ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: The six months' cooling-off period prescribed unde...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: The six months' cooling-off period prescribed unde...: advocatemmmohan AP HIGH COURT  Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — Section 13-B(2) — Mutual consent divorce — Cooling-off period — Waiver. (A) Hindu...

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — Section 13-B(2) — Mutual consent divorce — Cooling-off period — Waiver.

(A) Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, S.13-B(2) — Divorce by mutual consent — Six months' cooling-off period — Nature of provision — Directory and not mandatory.

The period of six months prescribed under Section 13-B(2) is not mandatory but directory. The Family Court possesses discretion to waive the said period where the parties have been living separately for a considerable period, have settled all their disputes, and there is no possibility of reconciliation. (Paras 9 to 12)

Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur, AIR 2017 SC 4417; Amit Kumar v. Suman Beniwal, (2023) 17 SCC 648, followed.

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(B) Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — S.13-B — Waiver of cooling-off period — Complete settlement between parties — Permanent alimony — Child welfare — Property settlement — Criminal proceedings — Effect.

Where husband and wife amicably settled all inter se disputes including permanent alimony, welfare of minor child, distribution of properties and withdrawal of criminal proceedings, and consciously decided to part ways, insistence upon completion of the statutory period would serve no useful purpose and would merely prolong the agony of the parties. (Paras 10 to 12)

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(C) Family Courts — Mutual consent divorce — Advancement petition — Rejection by Family Court — Legality.

Family Court dismissed application for advancement of hearing solely on the ground that six months' cooling-off period had not expired and that mediation before expiry of such period would defeat the object of the statute. Held, the approach was erroneous in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court that the period is directory and can be waived in appropriate cases. (Paras 4, 9 to 12)

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(D) Constitution of India — Article 227 — Supervisory jurisdiction — Interference with interlocutory order of Family Court.

High Court, in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, can interfere where the subordinate Court refuses to exercise jurisdiction vested in it or ignores binding precedents governing the exercise of discretion. Order dismissing application for advancement was liable to be set aside. (Paras 9 to 13)

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A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — Section 13-B(2) — Waiver of cooling-off period — Conditions.

The object of Section 13-B(2) is to provide an opportunity for reconciliation and reconsideration. Once the parties have remained separately for a substantial period, all disputes stand settled and the marriage has irretrievably broken down with no possibility of reunion, continuation of the waiting period becomes an empty formality. (Paras 11 and 12)

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B. Matrimonial Law — Mutual consent divorce — Irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

Law does not insist upon preservation of a dead marriage where the matrimonial relationship has completely broken down and the parties voluntarily seek dissolution after settling all ancillary disputes. (Para 11)

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Held:

The impugned docket order passed by the Family Court refusing advancement of the matter solely on the ground of non-completion of six months' period was set aside. The Family Court was directed to take up the petition and pass appropriate orders for dissolution of marriage by mutual consent in accordance with law expeditiously. (Para 13)

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Cases Referred:

1. Amit Kumar v. Suman Beniwal
2. Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur

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Ratio Decidendi:

The six months' cooling-off period prescribed under Section 13-B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act is directory and not mandatory. Where parties have genuinely settled all disputes and there exists no possibility of reconciliation, the Family Court possesses discretion to waive the period, and refusal to exercise such discretion contrary to settled law warrants interference under Article 227 of the Constitution.

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Relief:

Civil Revision Petition Allowed.
Impugned order set aside.
Family Court directed to advance the matter and dispose of the mutual consent divorce petition expeditiously.

Right to Information Act, 2005 — S.24(4) — Exemption from applicability of Act — “Intelligence and security organisations” — Scope — Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment (SPE) not an intelligence and security organisation — Notification granting exemption — Ultra vires.

SPECIAL POLICE ESTABLISHMENT v. KAMTA PRASAD MISHRA & ORS.
2026 INSC 644 : Criminal Appeal No. 3743 of 2024
Decided on 15-06-2026
Coram: Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar

HEADNOTES 

Right to Information Act, 2005 — S.24(4) — Exemption from applicability of Act — “Intelligence and security organisations” — Scope — Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment (SPE) not an intelligence and security organisation — Notification granting exemption — Ultra vires.

State Government issued Notification dated 25.08.2011 under S.24(4) excluding Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment (Lokayukt Organisation) from the purview of the RTI Act.

