as   to   render   the



execution   proceedings   invalid.     In   the   case   of  May   George



(supra), a Bench of this Court has expressed the view that the



notification   under   Section   9(1)   of   the   Act   as   contemplated



under Section 17(1) of the Act is not mandatory.




      Before   the   Government   takes   possession   of   the   land   in



exercise of its powers under Section 17(1) of the Act, it has to



comply   with   the   requirements   of   Section   17(3A)   of   the   Act.



The   amount   so   paid,   if   falls   short,   and/or   is   in   excess   of



compensation actually due to the land owners, the same shall



be   determined   and   adjusted   while   making   the   final   award



under   Section   11   of   the   Act.     It   is   evident   that   both   these



acquisitions have distinct schemes of acquisition.   Section 17



of  the   Act   itself   refers  to   some   other   provisions,   like   Sections



5A,   9,   11,   and   31   of   the   Act.     Wherever   such   reference   was



considered necessary by the Legislature, it has been so made.



Thus,  there  is   no  occasion   for   the   Court   to   read  into  Section


                                       96



17, the language of Section 11A of the Act which has not been



provided   by   the   Legislature;   more   so   when   doing   so   would



destroy   or   frustrate   the   very   object   of   the   urgent   acquisition.



Marked   distinction   between   the   implementation   of   these   two



types   of   acquisition   schemes   contained   in   the   Act   is   clearly



suggestive that these schemes operate in their respective fields



without any contradiction.   Hence, the Court would adopt an



interpretation which would further such a cause, rather than



the one which will go contra to the very scheme of the Act.




      In  my   considered   view,  it   will   be   difficult   for   me  to  hold



that   the   provisions   of   Section   11A   of   the   Act,   despite   being



mandatory,   would   apply   to   the   scheme   of   acquisition



contained under Section 17 of the Act.




Whether the Claimants can be granted any relief even on

equitable grounds?




      The facts, as already noticed by me above, are hardly in



dispute.     Admittedly,   the   possession   of   the   land   had   been



taken   on   4th  February,   2002   and   the   Writ   Petition   No.   2225



was   filed   by   the   petitioners   in   the   year   2006   i.e.   after   the


                                        97



possession   has   been   taken.     In   terms   of   Section   17(1)   of   the



Act,   the   land   has   been   vested   absolutely   and   free   from   all



encumbrances   in   the   Government.     After   vesting   of   the   land,



the   development   activity   had   been   carried   out   over   the   years



and   it   is   informed   that   Sector   88,   NOIDA   is   fully   developed



and operational.




      Once the development activity has been completed in the



entire   sector,   will   it   be   equitable   to   release   the   lands   from



acquisition?     Even  if   for  the   sake  of  argument,   it  is   assumed



that there is some merit in the contention raised on behalf of



the   appellant,   the   answer   has   to   be   in   the   negative.     It   is



settled   canon   of   equitable   jurisdiction   that   the   person   who



feels aggrieved by an action of the State should approach the



Court   without   any   unnecessary  delay,   particularly   in   cases



such as the present one.  While the notification under Section



4 read with Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act was issued on



14th  April,   2002   and   possession   taken   on   4th  February,   2003



the   writ   petitions   in   question   were   filed   in   August   2006,   i.e.,



more   than   four   years   subsequent   to   the   issuance   of   the


                                       98



notification under Section 4.   It was contended that the cause



of   action   to   challenge   the   acquisition   proceedings   arose   only



after   the   period   of   two   years   had   lapsed   from   the   date   of



issuance of the notification.  Even if that be so, still there is an



unexplained   and   undue   delay   of   more   than   two   years   in



approaching   the   Court.     This   would   itself   disentitle   the



appellants   to   claim   any   equitable   relief   in   the   facts   and



circumstances of the present case.




      I   must   not   be   understood   to   say   that   in   every   case   of



delay,  per   se,   the   Court   would   decline   to   exercise   its



jurisdiction   if   the   party   to   the  lis  can   otherwise   be   granted



relief in accordance with law.   This has to be decided keeping



in view the facts and circumstances of a given case.




      It   is   not  in  dispute   and,   in  fact,   can   hardly   be   disputed



that in the intervening period of nearly ten years, the acquired



areas have fully developed. Not only this, it is informed during



the course of hearing that the award was finally  made by the



authorities on 9th June, 2008 and has been accepted by nearly



97.6   per   cent   of   the   owners   whose   lands   were   acquired   vide


                                        99



the   said   notification.     In   other   words,   nearly   all   land   owners



have   accepted   the   award   and   permitted   the   development



activity   to   be   carried   out.     This   conduct   of   the   owners   as   a



whole   would   again   be   a   factor   which   will   weigh   against   the



grant of any relief to the appellants.   Huge amounts of money



and resources of  the State, as well as other bodies or persons



have been invested on the development of this sector which is



stated to be an industrial sector.   It will be unjust and unfair



to   uproot   such   a   developed   sector   on   the   plea   raised   by   the



present appellants.     In this  view, I am fully supported  by  the



judgment   of   a   Division   Bench   of   this   Court,   to   which   my



learned   brother   (Ganguly,   J.)   was   a   member,   in   the   case   of



Tamil   Nadu   Housing   Board  v.  L.   Chandrasekaran   (Dead)   by



Lrs.   &   Ors.  [(2010)   2   SCC   786].     The   Bench   was   primarily



dealing   with   the   question   of   re-conveyance   of   the   acquired



lands on the grounds of discrimination and arbitrariness.  The



High   Court   had   passed   a   direction   against   the   Board   to   re-



convey   the   acquired   land,   which   was   held   by   this   Court,   on



appeal,  to   be   contrary   to   the   provisions   of   Section   48   of   the



Act.   This Court settled the point of law holding  that it is not


                                            100



appropriate for the Court to quash the acquisition proceedings



at   the   instance   of   one   or   two   land   owners,   where   the



development had taken place and majority of the land owners



had   not   challenged   the   acquisition.     The   Court,   while   relying



upon   the   case   of  A.S.   Naidu  v.  State   of   Tamil   Nadu  [(2010)   2



SCC 801] held as under:




             "15.      The   first   issue   which   requires
             consideration is whether the order passed
             by this  Court  in  A.S. Naidu  case  has the
             effect   of   nullifying   the   acquisition   in   its
             entirety.   In  this   context,   it   is   apposite   to
             mention that neither the appellant Board
             nor   have   the   respondents   placed   before
             the   Court   copies   of   the   writ   petitions   in
             which   the   acquisition   proceedings   were
             challenged,   order(s)   passed   by   the   High
             Court   and   the   special   leave   petitions
             which   were   disposed   of   by   this   Court   on
             21-8-19903  and   without   going   through
             those   documents,   it   is   not   possible   to
             record   a   finding   that   while   disposing   of
             the   special   leave   petitions   preferred   by
             A.S.   Naidu   and   others,   this   Court   had
             quashed            the          entire         acquisition
             proceedings.   So   far   as   A.S.   Naidu   is
             concerned, he did not even make a prayer
             before   the   High   Court   for   quashing   the
             preliminary   notification   issued   under
             Section 4(1) of the Act.


             16.  This is evident from the prayer made
             by him in Writ Petition No. 7499 of 1983,
             which reads as under:


                      "For   the   reasons   stated   in   the
                      accompanying   affidavit,   it   is   most
                      respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble
                      Court may be pleased to issue a writ


                         101



      of certiorari or any other proceeding
      or   any   other   appropriate   writ   or
      direction or order in the nature of a
      writ to call for the records of the first
      respondent   relating   to   GOMs   No.
      1502,           Housing         and           Urban
      Development   Department   dated   7-
      11-1978   published   in   the   Tamil
      Nadu             Government                  Gazette
      Extraordinary   dated   10-11-1978   in
      Part II Section 2 on pp. 22 to 26 and
      quash   the   said   notification   issued
      under   Section   6   of   the   Land
      Acquisition   Act,   1894   insofar   as   it
      relates to the land in the petitioners'
      layout   approved   by   the   Director   of
      Town   Planning   in   LPDM/DTP/2/75
      dated 7-3-1975 in Survey Nos. 254,
      257,   258,   260,   268   and   271   in
      Mogapperi   Village,   No.   81,   Block   V,
      Saidapet   Taluk,   Chingleput   District
      and render justice."


From   the   above   reproduced   prayer

clause,   it   is   crystal   clear   that   the   only

relief   sought   by   Shri   A.S.   Naidu   was   for

quashing   the   notification   issued   under

Section   6   insofar   it   related   to   the   land

falling in Survey Nos. 254, 257, 258, 260,

268   and   271   in   Mogapperi   Village,   No.

81,   Block   V,   Saidapet   Taluk   and   in   the

absence   of   a   specific   prayer   having   been

made   in   that   regard,   neither   the   High

Court nor this Court could have quashed

the entire acquisition. This appears to be

the reason why the Division Bench of the

High   Court,   while   disposing   of   Writ

Appeals   Nos.   676   of   1997   and   8-9   of

1998   observed   that   quashing   of

acquisition   by   this   Court   was   only   in

relation   to   the   land   of   the   petitioner   of

that   case   and,   at   this   belated   stage,   we

are   not   inclined   to   declare   that   order

dated   21-8-19903  passed   by   this   Court

had   the   effect   of   nullifying   the   entire

acquisition   and  that  too  by  ignoring  that


                             102



the   appellant   Board   has   already   utilised

portion   of   the   acquired   land   for   housing

and other purposes. Any such inferential

conclusion           will           have         disastrous

consequences   inasmuch   as   it   will   result

in uprooting  those who may  have settled

in the flats or houses constructed by the

appellant   Board   or   who   may   have   built

their   houses   on   the   allotted   plots   or

undertaken other activities.


   XXX                       XXX                   XXX


26.  A   glance   at   the   impugned   order
shows that the Division Bench did not at
all advert to the factual matrix of the case
and   the   reasons   incorporated   in   the
Government's   decision   not   to   reconvey
the acquired land to the respondents. The
Division   Bench   also   did   not   examine   the
correctness   or   otherwise   of   the   order
passed   by   the   learned   Single   Judge   and
allowed   the   appeals   preferred   by   the
respondents simply by relying upon order
dated   18-2-2000   passed   in   Writ   Appeal
No.   2430   of   1999   and   that   too   without
even   making   an   endeavour   to   find   out
whether   the   two   cases   were   similar.   In
our   view,   the   direction   given   by   the
Division Bench to the appellant Board to
reconvey   the   acquired   land   to   the
respondents   is   per   se   against   the   plain
language   of   Section   48-B   of   the   Act   in
terms of which only the Government can
transfer the acquired land if it is satisfied
that   the   same   is   not   required   for   the
purpose   for   which   it   was   acquired   or   for
any   other   public   purpose.   The   appellant
Board   is   not   an   authority   competent   to
transfer the acquired land to the original
owner.   Therefore,   the   Division   Bench   of
the   High   Court   could   not   have   issued   a
mandamus   to   the   appellant   Board   to
reconvey   the   acquired   land   to   the
respondents. As a matter of fact, the High
Court   could   not   have   issued   such
direction   even   to   the   Government


                         103



because   the   acquired   land   had   already
been   transferred   to   the   appellant   Board
and   the   latter   had   utilised   substantial
portion   thereof   for   execution   of   the
housing   scheme   and   other   public
purposes.


