Saturday, July 4, 2026

(E) Precedent — Larger Bench decision — Binding effect. A Bench of lesser or co-equal strength cannot disregard the ratio of an earlier larger Bench. Where an earlier three-Judge Bench has authoritatively declared the source of power under a remission policy, a later inconsistent decision of a smaller Bench is liable to be treated as per incuriam. (Paras 14–15).

(A) Constitution of India — Art. 161 — Remission — Haryana Remission Policy, 2002 — Nature of power — Constitutional power of Governor.
The Haryana Remission Policy dated 12-04-2002 is an exercise of the Governor's constitutional power under Article 161. A subsequent statutory remission policy issued under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot override, supersede or curtail the constitutional power exercisable under Article 161. (Paras 9–13, 16).

(B) Constitution of India — Art. 161 — CrPC, 1973 — Ss. 432, 433 — Remission — Constitutional and statutory powers — Distinction.
The power of remission under Article 161 is distinct, independent and superior to the statutory powers under Sections 432 and 433 CrPC. A statutory policy framed under the Code cannot abrogate or supersede a remission policy operating under Article 161 of the Constitution. (Paras 9–10, 12–13, 16).

(C) Remission — Applicable Policy — Beneficial policy — Life convict.
Where the earlier remission policy is constitutional in character under Article 161, its operation is not displaced by a later statutory policy. The convict is entitled to consideration under the more beneficial constitutional policy. (Paras 10, 12–13, 16).

(D) Precedent — Per incuriam — Principles governing.
A judgment is per incuriam where its ratio is irreconcilable with an earlier decision rendered by a Bench of equal or larger strength, or where a binding statutory provision or binding precedent has not been noticed. The doctrine is an exception to stare decisis and must be invoked sparingly. Judicial discipline requires adherence to decisions of larger Benches. (Paras 14–15).

(E) Precedent — Larger Bench decision — Binding effect.
A Bench of lesser or co-equal strength cannot disregard the ratio of an earlier larger Bench. Where an earlier three-Judge Bench has authoritatively declared the source of power under a remission policy, a later inconsistent decision of a smaller Bench is liable to be treated as per incuriam. (Paras 14–15).

(F) Remission — Haryana Remission Policies, 2002 and 2008 — Applicability.
The observation in the 2008 statutory policy that it supersedes the 2002 Policy is ineffective insofar as the 2002 Policy derives its authority from Article 161 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the appellant's remission application is required to be considered under the 2002 Policy. (Paras 16–18).

(G) Prospective operation — Remission.
The declaration of law shall operate prospectively and shall not reopen remission applications already decided. The State may thereafter maintain separate constitutional and statutory remission policies. (Para 17).

Monday, June 29, 2026

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: LAND ACQUISITION AND REHABILITATION — Right to Fai...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: LAND ACQUISITION AND REHABILITATION — Right to Fai...: advocatemmmohan LAND ACQUISITION AND REHABILITATION — Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Re...

LAND ACQUISITION AND REHABILITATION — Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 — Challenge to Award passed after directions of High Court — Delay, knowledge of award, statutory remedy and validity of acquisition — Consideration.

Where landowners challenged awards passed under the Act, 2013 alleging non-service of notices, inadequate compensation, incorrect application of multiplier, non-grant of Rehabilitation and Resettlement benefits and violation of statutory procedure, while the State contended that notices were duly served, awards were passed pursuant to earlier High Court directions, compensation was deposited, petitioners had prior knowledge of the awards and had an effective statutory remedy before the LARR Authority, the Court examined the rival contentions in the light of the provisions of the Act, 2013 and the Rules.
(Paras 2 to 7)

LAND ACQUISITION — Notice to interested persons — Compliance with Sections 21 and 22 of the Act, 2013 — Burden of proof.

Petitioners contended that mandatory notices under Sections 21 and 22 of the Act, 2013 were never served before passing of the awards and that absence of claims recorded in the awards itself established non-compliance, whereas respondents asserted that notices were duly published and individually served and award enquiry was conducted in accordance with law.
(Paras 3(g), 4(c), 4(d), 7)

LAND ACQUISITION — Compensation — Market value — Multiplier factor — Applicability of Central Notification and State Rules.

Petitioners contended that market value was mechanically fixed at Rs.5,00,000/- per acre and multiplier factor of 1.25 was illegally adopted instead of factor 2.00 applicable to rural areas under the Central Notification and Rule 17 of the 2015 Rules, resulting in denial of fair compensation.
(Paras 3(h), 3(i))

LAND ACQUISITION — Rehabilitation and Resettlement — Mandatory benefits — Non-grant — Effect.

Failure to prepare Rehabilitation and Resettlement Award and to extend statutory rehabilitation benefits, if established, would amount to violation of the mandatory provisions contained in Sections 31 and 32 of the Act, 2013.
(Para 3(l))

LAND ACQUISITION — Consent compensation under Government Order — Whether bars statutory entitlement.

Government approval fixing compensation at Rs.20,00,000/- per acre for consent awards cannot, by itself, conclude the issue where landowners dispute the legality of consent, market value or compliance with statutory safeguards under the Act, 2013.
(Paras 3(j), 3(k), 4(c))

WRIT JURISDICTION — Land acquisition matters — Delay and laches — Prior litigation — Knowledge of award — Effect.

