The availability of a revisional remedy under Section 397 Cr.P.C. does not bar the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. A complaint under Section 56 FERA cannot be validly instituted without prior compliance with the mandatory opportunity notice requirement under the proviso to Section 61(2), and the Magistrate must record satisfaction regarding such compliance before taking cognizance. Where these statutory safeguards are ignored and the prosecution is responsible for extraordinary delay infringing the accused's right to a speedy trial under Article 21, continuation of criminal proceedings constitutes abuse of process and warrants quashing.

 

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK & ANR. v. ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS & ANR.

2026 INSC 727 | Criminal Appeal Nos. 2142–2143 of 2013
Coram: J.B. Pardiwala & Manoj Misra, JJ.
Decided on: 21 July 2026.

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A. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Sections 482 & 397 — Inherent jurisdiction of High Court — Availability of revision not a bar.

Paras 10–15

The availability of a revisional remedy under Section 397 Cr.P.C. does not operate as a bar to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Both provisions operate in different fields.

Where abuse of process or ends of justice require intervention, the High Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction notwithstanding the availability of revision.

The High Court may even treat a petition filed under Section 482 as one under Section 397, or vice versa, instead of rejecting it on a technical ground.

Relied on:

• Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 2 SCC 370.

• Prabhu Chawla v. State of Rajasthan (2016) 16 SCC 30.

• Akanksha Arora v. Tanay Maben (2024).

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B. Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 — Section 61(2) Proviso — Opportunity notice — Mandatory condition precedent.

Paras 16–23

Service of an opportunity notice under the proviso to Section 61(2) FERA is a mandatory statutory pre-condition before filing a complaint under Sections 56 or 57 FERA.

Failure to comply renders the complaint incompetent and vitiates the Magistrate's order taking cognizance.

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C. Opportunity notice — Meaningful opportunity — Principles of natural justice.

Paras 17–23

The opportunity contemplated under Section 61(2) must be real, adequate and meaningful.

A mere formal or technical assertion that notice was issued is insufficient.

The prosecution must establish:

• issuance of notice;

• proper service;

• opportunity to reply;

• consideration of the reply before prosecution.

Failure violates principles of natural justice.

---

D. Magistrate — Duty before taking cognizance under FERA.

Paras 21–23

Before taking cognizance of offences under Sections 56 or 57 FERA, the Magistrate must satisfy himself that:

• the statutory opportunity notice was issued;

• it was properly served;

• statutory requirements under Section 61(2) were fulfilled.

Absence of such satisfaction renders cognizance illegal.

---

E. Article 21 Constitution — Right to speedy trial.

Paras 24–33

The constitutional guarantee of speedy trial extends to:

• investigation,

• inquiry,

• trial,

• appeal,

• revision,

• retrial.

Where prolonged delay is attributable to the prosecution and not to the accused, continuation of criminal proceedings violates Article 21.

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F. Delay — Responsibility of prosecution.

Paras 30–33

Where:

• complaint remained pending for over two decades,

• summons were not diligently served,

• prosecution repeatedly failed to take necessary steps,

• High Court's directions for expeditious disposal were ignored,

the delay is attributable to the prosecution.

Such proceedings amount to keeping the accused in "suspended animation."

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G. Inherent powers — Quashing proceedings.

Paras 34–36

Where:

• mandatory statutory safeguards were violated,

• prosecution failed to establish compliance,

• extraordinary delay defeated the right to speedy trial,

continuation of prosecution constitutes abuse of process and proceedings deserve to be quashed.

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CASE FACTS

Paras 1–9

• Enforcement Directorate filed criminal complaints against Standard Chartered Bank and one of its officers alleging violations under FERA regarding foreign remittances.

• Complaints were filed in 2002 concerning transactions of 1991–1992.

• Appellants challenged the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

• High Court dismissed the petitions, holding that revision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. was the proper remedy and refused to quash the complaints.

• Appeals were filed before the Supreme Court.

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LAW ANALYSIS

I. Maintainability of petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Paras 10–15

The Supreme Court reaffirmed settled law that Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court.

Availability of revision cannot extinguish that jurisdiction.

The High Court committed an error in refusing to entertain the petitions merely because revision was available.

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II. Mandatory opportunity notice under Section 61(2) FERA

Paras 16–23

The Court emphasized that no criminal complaint under Section 56 FERA can be instituted unless the accused is first afforded a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that requisite RBI permission existed.

In the present case:

• no copy of the alleged opportunity notice was produced;

• date of notice was never disclosed;

• no proof of service was filed;

• Magistrate recorded no satisfaction regarding compliance.

