A challenge to the order of a statutory tribunal may validly be maintained under Article 226, Article 227, or both (where the High Court Rules so permit), and the maintainability of an intra-court appeal depends upon the nature of the jurisdiction actually invoked, not merely upon the form of the prayers. After the deletion of Section 71(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, there is no statutory ceiling on the number of stage carriage permits that may be held by an operator. Further, rejection of a permit application must be supported by recorded reasons as required by Section 80, and possession of a ready vehicle at the time of application is not a mandatory statutory requirement, though it may be a relevant comparative factor while considering rival applicants. 2026 INSC 733

 

Constitution of India – Articles 226 & 227 – Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Sections 71, 72, 80 & 89 – Stage Carriage Permit – Intra-Court Appeal – Whether an intra-court appeal is maintainable against an order of a Single Judge passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 challenging an order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, and whether a permit application can be rejected merely because the applicant had been granted another permit or had offered the same vehicle? – Held, Yes; No.

The appellant applied for a stage carriage permit on specified routes under the Motor Vehicles Act. The State Transport Authority rejected his application on the ground that he had already been granted another permit. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal affirmed the rejection. The writ petition filed under Article 226 was dismissed by the Single Judge, who held that since the appellant had offered the same vehicle for different routes, the transport authority was justified in allocating another route. The Division Bench dismissed the intra-court appeal as not maintainable, treating the proceedings as one under Article 227. Whether the intra-court appeal was maintainable and whether the authorities were justified in rejecting the permit application without recording legally sustainable reasons? – Held, Yes; No.

The Supreme Court held that the Division Bench committed a fundamental error in treating the writ petition as one under Article 227. Whether jurisdiction is invoked under Article 226 or Article 227 must be determined from the substance of the entire petition, including the pleadings, grounds, reliefs, and the jurisdiction actually invoked, and not merely from the nature of the prayers. Since the appellant had invoked Article 226, the intra-court appeal was maintainable under the applicable High Court Rules. On the merits, the Court held that after the omission of Section 71(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, there is no statutory restriction on the number of stage carriage permits that may be granted to an individual operator. The transport authorities failed to record reasons as mandated by Section 80 while rejecting the application. The Single Judge also sustained the rejection on a ground never assigned by the statutory authorities. The Court further held that possession of a ready vehicle on the date of applying for a permit is not a statutory pre-condition; the vehicle may be produced after selection but before issuance of the permit, although possession of a ready vehicle may constitute a relevant factor where competing applicants are otherwise similarly situated. The impugned orders were accordingly set aside and the appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal was restored for fresh consideration.

Ratio Decidendi

A challenge to the order of a statutory tribunal may validly be maintained under Article 226, Article 227, or both (where the High Court Rules so permit), and the maintainability of an intra-court appeal depends upon the nature of the jurisdiction actually invoked, not merely upon the form of the prayers. After the deletion of Section 71(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, there is no statutory ceiling on the number of stage carriage permits that may be held by an operator. Further, rejection of a permit application must be supported by recorded reasons as required by Section 80, and possession of a ready vehicle at the time of application is not a mandatory statutory requirement, though it may be a relevant comparative factor while considering rival applicants.    2026 INSC 733 

A criminal conviction cannot be sustained merely because the prosecution story appears plausible. Where the prosecution fails to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt and the defence adduces credible oral and documentary evidence creating a reasonable and probable hypothesis consistent with innocence, the benefit of doubt must necessarily enure to the accused. Defence evidence stands on the same footing as prosecution evidence and deserves equal judicial evaluation; it cannot be ignored or viewed with suspicion merely because it is led by the accused. 2026 INSC 695

 

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 173, 190 & 173(8) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 498-A & 304-B – Dowry Death – Further Investigation – Defence Evidence – Whether a conviction can be sustained where the prosecution fails to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and the defence adduces credible evidence creating a probable hypothesis of innocence? – Held, No.

The appellant was prosecuted for offences under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC in connection with the death of his wife due to burn injuries in her matrimonial home. Initially, the investigating officer found material against all seventeen accused named in the FIR but, acting upon directions of the Superintendent of Police, filed a charge-sheet only against the parents-in-law while continuing investigation against the remaining accused. Subsequently, another final report found no evidence against the remaining accused, resulting in two separate sessions trials arising from the same FIR. Ultimately, the appellant alone was convicted while all other accused were acquitted. The High Court remanded the matter on the ground of procedural irregularity. Whether the conviction could be sustained in the face of an inadequate prosecution investigation and credible defence evidence raising a reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution case? – Held, No.