Where petitioners had earlier participated in connected proceedings arising out of the same acquisition and respondents established that awards had already been passed and were within the knowledge of several petitioners, the plea of lack of knowledge assumes significance while considering maintainability and delay.
(Paras 4(a), 4(g))

LAND ACQUISITION — Statutory remedy — Reference before LARR Authority — Writ petition.

Disputes relating to adequacy of compensation and allied claims are ordinarily to be pursued before the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority under Section 64 of the Act, 2013, unless exceptional grounds justifying exercise of writ jurisdiction are established.
(Paras 4(f), 7)

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA — Article 226 — Land acquisition — Public purpose — Interference by Court.

In matters of land acquisition undertaken for public purpose, Courts are required to balance private rights with public interest and exercise writ jurisdiction with restraint, particularly where statutory remedies are available.
(Paras 5, 6)

Kerala Registration of Marriages (Common) Rules, 2008 — Registration of second marriage of Muslim husband — Notice to first wife — Necessity. Where a Muslim man seeks registration of his second marriage while the first marriage subsists and the first wife is alive, the Registrar shall issue notice and afford an opportunity of hearing to the first wife before registering the second marriage. Such hearing is a requirement of the principles of natural justice and constitutional equality. (Paras 10, 11)

MUHAMMAD SHAREEF C. v. STATE OF KERALA

2025 KER 82441 (Ker.)

(A) Kerala Registration of Marriages (Common) Rules, 2008 — Registration of second marriage of Muslim husband — Notice to first wife — Necessity.

Where a Muslim man seeks registration of his second marriage while the first marriage subsists and the first wife is alive, the Registrar shall issue notice and afford an opportunity of hearing to the first wife before registering the second marriage. Such hearing is a requirement of the principles of natural justice and constitutional equality. (Paras 10, 11)

(B) Kerala Registration of Marriages (Common) Rules, 2008 — Registrar — Scope of enquiry.

The Registrar has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the validity of a marriage. His enquiry under Rule 11 is summary and confined to prima facie verification of the memorandum and the factum of solemnization of marriage. (Paras 7–10)

(C) Kerala Registration of Marriages (Common) Rules, 2008 — Objection by first wife — Effect.

If, after notice, the first wife objects to the registration of the second marriage on the ground that it is invalid, the Registrar shall refrain from registering the marriage and direct the parties to approach the competent civil court for determination of its validity. (Para 10)

(D) Muslim Personal Law — Polygamy — Nature of right.

Muslim Personal Law permits a second marriage only in limited circumstances. The Holy Qur'an emphasizes justice, fairness and equal treatment among wives, making monogamy the norm and polygamy only an exception. (Paras 5, 6)

(E) Constitution of India — Arts. 14 and 15 — Equality and natural justice — Marriage registration.

While personal law may permit a second marriage, registration under a statutory law must conform to constitutional principles of equality, fairness and natural justice. Constitutional rights prevail in matters governed by statutory procedure. (Para 10)

(F) Registration of Marriage — Previous marital status.

Form I prescribed under the Kerala Registration of Marriages (Common) Rules, 2008 requires disclosure of previous marital status and whether any spouse is living. These particulars enable the Registrar to ascertain whether the marriage presented for registration is a second marriage. (Paras 8–9)

(G) Writ Jurisdiction — Necessary party.

A writ petition seeking registration of a second marriage is liable to be dismissed where the first wife, whose rights are directly affected by the proposed registration, is not impleaded as a party. (Para 10)

(H) Directions.

Petition dismissed. Petitioners granted liberty to apply afresh for registration. Upon such application, the Registrar shall issue notice to the first wife and proceed in accordance with law; if validity of the second marriage is disputed, parties shall be relegated to the competent civil court. (Para 10)

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act...: advocatemmmohan ROUSANARA BEGUM v. S.K. SALAHUDDIN @ SK SALAUDDIN & ANR. 2025 INSC 1375 (SC) (A) Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on D...

ROUSANARA BEGUM v. S.K. SALAHUDDIN @ SK SALAUDDIN & ANR.

2025 INSC 1375 (SC)

(A) Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 — S. 3(1)(d) — Return of property — Property given at marriage — Beneficial interpretation.

Property given to a Muslim woman before, at or after marriage by her relatives, husband or their relatives is recoverable under Section 3(1)(d) of the 1986 Act. The provision is a beneficial legislation enacted to secure the dignity, financial security and autonomy of a divorced Muslim woman and must receive a purposive and liberal construction. (Paras 7, 9)

(B) Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 — S. 3(1)(d) — Gold ornaments and money given at marriage — Entry in marriage register — Return of articles.

Where the marriage register and surrounding circumstances establish that money and gold ornaments formed part of the marriage transaction, the divorced wife is entitled to their return. A mere recital describing the articles as having been handed over to the bridegroom cannot defeat the statutory protection intended for the divorced woman. (Paras 7–10)

(C) Evidence — Marriage Register — Kazi/Marriage Registrar — Evidentiary value.