Consequently, cognizance itself was illegal.

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III. Speedy trial under Article 21

Paras 24–33

The Court reviewed:

• Abdul Rehman Antulay,

• P. Ramachandra Rao,

• Kailash Chandra Kapri.

Applying the balancing test, the Court found:

• prosecution delayed investigation and trial for decades;

• summons were not served with diligence;

• prosecution repeatedly remained absent;

• High Court's directions were ignored.

The delay was entirely attributable to the prosecution.

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IV. Abuse of process

Paras 34–36

After nearly 23 years from filing of the complaint and more than three decades from the alleged transactions, while the trial had not progressed beyond service of summons, continuation of prosecution was held to be wholly unjust.

The proceedings deserved to be terminated.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

The availability of a revisional remedy under Section 397 Cr.P.C. does not bar the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. A complaint under Section 56 FERA cannot be validly instituted without prior compliance with the mandatory opportunity notice requirement under the proviso to Section 61(2), and the Magistrate must record satisfaction regarding such compliance before taking cognizance. Where these statutory safeguards are ignored and the prosecution is responsible for extraordinary delay infringing the accused's right to a speedy trial under Article 21, continuation of criminal proceedings constitutes abuse of process and warrants quashing.

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IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN

1. Section 482 jurisdiction survives despite availability of Section 397 revision.

2. High Courts should avoid dismissing petitions on technical grounds of nomenclature.

3. Opportunity notice under Section 61(2) FERA is mandatory.

4. Notice must be meaningful, not merely formal.

5. Magistrate must verify statutory compliance before cognizance.

6. Right to speedy trial extends from investigation till conclusion of criminal proceedings.

7. Delay attributable to prosecution violates Article 21.

8. Extraordinary prosecutorial delay justifies quashing criminal proceedings.

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FINAL DECISION

Paras 35–38

• Appeals allowed.

• Judgment of the High Court set aside.

• Criminal complaints and summoning orders quashed against the appellants.

• Registry directed to circulate a copy of the judgment to all High Courts.

• Pending applications disposed of.

A consent decree incorporating a matrimonial settlement must be construed as a whole. Where the settlement provides a lump-sum maintenance arrangement together with an express clause terminating future maintenance upon payment of a specified amount, an interim income-linked maintenance clause cannot survive independently after such payment. In execution proceedings, Courts cannot enlarge, rewrite or substitute the contractual obligations embodied in the decree, nor can Article 142 be invoked to alter a fully performed settlement. Concurrent findings based upon a harmonious construction of the decree warrant no interference under Article 136.

 

VIJAYALAKSHMI R. v. C.L. BALAJI

2026 INSC 731 | Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.19770 of 2025
Coram: Sanjay Karol & Augustine George Masih, JJ.
Decided on: 21 July 2026.

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A. Family Courts Act, 1984 — Section 19 — Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — Consent decree — Settlement agreement — Interpretation of clauses — Harmonious construction.

Paras 23–31, 36–38

Clauses of a consent settlement incorporated into a decree must be read as one integrated and harmonious arrangement. No clause should be interpreted in isolation so as to render another clause redundant or otiose.

Where one clause expressly provides for discharge of maintenance liability upon occurrence of a specified event, such clause governs the operation of the remaining clauses.

Held: Clauses 8, 9 and 10 constituted one composite settlement.

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B. Consent Decree — Maintenance settlement — Lump-sum settlement — Interim maintenance clause — Whether continuing obligation.

Paras 25, 26, 27, 36, 37

Where the settlement fixed a lump-sum maintenance amount payable in installments and further expressly stipulated that after payment of Rs.1 crore "no further amount towards maintenance" would be payable, the clause requiring payment of 20% of annual income operated only as an interim arrangement until payment of the first Rs.1 crore.

After such payment, the interim obligation stood discharged.

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C. Execution Proceedings — Executing Court — Cannot go behind decree.

Paras 24, 32, 34

In execution proceedings the Court cannot rewrite, enlarge or modify rights flowing from the decree.

The executing Court is confined to construing and enforcing the decree as it stands and cannot undertake a fresh determination of maintenance or create additional liabilities.

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D. Construction of Settlement — Every clause to be given effect — Interpretation rendering clause otiose to be avoided.

Paras 26, 31

An interpretation that renders an express contractual clause redundant must be rejected.

Courts must adopt an interpretation which gives meaningful effect to every provision of the settlement.