Held, SPE is constituted for investigation of corruption and allied offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, Sections 409, 420 and Chapter XVIII IPC. It is neither entrusted with intelligence functions nor security functions. Consequently, it cannot be treated as an “intelligence and security organisation” within the meaning of S.24(4). Notification dated 25.08.2011 excluding SPE from the operation of the RTI Act is beyond the scope of S.24(4) and liable to be struck down.
(Paras 13-22).

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Right to Information Act, 2005 — S.24(4) — Interpretation — State Government's power to exempt organisations.

Held, exemption under S.24(4) is confined only to such organisations established by the State Government that are genuinely concerned with intelligence and security functions. Mere investigative powers relating to corruption or criminal misconduct do not bring an organisation within the ambit of “intelligence and security organisation”.
(Paras 13-20).

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Right to Information Act, 2005 — S.8(1)(h) — Information relating to sanction for prosecution — Investigation already completed.

Public servant sought information regarding decision-making process leading to grant of sanction for his prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Held, where investigation had already concluded and charge-sheet had been filed, information regarding grant of sanction for prosecution could not be denied merely by invoking S.8(1)(h). Disclosure of such information would not impede investigation, apprehension or prosecution of offenders.
(Paras 2, 3, 4, 7).

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Constitutional Law — Judicial Review — Subordinate Legislation — Validity can be examined suo motu.

Question regarding validity of Notification dated 25.08.2011 arose before Supreme Court though specific challenge to notification had not been raised before High Court.

Held, Constitutional Courts possess limited power to examine validity of subordinate legislation suo motu where pure questions of law arise and affected State authorities are afforded full opportunity to justify the legislation. Absence of a specific prayer does not always preclude examination of validity of subordinate legislation.
(Paras 8-11).

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Subordinate Legislation — Grounds of challenge — Principles.

Held, subordinate legislation may be challenged not only on grounds available against plenary legislation but also on the grounds that it fails to conform to the parent statute, exceeds delegated authority, or is contrary to the statutory scheme under which it is made.
(Para 12).

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Lokayukt — Anti-corruption mechanism — Nature of functions.

Held, the Lokayukt Organisation under the Madhya Pradesh Lokayukt Evam Up-Lokayukt Adhiniyam, 1981 is primarily an institution for inquiry into allegations of corruption, misconduct and abuse of office by public servants. Such functions are distinct from intelligence gathering and security operations contemplated by S.24 of the RTI Act.
(Paras 17-20).

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Interpretation of Statutes — Meaning of “intelligence and security organisations”.

Held, expression “intelligence and security organisations” in S.24 of the RTI Act must be construed in light of organisations enumerated in the Second Schedule to the Act, such as enforcement, border security and national security agencies. Organisations dealing only with corruption investigations do not fall within that category.
(Paras 14, 15, 20).

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Right to Information Act, 2005 — Transparency in anti-corruption proceedings.

Held, information concerning grant of sanction for prosecution cannot be withheld on a blanket basis once statutory conditions for exemption cease to exist. Transparency remains the governing principle and exemptions must be construed strictly.
(Paras 2-4, 22).

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Ratio Decidendi

1. An organisation can be exempted under S.24(4) of the RTI Act only if it is genuinely an intelligence or security organisation.
2. The Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment investigating corruption offences is not such an organisation.
3. A notification issued beyond the limits of delegated authority under S.24(4) is ultra vires and liable to be struck down.
4. Courts may, in exceptional cases, examine validity of subordinate legislation even without a specific challenge, after affording adequate opportunity to the State.
5. Information relating to sanction for prosecution cannot be denied under S.8(1)(h) once investigation is complete and disclosure would not impede prosecution.
   (Paras 8-12, 20-22).

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Held

Notification dated 25.08.2011 issued by the State of Madhya Pradesh excluding the Special Police Establishment from the operation of the RTI Act struck down. Judgment of the High Court directing supply of information upheld. Criminal appeal dismissed. Clarified that validity of the notification insofar as it relates to the State Bureau of Investigation of Economic Offences was not examined and continues to operate to that extent.
(Para 22).