27.  There   is   one   more   reason   why   the
impugned   judgment   deserves   to   be   set
aside.   Undisputedly,   the   land   of   the
respondents   forms   part   of   large   chunk
which   was   acquired   for   execution   of   the
housing   scheme.   The   report   sent   by   the
appellant Board to the State Government
shows   that   the   purpose   for   which   the
land was acquired is still subsisting. The
respondents   had   neither   pleaded   before
the   High   Court   nor   was   any   material
produced by them to show that the report
which   formed   basis   of   the   Government's
decision   not   to   entertain   their   prayer   for
reconveyance   of   the   land   was   vitiated   by
mala   fides   or   that   any   extraneous   or
irrelevant   factor   had   influenced   the
decision-making   process   or   that   there
was   violation   of   the   rules   of   natural
justice.   Therefore,   the   Division   Bench   of
the   High   Court   could   not   have   exercised
the power of judicial review and indirectly
annulled   the   decision   contained   in
communication dated 18-3-1999.


28.  It need no emphasis that in exercise
of   power   under   Section   48-B   of   the   Act,
the Government can release the acquired
land   only   till   the   same   continues   to   vest
in it and that too if it is satisfied that the
acquired   land   is   not   needed   for   the
purpose   for   which   it   was   acquired   or   for
any   other   public   purpose.   To   put   it
differently,   if   the   acquired   land   has
already been transferred to other agency,
the   Government   cannot   exercise   power
under   Section   48-B   of   the   Act   and
reconvey   the   same   to   the   original   owner.
In   any   case,   the   Government   cannot   be
compelled   to   reconvey   the   land   to   the
original owner if the same can be utilised


                                        104



              for any public purpose other than the one
              for which it was acquired."




       I am of the considered view that what has been stated by



the learned Judges in that case is squarely applicable, even on



facts,   to   the   present   case.     Firstly,   there   is   no   merit   in   the



contentions   of   law   raised   by   the   appellants,   which   I   have



already rejected. Secondly, even on equity, the appellants have



no case.




       Before   I   part   with   this   file,   I   cannot   ignore   one   very



important   aspect   which   has   come   to   my   notice   during   the



hearing of the case and which, as stated at the Bar, is an often



repeated   default   on  the   part   of   the   Government   Departments



causing   undue   inconvenience,   harassment,   hardship   and



ultimately   resulting   in   the   acquisition   itself   being   inequitable



against   the   land   owners/persons   interested   therein.     The



declaration under  Section 6 was made on 22nd  August, 2002,



the notice under Section 9(1) had been issued and possession



of   the   land   was   taken   on   4th  February,   2003.     In   the   normal



course   and   as   per   the   requirements   of   the   provisions   of



Section   17(3A)   read   with   Section   17(1),   80   per   cent   of   the


                                      105



estimated   compensation   ought   to   have   been   paid   to   the



owners of the land/persons interested, within that period prior



to taking possession and/or, in any case, within a very limited



and   reasonable   time.     This   I   am   only   noticing   subject   to   my



finding that there is unequivocal statutory obligation upon the



respondents   to   pay   the   amount   prior   to   taking   possession   of



the land in question.   However, the award made on 9th  June,



2008   would   have   otherwise   vitiated   the   entire   acquisition



proceedings, but for the fact that, as held by me above and for



reasons recorded supra that Section 11A does not apply to the



acquisition   made   in   exercise   of   emergent   powers   in   terms   of



Section  17  of the  Act.   Still,  to  do things  within a  reasonable



time   is   an   obligation   of   the   State,   as   is   imposed   by   the



Legislature   itself   and   even   otherwise   as   per   the   canons   of



proper   governance,   i.e.,  vigilantibus,   non   dormientibus,   jura



subveniunt,   which   means   the   laws   assist   those   who   are



vigilant,   not   those   who   sleep   over   their   rights.     According   to



Respondent   No.2,   they   had   deposited   10   per   cent   of   the



estimated compensation prior to issuance of notification under



Section 4, i.e., 17th April, 2002 and 70 per cent of the amount


                                      106



was deposited with the Government on 8/14th July, 2002 by a



cheque.     The   amount   deposited   was   nearly  `  6,66,00,000/-


and   odd.     For   reasons   best   known   to   the   State   Government,



this amount was not disbursed to the claimants until passing



of the award.  In other words, the amount was made available



to the Government and its authorities for disbursement to the



owner/claimants   prior   to   (or   soon   after)   taking   of   the



possession, which was taken on 4th  February, 2003,   but still



the   claimants   were   deprived   of   their   legitimate   dues   without



any   justification   or   reason.     In   order   to   show   this,   learned



counsel   appearing   for   respondent   No.2   had   even   shown   the



records to the Court.   It was also the duty of respondent No.2



to ensure that the payments were made to the claimants prior



to taking of possession but, in any case, it was an unequivocal



statutory   obligation   on   the   part   of   the   State/Collector   to



ensure that the payments were made to the claimants in terms



of   Section   17(1)   read   with   Section   17(3A)   prior   to   taking   of



possession.     No   justification   whatsoever   had   been   advanced



and  can be advanced for  such  an intentional  default  and the



casual attitude of the concerned  officers/officials in the  State


                                         107



hierarchy.




       These   authorities   are   instrumentalities   of   the   State   and



the officers are empowered to exercise the power on behalf of



the State.   Such exercise of power attains greater significance



when   it   arises   from   the   statutory   provisions.   The   level   of



expectation   of   timely   and   just   performance   of   duty   is   higher,



as   compared   to   the   cases   where   the   power   is   executively



exercised   in   discharge   of   its   regular   business.     Thus,   all



administrative   norms   and   principles   of   fair   performance   are



applicable   to   them   with   equal   force,   as   they   are   to   the



Government department, if not with a greater rigour.   The well



established precepts of public trust and public accountability



are   fully   applicable   to   the   functions   which   emerge   from   the



public   servants  or  even  the   persons  holding   public  office.     In



the case of State of Bihar v. Subhash Singh [(1997) 4 SCC 430],



this Court, in exercise of the powers of judicial review, stated



that   the   doctrine   of   `full   faith   and   credit'   applies   to   the   acts



done by the officers in the hierarchy of the State.  They have to



faithfully discharge their duties to elongate public purpose.


                                       108



      The concept of public accountability and performance of



functions   takes   in   its   ambit,   proper   and   timely   action   in



accordance   with   law.   Public   duty  and   public  obligation   both



are essentials of good administration whether by the State or



its  instrumentalities.    In the case of  Centre  for Public Interest



Litigation   &  Anr.  v.  Union of  India   & Anr.  [(2005)  8  SCC  202],



this Court declared the dictum that State actions causing loss



are actionable under public law. This is a result of innovation,



a   new   tool   with   the   courts   which   are   the   protectors   of   civil



liberties   of   the   citizens   and   would   ensure   protection   against



devastating   results   of   State   action.   The   principles   of   public



accountability and transparency in State action are applicable



to   cases   of   executive   or   statutory   exercise   of   power,   besides



requiring that such actions also not lack bona fides.  All these



principles   enunciated   by   the   Court   over   a   passage   of   time



clearly   mandate   that   public   officers   are   answerable   for   both



their inaction and irresponsible actions.  If what ought to have



been   done   is   not   done,   responsibility   should   be   fixed   on   the



erring   officers;   then   alone,   the   real   public   purpose   of   an



answerable administration would be satisfied.


                                        109



      The   doctrine   of   `full   faith   and   credit'   applies   to   the   acts



done   by   the   officers.   There   is   a   presumptive   evidence   of



regularity in official acts, done or performed, and there should



be   faithful   discharge   of   duties   to   elongate   public   purpose   in



accordance   with   the   procedure   prescribed.     Avoidance   and



delay in decision making process in Government hierarchy is a



matter of growing concern.   Sometimes delayed decisions can



cause prejudice to the rights of the parties besides there being



violation   of   the   statutory   rule.     This   Court   had   occasion   to



express   its   concern   in   different   cases   from   time   to   time   in



relation   to   such   matters.     In   the   case   of  State   of   Andhra



Pradesh  v. Food Corporation   of   India  [(2004)  13  SCC 53], this



Court observed that it is a known fact that in transactions of



Government   business,   no   one   would   own   personal



responsibility   and   decisions   would   be   leisurely   taken   at



various levels.




      Principles of public accountability are applicable to such



officers/officials   with   all   their   rigour.     Greater   the   power   to



decide,   higher   is   the   responsibility   to   be   just   and   fair.     The


                                         110



dimensions   of   administrative   law   permit   judicial   intervention



in   decisions,   though   of   administrative   nature,   which   are  ex



facie  discriminatory.   The adverse impact of lack of probity in



discharge of public duties can result in varied defects, not only



in   the   decision   making   process   but   in   the   final   decision   as



well.     Every   officer   in   the   hierarchy   of   the   State,   by   virtue   of



his being `public officer' or `public servant', is accountable for



his   decisions   to   the   public   as   well   as   to   the   State.     This



concept   of   dual   responsibility   should   be   applied   with   its



rigours in the larger public interest and for proper governance.




       I   find   no   justification,   whatsoever,   for   the   Government,



despite deposit by the beneficiary, not to pay 80 per cent of the



estimated   compensation  due   to   the   claimants   within   the



requisite time and not even within the reasonable time.  It was



breach   of   statutory   and   governance   obligation   of   the   State's



officers/officials to pay the amount to the claimants after more



than five years.  It is expected of the State officers not to forget



that   these   are   compulsory   acquisitions   in   exercise   of   State's



power   of   eminent   domain   and   the   legislative   intent   behind


                                     111



providing   safeguards   and   some   benefits   against                such



acquisition   ought   not   to   be   frustrated   by   inaction   and



omissions   on   the   part   of   the   officers/officials.     There   being



patent   unexplained   mistakes,   omissions   and   errors,



committed   by   the   officers/officials   in   the   State   of   Uttar



Pradesh   in   dealing   with   this   entire   matter,   I   hereby   impose



cost of ` 1,00,000/- on the State Government which at the first


instance shall be paid by the State to the owners of the land,



i.e., present appellants or persons situated alike. However this



amount   shall   be   recovered   from   the   salary   of   all   the



officers/officials found guilty by the State which shall conduct



an   inquiry   for   that   purpose   in   accordance   with   law.     The



inquiry shall be completed within a period of six months from



today and a report shall be submitted to the Secretary General



of this Court on the administrative side.  Imperatively, it must



follow that the Central Government and all State Governments



must   issue   appropriate   directions   to   ensure   that   there   is   no



harassment,   hardship   or   inequality   caused   to   the



owners/persons interested in the lands acquired by the State,



in   exercise   of   its   powers   of   eminent   domain   under   Section


                                        112



17(1) of the Act.   Wherever the payments are not made within



time   and   appropriate   steps   are   not   taken   to   finalize   the



acquisition   of   the   land,   the   concerned   Government   should



take   appropriate   disciplinary   action   against   the   erring



officers/officials involved in and responsible for the process of



acquisition.




       I will prefer to record my conclusions and also answer the



four   legal   questions   (`A'   to   `D')   as   framed   in   the   judgment   by



my learned brother.  They are as follows:




(A)I   hold   and   declare   that   Section   11A   of   the   Act   has   no



   application to the acquisition proceedings conducted under



   the provisions of Section 17 of the Act;




       Once the acquired land has vested in the Government in



       terms   of   Section   16   or   17(1)   of   the   Act,   possession   of



       which has already been taken, such land is incapable of



       being   re-vested   or   reverted   to   the   owners/persons



       interested therein, for lack of any statutory provision for



       the same under the Act.