The testimony of the Marriage Registrar explaining an inadvertent entry in the marriage register cannot be discarded merely because overwriting exists. Once the Registrar produces the original register and satisfactorily explains the discrepancy, his evidence deserves due weight. Mere suspicion is not a substitute for proof. (Para 8)

(D) Evidence — Appreciation of evidence — Previous criminal proceedings — Limited evidentiary value.

A statement made by the bride's father in proceedings under Section 498-A IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act cannot automatically prevail over the evidence of the Marriage Registrar, particularly when those criminal proceedings culminated in acquittal which attained finality. (Para 8)

(E) Constitution of India — Art. 227 — Supervisory jurisdiction — Interference.

Though the High Court possesses wide supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 to prevent abuse of process, interference is not justified where the subordinate courts have correctly appreciated the evidence and adopted the statutory object of a beneficial legislation. (Paras 5, 9, 10)

(F) Constitution of India — Art. 21 — Social justice adjudication — Rights of divorced Muslim women.

While construing the 1986 Act, Courts must adopt an interpretation advancing equality, dignity and autonomy of women. Judicial interpretation must remain sensitive to the lived realities of women and the constitutional commitment to social justice under Article 21. (Para 9)

(G) Supreme Court — Art. 136 — Two possible views — Exception.

Ordinarily, the Supreme Court does not interfere merely because two views are possible. However, interference is warranted where the High Court ignores the purposive construction of a welfare statute and approaches the dispute as a purely civil controversy, thereby frustrating the legislative object. (Para 9)

(H) Result.

Appeal allowed. Judgment of the High Court set aside. Respondent directed to remit the amount directly to the appellant, furnish compliance affidavit within six weeks, failing which interest at 9% per annum shall be payable. (Para 10)

Tuesday, June 23, 2026

In cases of permanent disability, compensation must be based upon functional disability affecting earning capacity and not merely upon the percentage of physical disability certified by medical experts. Where the injury completely disables a person from pursuing his established vocation, the functional disability may be assessed at 100% notwithstanding a lower percentage of physical disability.

APEX COURT

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 — Injury claim — Amputation above knee — Functional disability.

(A) Permanent disability — Physical disability and functional disability — Distinction.

For determining compensation in injury cases, the relevant consideration is not merely the percentage of physical disability certified by the medical expert, but the effect of such disability upon the earning capacity of the injured. Physical disability and functional disability are distinct concepts. (Paras 20 to 22)

Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar, (2011) 1 SCC 343, followed.

(B) Functional disability — Mason suffering above-knee amputation — 100% loss of earning capacity.

Where the claimant was employed as a mason and suffered amputation of the right leg above the knee, rendering him incapable of performing manual and physical labour constituting his sole avocation, the functional disability was liable to be assessed at 100%, notwithstanding physical disability being certified at 70%. (Paras 23 to 26)

(C) Loss of earning capacity.

The percentage of physical disability cannot mechanically be adopted as the percentage of economic loss or loss of earning capacity. The Tribunal must ascertain the effect of the injury upon the actual vocation of the injured. (Paras 21 and 22)

(D) Manual labourer — Amputation.

A mason necessarily depends upon continuous use and support of both lower limbs. Amputation of a leg above the knee effectively destroys his capacity to continue such avocation and may justify assessment of total functional disability. (Paras 23 to 25)

Motor Vehicles Act — Compensation.

(E) Future prospects — Injured claimant.

Where the injured claimant was aged about 30 years and self-employed, addition of 40% towards future prospects was rightly granted. (Paras 9 and 26)

(F) Assessment of income.

In the absence of documentary proof supporting the claimed income of Rs.20,000/- per month, the High Court was justified in assessing the claimant's monthly income at Rs.12,000/-. (Para 18)

(G) Future medical expenses — Artificial limb.

Where the claimant suffered above-knee amputation and would require repeated replacement, maintenance and rehabilitation in relation to artificial limbs throughout his lifetime, compensation towards future medical expenses deserved enhancement. (Para 27)

(H) Prosthesis and rehabilitation.

Compensation in amputation cases must adequately account for continuing medical expenses, prosthetic replacement, rehabilitation and long-term assistance necessitated by the permanent disability. (Para 27)

Principles.

(I) Loss of future earnings.

The Tribunal must undertake three distinct inquiries:

Nature and extent of permanent disability.
Occupation and avocation of the claimant.
Actual impact of the disability on earning capacity.

The economic loss may in appropriate cases be greater than the medical percentage of disability. (Paras 21 and 22)

Held

The Courts below erred in mechanically equating 70% physical disability with 70% loss of earning capacity. Since the appellant was a mason whose livelihood depended entirely upon physical labour and he had suffered amputation of his right leg above the knee, the functional disability was liable to be assessed at 100%.

Further, the amount awarded towards future medical expenses for prosthesis required enhancement from Rs.1,00,000/- to Rs.2,00,000/-.

Accordingly, compensation was enhanced from Rs.29,01,570/- to Rs.40,29,730/- with interest at the rate awarded by the High Court. (Paras 26 to 31)

Ratio Decidendi