HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955 – Section 13(1)(ia) – Mental Cruelty – Persistent denial of sexual relations without reasonable cause – Ground for divorce. Persistent refusal of sexual intercourse and denial of conjugal relations without any justifiable reason strikes at the foundation of marital life and constitutes mental cruelty within the meaning of Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act. Where the wife continuously denied sexual relations and the parties lived separately even during the brief period of cohabitation, grant of divorce on the ground of cruelty was justified. Paras 18, 19.

 

HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955 – Section 13(1)(ia) – Mental Cruelty – Persistent denial of sexual relations without reasonable cause – Ground for divorce.

Persistent refusal of sexual intercourse and denial of conjugal relations without any justifiable reason strikes at the foundation of marital life and constitutes mental cruelty within the meaning of Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act. Where the wife continuously denied sexual relations and the parties lived separately even during the brief period of cohabitation, grant of divorce on the ground of cruelty was justified. Paras 18, 19.

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Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13(1)(ia) – Mental Cruelty – Long period of separation – Relevant consideration.

Long and continuous separation between spouses, resulting in complete emotional alienation and absence of marital companionship, may itself amount to mental cruelty. When matrimonial ties have become a mere legal fiction and there is no possibility of restoration of cohabitation, continuation of such relationship may amount to cruelty to both parties. Paras 16, 24, 25, 26.

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Marriage – Conjugal Rights and Conjugal Duties – Reciprocal obligations of spouses.

Marriage is not merely a bundle of enforceable rights but a partnership founded upon mutual respect, emotional support, fidelity, companionship and shared responsibility. Conjugal rights cannot be claimed while abandoning corresponding matrimonial duties. Persistent withdrawal from the foundational obligations of marriage may constitute mental cruelty. Para 22.

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Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13(1)(ia) – Appellate Court – Consideration of subsequent events.

An appellate court is entitled to take into consideration subsequent events occurring during pendency of litigation, including prolonged separation, cessation of cohabitation, failure of reconciliation efforts and conduct of parties, while determining whether cruelty stands established. Appeal being a continuation of the original proceedings, such subsequent developments may support or negate the pleaded matrimonial ground. Para 25.

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Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13(1)(ia) – Desertion not specifically pleaded – Long separation and continued non-cohabitation – Relevance.

Even where statutory desertion under Section 13(1)(ib) is not specifically pleaded, prolonged separation, absence of cohabitation and failure of both parties to make efforts for reunion may be considered while evaluating mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia). Paras 21, 25, 27, 28.

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Marriage – Mutual failure to accommodate each other – Mental Cruelty.

Where spouses hold irreconcilable views regarding matrimonial life and refuse to accommodate each other over a prolonged period, such conduct itself may amount to cruelty. In matrimonial disputes, the Court is not concerned with determining which spouse is correct; the focus is whether the conduct and incompatibility have rendered continuation of marriage impossible. Para 23.

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Article 142 of the Constitution – Divorce on ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage – Scope.

The Supreme Court, in exercise of powers under Article 142(1) of the Constitution, may dissolve a marriage where it is satisfied that the matrimonial bond has completely failed, reconciliation is impossible, cohabitation has ceased for a sufficiently long period and continuation of the legal relationship would serve no useful purpose. Paras 29, 32, 34, 37.

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Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Factors for consideration.

Relevant factors include duration of cohabitation, length of separation, attempts at reconciliation, mediation efforts, emotional alienation, pendency of litigation, existence of children, financial dependence and overall possibility of restoring matrimonial life. Paras 13, 30, 32.

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Article 142 – Dissolution of marriage – Parties living separately for more than fifteen years – No children – Both financially independent.

Where spouses cohabited only for a few months, lived separately for more than fifteen years, mediation failed, there was no possibility of reunion, no children were born from the wedlock and both parties were financially independent professionals, the marriage was held to have broken down irretrievably warranting dissolution under Article 142. Paras 13, 30, 34, 35, 37.

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Matrimonial Litigation – Long pendency – Continuation of marriage merely on paper – Undesirable.

Prolonged matrimonial litigation perpetuates a dead relationship and results in psychological, emotional and social stagnation. Courts should not permit parties to remain trapped indefinitely in a marriage which has ceased to exist in substance and reality. Para 36.