Service Law — Public Employment — Recruitment Process — Eligibility criteria — Workshop experience certificate — Retrospective renewal of approval to workshops. Recruitment to 113 posts of Motor Vehicle Inspector Grade-II. Certain candidates were excluded on the ground that workshop approval was not in force during part of the experience period. Subsequently, retrospective approval was granted and re-verification undertaken. Held, once the Motor Vehicles Maintenance Department (MVMD) re-verified the workshop experience certificates and certified that the candidates possessed more than one year of qualifying experience in approved workshops, such candidates were entitled to be considered for inclusion in the select list and further stages of recruitment. (Paras 10-13).

 S. SENTHIL KUMARAN BOSE v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. and Connected Appeals

2026 INSC 645 : Civil Appeals arising out of SLP (C) No.7906 of 2024 and connected matters
Decided on 15-06-2026
Coram: Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar

HEADNOTES 

Service Law — Public Employment — Recruitment Process — Eligibility criteria — Workshop experience certificate — Retrospective renewal of approval to workshops.

Recruitment to 113 posts of Motor Vehicle Inspector Grade-II. Certain candidates were excluded on the ground that workshop approval was not in force during part of the experience period. Subsequently, retrospective approval was granted and re-verification undertaken.

Held, once the Motor Vehicles Maintenance Department (MVMD) re-verified the workshop experience certificates and certified that the candidates possessed more than one year of qualifying experience in approved workshops, such candidates were entitled to be considered for inclusion in the select list and further stages of recruitment.
(Paras 10-13).

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Recruitment and Selection — Candidate not at fault — Effect of pendency of renewal applications of workshops.

Held, candidates who acquired experience in workshops that were functioning with Government approval could not be prejudiced merely because applications for renewal of approval were pending with authorities. Delay in grant of renewal was beyond the control of candidates and workshop owners and could not deprive otherwise eligible candidates of consideration for public employment.
(Paras 15, 16).

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Public Employment — Recruitment Process — Fresh selection directed — Level playing field.

Certain candidates whose names appeared in the revised list of 226 candidates challenged the direction requiring fresh recruitment exercise after reconsideration of workshop approvals.

Held, where a class of candidates had been wrongly excluded from participation for no fault of theirs, directing a fresh recruitment process to ensure equal opportunity and a level playing field was justified. Such exercise would enlarge the zone of consideration and enable selection of more meritorious candidates in public interest.
(Paras 16, 17).

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Public Employment — Select List — Mere inclusion in select list — No vested right.

Held, mere inclusion of a candidate's name in a provisional or revised select list does not confer any vested right to appointment. Candidates whose names appeared in the revised list dated 28.04.2021 could not resist a fresh selection process when similarly situated eligible candidates had earlier been excluded from consideration.
(Para 17).

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Service Law — Recruitment — Public interest — Larger pool of eligible candidates.

Held, where a larger pool of eligible candidates becomes available after correction of an arbitrary exclusion, continuation of recruitment from such enlarged pool promotes merit-based selection and serves public interest.
(Paras 16, 17).

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Public Employment — Persons Studied in Tamil Medium (PSTM) Quota — Proof of eligibility.

Candidates claiming benefit under PSTM quota produced certificates issued by Heads of Educational Institutions certifying that the diploma course was pursued in Tamil medium.

Held, where the recruitment notification did not prescribe any additional requirement, certificate issued by the Head of the Institution was sufficient proof of study in Tamil medium. TNPSC could not insist upon further certification from the Directorate of Technical Education.
(Paras 19, 21).

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Recruitment Examination — Disclosure of Marks — Candidates outside zone of consideration.

Division Bench directed TNPSC to communicate marks obtained by candidates who did not fall within the zone of consideration while clarifying that answer scripts need not be supplied.

Held, disclosure of marks was justified in public interest considering prolonged litigation concerning the recruitment process. Communication of marks individually would promote transparency and help bring finality to disputes. Such disclosure does not automatically entitle candidates to copies of answer sheets.
(Paras 20-22).

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Right to Information — Recruitment Examinations — Disclosure of marks.

Following the principle in Joint Directors and Central Public Information Officer v. T.R. Rajesh, disclosure of examination-related information may be directed where public interest so requires.

Held, Court was justified in directing disclosure of marks of candidates not falling within the zone of consideration, having regard to public interest and prolonged recruitment litigation.
(Paras 20-22).