The Supreme Court held that although the Superintendent of Police had no authority to direct filing of a partial charge-sheet and continuation of investigation in the manner adopted, the irregularity did not by itself vitiate the cognizance taken by the Court, since the power to take cognizance rests exclusively with the Magistrate. However, on the merits, the prosecution utterly failed to establish the essential ingredients of cruelty or dowry death beyond reasonable doubt. There was no post-mortem examination, no effective investigation at the places where the victim was treated, no production of crucial medical evidence, and the prosecution witnesses merely repeated general allegations of dowry demand without independent corroboration. On the other hand, the defence produced independent witnesses, medical records, documentary proof of treatment, evidence of investments made jointly in the names of the spouses, and an Executive Magistrate's dying declaration indicating that the burn injuries were accidental. The defence evidence remained substantially unshaken and raised a probable hypothesis consistent with innocence. The Court reiterated that defence evidence must receive the same judicial consideration as prosecution evidence and cannot be discarded merely because it emanates from the accused. Since the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the conviction was set aside and the appellant was acquitted.

Ratio Decidendi

A criminal conviction cannot be sustained merely because the prosecution story appears plausible. Where the prosecution fails to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt and the defence adduces credible oral and documentary evidence creating a reasonable and probable hypothesis consistent with innocence, the benefit of doubt must necessarily enure to the accused. Defence evidence stands on the same footing as prosecution evidence and deserves equal judicial evaluation; it cannot be ignored or viewed with suspicion merely because it is led by the accused. 2026 INSC 695

Appointments to recognised aided Madrasahs made during the period when the constitutional validity of the West Bengal Madrasah Service Commission Act, 2008 was under challenge do not automatically become valid merely because they were made in the interregnum. Every appointment must independently satisfy the mandatory statutory recruitment procedure, including appointment against a sanctioned vacancy by a competent authority through a transparent selection process. Findings of a Court-appointed Verification Committee rejecting such claims, after individual scrutiny, are not liable to be interfered with in judicial review absent manifest perversity or patent illegality. 2026 INSC 691

  

Constitution of India – Articles 30(1), 32 & 142 – West Bengal Madrasah Service Commission Act, 2008 – Appointment of Teachers and Non-Teaching Staff in Recognised Aided Madrasahs – Verification Committee – Whether appointments made during the interregnum after the High Court declared the Act unconstitutional and before the Supreme Court upheld its validity automatically confer a right to approval and service benefits? – Held, No.

The petitioners, comprising teaching and non-teaching staff of various recognised aided Madrasahs in West Bengal, claimed approval of their appointments and consequential service benefits on the ground that they had been appointed during the period when the High Court had declared certain provisions of the West Bengal Madrasah Service Commission Act, 2008 unconstitutional. Pursuant to the decision in Snehasis Giri, this Court had constituted a Committee headed by a former High Court Judge to verify the legality of such appointments. The Committee, after examining each individual claim, found that none of the appointments satisfied the prescribed statutory requirements. The petitioners challenged the Committee's report under Article 32, contending that the appointments stood protected by the earlier decision in Sk. Mohd. Rafique and that the Committee had arbitrarily rejected all claims. Whether appointments made during the interregnum automatically acquire validity and entitle the appointees to approval and service benefits irrespective of compliance with the prescribed recruitment procedure? – Held, No.

The Supreme Court held that the observations in Sk. Mohd. Rafique did not dispense with the requirement of verifying whether appointments had been made in accordance with the governing recruitment notifications and statutory procedure. The Committee constituted in Snehasis Giri was specifically entrusted with examining the legality and genuineness of each appointment, including the existence of sanctioned vacancies, validity of the Managing Committee, prescribed qualifications, publication of proper advertisements, constitution of the Selection Committee, observance of recruitment procedure, and actual appointment against approved posts. Judicial review over such factual findings is limited and interference is warranted only upon demonstration of manifest perversity or arbitrariness. On an independent examination of the representative cases projected by the petitioners, the Court found repeated violations of the mandatory recruitment procedure, including appointments by incompetent authorities, absence of sanctioned vacancies, non-publication of advertisements in State-level newspapers, failure to follow prescribed selection norms, appointments after the stay granted by this Court, and appointments made contrary to statutory notifications. Since none of the selected cases established a legally valid appointment, the petitioners acquired no enforceable right to approval, salary or continuation in service. The writ petitions were accordingly dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Appointments to recognised aided Madrasahs made during the period when the constitutional validity of the West Bengal Madrasah Service Commission Act, 2008 was under challenge do not automatically become valid merely because they were made in the interregnum. Every appointment must independently satisfy the mandatory statutory recruitment procedure, including appointment against a sanctioned vacancy by a competent authority through a transparent selection process. Findings of a Court-appointed Verification Committee rejecting such claims, after individual scrutiny, are not liable to be interfered with in judicial review absent manifest perversity or patent illegality.    2026 INSC 691 

Section 340 CrPC is not attracted merely because a pleading contains an incorrect or wrong statement. Before directing prosecution for offences under Sections 193, 199 or 200 IPC, the Court must record a prima facie finding that the statement is deliberately false, made with the intention to mislead the Court, and must further be satisfied that prosecution is expedient in the interests of justice. Mere inadvertent, typographical or innocent mistakes do not constitute perjury, nor do they justify prosecution under Section 340 CrPC. 2026 INSC 724

  

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 340 & 341 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 193, 199 & 200 – Perjury – Wrong statement in pleadings – Whether every incorrect or wrong statement in pleadings justifies prosecution under Section 340 CrPC? – Held, No.