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Ratio Decidendi

Persistent denial of conjugal relations, prolonged separation, absence of cohabitation, failure of reconciliation efforts and complete emotional breakdown of the marital relationship constitute mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act. Additionally, where parties have lived apart for over fifteen years and the marriage has become emotionally dead and beyond salvage, the Supreme Court may invoke Article 142 of the Constitution to dissolve the marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown in order to do complete justice between the parties. Paras 18–19, 24–30, 32–37.

Arbitration – Limitation – Dismissal of application under Section 33 – Whether benefit of Section 34(3) lost – No. The fact that an application under Section 33 is eventually dismissed or found without merit does not deprive a party of the benefit available under Section 34(3). The commencement of limitation depends upon disposal of the Section 33 proceedings and not upon their outcome. Paras 13, 15.

 advocatemmmohan

ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996 – Sections 33 and 34(3) – Limitation for application to set aside arbitral award – Starting point of limitation where application under Section 33 is filed.

Where a request under Section 33 is made and entertained by the Arbitral Tribunal, limitation under Section 34(3) for filing an application to set aside the award commences from the date on which such request is disposed of by the Tribunal and not from the date of the original award. Paras 13, 14, 18.

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Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 34(3) – Interpretation of statutory limitation provision – Court cannot add words to statute.

Section 34(3) does not distinguish between applications under Section 33 which are allowed, dismissed, maintainable or otherwise. Where the legislature has not imposed any such restriction, the Court cannot read into the provision a condition that only a maintainable or successful application under Section 33 would postpone commencement of limitation. Para 13.

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Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 33 – Formal invocation of jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribunal – Effect on limitation under Section 34(3).

For the purpose of Section 34(3), the relevant consideration is whether the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 33 has been formally invoked and proceedings remained pending before the Tribunal. The ultimate success or failure of the application is immaterial. Paras 14, 15.

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Arbitration – Limitation – Pendency of proceedings under Section 33 – Parties cannot be compelled to simultaneously pursue remedy under Section 34.

Once proceedings under Section 33 are pending, the award remains subject to the limited jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal for correction, interpretation or supplementation. Parties cannot be compelled to institute proceedings under Section 34 merely by way of abundant caution during pendency of Section 33 proceedings. Para 14.

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Arbitration – Limitation – Dismissal of application under Section 33 – Whether benefit of Section 34(3) lost – No.

The fact that an application under Section 33 is eventually dismissed or found without merit does not deprive a party of the benefit available under Section 34(3). The commencement of limitation depends upon disposal of the Section 33 proceedings and not upon their outcome. Paras 13, 15.

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Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 33 – Formal application distinguished from correspondence seeking review.

Where a party formally invokes Section 33 and the Arbitral Tribunal entertains and adjudicates the application, limitation under Section 34(3) runs from disposal of such application. Decision in State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Damani Construction Co. distinguished, as that case involved only a letter substantially seeking review and not a formal application under Section 33. Para 16.

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Arbitration – Interpretation advancing object of Act – Avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings.

An interpretation requiring parties to file proceedings under Section 34 during pendency of Section 33 proceedings would result in multiplicity of litigation and procedural uncertainty and would defeat the scheme and object of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Para 17.

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Arbitration – Abuse of process – Frivolous or mala fide applications under Section 33 – Consequences.

Though filing of an application under Section 33 postpones commencement of limitation under Section 34(3), courts are empowered to impose exemplary and punitive costs where such applications are found to be sham, frivolous, mala fide or filed solely for defeating limitation. Para 17.

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Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Sections 33 and 34(3) – Computation of limitation – Certified copy of order disposing Section 33 applications received on 15.09.2022 – Section 34 applications filed on 07.11.2022 – Held, within limitation.

Since both parties had filed applications under Section 33 which were disposed of by common order dated 04.07.2022 and the certified copy thereof was received on 15.09.2022, the applications under Section 34 filed on 07.11.2022 were within the period prescribed by Section 34(3). Paras 19, 20.

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Ratio Decidendi

A formal request under Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, once entertained by the Arbitral Tribunal, postpones commencement of limitation under Section 34(3) until disposal of such request. The benefit is available irrespective of whether the Section 33 application is ultimately allowed or dismissed, provided the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 33 was duly invoked. Paras 13–18.

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Cases Referred

1. State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Damani Construction Co. – distinguished – Para 16.
2. Geojit Financial Services Ltd. v. Sandeep Gurav – followed – Paras 9, 18.
3. Ved Prakash Mithal and Sons v. Union of India – relied upon – Para 18.
4. USS Alliance v. State of U.P. – relied upon – Para 18.