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Ratio Decidendi

1. Eligible candidates cannot be excluded because of administrative delays in renewal of workshop approvals.
2. Retrospective approval and re-verification of experience certificates can validly restore eligibility.
3. Inclusion in a select list does not create an enforceable right to appointment.
4. Fresh recruitment may be directed to ensure equal opportunity and a level playing field.
5. PSTM eligibility is established through certificates issued by the Head of the Institution when the notification prescribes no additional requirement.
6. Disclosure of marks may be ordered where public interest warrants transparency in recruitment.
   (Paras 13, 16, 17, 21, 22).

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Held

Directions of the High Court regarding re-verification of workshop experience, fresh recruitment exercise, recognition of PSTM certificates and disclosure of marks of candidates outside the zone of consideration upheld. Recruitment process directed to be completed expeditiously in accordance with the High Court's timeline. Appeals disposed of.
(Paras 13, 17, 21-23)

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Precedent — Coordinate Bench — Divergent view — Re...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Precedent — Coordinate Bench — Divergent view — Re...: advocatemmmohan 2026 INSC 646 SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 1 of 69 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CI...

RAJESH SHARMA v. NORTH DELHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ANR.
2026 INSC 646 (SC) : Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019
Decided on 19-06-2026
Coram: Justice Manoj Misra

HEADNOTES 

Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Ss. 59(d), 92, 95, 98 and 480 — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Disciplinary Authority — Category ‘A’ Officer — Commissioner or Corporation.

Executive Engineer (Civil), a Category ‘A’ officer, was dismissed from service by the Commissioner after conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Challenge was on the ground that under the 1959 Regulations, the Corporation and not the Commissioner was the competent disciplinary authority.

Held, by Act 67 of 1993, the Commissioner was made both the appointing authority under S.92 and the disciplinary authority under S.59(d). Legislative intent was to vest disciplinary control in the Commissioner. Consequently, the Commissioner was competent to impose the penalty of dismissal.
(Paras 30, 50-52, 60-63).

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Statutory Interpretation — Amendment by substitution — Principles governing construction.

Held, substitution of a statutory provision does not automatically relate back to the date of the original enactment. Mere use of the words “substitute” or “substitution” does not make the substituted provision retrospective. Unless a contrary legislative intention appears, the substituted provision operates from the date on which it is brought into force.
(Paras 35-44, 47-52).

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Statutory Interpretation — Amendment by substitution — Legal principles summarized.

Held, principles governing amendment by substitution include:

(i) substitution is not necessarily two severable steps of repeal and reenactment;
(ii) use of the expression “substitution” does not by itself confer retrospective effect;
(iii) substituted provision ordinarily operates prospectively from the date of enforcement; and
(iv) legislative intent governs construction of the amended provision.
(Para 44).

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Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — S.59(d) — Expression “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” — Interpretation.

Held, the expression “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” refers to regulations that may be framed after insertion of S.59(d) by the 1993 Amendment. The provision was intended to operate notwithstanding the earlier regulatory framework and to enable future regulations to modify the position.
(Paras 64-67 and discussion thereunder).

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Service Law — Conflict between statute and regulations — Resolution.

Held, where a statutory provision and subordinate legislation occupy the same field, the statute prevails. Since amended S.59(d) specifically designated the Commissioner as disciplinary authority, the earlier provisions in the 1959 Regulations could not override the statutory mandate.
(Paras 33, 62-64).

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Service Law — Disciplinary Proceedings — Dismissal following conviction in criminal case.

Appellant, a municipal officer, having been convicted under the Prevention of Corruption Act and IPC offences, was dismissed from service by the Commissioner.

Held, dismissal order could not be invalidated on the ground of lack of competence of the Commissioner. The Commissioner was the statutory disciplinary authority after the 1993 amendments.
(Paras 3, 4, 62-64).

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Precedent — Coordinate Bench — Divergent view — Reference to larger Bench.

Held, though judicial discipline ordinarily requires a Bench differing from an earlier coordinate Bench decision to refer the matter to a larger Bench, failure to do so would not warrant interference where the view taken is otherwise legally correct on interpretation of the statute.
(Issue No. III and related discussion).