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E. Conduct of parties — Relevant aid to interpretation.

Paras 28–30

Long silence after complete performance of the settlement, absence of any contemporaneous demand, execution of subsequent documents without protest and acknowledgment of receipt of settlement amount are relevant circumstances supporting the construction adopted by the Court.

Such conduct reinforces the parties' own understanding of the settlement.

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F. Limitation Act, 1963 — Article 136 — Execution within twelve years — Delay distinguished from limitation.

Para 29

Though an execution petition may be filed within twelve years, delay in invoking execution may still constitute a relevant circumstance while interpreting the parties' understanding of a settlement.

The case was decided on construction of the decree and not on limitation.

---

G. Maintenance of child — General legal obligation cannot rewrite consent decree.

Para 32

General principles regarding a father's obligation to maintain a dependent child cannot be invoked in execution proceedings to revive an obligation which stands discharged under a consent decree.

---

H. Article 136 Constitution — Concurrent findings — Limited interference.

Paras 33, 36–38

The Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings unless shown to be perverse, manifestly erroneous or based upon misreading of evidence.

Where the interpretation adopted by the Family Court and High Court is natural and harmonious, interference under Article 136 is unwarranted.

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I. Article 142 Constitution — Equitable jurisdiction — Cannot rewrite settlement.

Paras 34, 39

Article 142 cannot be invoked to recast a fully performed settlement or create a fresh maintenance liability inconsistent with the consent decree.

Complete justice cannot override concluded contractual obligations voluntarily undertaken by the parties.

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J. Voluntary payment by father — Welfare of child.

Paras 35, 40, 41

A voluntary undertaking by the father not to seek refund of Rs.1 crore deposited for the son's higher education was recorded and accepted by the Court.

Such payment was held to arise from the father's volition and not from any surviving legal liability under the settlement.

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CASE FACTS

Paras 2–12

• Husband and wife obtained divorce by mutual consent.
• Settlement Petition dated 29.08.2015 formed part of the consent decree.
• Clause 8 provided payment of Rs.2.20 crores towards maintenance of the minor son.
• Clause 9 required payment of 20% of annual income.
• Clause 10 stated that after payment of Rs.1 crore no further maintenance would be payable, while the balance lump sum would thereafter be paid.
• Entire Rs.2.20 crores was admittedly paid.
• Wife later filed execution proceedings seeking enforcement of Clause 9 as an independent continuing obligation.
• Family Court dismissed the execution petition.
• High Court affirmed.
• Appeal before the Supreme Court.

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LAW ANALYSIS

I. Nature of Clause 9

Paras 25–27

The Court held that Clause 9 was neither independent nor perpetual.

It was only a transitional arrangement meant to ensure maintenance until payment of the first tranche under Clause 8.

Clause 10 expressly terminated the obligation.

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II. Harmonious construction

Paras 26–31

The Court rejected the interpretation that Clause 9 survived independently.

Such interpretation would render Clause 10 meaningless.

Instead, every clause was read together so that all provisions remained operative.

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III. Scope of execution proceedings

Paras 24, 32, 34

Execution Courts cannot:

• modify settlements,
• create new maintenance obligations,
• rewrite consent decrees.

Their function is confined to enforcing existing rights under the decree.

---

IV. Article 142

Paras 34–35

Although sympathetic to the son's educational aspirations, the Court declined to create a corpus fund under Article 142 because doing so would amount to rewriting the settlement.

However, the voluntary payment of Rs.1 crore already made by the father was protected for the son's education.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

A consent decree incorporating a matrimonial settlement must be construed as a whole. Where the settlement provides a lump-sum maintenance arrangement together with an express clause terminating future maintenance upon payment of a specified amount, an interim income-linked maintenance clause cannot survive independently after such payment. In execution proceedings, Courts cannot enlarge, rewrite or substitute the contractual obligations embodied in the decree, nor can Article 142 be invoked to alter a fully performed settlement. Concurrent findings based upon a harmonious construction of the decree warrant no interference under Article 136.

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FINAL DECISION

Paras 37–42

• Appeal dismissed.
• Orders of the Family Court and High Court affirmed.
• Declaration that Clause 9 survived independently rejected.
• Prayer under Article 142 for creation of an educational corpus declined.
• Respondent's voluntary payment of Rs.1 crore was recorded and directed to remain available exclusively for the son's higher education.
• No order as to costs.