National Highway Authority of India v. T. Younis & Anr., Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.7570 of 2024, decided on 02.06.2026 (Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Alok Aradhe, JJ.)

Section 34 “34. Application for setting aside arbitral award. (…) (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.”

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Sections 8, 10 and 19 – Succession to separate property of male Hindu dying intestate – Nature of rights acquired by widow and daughters – Tenants-in-common and not joint tenants – Legal necessity – Karta doctrine inapplicable.

 

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Sections 8, 10 and 19 – Succession to separate property of male Hindu dying intestate – Nature of rights acquired by widow and daughters – Tenants-in-common and not joint tenants – Legal necessity – Karta doctrine inapplicable.

Where a male Hindu dies intestate leaving separate/self-acquired property, succession opens under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. The widow and daughters succeed simultaneously as Class-I heirs and take definite shares in the property. By virtue of Section 19, they hold the property as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants. Consequently, the doctrine of survivorship has no application and each heir acquires a distinct and identifiable share. Paras 5, 6, 8.

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Joint Tenancy and Tenancy-in-Common – Distinction explained.

In joint tenancy, ownership is joint and indivisible, governed by survivorship, and no co-owner possesses a separately inheritable share. In tenancy-in-common, each co-owner possesses a distinct though undivided share, which devolves upon his or her own heirs by succession. Hindu law generally recognizes joint tenancy only in the context of coparcenary, whereas succession under the Hindu Succession Act creates tenancy-in-common. Paras 7.

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Hindu Law – Coparcenary – Property inherited under Section 8 – Whether becomes HUF property – No.

Property devolving upon an heir under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act is inherited in the heir's individual capacity and does not automatically acquire the character of coparcenary or Hindu Undivided Family property. Descendants do not obtain rights in such property by birth. The principles laid down in CWT v. Chander Sen, Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar and M. Arumugam v. Ammaniammal reaffirmed. Paras 7.

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Karta – Alienation for legal necessity – Pre-condition – Existence of coparcenary/joint family property.

The power of a karta to alienate family property for legal necessity arises only in relation to joint family/coparcenary property. Where heirs succeed under Section 8 and hold the property as tenants-in-common with separate shares, no heir can claim authority as karta over the shares belonging to the others. Paras 7, 8.

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Widow succeeding to intestate property – Extent of authority.

Upon intestate succession, the widow acquires only her own statutory share. She is competent to deal with or alienate only that share and has no authority to alienate the shares vested in other heirs on the plea of legal necessity. Para 8.

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Partition Suit – Sale executed by widow claiming to act as karta for marriage expenses of daughter – Validity.

Where the deceased's separate property devolved equally upon widow and four daughters, each acquiring 1/5th share as tenants-in-common, the widow could not validly alienate the property as karta for meeting marriage expenses or any alleged legal necessity. Such alienation could operate, if at all, only to the extent of her own 1/5th share. Para 8.

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Ratio Decidendi

Upon the death of Dajiba, his widow and four daughters succeeded to his separate property under Sections 8 and 10 of the Hindu Succession Act and became tenants-in-common under Section 19, each holding a distinct 1/5th share. Since the property was not coparcenary property and the heirs did not constitute a joint tenancy, the widow could not act as karta nor alienate the shares of the other heirs on the ground of legal necessity. The High Court rightly restored the trial court decree and the appeal was dismissed. Paras 5–9.

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Cases Referred

1. Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ram Chund Dutt – referred – Para 7.
2. Nawab Nisar Ali Khan v. Sardar Nawazish Ali Khan – referred – Para 7.
3. Azizun Nisa v. Assistant Custodian – referred – Para 7.
4. In re Schar Midland Bank Executor and Trustee Co. Ltd. v. Damer – referred – Para 7.
5. CWT v. Chander Sen – relied on – Para 7.
6. Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar – relied on – Para 7.
7. M. Arumugam v. Ammaniammal – relied on – Para 7.