The respondents initiated proceedings under Section 340 CrPC alleging that the appellant and his advocate had made incorrect statements in a memorandum of appeal and stay application filed in civil proceedings. The appellate court found that "wrong statements" had been made and directed filing of a criminal complaint for offences under Sections 193, 199 and 200 IPC. The High Court affirmed the order and further observed that false affidavits had been filed. Whether the mere existence of wrong or incorrect statements in pleadings is sufficient to invoke Section 340 CrPC and direct prosecution for perjury? – Held, No.

The Supreme Court held that proceedings under Section 340 CrPC can be initiated only where the Court forms a prima facie opinion that a person has deliberately made a false statement or given false evidence attracting the offences specified in Section 195(1)(b) CrPC, and further records its satisfaction that prosecution is expedient in the interests of justice. There is a material distinction between a "wrong statement" and a "false statement". An incorrect or erroneous statement resulting from inadvertence, typographical error or mistake does not by itself constitute a false statement punishable under Sections 193, 199 or 200 IPC. The Court must also independently consider whether the alleged falsehood has a serious impact on the administration of justice. Since the trial court had merely recorded that "wrong statements" were made, had failed to record satisfaction regarding expediency in the interests of justice, and the mistakes had already been sought to be corrected by an application explaining them as typographical errors, the initiation of prosecution was legally unsustainable. The High Court further erred in improving the reasons of the trial court by recording findings of "false statements" which had never been recorded by the original court. The proceedings under Section 340 CrPC were therefore quashed.

Ratio Decidendi

Section 340 CrPC is not attracted merely because a pleading contains an incorrect or wrong statement. Before directing prosecution for offences under Sections 193, 199 or 200 IPC, the Court must record a prima facie finding that the statement is deliberately false, made with the intention to mislead the Court, and must further be satisfied that prosecution is expedient in the interests of justice. Mere inadvertent, typographical or innocent mistakes do not constitute perjury, nor do they justify prosecution under Section 340 CrPC.  2026 INSC 724 

A contractual clause stipulating refund of earnest money upon non-execution of a sale deed does not, by itself, bar a decree for specific performance under Section 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, unless the agreement clearly confers upon the defaulting party an option to substitute payment in lieu of performance. Further, in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, the High Court cannot reappreciate evidence or disturb concurrent findings of fact in the absence of perversity or a substantial question of law. 2026 INSC 700

 

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 23 – Agreement to Sell – Earnest Money Clause – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100 – Second Appeal – Whether a clause providing for refund of earnest money in the event of non-execution of the sale deed bars a decree for specific performance? – Held, No.

The appellant entered into an Agreement to Sell immovable property, paid substantial earnest money, and the parties twice extended the date for execution of the sale deed. The Trial Court found that the agreement was genuine and that the purchaser was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, but refused specific performance on the ground that the agreement merely provided for refund of the earnest money if the sale deed was not executed. The First Appellate Court reversed the decree and granted specific performance. In second appeal, the High Court, while affirming the concurrent findings regarding execution of the agreement and the purchaser's readiness and willingness, restored the Trial Court's decree by holding that the agreement did not contemplate specific performance and by drawing adverse inferences from collateral circumstances. Whether an earnest money clause providing for refund of the advance excludes the remedy of specific performance, and whether the High Court could reappreciate concurrent findings of fact in second appeal? – Held, No.

The Supreme Court held that Section 23 of the Specific Relief Act expressly permits specific performance notwithstanding a contractual stipulation for payment or refund of money upon breach, unless the contract clearly confers an option on the defaulting party to substitute payment in place of performance. A clause requiring refund of earnest money merely secures performance and does not confer an option to avoid the contract. The agreement contained no language enabling the vendor to discharge his obligation by refunding the advance. The High Court further exceeded the limited jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC by reappreciating evidence and disturbing concurrent findings of fact without recording any finding of perversity. Once execution of the agreement, payment of consideration, and the purchaser's readiness and willingness stood concurrently established, the High Court could not revisit those findings by relying upon collateral circumstances or fresh factual inferences. The decree for specific performance granted by the First Appellate Court was accordingly restored.

Ratio Decidendi

A contractual clause stipulating refund of earnest money upon non-execution of a sale deed does not, by itself, bar a decree for specific performance under Section 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, unless the agreement clearly confers upon the defaulting party an option to substitute payment in lieu of performance. Further, in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, the High Court cannot reappreciate evidence or disturb concurrent findings of fact in the absence of perversity or a substantial question of law.