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Ratio Decidendi

1. Amendment by substitution does not automatically operate retrospectively.
2. Legislative intent behind the 1993 amendment to the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act was to vest appointing and disciplinary powers in the Commissioner.
3. Existing regulations cannot override an express statutory provision.
4. Commissioner is competent to dismiss Category ‘A’ municipal officers after the 1993 amendment.
5. The phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made” contemplates future regulations and does not preserve inconsistent earlier regulations.
   (Paras 44, 52, 62-65).

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Held

High Court rightly held that the Commissioner was competent to dismiss the appellant from service. Order of CAT setting aside dismissal was unsustainable. Appeal dismissed and dismissal order upheld.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Relief not claimed – Grant of compensation in place of mandatory injunction – Legality. Held, where the plaintiff sought only mandatory and permanent injunctions for removal of encroachment and illegal construction, and had not claimed damages or compensation, the Court could not compel the plaintiff or his legal heirs to accept monetary compensation in substitution of the decree. A Court cannot create and grant a relief never prayed for, particularly against the wishes of the successful party. (Para 5(a), (c))

 RAJAT KUMAR & ORS. v. S.D. ADARSH JAIN KANYA MAHA VIDYALAYA SADHAURA & ORS.

2026 INSC 648 (SC)

HEAD NOTES 

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Section 100 – Second Appeal – Scope of jurisdiction – Reversal of concurrent findings without framing substantial question of law – Impermissibility.

Held, the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, cannot reverse concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court and affirmed by the First Appellate Court without framing and deciding substantial questions of law. Reversal of decrees without adherence to the mandatory requirements of Section 100 CPC is unsustainable. (Paras 3, 5(d), 6)

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Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Relief not claimed – Grant of compensation in place of mandatory injunction – Legality.

Held, where the plaintiff sought only mandatory and permanent injunctions for removal of encroachment and illegal construction, and had not claimed damages or compensation, the Court could not compel the plaintiff or his legal heirs to accept monetary compensation in substitution of the decree. A Court cannot create and grant a relief never prayed for, particularly against the wishes of the successful party. (Para 5(a), (c))

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Mandatory Injunction – Encroachment – Decree in plaintiff’s favour – Substitution by compensation without consent.

Held, a decree directing removal of encroachment and illegal construction cannot be replaced by an order directing payment of compensation merely because the construction has existed for a long period. In the absence of consent of the decree-holder and in the absence of a prayer for compensation, such substitution is legally impermissible. (Para 5(a), (c))

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Execution Proceedings – Order XXI CPC – Scope.

Held, once the decree granting mandatory injunction is set aside, there remains no executable decree. Consequently, the Executing Court cannot be directed to assess the value of the disputed construction for payment of compensation. Such a direction is outside the scope of execution proceedings and is unsupported by Order XXI CPC. (Para 5(b))

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Findings based on erroneous factual premise – Effect.

Held, the High Court proceeded on the incorrect assumption that the Trial Court had held the wall to be a common wall. No such finding existed. On the contrary, the Trial Court had decreed removal of the offending wall. A judgment founded upon a factually erroneous premise cannot be sustained. (Para 5(d))

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Injunction – Encroachment and illegal construction – Protection of property rights.

Plaintiff obtained decrees directing removal of (i) a wall allegedly erected by defendants on common open space and (ii) a lintel of a school building constructed on the plaintiff’s wall. Both decrees were affirmed in first appeal.

Held, the High Court erred in setting aside the decrees on equitable considerations and substituting them with compensation. The matter required adjudication strictly in accordance with Section 100 CPC and on the merits of the Second Appeals. (Paras 5, 6)

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Ratio Decidendi

1. Relief not sought in pleadings cannot ordinarily be imposed by the Court as a substitute for the relief actually claimed.
2. Compensation cannot be forced upon a successful plaintiff in place of a decree for mandatory injunction in the absence of consent.
3. An Executing Court cannot undertake valuation proceedings when no executable decree survives.
4. A Second Appeal can be decided only upon properly framed substantial questions of law under Section 100 CPC.
5. Findings based on incorrect factual assumptions vitiate the judgment. (Paras 5(a)–(d), 6)

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Final Order

Impugned judgment of the High Court dated 02.05.2016 in RSA Nos. 363 and 364 of 2008 set aside. Matter remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration of both Second Appeals in accordance with Section 100 CPC and on their own merits. Appeals allowed. No order as to costs. (Paras 6, 7)