                                      113



(B)The   provisions   of   Section   17(3A)   of   the   Act,   on   their   bare



   reading,   suggest  that  the   said   provision   is   mandatory   but,



   as no consequences of default have been prescribed by the



   Legislature   in   that   provision,   thus,   it   will   hardly   be



   permissible for the Court to read into the said provision any



   drastic   consequences   much   less   lapsing   of   entire



   acquisition   proceedings.     In   other   words,   default   in



   complying with provisions of Section 17(3A) cannot result in



   invalidating   or   vitiating   the   entire   acquisition   proceedings,



   particularly   when   the   possession   of   the   acquired   land   has



   been  taken   and it  has  vested  in  the   Government  free  from



   all encumbrances.




(C)Keeping   in   view   the   scheme   of   the   Act,   the   provisions   of



   Section   17   of   the   Act   can   be   construed   strictly   but   such



   interpretation   must   be   coupled   with   the   doctrine   of   literal



   and   contextual   interpretation,   while   ensuring   that   the



   object   of   the   legislation   is   not   defeated   by   such   an



   interpretation.          Strict   compliance   to   the   conditions



   contemplated   under   Section   17   of  the   Act  should   be   given


                                      114



   effect   to   but   within   the   framework   of   the   statute,   without



   making any additions to the language of the section.




(D) Once   the   right   to   property   ceases   to   be   a   Fundamental



   Right after omission of Articles 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of



   India,   the   addition   of   Articles   31A   and   300A   by   the   44th



   Constitutional   Amendment,   1978,   cannot   place   the   legal



   right   to   property   at   the   same   pedestal   to   that   of   a



   fundamental   right   falling   under   Chapter   III   of   the



   Constitution.     It   has   been   clearly   held   by   the   Courts   that



   the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act are not violative



   of Article 14 of the Constitution.   The rights of the citizens



   and   interest   of   the   State   can   be   balanced   under   the



   provisions   of   the   Act,   without   any   violation   of   the



   Constitutional mandate.




      Besides   answering   the   questions   of   law   and   stating   my



conclusions as above, it is both appropriate and necessary to



pass   certain   directive   orders   to   ensure   the   maintenance   of



balance between the might of the State on the one hand and


                                          115



the   rights   of   land   owners   on   the   other.     It   is,   therefore,



necessary to issue the following directions :




(i)    The   Government/acquiring   authority   shall   be   liable   to


       pay   interest   at   the   rate   of   15   per   cent  per   annum   with



       reference   to   or   alike   the   provisions   of   Section   34   of   the



       Act,   after   the   expiry   of   15   days   from   issuance   of



       notification   under   Section   9(1)   of   the   Act,   and   from   the



       date on which the possession of the land is taken, till the



       amount of 80 per cent  of the estimated compensation is



       paid to the claimants.




       In   the   facts   of   the   present   case,   it   is   clear   that   80   per



       cent   of   the   estimated   compensation   had   been   deposited



       by the beneficiary.  However, it is no way clear on record



       that   these   amounts   had   actually   been   received   by   the



       owners/interested   persons.     Where   the   amounts   have



       been paid beyond the period as stated in Section 17(3A),



       the claimants still would be entitled to the rate of interest



       afore-indicated.     Interest   should   be   computed   from   the



       date   of   the   notification   till   the   date   of   payment   to   the


                                        116



         claimants.   The Government is also liable to pay interest



         as   afore-indicated   on   the   balance   amount   determined



         upon making of an award in accordance with Section 11



         of the Act.




(ii)     The   Central   Government   and   all   the   State   Governments


         shall issue appropriate and uniform  guidelines, within 8



         weeks   from   today,  to   ensure   that   the   land   owners   and



         the persons interested in the lands cquired by the State



         or   its   instrumentalities   are   not   put   to   any   undue



         harassment,   hardship   and   inequity   because   of   inaction



         and   omission   on   the   part   of   the   acquiring   authority,   in



         cases  of  urgent   acquisition  under   Section   17  of  the  Act.



         The   Government   should   ensure   timely   action   for



         acquisition and payment of compensation in terms of the



         provisions   of   the   Act,   particularly   Section   17(3A)   of   the



         Act, as explained in this judgment.




(iii)    Wherever   the   Government   exercises   its   power   under



         Section 17(1) of the Act and there is default in deposit of



         the   amount   in   terms   of   Section   17(3A)   of   the   Act,   as


                                       117



        explained   in   this   judgment,   the   concerned   Government



        shall   take   appropriate   disciplinary   action   against   the



        erring   officers/officials   including   making   good   the   loss



        caused   to   the   Government   revenue   on   account   of   the



        liabilities towards interest  or otherwise, because of such



        undue delay on the part of such officers/officials;




(iv)    In  this case, the  claimants would be entitled  to the cost


        of  `  1,00,000/-   (Rupees   one   lakh   only)   which   shall   be


        deposited at the first instance by the State Government of



        Uttar   Pradesh   and   then   would   be   recovered   from   the



        salaries   of   the   defaulting/erring   officers/officials   in



        accordance   with   law.   The   inquiry   shall   be   completed



        within   a   period   of   six   months   from   today   and   a   report



        shall be submitted to the Secretary General of this Court



        on the administrative side immediately thereafter.




        In   result,   the   appeal   is   accordingly   dismissed   with   the



above directions.


                         118



                                                                         ..

                                ...........................................J.

                            [Swatanter Kumar]

New Delhi;

August 18, 2011


                                                          REPORTABLE


             IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

               CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION




                 CIVIL APPEAL NO.24 OF 2009




M/s. Delhi Airtech Services

Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.                                       ... Appellants


                                  Versus


State of U.P. & Anr.                                   ... Respondents


                           J U D G M E N T




Ganguly, J.




1.    The   facts   giving   rise   to   the   present   appeal   are   simple



and   fall   within   a   narrow   compass.   However,   they   raise



questions   which   are   of   public   importance   and   legal



significance.   Thus, it will be appropriate for us to state the



questions of law at the very threshold:




A.    When   the   Government,   in   exercise   of   its   emergency



      powers   under  Section   17   of  the   Land  Acquisition   Act,



      1894   (for   short   the   `Act')   acquires   lands,   which   have



      since   vested   in   the   State,   can   such   an   acquisition



      proceeding   lapse  and   consequently   the   land   can   be





                                    119


      transferred   to   the   owners/persons   interested   in   the



      event   of  default   by   the   State,   in   complying  with   the



      provisions of Section 11A of the Act?




B.    Whether the provisions of Section 17(3A) of the Act are



      mandatory   or   directory?     In   either   event,   would  non-



      compliance   with   this   Section  have   the   effect   of



      invalidating   or   vitiating   the   entire   acquisition



      proceedings,   even   where   the   land   has     vested   in   the



      State in terms of Section 17(1) of the Act?




C.    Whether with the invoking of the emergency provisions



      which have the effect of dispensing with the provision



      of   hearing   under   Section   5A   of   the   Act,   the   Court   is



      entitled   to  construe   the   emergency   provisions   strictly,



      being   drastic   provisions   in   an   exproprietory   law   and



      consider   the   safeguards   inbuilt   in   Section   17(3A)



      against   such   drastic   provisions   as   conditions



      precedent   and   mandatory   for   a   valid   exercise   of



      emergency provisions.




D.    Whether   having   regard   to   the   principle   of



      reasonableness   being   a   basic   component   of





                                    120


      fundamental rights under the Constitution, this Court



      has   to   construe   the   provisions   of   the   said   Act,   a   pre-



      constitutional   law   in   consonance   with   reason   and



      justice-the   fundamental   tenets   of   Article   14   and   thus



      arrive at a balanced interpretation of the interest of the



      State as against the rights of citizens or land owners.




FACTS:




2.    The   appellant   No.1   is   a   company   duly   incorporated


      under   the   provisions   of   the   Indian   Companies   Act,



      1956 and is alleged to be the owner of the land sought



      to   be   acquired   by   the   respondents.     The   appellant's



      land,   admeasuring   about   2-06-1/3-0   Bighas   situated



      in Village Haldauni, Tehsil and Pargana Dadri, District



      Gautam Budh Nagar which is  abadi  land, was sought



      to be acquired by the appropriate Government under a



      notification   dated   17th  April,   2002   issued   under



      Section   4(1)   read with  Sections  17(1)  and  17(4)   of  the



      Act.  This land was acquired for the planned industrial



      development   in   District   Gautam   Budh   Nagar   through



      the   New   Okhla   Industrial   Development   Authority





                                     121


      (NOIDA).        The   notification   also   stated   that   the



      provisions of Section 5A of the Act shall not apply.   In



      pursuance to the said notification, a declaration under



      Section   6   of   the   Act   was   published   on   22nd  August,



      2002,   declaring   the   area   which   was   required   by   the



      Government. It also stated that after expiry of 15 days



      from   the   date   of   the   publication   of   the   notification



      under   sub-section   (1)   of   Section   9   of   the   Act,



      possession   of   the   acquired   land   shall   be   taken.     The



      appellants   have   alleged   that   they   did   not   receive   any



      notice under  Section 9(1) of the Act but possession of



      the land was nevertheless taken on 4th February, 2003.



      According to the appellants, even after a lapse of more



      than three and a half years after the declaration under



      Section   6   of   the   Act,   no   award   had   been   made   and



      published.




3.    The appellants further alleged that, despite inordinate


      delay,   they   were   neither   paid   80   per   cent   of   the



      estimated   compensation   in   terms   of   Section   17(3A)   of



      the Act at the time of taking of possession, nor had the



      Collector passed an award within two years of making




                                   122


      the   declaration   under   Section   17(1),   as   required   by



      Section   11A   of   the   Act.   It   was   the   case   of   the



      appellants that this has the effect of vitiating the entire



      acquisition          proceedings.                Non-payment            of



      compensation   and   conduct   of   the   Government



      compelled   the   appellants   to   file   a   writ   petition   in   the



      High   Court   of   Allahabad   praying   for   issuance   of   an



      order   or   direction   in   the   nature   of  certiorari  or   any



      other   writ,   and   not   to   create   any   encumbrance   or



      interest   on   the   land   of   the   appellants.   Further,   they



      prayed   that   the   acquisition   proceedings,   insofar   as



      they   relate   to   the   land   of   the   appellants,   be   declared



      void  ab  initio  and   that  the   respondents   be   directed  to



      return   the   land   under   the   possession   of   the



      Government to the owners. Lastly, the appellants pray



      that   the   respondents/Government   be   directed   to   pay



      damages for use and occupation of the land.




4.    To   this   writ   petition,   on   behalf   of   NOIDA   a   counter


      affidavit was filed in the High Court, denying that the



      acquired  land   was  in  fact  part   of  abadi  land.    NOIDA



      also stated that 80 per cent compensation in terms of




                                     123


      Section   17(3A)   had   been   deposited   with   the   state



      authorities.     The   land   had   been   acquired   for   planned



      development   of   NOIDA   and   it   was   in   the   physical



      possession   of   the   said   authority.     Possession   of   the



      land   had   been   taken   on   4th  February,   2003   and   no



      right   had   survived   in   favour   of   the   appellant   as   the



      land had vested in the Government.




5.    The   High   Court,   vide   its   judgment   dated   28th  August,


      2006,   dismissed   the   writ   petition.   The   High   Court



      relied   upon  the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of


      Satendra   Prasad   Jain   &   Ors.  v.  State   of   U.P.   &


      Ors.,   [AIR   1993   SC   2517   =   (1993)   4   SCC   369],   and


      dismissed   the   petition   as   the   High   Court   held   that



      provisions   of  Section   11A   of  the   Act  are   not   attracted



      to   proceedings   for   acquisition   by   the   Government



      under   Section   17   of   the   Act.     However,   liberty   was



      granted   to   the   appellants   to   pray   for   grant   of



      appropriate   compensation   in   accordance   with   law



      before the competent forum.