Proceedings under Section 340 Cr.P.C. can be initiated only where the Court records a prima facie finding of deliberate falsehood, supported by material indicating commission of offences under Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C., and further records an independent satisfaction that prosecution is expedient in the interests of justice. Mere wrong, inadvertent or typographical statements do not constitute "false statements" attracting Sections 193, 199 or 200 IPC. Orders lacking these statutory prerequisites are unsustainable.

 

PRABHAKAR YESHWANT MASRAM & ANR. v. SOU TULA NAMDEORAO JAIPURKAR & ANR.

2026 INSC 724 | Criminal Appeal No.1365 of 2015
Coram: Ujjal Bhuyan & Atul S. Chandurkar, JJ.
Decided on: 21 July 2026.

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A. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Sections 340 & 195(1)(b) — Initiation of prosecution for perjury — Conditions precedent — Mere prima facie finding of "wrong statement" insufficient.

Paras 6, 7, 11, 12, 16, 17

Before directing prosecution under Section 340 Cr.P.C., the Court must record:

(i) prima facie satisfaction that the alleged statement is false and not merely wrong;

(ii) satisfaction that it is expedient in the interests of justice to prosecute.

Absence of either condition vitiates the order directing prosecution.

Held: Order directing prosecution quashed.

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B. Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 193, 199 & 200 — Wrong statement and false statement — Distinction.

Paras 10, 11, 15

A "wrong statement" is not synonymous with a "false statement."

A false statement necessarily imports an element of conscious falsity, knowledge, or intention to deceive for obtaining an undue advantage.

An inadvertent, mistaken or erroneous statement does not by itself constitute offences under Sections 193, 199 or 200 IPC.

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C. Section 340 Cr.P.C. — Expediency in the interest of justice — Mandatory satisfaction.

Paras 7, 12

Recording satisfaction regarding expediency in the interest of justice is a mandatory statutory requirement.

The Court cannot order prosecution merely because an incorrect statement has been noticed.

The impact of the alleged falsehood upon the administration of justice must be evaluated before exercising jurisdiction.

Relied on:

Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, 2005 INSC 129.

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D. Perjury proceedings — To be initiated sparingly.

Paras 12, 16, 17

Proceedings under Section 340 Cr.P.C. are exceptional.

Courts should not order prosecution for every incorrect pleading.

Only glaring cases involving deliberate falsehood on material issues, supported by strong evidence and where conviction appears reasonably probable, justify prosecution.

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E. Typographical mistakes in pleadings — Bona fide explanation — No criminal prosecution.

Paras 14, 15

Where mistakes in pleadings arose due to typographical errors and an application seeking correction had already been filed with an explanation and apology before initiation of Section 340 proceedings, such errors cannot be treated as deliberate false statements warranting prosecution.

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F. Appellate Court — Cannot improve defective order while deciding appeal.

Para 13

Where the original Court recorded only that "wrong statements" were made, the appellate Court cannot convert such finding into one of "false statements" nor supply the missing statutory satisfaction regarding expediency.

An appellant cannot be placed in a worse position merely because he preferred an appeal.

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G. Section 340 Cr.P.C. — Proceedings ordinarily after conclusion of main case.

Para 17

Ordinarily proceedings under Section 340 Cr.P.C. should await disposal of the substantive proceedings.

Premature invocation of Section 340 often delays adjudication and should be discouraged.

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CASE FACTS

Paras 1–5

• Plaintiffs filed a civil suit seeking injunction regarding property rights.
• Trial Court granted temporary injunction.
• Defendant preferred Miscellaneous Civil Appeal.
• Plaintiffs alleged that incorrect statements were made in the appeal memorandum and stay application.
• High Court declined contempt proceedings but granted liberty to invoke Section 340 Cr.P.C.
• Appellate Court directed filing of criminal complaint under Sections 193, 199 and 200 IPC against the defendant and his advocate.
• High Court affirmed the order.
• Supreme Court considered whether such prosecution was legally sustainable.

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LAW ANALYSIS

I. Scope of Section 340 Cr.P.C.

Paras 6–12

The Supreme Court reiterated that Section 340 is not meant to prosecute every inaccurate statement made before Court.

Before initiating prosecution, the Court must independently examine:

• existence of a prima facie offence;
• whether the statement is actually false;
• whether prosecution is expedient in the interest of justice.

Both requirements are mandatory.

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II. Difference between "Wrong" and "False"

Paras 11 & 15

The judgment draws an important jurisprudential distinction.

A wrong statement may result from:

• mistake,
• negligence,
• misunderstanding,
• typographical error.

A false statement involves:

• knowledge of falsity,
• deliberate deception,
• intention to mislead the Court.