Darubai & Anr. v. Kamalabai & Ors., Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.13232 of 2022, decided on 01-06-2026, Supreme Court of India (Sanjay Karol & Augustine George Masih, JJ.)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Ss.34 and 37 — Scope of interference with arbitral award — Re-appreciation of evidence — Computational objection — Adjustment of mobilization advance. Jurisdiction under Section 37 being narrower than jurisdiction under Section 34, appellate Court cannot undertake fresh factual determination or re-appreciation of evidence relating to computation and reconciliation of accounts between parties. Where arbitral award and material on record disclosed that mobilization advance and recoveries thereof had been duly accounted for, challenge alleging excess award on account of non-adjustment, founded merely on speculative apprehension and not on demonstrable patent illegality, does not warrant interference under Sections 34 or 37. (Paras 23 to 40)

 Delhi High Court held that 

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Ss.34 and 37 — Scope of interference with arbitral award — Re-appreciation of evidence — Computational objection — Adjustment of mobilization advance.

Jurisdiction under Section 37 being narrower than jurisdiction under Section 34, appellate Court cannot undertake fresh factual determination or re-appreciation of evidence relating to computation and reconciliation of accounts between parties. Where arbitral award and material on record disclosed that mobilization advance and recoveries thereof had been duly accounted for, challenge alleging excess award on account of non-adjustment, founded merely on speculative apprehension and not on demonstrable patent illegality, does not warrant interference under Sections 34 or 37.
(Paras 23 to 40)

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Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Ss.34 and 37 — Patent illegality — Scope.

Interference with arbitral award under Sections 34 and 37 is confined to cases involving patent illegality, perversity, jurisdictional error or violation of fundamental legal principles. Appellate Court under Section 37 does not sit in appeal over findings of arbitral tribunal and cannot substitute its own view on facts or computation.
(Paras 23 to 29, 42)

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FACTS OF THE CASE

1. Disputes arose between parties out of contract agreement relating to execution of works and same were referred to arbitration in terms of arbitration clause contained in contract.
   
2. Arbitral Tribunal passed award granting various claims in favour of claimant including Claim No.6 relating to wrongful encashment of Performance Bank Guarantee (PBG).
   
3. Employer challenged arbitral award under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act contending that while awarding amount under Claim No.6, Arbitrator failed to account for adjustment of mobilization advance, thereby resulting in excess payment.
   
4. Learned Single Judge dismissed Section 34 petition holding that plea regarding adjustment had not been raised before Arbitrator and that findings of Arbitrator did not warrant interference under Section 34.
   
5. In appeal under Section 37, challenge was confined only to Claim No.6 and appellant contended that amount awarded suffered from computational illegality due to alleged duplication and non-adjustment of mobilization advance.
   
6. Respondent asserted that mobilization advance had already been fully adjusted and accounted for in arbitral award including through recoveries made from running account bills and encashment of bank guarantee.
   

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

The Division Bench undertook detailed examination of the limited scope of appellate interference under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

The Court reiterated settled principle that jurisdiction under Section 37 is even more circumscribed than jurisdiction under Section 34 and does not permit appellate Court to reassess evidence or substitute its own factual conclusions for those of arbitral tribunal.

Relying upon precedents including MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., UHL Power Co. Limited v. State of Himachal Pradesh and NHAI v. M. Hakeem, the Court held that interference is permissible only in cases involving patent illegality, perversity or jurisdictional infirmity.

The Court then examined contention relating to alleged non-adjustment of mobilization advance. It noted that Claim No.6 related to wrongful invocation of Performance Bank Guarantee whereas Claim No.7 independently dealt with recovery and adjustment of mobilization advance.

The Court found from arbitral award and affidavit filed by respondent that recoveries towards mobilization advance, including recoveries through running account bills and encashment of bank guarantee, had already been taken into account by Arbitrator while computing amounts payable.

The Division Bench held that appellant’s plea essentially invited Court to undertake fresh reconciliation of accounts and re-appreciation of computation, which is impermissible within narrow scope of Sections 34 and 37.

The Court further observed that challenge rested merely on speculative apprehension regarding duplication and not upon any demonstrable patent illegality apparent on face of award. Consequently, no ground for interference was made out.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

In proceedings under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Court cannot undertake fresh factual determination, re-appreciation of evidence or reconciliation of accounts relating to arbitral computation, and where arbitral award together with material on record demonstrates that recoveries and adjustments have been duly accounted for, a challenge alleging excess award founded only on speculative apprehension and not on demonstrable patent illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error, does not warrant interference with the arbitral award.
(Paras 23 to 42)

Anticipatory bail — Scope of jurisdiction while deciding bail application — Departmental enquiry against police officials — Judicial overreach. While considering application for anticipatory bail, Court is confined to question of grant or refusal of bail and cannot travel beyond scope of proceedings by directing departmental enquiry against police officials, monitoring disciplinary proceedings or passing adverse remarks unrelated to adjudication of bail application. After disposal of anticipatory bail application, Court becomes functus officio and cannot continue proceedings by calling status reports or supervising departmental action. (Paras 12 to 18)

 

Delhi High Court 

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S.438 — Anticipatory bail — Scope of jurisdiction while deciding bail application — Departmental enquiry against police officials — Judicial overreach.