                                    124


6.    Aggrieved   by   the   said   order   of   the   High   Court,   the


      appellants have filed the present appeal impugning the



      judgment dated 28th August, 2006.




7.    In   the   counter   affidavit   filed   before   this   Court   by



      NOIDA, the stand in the counter filed  before the High



      Court has been reiterated, with an additional fact that



      the   sector   in   question   was   designated   as   industrial



      area,   and,   after   development   activity   was   completed,



      allotment   has   been   made   and   possession   of   these



      industrial   plots   has   also   handed   over   to   such



      entrepreneurs/allottees.   This   falls   under   Sector   88   of



      the NOIDA City. The rest of the allegations made in the



      writ   petition,   except   the   dates   in   question,   have   been



      disputed.




8.    It   has   also   been   stated   at   the   Bar   by   the   State


      Counsel,   on  the   basis   of   the   record,   without   filing   an



      affidavit, despite directions given to that effect by this



      Court   on   5.1.2009,   that   10   per   cent   of   the   estimated



      compensation was deposited by NOIDA with the State



      Government   even   prior   to   the   date   of   the   notification





                                    125


      under   Section   4(1)   read with   Section   17(4)   of  the   Act,



      issued   by   the   Government   on   17.4.2002.   The



      remaining  70   per   cent   of   the   estimated   compensation



      had been allegedly deposited vide cheque dated 8/14th



      July,         2002         amounting           to         approximately



      Rs.6,66,00,000/-.   As   such,   it   is   claimed   there   is



      compliance with the provisions of Section 17(3A) of the



      Act.     The   Award   was   made   on   9.6.2008,   which   has



      been accepted by a large number of owners, i.e., 97.6



      per   cent   of   all   owners.   Some   of   these   facts   have   also



      been   averred   in   the   counter   affidavit   of   NOIDA   filed



      before the High Court.




9.    It may be noted that neither before the High Court nor



      before   this   Court   any   affidavit   was   filed   either   by   the



      State or by the Collector. The assertion of the appellant



      about   non-payment   of   compensation   as   contemplated



      under   Section   17(3A)   of   the   Act   has   not   been



      controverted. Such payment has to be tendered by the



      Collector   to   the   person   interested   and   entitled   to   the



      same,   subject   to   certain   statutory   conditions.



      Assuming   there   has   been   deposit   of   80%   of   the




                                     126


       compensation   amount   by   NOIDA   with   the   state



       authorities,   that   does   not   satisfy   the   requirement   of



       Section 17(3A) of the Act. From the above pleadings of



       the   parties,   the   admitted   facts   that   emerge   from   the



       record can be usefully recapitulated.




10.    The   Governor   of   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh   on   17th  April,


       2002,   issued   a   notification   under   Section   4(1)   of   the



       Act,   expressing   the   intention   of   the   Government   to



       acquire   the   land   stated   in   the   said   Notification   for   a



       public   purpose,   namely,   for   the   planned   industrial



       development   in   District   of   Gautam   Budha   Nagar



       through   NOIDA.   Vide   the   same   notification   the



       emergency   provisions   contained   in   Section   17   of   the



       Act,   specifically   Section   17(4)   of   the   Act,   were   also



       invoked,   intimating   the   public   at   large   that   the



       provisions   of   Section   5A   of   the   Act   shall   not   be



       applicable.   After   issuance   of   the   declaration   under



       Section   6  of  the   Act,  admittedly   the   possession   of  the



       land   in   question   was   taken   on   4th  February,   2003.



       Another   undisputed   fact   is   that   the   claimants-owners



       of the land were not paid 80 per cent of the estimated




                                     127


       compensation prior to taking of possession in terms of



       Section 17(3A) of the Act.




11.    The   Collector   had   not   made   or   published   this   award


       even at the time of pronouncement of the judgment of



       the High Court, in Writ Petition No. 22251 of 2006, on



       28   August   2006.   The   High   Court,   in   the   impugned



       judgment, directed respondent No.1 to ensure that the



       Award is made as early as possible, preferably within a



       period of three months from the date of production of



       the certified copy of that order.  In the counter affidavit



       filed   before   this   Court   by   NOIDA,   it   has   been   stated



       that the Award was finally made and published on 9th



       June,   2008.     According   to   the   appellant,   in   terms   of



       Section 11A of the Act, the Award ought to have been



       pronounced   on   or   before   26th  August,   2004   as   the



       declaration under Section 6 of the Act was dated 22nd



       August, 2002.




Legal Issues




12.    If   I   may   consider   certain   features   of   the   said   Act   and



       the constitutional provisions.





                                      128


13.    Enactment   of   the   said   Act   was   rooted   in   the   colonial



       past   of   this   country   having   been   brought   on   the



       statute   book   on   1894   as   Act   1   of   1984.     With



       enormous   expansion   of   State's   role   in   promoting



       welfare and development activities since independence,



       acquisition of land for public purposes increased with



       the   passage   of   time.   Several   decades   after   the



       enactment   of   the   Act,   came   Constitution   in   India   in



       1950.   Along   with   it   came   the   concept   of   social   and



       economic justice based on expansive values of human



       rights.   Under   article   366   (10)   of   the   Constitution   the



       Act   was   an   `existing   law'   made   before   the



       commencement of the Constitution.



       Article 366(10) is quoted below:-





             "366 (10)    "existing   law"   means   any   law,

       Ordinance,   order,   bye-law,   rule   or   regulation

       passed   or   made   before   the   commencement   of

       this Constitution by any Legislature, authority

       or   person   having   power   to   make   such   a   law,

       Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule or regulation;"





                                     129


14.    Article   372   of   the   Constitution   provides   for



       continuance   in   force   of   such   `existing   law'   and   their



       adaptation. Article 372 (1) of the Constitution makes it



       clear  that notwithstanding   the  provision  of the  Article



       395,   but   subject   to   the     other   provisions   of   the



       Constitution,   all  laws  in   force   in   the   territory   of  India



       immediately   before   the   commencement   of   the



       Constitution   shall   continue   in   force   until   altered   or



       repealed   or   amended   by   a   competent   Legislature   or



       other competent authority.




15.    Article   13   of   the   Constitution,   which   is   a   part   of



       Fundamental Right (Part III), also defines `laws in force'



       under Article 13(3)(b).   Article 13(3)(b) is set out:-




       "13 (3) (b) "laws in force" includes laws passed

       or   made   by   a   Legislature   or   other   competent

       authority   in   the   territory   of   India   before   the

       commencement   of   this   Constitution   and   not

       previously   repealed,   notwithstanding   that   any

       such law or any part thereof may not be then

       in   operation   either   at   all   or   in   particular

       areas."





                                     130


16.    The   said   definition   of   `laws   in   force'   under   Article



       13(3)(b)   with   certain   changes,   is   consistent   with   the



       definition of `existing laws' in  Article 366(10).




17.    The   said   Act   is   thus   both   an   `existing   law'   within   the



       meaning   of   Article   366(10)   and   `laws   in   force'   within



       the meaning of Article 13(3)(b) of the Constitution.




18.    Article   13(1),   which   is   relevant   in   this   context,   is   set



       out below:




        "Article 13.        Laws   inconsistent   with   or   in

       derogation of the fundamental rights: (1) All

       laws   in   force   in   the   territory   of   India

       immediately  before  the  commencement  of this

       Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent

       with   the   provisions   of   this   Part,   shall,   to   the

       extent of such inconsistency, be void."





19.    Under Article 372 such laws in force can continue with



       some   amendments,   subject   to   `the   other   provisions   of



       this   Constitution'.   Article   13   certainly   comes   within



       `the other provisions of the Constitution'.




20.    Therefore,   Article   372   and   Article   13   must   be   read



       together   in   as   much   as   both   the   articles   relate   to



       continuance   of   pre-constitutional   laws   validly   made.





                                      131


       Article   372   permits   such   continuance   and   Article   13



       stipulates   the   condition   on   which   they   can   continue.



       Article   13   is   of   greater   importance   as   it   is   part   of



       fundamental right and makes all laws, whether pre or



       post-constitution,   subject   to   the   primacy   of



       fundamental rights. The continuance of the said Act is



       thus   made   to   depend   on   its   compliance   with   the



       mandate of Article 13. The mandate of Article 13(1) is



       clear   that   such   law   can   continue   provided   it   is   not



       inconsistent with the provision of Part III. In the event



       of such laws becoming inconsistent with the provision



       of   Part   III,   such   laws,   to   the   extent   of   their



       inconsistency, shall be void. This is the mandate of the



       Constitution.




21.    Therefore, several amendments were made to the said


       Act   keeping   in   view   the   broad   concept   of   social   and



       economic   justice   which   is   one   of   the   main



       constitutional   goals.   In   the   instant   case   I   am



       concerned   with   some   amendments   to   the   said   Act   by



       amendment Act 68 of 1984 which took effect from 24th



       September 1984. Among several new sections, Section




                                     132


       11(A)   and   17(3A)   were   introduced   by   amendment   to



       the said Act.




22.    From   the   Statement   of   Objects   and   Reasons   for   the



       said   amendment   it   will   be   clear   that   the   said



       amendment was brought into existence to give effect to



       the   message   of   social   and   economic   justice   based   on



       the concept of Social Welfare State on broad principles



       of   human   rights.   The   Statements   of   Objects   and



       Reasons are as follows:



       "With the enormous expansion of the State's role

       in   promoting   public   welfare   and   economic

       development   since   independence,   acquisition   of

       land   for   public   purposes,   industrialization,

       building of institutions, etc., has become far more

       numerous   than   ever   before.   While   this   is

       inevitable, promotion of public purpose has to be

       balanced  with  the  rights  of  the  individual   whose

       land   is   acquired,   thereby   often   depriving   him   of

       his means of livelihood. Again, acquisition of land

       for private enterprises ought not to be placed on

       the   same   footing   as   acquisition   for   the   State   or

       for   an   enterprise   under   it.   The   individual   and

       institutions   who   are   unavoidably   to   be   deprived

       of   their   property   rights   in   land   need   to   be

       adequately   compensated   for   the   loss   keeping   in

       view the sacrifice they have to make for the larger

       interests   of   the   community.   The   pendency   of

       acquisition   proceedings   for   long   periods   often

       causes   hardship   to   the   affected   parties   and

       renders   unrealistic   the   scale   of   compensation

       offered to them.





                                     133


       2.    It is necessary, therefore, to restructure the

       legislative   framework   for   acquisition   of   land   so

       that   it   is   more   adequately   informed   by   this

       objective   of      serving   the   interests   of   the

       community   in   harmony   with   the   rights   of   the

       individual.  Keeping the above objects in view and

       considering   the   recommendations   of   the   Law

       Commission,   the   Land   Acquisition   Review

       Committee   as   well   as   the   State   Governments,

       institutions   and   individuals,   proposals   for

       amendment   to   the   Land   Acquisition   Act,   1894,

       were   formulated   and   a   Bill   for   this   purpose   was

       introduced   in   the   Lok   Sabha   on   the   30th  April,

       1982.   The   same   has   not   been   passed   by   either

       House   of   Parliament.   Since   the   introduction   of

       the   Bill,   various   other   proposals   for   amendment

       of the Act have been received and they have also

       been   considered   in   consultation   with   State

       Governments   and   other   agencies.   It   is   now

       proposed to include all these proposals in a fresh

       Bill after withdrawing the pending Bill...."