Only the latter attracts Sections 193, 199 and 200 IPC.

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III. Typographical errors

Paras 14–15

The defendant had sought correction of the typing mistakes much before Section 340 proceedings.

This conduct was inconsistent with any intention to deceive.

Consequently, no prima facie offence was made out.

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IV. Role of Appellate Court

Para 13

The High Court exceeded appellate jurisdiction by:

• substituting "false statement" for "wrong statement";
• supplying the missing finding regarding expediency.

Such improvement of the impugned order is impermissible.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

Proceedings under Section 340 Cr.P.C. can be initiated only where the Court records a prima facie finding of deliberate falsehood, supported by material indicating commission of offences under Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C., and further records an independent satisfaction that prosecution is expedient in the interests of justice. Mere wrong, inadvertent or typographical statements do not constitute "false statements" attracting Sections 193, 199 or 200 IPC. Orders lacking these statutory prerequisites are unsustainable.

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IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN

1. Wrong statement ≠ False statement.
2. Deliberate intention to deceive is essential.
3. Expediency in the interest of justice is mandatory.
4. Section 340 is an exceptional jurisdiction.
5. Perjury prosecution should not become a tool to delay civil litigation.
6. Appellate Court cannot cure defects in the original order by supplying new findings.
7. Bona fide typographical errors do not amount to criminal perjury.

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FINAL DECISION

Para 18

• Criminal Appeal Allowed.
• Orders of the Additional District Judge and the High Court set aside.
• Application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. dismissed.
• No prosecution against the defendant or his advocate

A landlord who establishes a genuine and bona fide requirement under the Rent Act is entitled to eviction, and the Court must ordinarily respect the landlord's choice of the premises. The existence of another property does not by itself negate bona fide requirement. Furthermore, the High Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, cannot re-appreciate evidence or overturn concurrent findings of fact unless such findings are perverse, illegal, or suffer from jurisdictional infirmity.

 

MADAN MOHAN (Dead) through LRs v. THAKAR DASS (Dead) through LRs

2026 INSC 730 | Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.12435 of 2019
Coram: Sanjay Karol & Augustine George Masih, JJ.
Decided on: 21 July 2026

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HEAD NOTES (AIR STYLE)

A. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 — Section 13 — Bona fide requirement — Death of original landlord during pendency — Requirement of family member survives.

Paras: 2, 3.3, 9, 11

Where eviction was sought on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlady as well as her son, the death of the landlady during pendency of proceedings does not extinguish the cause of action, since the son's independent requirement continued to subsist. The eviction petition survives through the legal representatives.

Held: Eviction rightly granted.

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B. Rent Control — Bona fide requirement — Meaning and scope — Genuine need distinguished from mere desire.

Paras: 6, 6.1, 7

"Bona fide requirement" denotes a real, honest and genuine need and not a fanciful or pretended desire. Courts must objectively assess the sincerity of the landlord's need by placing themselves in the position of the landlord. Once the need is proved, the landlord's choice of the premises cannot ordinarily be substituted by judicial opinion.

Relied on:

• Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999) 6 SCC 222.
• Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini, (2005) 12 SCC 778.

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C. Alternative accommodation — Landlord's choice — Court cannot compel use of another premises.

Paras: 9

Merely because another shop exists does not disentitle the landlord from seeking eviction where the alleged alternative premises was being used as a store or for waste material and concurrent findings accepted such explanation. The landlord is the best judge of the suitability of his premises.

Held: High Court erred in substituting its own assessment.

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D. Revisional jurisdiction — Section 115 CPC — Concurrent findings of fact — High Court cannot re-appreciate evidence.

Paras: 9, 10, 10.1, 10.2, 10.3

The revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC is supervisory and not appellate. The High Court cannot reassess evidence or upset concurrent findings merely because another view is possible. Interference is justified only where findings are perverse, illegal or suffer from jurisdictional error.

Relied on:

• Masjid Kacha Tank v. Tuffail Mohammed, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 270.
• Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78.
• Ambadas Khanduji Shinde v. Ashok Sadashiv Mamurkar, (2017) 14 SCC 132.

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E. Rent legislation — Object — Balance between tenant's protection and landlord's rights.

Paras: 5, 7

Rent control statutes are welfare legislations intended to protect tenants from arbitrary eviction while simultaneously preserving the genuine rights of landlords. The doctrine of bona fide requirement is the statutory mechanism through which this balance is maintained.

Relied on:
Ram Krishan Grover v. Union of India, (2020) 12 SCC 506.