While considering application for anticipatory bail, Court is confined to question of grant or refusal of bail and cannot travel beyond scope of proceedings by directing departmental enquiry against police officials, monitoring disciplinary proceedings or passing adverse remarks unrelated to adjudication of bail application. After disposal of anticipatory bail application, Court becomes functus officio and cannot continue proceedings by calling status reports or supervising departmental action.
(Paras 12 to 18)

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Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Judicial discipline — Adverse remarks against public officials — Principles of natural justice.

Adverse or disparaging remarks against police officials cannot be made without affording opportunity of hearing, particularly where such remarks prejudge conduct of officials and affect disciplinary proceedings. Courts should refrain from unnecessary castigatory observations regarding investigation unless absolutely necessary for adjudication of lis.
(Paras 9, 15 to 17)

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Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Bail proceedings — Scope — Functus officio.

Once anticipatory bail application stands finally disposed of, nothing survives before Court and continuation of proceedings thereafter by summoning officials, calling explanations or monitoring disciplinary proceedings is wholly without jurisdiction.
(Paras 14 and 15)

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FACTS OF THE CASE

1. FIR was registered under Section 363 IPC concerning missing minor girl and during investigation offences under Sections 328 and 376 IPC and Section 4 of POCSO Act were added.
   
2. Investigation was conducted by different Investigating Officers from time to time and during pendency of investigation one co-accused moved application for anticipatory bail before Sessions Court.
   
3. While disposing of anticipatory bail application, Sessions Court called for status reports regarding delay in investigation and directed appearance of previous IOs and SHOs.
   
4. Subsequently, Sessions Court ordered departmental enquiry against concerned police officials and called for explanations from supervisory officers regarding alleged delay in investigation.
   
5. Petitioners challenged said orders contending that after disposal of anticipatory bail application the Sessions Court had become functus officio and exceeded jurisdiction by continuing proceedings and directing disciplinary action.
   
6. Petitioners further contended that adverse remarks and directions for departmental enquiry were issued without affording them opportunity of hearing, thereby violating principles of natural justice.
   

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

The High Court examined permissible scope of jurisdiction exercised by a Court while deciding an application for anticipatory bail.

The Court reiterated that while adjudicating a bail application, jurisdiction of the Court remains confined to determination whether bail ought to be granted or refused. Bail proceedings cannot be converted into supervisory proceedings concerning administration of police department or disciplinary control over investigating officials.

Relying upon decision of the Supreme Court in State v. M. Murugesan, the Court held that even laudable objectives cannot justify exercise of jurisdiction beyond statutory limits while deciding bail matters.

The Court further held that once anticipatory bail application stood finally disposed of, the Sessions Court became functus officio and no proceedings survived thereafter. Consequently, continuation of proceedings by calling status reports, summoning police officials, directing departmental enquiries and monitoring such proceedings was wholly impermissible.

The judgment also emphasized principles of natural justice governing adverse judicial remarks against public officials. The Court held that disparaging remarks affecting reputation and disciplinary prospects of officials cannot be made without giving them opportunity of hearing.

The High Court further observed that unnecessary castigatory observations against investigating officers are to be avoided, particularly where such remarks are not essential for adjudication of controversy before Court.

Accordingly, impugned orders directing departmental enquiry and all consequential proceedings were set aside and adverse remarks expunged.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

While adjudicating an application for anticipatory bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the jurisdiction of the Court is confined solely to consideration of grant or refusal of bail, and after disposal of the bail application the Court becomes functus officio and cannot continue proceedings by directing or monitoring departmental enquiries against police officials, calling status reports or passing adverse remarks unrelated to adjudication of bail; and disparaging remarks affecting public officials cannot be made without affording them an opportunity of hearing in conformity with principles of natural justice.
(Paras 12 to 19)