                                                     (emphasis added)




23.    It is clear from the aforesaid objects and reasons that



       by   introducing   the   provisions   of   Section   11A   and



       17(3A)   by   way   of   amendment   to   the   Act,   greater



       responsibility was   fastened upon the concerned State



       authorities,   whereby   they   were   obliged   to   make   an



       award within two years of the declaration made under



       Section 6 of the Act. Thus the rights of the land owners



       were   sought   to   be   protected   by   balancing   the   same



       against the rights of the State. In respect of emergency





                                      134


       provisions where land is acquired without a hearing, it



       is   provided   under   Section   17(3A)   that   before   taking



       possession either under Section 17(1) and 17(2) it was



       obligatory   upon   the   authorities   concerned   to   pay   80



       per   cent   of   the   estimated   compensation   to   the   land



       owners.   This   was   also   for   protecting   the   right   of   the



       land owners.




24.    These amendments along with Statement, Objects and


       Reasons   are   very   crucial   in   interpretation   of   some   of



       the amended provisions. The amendment was brought



       about   in   1984   and   by   that   time,   the   contents   and



       reach of Fundamental Rights in Part III, as interpreted



       by this Court had assumed a very expansive profile. In



       view of the mandate of Article 13, the provision of the



       said   Act   must   be   tested   on   the   anvil   of   the   broad



       interpretation   of   Fundamental   Rights   given   by   this



       Court. In view of the decision of this Court in  Maneka


       Gandhi  v.  Union of India & Another  - (1978) 1 SCC


       248, the interpretation of Part  III rights namely rights



       under   Article   14,   19   and   21   given   therein   by   this



       Court,   read   with   Article   141,   becomes   the   law   of   the




                                     135


       land.   Therefore,   the   reach   of   Article   13(1)   is



       correspondingly widened. Thus, the 1984 amendments



       must   be   construed   as   a   conscious   attempt   by   the



       legislature being aware of the expansive interpretation



       of Fundamental Rights by this  Court, to bring the said



       act   consistent   with   the   rights   of   the   citizens   and



       persons in Part III.




25.    Despite   the   fact   that   Right   to   Property   in   terms   of


       Article   19(1)(f)   of   the   Constitution   stood   deleted   from



       Chapter III of the Constitution, vide 44th Constitutional



       Amendment,   1978,     Article   300A   of   the   Constitution



       was   added   by   the   same   Constitutional   Amendment,



       mandating   that   `no   person   shall   be   deprived   of   his



       property save by authority of law'.   This indicates that



       the   Constitution   still   mandates   that   right   to   property



       may   have   ceased   to   be   a   fundamental   right,   but   it   is



       still   protected   by   the   Constitution   and   is   a



       Constitutional   right.   Constitution   also   provides   that



       deprivation of that right cannot be brought about save



       by authority of law.





                                     136


26.    It   is   accepted   in   every   jurisprudence   and   by   different


       political thinkers that some amount of property right is



       an   indispensable   safeguard   against   tyranny   and



       economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was



       of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the



       support   of   property.   "Property   must   be   secured,   else



       liberty cannot subsist" was the opinion of John Adams.



       Indeed   the   view   that   property   itself   is   the   seed   bed



       which must be conserved if other constitutional values



       are   to   flourish   is   the   consensus   among   political



       thinkers   and   jurists.   The   U.S.   Supreme   Court   in


       Dorothy   Lynch  v.  Household   Finance   Corporation,


       405 US 538: 31 L Ed. 2d 424  held:




       "....the dichotomy between personal liberties and

       property rights is a false one. Property does not

       have   rights.   People   have   rights.   The   right   to

       enjoy property  without unlawful  deprivation,  no

       less than the right to speak or the right to travel,

       is   in   truth   a   "personal"   right,   whether   the

       "property"   in   question   be   a   welfare   check,   a

       home,   or   a   savings   account.           In   fact,   a

       fundamental interdependence exists between the

       personal   right   to   liberty   and   the   personal   right

       in property. Neither could have meaning without

       the other. That rights in property are basic civil

       rights   has   long   been   recognized.  J.   Locke,   of

       Civil   Government   82-85   (1924);   J.   Adams,   A

       Defence   of   the   Constitutions   of   Government   of




                                     137


       the   United   States   of   America,   in   F.   Coker,

       Democracy,   Liberty,   and   Property   121-132

       (1942);   1   W.   Blackstone,   Commentaries   138-

       140..."  (P.552 of the report)





27.    Justice   K.K.   Mathew   in   his   treatise   on   "Democracy,



       Equality   and   Freedom":   (1978)   very   categorically



       expressed the view:




       "In a Society with a mixed economy, who can be

       sure   that   freedom   in   relation   to   property   might

       not   be   regarded   as   an   aspect   of   individual

       freedom?   People   without   property   have   a

       tendency   to   become   slaves.   They   become   the

       property   of   others   as   they   have   no   property

       themselves.   They   will   come   to   say:   "Make   us

       slaves,   but   feed   us".   Liberty,   independence,   self-

       respect, have their roots in property. To denigrate

       the institution of property is to shut one's eyes to

       the stark reality evidenced by the innate instinct

       and   the   steady   object   of   pursuit   of   the   vast

       majority of people. Protection of property interest

       may   quite   fairly   be   deemed   in   appropriate

       circumstances an aspect of freedom." (P.38-39)





28.    Explaining   the   interrelation   between   the   right   of



       property and personal liberty, Learned Hand ruled that



       property right is a personal right. (Learned Hand : The



       Spirit of Liberty)





                                    138


29.    In  our  Constitution   the   word  `law'  finds   place   both   in


       Article 21 and in Article 300A. The term `law' in Article



       21   has   been   interpreted   by   the   Supreme   Court   from



       time   to   time.   In    A.K.   Gopalan  v.  State   of   Madras,



       (AIR  1950  SC  27),  the  expression  `law' meant enacted



       law,   meaning   thereby   if   the   law   was   passed   by   a



       competent   legislature   and   was   not   violative   of   any



       other   provision   of   the   Constitution,   the   law   would   be



       valid.   But   the   said   interpretation   does   no   longer   hold



       good after  the  epoch making decision of this Court  in


       Maneka Gandhi (supra), where this Court held the law


       does   not   mean   any   enacted   piece.   According   to   the



       majority   decision   in  Maneka   Gandhi  (supra)   "law   is



       reasonable   law   not   any   enacted   piece"   (para   85   page



       338 of the report)




30.    In  Maneka   Gandhi  (supra)   this   Court   held   that   the


       expression `procedure established by law' in Article 21



       means   a   procedure   established   by   a   just,   reasonable



       and   fair   law.   Thus   the   concept   of   due   process   of   law



       was   incorporated   in   our   constitutional   framework   by





                                     139


       way   of   judicial   interpretation   even   though   it   was



       rejected by the framers.




31.    As   a   result   of   incorporation   of   this   doctrine   of   `due


       process'   in   our   constitutional   framework,   the   concept



       of Articles 14 and 21 has undergone a sea-change. In


       Maneka   Gandhi  (supra),   Justice   Bhagwati,   as   His


       Lordship then was, gave a very dynamic interpretation



       of Articles 14 and 21.




32.    Even prior to the decision in  Maneka Gandhi  (supra),


       a   Constitution   Bench   of  this  Court   in  R.C.   Cooper  v.


       Union   of   India  -   (1970)   1   SCC   248   also   gave   a


       composite and integrated interpretation of rights under



       Part   III   of   the   Constitution.   The   question   before   this



       Court   in  R.C.   Cooper  (supra)   was   whether   the   rights



       under   Articles   19(1)(f)   and   31(2)   are   mutually



       exclusive.  Answering the said question, the majority of



       the   Constitution   Bench,   speaking   through   Shah,   J.



       analysed the different features  of Fundamental Rights



       in   para   52   at   page   289   of   the   report   and   came   to   a



       conclusion   that   part   III   of   the   Constitution   "weaves   a





                                      140


       pattern   of   guarantees   on   the   texture   of   basic   human



       rights.   The   guarantees   delimit   the   protection   of   those



       rights   in   their   allotted   fields:   they   do   not   attempt   to



       enunciate distinct rights." (page 289)




33.    In   the   following   paragraph   53,   the   learned   judges



       further made it clear by saying:




       "acquisition must be under the authority of a law

       and   the   expression   "law"   means   a   law   which   is

       within   the   competence   of   the   Legislature,   and

       does   not   impair   the   guarantee   of   the   rights   in

       Part III."




34.    In   view   of   this   clear   enunciation   of   law   by   two


       Constitution Benches of this Court and the wording of



       Article   300A   of   the   Constitution,   let   us   examine   the



       correctness   of   the   impugned   Judgment   of   the   High



       Court which relies only on S.P. Jain's case (supra).




35.    The facts are totally different in S.P. Jain (supra).  It is


       clear from the facts in  S.P. Jain  (supra) that the third



       respondent,   the  Krishi   Utpadan   Mandhi   Samity,   in



       whose favour the land was acquired for construction of



       market-yard,   resolved   on   13th  January,   1989   to



       withdraw from the acquisition as it was suffering from




                                      141


       a   fund   crunch   and   the   proposed   Mandhi   site   was   far



       away from Baraut (para 5).




36.    The   second   round   of   litigation,   out   of   which   the


       judgment   in  S.P.   Jain  (supra)   was   rendered   by   this



       Court,   was   filed   after   the   aforesaid   resolution   of   the



       third   respondent   was   passed.   Challenging   the   same,



       the writ petition was filed before the High Court on 10th



       August,   1989   wherein   the   writ   petitioner   prayed   that



       the   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh   (the   first   respondent),   The



       Collector,   Merrut   (the   second   respondent)   and   the



       Mandhi   (the   third   respondent)   be   directed   by   Writ   of



       Mandamus   to   make   and   publish   an   award   in   respect



       of   the   land.   In   that   context   this   Court   examined



       various provisions of the Act and gave a direction upon



       the first and second respondents to publish an award



       within 12 weeks and imposed a cost of Rs.10,000/- on



       the third respondent. In fact the writ petition in terms



       of the prayer was allowed.




37.    In  coming   to  the   aforesaid   conclusion  this  Court   held



       that   in   a   case   where   the   emergency   provisions   are





                                     142


       invoked under Section 17 of the Act, the provisions of



       Section 11A will not apply. And this Court came to an



       incidental   finding,   though   it  was   not  strictly   in   issue,



       that   taking   over   the   possession   without   making



       payment under Section 17 (3A) of the Act is not illegal.



       This   finding   was   not   at   all   necessary   for   deciding   the



       issue,   namely   whether   prayer   in   the   writ   petition   for



       publishing the award was correctly made or not.




38.    It   has   been   held   in   the   decision   of   this   Court   in


       Municipal   Corporation   of   Delhi  v.  Gurnam   Kaur,


       reported in AIR 1989 SC 38 that when a point does not



       fall for decision of a Court but incidentally arises for its



       consideration   and   is   not   necessary   to   be   decided   for



       the ultimate decision of the case, such a decision does



       not form a part of the ratio of the case but the same is



       treated as a decision passed sub silentio. The concept



       of   `sub   silentio'   has   been   explained   by   Salmond   on



       Jurisprudence "12th Edition" as follows:




       "A decision passes sub silentio, in the technical

       sense   that   has   come   to   be   attached   to   that

       phrase, when the particular point of law involved

       in the  decision is not perceived by  the Court  or





                                     143


       present to its mind. The Court may consciously

       decide in favour of one party because of point A,

       which it considers and pronounces upon. It may

       be   shown,   however,   that   logically   the   Court

       should   not   have   decided   in   favour   of   the

       particular party unless it also decided point B in

       his   favour;   but   point   B   was   not   argued   or

       considered by the Court. In such circumstances,

       although   point   B   was   logically   involved   in   the

       facts   and   although   the   case   had   a   specific

       outcome,   the   decision   is   not   an   authority   on

       point   B.   Point   B   is   said   to   pass   sub   silentio."