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CASE FACTS

Paras: 2–4

• The landlady instituted eviction proceedings under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act.
• Eviction was sought on two grounds:
  1. Non-payment of rent.
  2. Bona fide personal requirement of herself and her son.
• The tenant tendered arrears during the proceedings; consequently, the dispute substantially survived only on the ground of bona fide requirement.
• The Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority concurrently ordered eviction.
• The High Court reversed the concurrent findings on the ground that the landlady had concealed the availability of another shop and therefore had not approached the Court with clean hands.
• The landlords appealed before the Supreme Court.

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LAW ANALYSIS

(i) Bona fide requirement

Paras: 6–9

The Court reiterated that:

• "Requirement" means a genuine necessity and not a mere wish.
• Courts should objectively evaluate whether the need is natural and honest.
• Once the requirement is established, the landlord's preference regarding which premises should be used deserves judicial respect.

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(ii) Alternative accommodation

Para: 9

Availability of another premises does not automatically defeat the claim of bona fide requirement.

The Court observed that:

• the alleged third shop was concurrently found to be used as storage;
• the High Court wrongly re-appreciated factual evidence;
• the landlord cannot be compelled to use another premises merely because it exists.

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(iii) Revisional jurisdiction

Paras: 10–10.3

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that:

• revision is not a first appeal;
• concurrent findings cannot be disturbed merely because another interpretation is possible;
• interference is confined to jurisdictional error, perversity or material illegality.

The High Court exceeded the limits of Section 115 CPC by reassessing factual findings.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

A landlord who establishes a genuine and bona fide requirement under the Rent Act is entitled to eviction, and the Court must ordinarily respect the landlord's choice of the premises. The existence of another property does not by itself negate bona fide requirement. Furthermore, the High Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, cannot re-appreciate evidence or overturn concurrent findings of fact unless such findings are perverse, illegal, or suffer from jurisdictional infirmity.

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FINAL DECISION

Paras: 11

• Appeal Allowed.
• High Court judgment set aside.
• Orders of the Rent Controller and Appellate Authority restored.
• Tenant directed to deliver vacant possession within two months.
• No order as to costs. 

Appointment to teaching or non-teaching posts in aided minority madrasahs made without strict compliance with the prescribed statutory recruitment procedure—including sanctioned vacancy, public advertisement, competent selection process and approval requirements—is void in law and confers no enforceable right to approval, salary or regularisation. The Supreme Court's power under Article 142 cannot be exercised to legitimise such illegal appointments.

  Najma Khatun & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., 2026 INSC 691

The Supreme Court held that teachers and non-teaching staff appointed in aided minority madrasahs during the interregnum (after the High Court struck down the Madrasah Service Commission Act, 2008, but before and after the Act was ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court) do not acquire any vested or enforceable right to service benefits merely because they were appointed during that period. Their appointments are valid only if they were made strictly in accordance with the governing recruitment rules and statutory notifications.

The Court further laid down the following principles:

1. Verification of appointments is mandatory. The Committee constituted by the Supreme Court in Snehasis Giri was competent to examine whether each appointment satisfied the prescribed legal requirements, notwithstanding the observations in Sk. Mohd. Rafique.

2. Compliance with recruitment procedure is mandatory, not directory. Requirements such as:

   • existence of a sanctioned vacancy,
   • open advertisement in State-level newspapers,
   • constitution of a valid Selection Committee,
   • communication to the District Inspector of Schools and other competent authorities, and
   • appointment by a duly competent Managing Committee,

   are essential conditions. Breach of these requirements renders the appointment illegal.

3. An illegal appointment creates no enforceable legal right. Persons appointed contrary to the statutory procedure cannot invoke Articles 14, 16, 21, or 32 to seek approval of service, salary, or regularisation.
4. Judicial review over the Committee's findings is limited. The Court will interfere only where the findings are shown to be manifestly perverse or arbitrary. It will not reappreciate disputed questions of fact in every individual case.
5. Article 142 cannot be used to validate illegal appointments. The power to do complete justice cannot override mandatory statutory recruitment requirements or protect appointments made in violation of law, particularly where public employment and educational standards are involved.

Ratio

Appointment to teaching or non-teaching posts in aided minority madrasahs made without strict compliance with the prescribed statutory recruitment procedure—including sanctioned vacancy, public advertisement, competent selection process and approval requirements—is void in law and confers no enforceable right to approval, salary or regularisation. The Supreme Court's power under Article 142 cannot be exercised to legitimise such illegal appointments.