       (page 43)




39.    The   aforesaid   passage   has   been  quoted   with   approval


       by   the   three   Judge   Bench   in  Gurnam   Kaur  (supra).



       This   Court   in  Gurnam   Kaur  (supra),   in   order   to



       illustrate the aforesaid proposition further relied on the



       decision   of   the   English   Court   in  Gerard  v.  Worth   of


       Paris   Ltd.,  reported   in   1936   (2)   All   England   Reports


       905.   In   Gerard,   the   only   point   argued   was   on   the



       question   of   priority   of   the   claimant's   debt.   The   Court



       found that no consideration was given to the question



       whether a garnishee order could be passed. Therefore,



       a point in respect of which no argument was advanced



       and   no   citation   of   authority   was   made   is   not   binding



       and would not be followed. This Court held that such



       decisions,   which   are   treated   having   been   passed   sub




                                      144


       silentio and without argument, are of no moment. The



       Court further explained the position by saying that one



       of the chief reasons behind the doctrine of precedent is



       that   once   a   matter   is   fully   argued   and   decided   the



       same   should   not   be   reopened   and   mere   casual



       expression   carry   no   weight.   In  Gurnam   Kaur  (supra)



       this   Court   conclusively   held   that   not   every   passing



       expression   of   a   Judge,   however   eminent,   can   be



       treated as "ex cathedra statement, having the weight of



       authority" (see para 12 page 43)




40.    Similarly, it has also been held by the majority opinion


       in   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of


       Madhav   Rao   Jivaji   Rao   Scindia  v.  Union   of   India,


       reported   in   AIR   1971   SC   530   that   "it   is   difficult   to



       regard   a   word,   a   clause   or   a   sentence   occurring   in   a



       judgment   of   this   Court,   divorced   from   its   context,   as



       containing   a   full   exposition   of   the   law   on   a   question



       when the question did not even fall to be answered in



       that judgment." (page 578 of the report)





                                     145


41.    In another Constitution Bench decision of this court in


       Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) & Ors., v. State of Tamil


       Nadu & others  reported in (2002) 3 SCC 533, similar


       views have been expressed by this Court in para 9, at



       page   540   of   the   report   wherein   the   unanimous



       Constitution Bench of this Court opined:




       "9.   Court   should   not   place   reliance   on  decisions

       without   discussing   as   to   how   the   factual

       situation   fits   in   with   the   fact   situation   of   the

       decision   on   which   reliance   is   placed.   There   is

       always   peril   in   treting   the   words   of   a   speech   or

       judgment   as   though   they   are   words   in   a

       legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered

       that judicial utterances are made in the seting of

       the facts of a particular case, said Lord Morris in

       Herrington V. British Railways Board - (1972) AC

       877.   Circumstantial   flexibility,   one   additional   or

       different   fact   may   make   a   world   of   difference

       between conclusions in two cases."





42.    The reason behind enacting Section 17 (3A) of the Act



       is   clear   from   the   Statement   of   Object   and   Reasons



       extracted   above.   It   is   clear   therefore   the   provisions



       were incorporated in order to strike a balance between



       the rights of the State and those of the land owner. A



       clear   legislative   intent   in   Section   17(3A)   was   thus



       expressed   that   before   taking   possession   of   any   land





                                      146


       under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 17,



       the   Collector   shall   tender   payment   of   80%   of   the



       estimated   compensation   for   such   land   to   the   persons



       interested   and   entitled   thereto.   This   is   the   clear



       mandate of law.




43.    In   view   of   the   principles   enunciated   in  R.C.   Cooper


       (supra)   and  Maneka   Gandhi  (supra),   reasonableness



       in law has to be its implicit content. Here no challenge



       to   the   reasonableness   of   Section   17   (3A)   is   either



       argued   or   considered   by   this   Court.   But   when   law



       gives   a   specific   mandate   on   the   State   to   tender   the



       payment before taking possession under Section 17(1)



       and   Section   17(2)   by   invoking   the   emergency   powers,



       to   hold   that   the   taking   over   of   possession   without



       complying   with   that   mandate   is   legal   is   clearly   to



       return   a   finding   which   is   contrary   to   the   express



       provision of the statute. Such a finding is certainly not



       on   a   reasonable   interpretation   of   Section   17   (3A).



       Therefore, the casual observation in para 17 (page 375)



       in  S.P.  Jain  (supra)   to  the   effect  of   taking  possession



       of   land   under   emergency   provision   and   without




                                    147


       making the payment mandated under Section 17(3A) is



       a valid  mode of taking possession is  in clear  violation



       of Section  17(3A)  and be regarded  made  per  incuriam



       and does not have the effect of a binding precedent.




44.    If   I   look   at   the   emergency   provisions   of   the   statute


       which   empowers   the   State   to   acquire   land   by



       dispensing with the provisions of making an enquiry it



       is clear that the said provision is a drastic provision. It



       is   well-known   that   the   provisions   of   the   said   Act   are



       expropriatory   in   nature   and   must   be   strictly



       construed. In that expropriatory legislation, Section 17



       is   a   very   drastic   provision   as   Section   17   of   the   Act



       seeks   to   authorize   acquisition   and   taking   over   of



       possession without hearing the land owner. This Court



       held   that   the   right   of   hearing   which   is   given   under



       Section 5A of the Act and which is taken away in view



       of   the   emergency   acquisition   is   a   very   valuable   right



       and is akin to a fundamental right. (See Dev Sharan &


       Ors.  v.  State  of  U.P.  &  Ors.  - JT  2011  (3)  SC  102).


       Therefore, when that right is taken away and the land



       is   acquired   by   invoking   the   emergency   provision   of




                                     148


       Section   17(3A)   to   hold   that   even   the   safeguards



       provided under Section 17(3A) are not mandatory and



       taking   over   of   possession   without   complying   with   the



       provisions of Section 17 (3A) is not illegal is to overlook



       the   clear   provisions   of   the   Act   and   come   to   a   finding



       which   is   contrary   to   the   Act.   This   Court   is   unable   to



       accept   that   the   taking   over   of   the   possession   by



       invoking Section  17(1) or Section 17(2) of the Act and



       without   making   the   payment   under   Section   17(3A)   is



       legal taking over of possession.




45.    This Court is of the view that Section 17(3A) is not an



       isolated   provision.   Section   17(3A)   figures   very



       prominently   as   part   of   the   statutory   mechanism   in



       Section   17  of  the   Act  which  confers  special  powers   in



       cases of urgency. Section 17 has four sub sections and



       all   these   sub   sections   comprise   a   composite



       mechanism   and   are   closely   intertwined.   Power   under



       one sub section cannot be exercised without complying



       with the conditions imposed by the other sub section.



       For   a  proper   appreciation   of  this  question,   section   17



       with all its sub sections are set out:




                                      149


"17.   Special   powers   in   cases   of   urgency.   (1)   In

cases   of   urgency,   whenever   the   appropriate

Government, so directs, the Collector, though no

such   award   has   been   made,   may,   on   the

expiration   of   fifteen   days   from   the   publication   of

the notice mentioned in section 9, sub-section (1),

take   possession   of   any   land   needed   for   a   public

purpose.   Such   land   shall   thereupon   vest

absolutely   in   the   Government,   free   from   all

encumbrances.


(2) Whenever, owing to any sudden change in the

channel   of   any   navigable   river   or   other

unforeseen   emergency,   it   becomes   necessary   for

any   Railway   administration   to   acquire   the

immediate   possession   of   any   land   for   the

maintenance of their traffic  or for the purpose of

making thereon a river-side or ghat station, or of

providing convenient connection with or access to

any such station, or the appropriate Government

considers   it   necessary   to   acquire   the   immediate

possession   of   any   land   for   the   purpose   of

maintaining   any   structure   or   system   pertaining

to   irrigation,   water   supply,   drainage,   road

communication   or   electricity,   the   Collector   may,

immediately   after   the   publication   of   the   notice

mentioned   in   sub-section   (1)   and   with   the

previous sanction of the appropriate Government,

enter   upon   and   take   possession   of   such   land,

which   shall   thereupon   vest   absolutely   in   the

Government free from all encumbrances:


Provided   that   the   Collector   shall   not   take

possession   of   any   building   or   part   of   a   building

under   this   sub-section   without   giving   to   the

occupier thereof at least forty-eight hours'  notice

of his intention so to do, or such longer notice as

may   be   reasonably   sufficient   to   enable   such

occupier   to   remove   his   movable   property   from

such          building          without          unnecessary

inconvenience.





                                150


(3)   In   every   case   under   either   of   the   preceding

sub-sections   the   Collector   shall   at   the   time   of

taking   possession   offer   to   the   persons   interested

compensation for the standing crops and trees (if

any)   on   such   land   and   for   any   other   damage

sustained   by   them   caused   by   such   sudden

dispossession   and   not   excepted   in   section   24;

and, in case such offer is not accepted, the value

of such crops and trees and the amount of such

other   damage   shall   be   allowed   for   in   awarding

compensation   for   the   land   under   the   provisions

herein contained.


(3A)   Before   taking   possession   of   any   land   under

sub-section   (1)   or   sub-section   (2),   the   Collector

shall, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-

section (3),-


(a)   tender   payment   of   eighty   per   centum   of   the

compensation for such land as estimated by him

to the persons interested entitled thereto, and


(b) pay it to them, unless prevented by some one

or more of the contingencies mentioned in section

31, sub-section (2),


and   where   the   Collector   is   so   prevented,   the

provisions   of   section   31,   sub-section   (2),   (except

the   second   proviso   thereto),   shall   apply   as   they

apply to the payment of compensation under that

section.


(3B)   The   amount   paid   or   deposited   under   sub-

section   (3A),   shall   be   taken   into   account   for

determining   the   amount   of   compensation

required   to   be   tendered   under   section   31,   and

where   the   amount   so   paid   or   deposited   exceeds

the compensation awarded by the Collector under

section   11,   the   excess   may,   unless   refunded

within   three   months   from   the   date   of   the

Collector's   award,   be   recovered   as   an   arrear   of

land revenue.





                             151


       (4)   In   the   case   of   any   land   to   which,   in   the

       opinion   of   the   appropriate   Government,   the

       provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are

       applicable,   the   appropriate   Government   may

       direct   that  the  provisions  of  section 5A  shall not

       apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may

       be made under section 6 in respect of the land at

       any   time   after   the   date   of   publication   of   the

       notification under section 4, sub-section (1)."





46.    Sub-section   (3A)   of   Section   17   is   linked   with   sub



       section (2) of Section 31. Sub section (2) of Section 31



       runs thus:




       "(2)   If   they   shall   not   consent   to   receive   it,   or   if

       there   be   no   person   competent   to   alienate   the

       land,  or  if  there  be  any  dispute   as  to  the  title   to

       receive   the   compensation   or   as   to   the

       apportionment   of   it,   the   Collector   shall   deposit

       the   amount  of  the   compensation  in  the   Court   to

       which   a   reference   under   section   18   would   be

       submitted:


       Provided   that   any   person   admitted   to   be

       interested   may   receive   such   payment   under

       protest as to the sufficiency of the amount:


       Provided   also   that   no   person   who   has   received

       the amount otherwise than under protest shall be

       entitled   to   make   any   application   under   section

       18:


       Provided also that nothing herein contained shall

       affect the liability of any person, who may receive

       the   whole   or   any   part   of   any   compensation

       awarded   under   this   Act,   to   pay   the   same   to   the

       person lawfully entitled thereto."





                                        152


47.    It is thus clear that sub section (3A) of Section 17 read



       with   sub   section   (2)   of   Section   31   of   the   Act   form   a



       composite   statutory   scheme.   The   said   scheme   has



       been   legislatively   framed   to   balance   the   promotion   of



       public   purpose   in   acquisition   with   rights   of   the



       individual   whose   land   is   acquired.   This   is   clear   from



       the Statement of Objects and Reasons which was kept



       in view for  bringing  about the  amendment of the said



       Act   by   Amendment   Act   68   of   1984.   By   the   said



       amendment   Section   17(3A)   was   brought   on   the



       statute.




48.    Therefore,   the   provision   of   Section   17(3A)   cannot   be



       viewed in isolation as it is an intrinsic and mandatory



       step   in   exercising   special   powers   in   cases   of



       emergency.   Sections   17(1)   and  17(2)  and   17(3A)   must



       be   red   together.   Section   17(1)   and   17(2)   cannot   be



       worked out in isolation.




49.    It   is   well   settled   as   a   canon   of   construction   that   a


       statute has to be read as a whole and in its context. In


       Attorney   General  v.  HRH   Prince   Earnest   Augustus





                                      153


       of   Hanover,   reported   in   (1957)   1   AER   49,   Lord


       Viscount   Simonds   very   elegantly   stated   the   principle



       that it is the duty of Court to examine every word of a



       statute   in   its   context.   The   learned   Law   Lord   further



       said   that   in   understanding   the   meaning   of   the



       provision, the Court must take into consideration "not



       only other enacting provisions of the same statute, but



       its   preamble,   the   existing   state   of   the   law,   other



       statutes in pari material, and the mischief which I can,



       by those and other legitimate means, discern that the



       statute   was   intended   to   remedy"   (page   53   of   the



       report).




50.    Lord Normand expressed the same view differently and



       which is equally pertinent and worth remembering and



       parts of which are excerpted below:




       "The key to the opening of every law is the reason

       and   spirit   of   the   law   -   it   is   the   animus

       imponentis,   the   intention   of   the   law   maker,

       expressed   in   the   law   itself,   taken   as   a   whole.

       Hence   to   arrive   at   the   true   meaning   of   any

       particular   phrase   in   a   statute,   that   particular

       phrase   is   not   to   be   viewed   detached   from   its

       context   ...   meaning   by   this   as   well   the   title   and

       the   preamble   as   the   purview   or   enacting   part   of

       the statute" (page 61 of the report).





                                     154


51.    These principles have been followed by this Court in its


       Constitution   Bench   decision   in  Union   of   India  v.


       Sankalchand   Himatlal   Sheth   &   anr.,  [(1977)   4   SCC


       193].   At page 240 of the report, Justice Bhagwati, as



       His   Lordship   then   was,   in   a   concurring   opinion   held



       that   words   in   a   statute   cannot   be   read   in   isolation,



       their colour and content are derived from their context



       and   every   word   in   a   statute   is   to   be   examined   in   its



       context. His Lordship explained  that the word context



       has   to   be   taken   in   its   widest   sense   and   expressly



       quoted the formulations of Lord Viscount Simonds, set



       out above. (See para 54, P.241 of the report).




52.    In   this   connection,   if   I   compare   the   normal   mode   of



       vesting   of   acquired   property   under   Section   16   of   the



       Act   with   the   mode   of   vesting   under   emergency



       provisions   of   Section   17   thereof,   I   will   discern   that



       under the said Act the vesting of acquired property in



       the State presupposes compliance with two conditions.



       Under Section 16, first there has to be an award under





                                      155


       section   11   and   then   there   has   to   be   taking   over   of



       possession.   Only   thereupon   the   land   shall   vest



       absolutely   in   the   state,   free   from   all   encumbrances.



       Section 16 of the act which makes it clear is as under:



              "16.     Power   to   take   possession.-   When

       the   Collector   has   made   an   award   under

       section   11,   he   may   take   possession   of   the

       land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in

       the Government, free from all encumbrances."





53.    But   in   case   of   emergency   acquisition,   possession   is


       taken   before   the   making   of   an   award.   This   is   clear



       from section 17(1) and section 17(2). But the intention



       of the legislature is that even though the award is not



       made,   payment   mandated   under   Section   17(3A)   must



       be   made   before   possession   is   taken   either   under



       Section   17(1)   and   17(2).   Therefore   this   provision



       relating to payment under Section 17(3A) is a condition



       precedent  to   the   vesting   of   land   under   Section   17(1)



       and   17(2).   In   the   later   part   of   this   judgment,   I   shall



       discuss some authorities which have opined that when



       possession is illegally taken over without following the



       conditions   precedent   for   taking   such   possession,





                                      156


       vesting of a property in law does not take place in the



       authority   which   thus   illegally   enters   upon   the



       property.




54.    Judicial   opinion   is   uniformly   in   favour   of   strict


       construction of an expropriatory law which admittedly



       Land   Acquisition   Act,   1894   is.       Reference   in   this



       connection   can   be   made   to   the   observations   of



       Cottenham,   L.C.   in  Webb  v.  Manchester   and   Leeds


       Rail
                 Co.,
                       [(1839),   4   Myl.   &   Cr.116]   where   the   Lord


       Chancellor held:



       "The powers are so large - it may be necessary for

       the benefit of the people - but they are so large,

       and   so   injurious   to   the   interests   of   the

       individuals,   that   I   think   it   is   the   duty   of   every

       court   to   keep   them   most   strictly   within   those

       powers; and if there be any reasonable doubt as

       to   the   extent   of   their   powers,   they   must   go

       elsewhere and get enlarged powers; but they will

       get none from me by way of construction of their

       Act of Parliament."





55.    In   the   Indian   context,   as   early   as   in   1916.     Judicial


       committee of Privy Council in  Secretary of State for


       India v. Birendra Kishore Manikya (ILR 44 Cal 328),


       speaking   through   Lord   Dunedin   held,   `the   Act   is





                                      157


       drastic in its character and makes invasion in private



       rights...matter   must   be   brought   "strictly   within   its



       provisions".' (p 343)




56.    Cripps in "The Law of Compensation for Land Acquired



       under Compulsory Powers"  (8th  ed., Stevens and Sons,



       Ltd.)   has   quoted   the   above   opinion   of   the   Lord



       Chancellor   and   further   dealt   with   this   aspect   of   the



       matter   at   page   27   of   the   book   wherein   the   learned



       author   said,   "Where   the   promoters   of   a   public



       undertaking   have   authority   from   Parliament   to



       interfere   with   private   property   on   certain   terms,   any



       person   whose   property   is   interfered   with   by   virtue   of



       that authority has a right to require that the promoters



       shall comply with the letter of the enactment, so far as



       it   makes   provision   on   his   behalf."   Again   at   page   100,



       the   learned   author   has   stressed   the   above   position



       very strongly to the following effect:-




       "If   no   consent   has   been   given,   and   the

       promoters  have not complied with the statutory

       conditions   as   to   entry   on   lands,   they   can   be

       proceeded   against   as   trespassers   by   any   owner

       who   has   an   interest   in   the   lands.  The   principle

       is that all statutory conditions which have been





                                     158


       imposed   as   condition   precedent   to   an   entry   on

       lands must be fulfilled."




57.    In   support   of   this   aforesaid   proposition,   the   learned


       author   has   relied   on  Parkdale   Corporation  v.  West



       [(1887), 12 App. Cas. 602, 614].




58.    And again at page 173, the learned author opines:




       "It   must   be   borne   in   mind   that   promoters   have

       no   powers,   other   than   those   comprised   in   their

       special Acts and the Acts therewith incorporated,

       to   enter   upon   or   take   lands   against   the   wish   of

       the   owners.   It   is   incumbent   on   promoters   to

       comply   with   all   conditions   and   limitations

       imposed   upon   them,   and,   unless   they   have   so

       complied, any interested owner can restrain them

       by injunction from taking, as against him, further

       proceedings".




       I   am   in   respectful   agreement   with   the   aforesaid



principles.




59.    I   find   that   same   principles   have   been   laid   down   in



       Cooley's   `A   Treatise   on   the   Constitutional   Limitations'



       Volume II,  (Eight Edition). Cooley while dealing with the



       concept   of   `Eminent   Domain'   in   Chapter   15   opined



       (p.1120):



       "...whenever in pursuance of law the property of

       an   individual   is   to   be   divested   by   proceedings




                                     159


       against his will, a strict compliance must be had

       with all the provisions of law which are made for

       his protection and benefit, or the proceeding will

       be   ineffectual.      Those   provisions   must   be

       regarded   as   in   the   nature   of   conditions

       precedent,   which   are   not   only   to   be   observed

       and   complied   with   before   the   right   of   the

       property   owner   is   disturbed,   but   the   party

       claiming authority under the adverse proceeding

       must show affirmatively such compliance".


                                                (emphasis added)




60.    The learned author explained the aforesaid proposition



       with   certain   illustration   which   very   closely   fit   in   with



       the legal framework with which I am concerned in this



       case. The learned author said:



       "So   if   the   statute   vests   the   title   to   lands

       appropriated   in   the   state   or   in   a   corporation   on

       payment therefore being made, it is evident that,

       under the rule stated, the payment is a condition

       precedent to the passing of the title."



                                                (Emphasis added)





61.    Reference   in   this   connection   should   be   made   to   the


       decision   of   Supreme   Court   of   Vermont   in  Henry   B.


       Stacey  v  The Vermont Central Railroad Co, (27 Vt.


       39).   In   that   case,   while   discussing   the   concept   of



       Eminent   Domain,   the   court   after   referring   to   various



       decisions   held   "that   this   provision   (relating   to   deposit




                                     160


       of   the   appraised   value)   should   be   considered   in   the



       nature   of   a   condition   precedent,   not   only   to   the



       acquisition of the legal title to the land, but also to the



       right   to   enter   and   take   the   permanent   possession   of



       the land for the use of the corporation."




62.    The expression condition precedent has been defined in


       Words   and   Phrases   (permanent   edition,   Vol.   8.   St.



       Paul, Minn, West Publishing Co., 1951, p 629) as those



       which `must be punctually performed before the estate



       can   vest'.   Similarly,   in   Bouvier's   Law   Dictionary,   (A



       Concise   encyclopedia   of   the   Law,   Rawle's   Third



       Revision, Vol. 1, Vernon Law Book Company, 1914, p



       584), virtually the same principles have been followed.



       The learned author expressed this even more strongly



       by explaining that:



       "The   effect   of   a   Condition   precedent   is,   when

       performed,   to   vest   an   estate,   give   rise   to   an

       obligation,   or   enlarge   an   estate   already   vested;

       [...].   Unless   a   condition   precedent   be   performed,

       no   estate   will   vest;   and   this   even   where   the

       performance is prevented by the act of God or of

       the law; [...]."





                                    161


63.    In   Wharton's   Law   Lexicon,   it   has   been   held   that



       conditions   precedent   in   their   primary   meaning   are



       those   events,   but   for   the   happenings   of   which   rights



       will not arise. (Wharton's Law Lexicon, 1976, reprint, p



       228).




64.    In the case of Gujarat Electricity Board v Girdharlal


       Motilal And Anr  (AIR 1969 SC 267), this court while


       dealing with the power of the State Electricity Board to



       purchase   the   property   of   the   licensee   held   that   right



       can   be   exercised   only   in   the   manner   provided   in   the



       act and not in any other way. The court held that since



       this   power   of   the   Board   under   the   law   is   to   interfere



       with   the   property   rights   of   the   licensee,   such   power



       will   have   to   be   strictly   construed.   In   laying   down   the



       said   principle   this   court   relied   on   the   well-known



       doctrine in case of Nazir Ahmad v King Emperor [AIR



       1936 PC 253] that when a power is to be exercised in a



       manner   it   has   to   be   exercised   in   that   manner   alone



       and   in   no   other   manner.   In   two   other   recent



       judgments,   this   court   reiterated   the   same   principle,



       and held that expropriatory statute, as is well known,




                                      162


       must be strictly construed. [See Hindustan Petroleum


       corpn.   Ltd.,   v.  Darius   Shapur   Chenai   and   others


       reported in (2005) 7 SCC 627]. The said principle has



       also been followed by this Court in the case of Bharat


       Petroleum   Corporation   Ltd.  v  Maddula   Ratnavalli


       and Others  [(2007)  6 SCC 81]   where  learned  judges


       relying   on   Hindustan   Petroleum   reiterated   the   same



       principle   of   strict   construction   of   expropriatory



       legislation (p 91).




65.    In   an   earlier   decision  Jilubhai   Nanbhai   Khachar


       and others  v  State of Gujarat and Anr  [1995 Suppl


       (1) SCC 596], this Court while dealing with the concept



       of   eminent   domain   and   right   to   property   in   Article



       300A held as follows (para 50, p. 628):



       "50.   All   modern   constitutions   of   democratic

       character   provide   payment   of   compensation   as

       the   condition   to   exercise   the   right   of

       expropriation. Commonwealth of Australia Act, a

       Frecnh   Civil   Code   (Article   545),   the   5th

       Amendment   of   the   Constitution   of   USA   and   the

       Italian   constitution   provided   principles   of   "just

       terms", "Just indemnity", Just compensation" as

       reimbursement for the property taken, have been

       provided for. As pointed out in Halsbury's Law of

       England   that   "when   Parliament   has   authorized

       the   compulsory   acquisition   of   land   it   is   almost

       invariably   provided   for   payment   of   a   money




                                    163


       compensation   to   the   person   deprived   of   his

       interest in it."





66.    On   the   basis   of   aforesaid   principles,   I   hold   that   the


       requirement of payment under section 17(3A) is in the



       nature   of   condition   precedent   clamped   by   the   statute



       before  taking possession  under   emergency  acquisition



       by   the   State.   The   vesting   contemplated   either   under



       Section   17(1)   or   17(2)   of   this   Act   is   conditioned   upon



       payment mandated under Section 17(3A).  This is clear



       from   the   opening   words   of   Section   17(3A)   namely



       "before   taking   possession   of   any   land   either   under



       sub-section   (1)   or   (2),   Collector   shall.......   tender



       payment."     Therefore,   the   eminent   domain   concept   is



       subject   to   the   aforesaid   statutory   condition   and   must



       be   read   subject   to   due   process   concept   introduced   in



       our constitutional  law in  Maneka Gandhi  (supra). If I



       read,   Section   17(3A)   as   I   must,   consistently   with   the



       constitutional doctrine of due process as articulated in



       the   expression   `authority   of   law'   under   Article   300A



       which constitutionally protects deprivation of a right to





                                     164


       property,   save   by   authority   of   law,   the   conclusion   in



       my   judgment   is   inescapable   that   the   requirement   of



       section   17(3A)   constitutes   the   authority   of   law   within



       the meaning of Article 300A. Therefore, in the context



       of   aforesaid   statutory   dispensation   and   constitutional



       provision,   the  debate  whether   the   provision  of  section



       17(3A)   is   mandatory   or   directory   does   not   present



       much   difficulty   for   the   reasons   discussed   above   and



       also for the following reasons.




67.    Basically,  the language used  is `shall' which  primarily



       indicates   mandatory   compliance.   That   apart,   in   the



       context   of   the   nature   of   statute   which   is   admittedly



       expropriatory   in   character   and   the   nature   of   the



       statutory   requirement   under   section   17(3A)   which   is



       clearly   and   undoubtedly   a   condition   precedent   to   the



       taking   over   of   possession   in   emergency   acquisition,



       there   can   be   no   doubt   that   the   requirement   under



       section 17(3A) is mandatory.




68.    Section   17(3A)   has   been   enacted   for   protecting   the


       rights   of   deprived   land-loser   in   an   emergency





                                    165


       acquisition.   The   said   provision   is   therefore   based   on



       reason,   justice   and   fairplay.   Since   the   said   provision



       has   been   introduced   by   way   of   an   amendment   as



       noted above to balance the right of the state as against



       the   interest   of   the   land-loser,   the   State's   power   of



       eminent domain is expressly made subject to aforesaid



       statutory   provision   as   also   the   constitutional   right   to



       property   protected   under   Article   300A.   Right   to



       property has been pronounced as fundamental human



       right   by   this   Court   in  Chairman,   Indore   Vikas


       Pradhikaran  v.  Pure   Industrial   Coke   &   Chemicals


       Ltd., and others reported in (2007) 8 SCC 705.




69.    The   expression   `law'   which   figures   both   in   Article   21


       and Article 300A must be given the same meaning. In



       both   the   cases   the   law   would   mean   a   validly   enacted



       law.  In  order   to   be   valid   law   it  must   be  just,   fair   and



       reasonable having regard to the requirement of Article



       14   and   21   as   explained   in  Maneka   Gandhi  (supra).



       This   is   especially   so,   as   `law'   in   both   the   Articles   21



       and   300A   is   meant   to   prevent   deprivation   of   rights.



       Insofar as Article 21 is concerned, it is a Fundamental




                                       166


       Right   whereas   in   Article   300A   it   is   a   constitutional



       right which has been given a status of a basic human



       right.




70.    I, therefore, hold that Section 17(3A) of the Act is a law



       which   has   been   enacted   to   prevent   deprivation   of



       property   rights   guaranteed   under   Article   300   A.   This



       provision   of   Section   17(3A)   must   therefore   be   given   a



       very   broad   interpretation   to   mean   a   law   that   gives   a



       fair, just and reasonable  protection  of the  land-loser's



       constitutional right to property.




71.    Therefore,   the   provisions   of   section   17(3A)   read   with


       Article 300A must be liberally construed. Reference in



       this connection be made to the majority opinion in the



       Constitution   Bench   decision   in   the   case   of  Madhav


       Rao   Jivaji   Rao   Scindia  (supra).     Shah,   J.,   speaking


       for the majority opinion observed (para 33, p 576):




       "The   court   will   interpret   a   statute   as   far   as

       possible, agreeably to justice and reason and that

       in case of two or more interpretations, one which

       is   more   reasonable   and   just   will   be   adopted,   for

       there   is   always   a   presumption   against   the   law

       maker   intending   injustice   and   unreason.   The

       court   will   avoid   imputing   to   the   Legislature   an

       intention   to   enact   a   provision   which   flouts




                                     167


       notions of justice and norms of fairplay, unless a

       contrary   intention   is   manifest   from   words   plain

       and   unambiguous.   A   provision   in   a   statute   will

       not   be   construed   to   defeat   its   manifest   purpose

       and   general   values   which   animate   its   structure.

       In   an   avowedly   democratic   polity,   statutory

       provisions   ensuring   the   security   of   fundamental

       human rights including the right to property will,

       unless   the   contrary   mandate   be   precise   and

       unqualified,   be   construed   liberally   so   as   to

       uphold   the   right.   These   rules   apply   to   the

       interpretation   of   constitution   and   statutory

       provisions alike."





72.    On the above premise, taking over a possession of land


       without   complying   with   the   requirement   of   section



       17(3A)   is   clearly   illegal   and   in   clear   violation   of   the



       statutory   provision   which   automatically   violates   the



       constitutional guarantee under Article 300A. A passing



       observation   to   the   contrary   in  S.P.   Jain  (supra)  must



       pass  sub silentio  being unnecessary in the facts of the



       case as otherwise such a finding is per incuriam, being



       in violation  of  the  statute.  A fortiorari  the said  finding



       cannot be sustained as a binding precedent.




73.    For the reason aforesaid, this Court holds that the writ


       petition cannot be dismissed in view of the decision in


       S.P.   Jain  (supra)   which   was   decided   on   totally





                                      168


       different facts.   The judgment of the High Court is set



       aside.




74.    This court further holds that in all cases of emergency


       acquisition   under   section   17,   the   requirement   of



       payment under section 17(3A) must be complied with.



       As   the   provision   of   section   17(1)   and   section   17(2)



       cannot   be   worked   out   without   complying   with



       requirement of payment under section 17(3A) which is



       in the nature of  condition  precedent.   If section 17(3A)



       is   not   complied   with,   the   vesting   under   section   17(1)



       and   section   17(2)   cannot   take   place.   Therefore,



       emergency acquisition  without  complying   with section



       17(3A)   is   illegal.   This   is   the   plain   intention   of   the



       statute   which   must   be   strictly   construed.     Any   other



       construction, in my opinion, would lead to diluting the



       Rule of Law.




75.    However, coming to the question of relief in the instant



       case,  the  Court has  to take note of the  fact situation.



       Admittedly, possession of the land has been taken and



       same   has   been   handed   over   to   the   beneficiary   on





                                     169


       which   construction   had   taken   place   and   third   party



       interests   had   arisen.   It   is   very   difficult   to   put   the



       hands   of   the   clock   back   now,   despite   the   aforesaid



       declaration of law by the Court. This Court, therefore,



       has to think in terms of adequately compensating the



       appellants.   In   the   special   facts   of   this   case,



       compensation   in   respect   of   the   land   acquired   insofar



       as the appellants are concerned cannot be decided on



       the basis of the date of notice under Section 4.




76.    In   view   of   the   discussions   above,   the   compensation



       has   to   be   fixed   with   regard   to   the   value   of   the



       appellant's   land   as   on   the   date   of   filing   of   the   writ



       petition   which   was   in   March,   2006   before   the   High



       Court.   The   section   4   notification   must   be   deemed   to



       have   been   issued   on   March   1,   2006   and   the



       compensation   must   be   worked   out   on   that   basis.   An



       award   on   that   basis   must   be   passed   by   the   Collector



       within   four   months   from   date   and   the   appellants   are



       given   liberty,   if   so   advised,   to   challenge   the   same   in



       appropriate   proceedings.   All   questions   relating   to



       compensation   in   aforesaid   proceeding   are   kept   open




                                      170


       for both the parties. As the respondent - the acquiring



       authority has proceeded illegally in the matter, it must



       pay   costs   of   Rupees   one   lakh   in   favour   of   Allahabad



       High   Court   Mediation   Centre   within   a   period   of   six



       weeks from date. The State is at liberty to recover the



       same from the erring officials.





77.    The appeal is, thus, allowed with costs as aforesaid.





                                     .............................................J.

                                       [Asok Kumar Ganguly]



New Delhi

August 18, 2011





                                    171


                                                                       REPORTABLE


                 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION




                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.24 OF 2009




M/s. Delhi Airtech Services

Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.                                                    ... Appellants


                                          Versus


State of U.P. & Anr.                                                ... Respondents


                                       O R D E R




        In view  of the  divergence  of opinion  on conclusions   and  also  on


various   legal   questions   discussed   in   two   separate   judgments   by   us,   the


matter   is   required   to   be   placed   before   the   Hon'ble   the   Chief   Justice   of


India   for   reference   to   a   larger   Bench   to   resolve   the   divergent   views


expressed   in   both   the   judgments   and   to   answer   the   questions   of   law


framed.





                                              .............................................J.

                                               [Asok Kumar Ganguly]





                                              .............................................J.

                                                    [Swatanter Kumar]

New Delhi

August 18, 2011




                                             172