Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Bail in cases involving caste-based violence — Parameters — Gravity of offence and societal impact to be considered — Pendency of prior civil litigation not a mitigating circumstance at bail stage where it furnishes motive. (Paras 11, 25, 27, 31) The Court observed that the High Court treated pending civil litigation between the parties as a circumstance favouring bail. The Supreme Court held that such litigation could equally constitute motive for the assault. In a case involving allegations of caste-based insults and violence against a Scheduled Caste victim, the gravity of the offence and societal ramifications must be given due weight. Ratio Decidendi: In cases involving serious offences under the SC/ST Act coupled with murder, pendency of civil disputes cannot be treated as a mitigating factor for bail when it may provide motive for the crime. Medical Evidence — Stage of bail — Dissection of post-mortem findings impermissible — Multiple injuries including head trauma with cerebral damage — High Court erred in evaluating medical causation as if at final trial. (Paras 28–31) The post-mortem report recorded multiple injuries, including contusions and head injury leading to cerebral damage. The High Court’s reasoning that only eight injuries were caused by six accused and that nexus between injury and death required scrutiny at trial was held inappropriate at bail stage. Evaluation of medical causation and intention is a matter for trial. Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of bail, the Court ought not to undertake a meticulous dissection of medical evidence as if adjudicating guilt; existence of multiple injuries including head trauma is sufficient to weigh against grant of bail in a murder case.

Criminal Procedure — Grant of bail — Distinction between cancellation of bail and reversal of bail order — Scope of interference by superior Court — Held, where order granting bail ignores gravity of offence, relevant material and is founded on extraneous considerations, superior Court is justified in setting aside such order — Present case falls in category of reversal of perverse bail order, not mere cancellation for misuse of liberty. (Paras 20–22, 32)

The Court clarified that cancellation of bail under Section 439(2) CrPC (corresponding provision under BNSS) is distinct from interference with an unjustified bail order. While cancellation ordinarily requires misuse of liberty, a superior court may set aside a bail order if it suffers from perversity, ignores material evidence, or is based on irrelevant considerations. The High Court’s approach in granting bail in a case involving offences under Sections 302 IPC and the SC/ST Act was found legally unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: An unreasoned or perverse bail order in a grave offence can be reversed by a superior Court even in absence of misuse of liberty by the accused.

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Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 143, 147, 148, 149 IPC — Unlawful assembly — Stage of bail — Attribution of specific overt act — Held, once offences relating to unlawful assembly and common object are invoked, prosecution is not required at bail stage to attribute specific injury to each accused — High Court erred in granting bail on ground that individual role was not clearly fixed. (Paras 26–30)

The FIR alleged that six accused persons formed an unlawful assembly and launched a concerted assault using iron rods and sticks. The High Court granted bail on the reasoning that it could not be ascertained whose weapon caused the head injury. The Supreme Court held that such reasoning overlooks the settled principle that under Section 149 IPC, each member of an unlawful assembly is vicariously liable for acts committed in prosecution of the common object. Individual attribution is not a sine qua non at the stage of bail.

Ratio Decidendi: In cases involving unlawful assembly under Section 149 IPC, failure to attribute a specific fatal injury to a particular accused is not a valid ground for grant of bail at the threshold.

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Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Bail in cases involving caste-based violence — Parameters — Gravity of offence and societal impact to be considered — Pendency of prior civil litigation not a mitigating circumstance at bail stage where it furnishes motive. (Paras 11, 25, 27, 31)

The Court observed that the High Court treated pending civil litigation between the parties as a circumstance favouring bail. The Supreme Court held that such litigation could equally constitute motive for the assault. In a case involving allegations of caste-based insults and violence against a Scheduled Caste victim, the gravity of the offence and societal ramifications must be given due weight.

Ratio Decidendi: In cases involving serious offences under the SC/ST Act coupled with murder, pendency of civil disputes cannot be treated as a mitigating factor for bail when it may provide motive for the crime.

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Medical Evidence — Stage of bail — Dissection of post-mortem findings impermissible — Multiple injuries including head trauma with cerebral damage — High Court erred in evaluating medical causation as if at final trial. (Paras 28–31)

The post-mortem report recorded multiple injuries, including contusions and head injury leading to cerebral damage. The High Court’s reasoning that only eight injuries were caused by six accused and that nexus between injury and death required scrutiny at trial was held inappropriate at bail stage. Evaluation of medical causation and intention is a matter for trial.

Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of bail, the Court ought not to undertake a meticulous dissection of medical evidence as if adjudicating guilt; existence of multiple injuries including head trauma is sufficient to weigh against grant of bail in a murder case.

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Bail — Gravity of offence — Murder coupled with caste-based abuse — Public confidence in justice system — Held, superficial consideration of bail parameters in grave crimes undermines administration of justice — Bail cancelled. (Paras 21–22, 31–32)

Relying on settled principles, the Court reiterated that in heinous offences affecting societal conscience, courts must exercise caution in granting bail. The High Court’s order was found to have inadequately considered the gravity of the offence, role attributed to accused, and seriousness of allegations.

Ratio Decidendi: In cases involving heinous offences such as murder with caste-based violence, bail must not be granted on superficial or speculative reasoning; orders ignoring gravity and material evidence are liable to be set aside.

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Final Order: Appeal allowed. Impugned bail order set aside. Bail granted to respondents-accused cancelled. Accused directed to surrender within four weeks. Trial directed to be concluded within one year. Observations confined to bail adjudication and not to influence trial. (Paras 32–34)**

Evidence — Post-mortem report admitted by defence — Non-examination of doctor — Evidentiary value — Held, where genuineness of post-mortem report is admitted under Section 294 CrPC, the report constitutes substantive evidence and absence of oral testimony of medical officer does not weaken prosecution case. (Paras 52, 63–64) The defence admitted the post-mortem report (Exh.P/8), and consequently the doctor was not examined. The Court held that once genuineness is admitted, the contents stand proved and may be relied upon substantively. There was no suggestion of any intervening cause of death. The medical findings were corroborated by ocular evidence. Ratio Decidendi: Admission of post-mortem report under Section 294 CrPC dispenses with formal proof; non-examination of the medical officer does not create infirmity where the report stands admitted and corroborated.

Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 299, 300, 302, 304 Part II — Distinction between murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder — Application of Clause (3) of Section 300 — Repeated lathi blows on vital part (head) causing bone-deep lacerations, skull fracture and brain damage — Held, intention to inflict bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death established — Case falls within Section 300 Thirdly — Conviction under Section 302 IPC restored. (Paras 53, 56–63, 70)

The Court reiterated the structured approach for determining whether an offence amounts to murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Upon proof that death was homicidal and attributable to acts of the accused, the decisive inquiry was whether the case fell within any clause of Section 300 IPC. The deceased sustained 29 injuries, including multiple bone-deep lacerated wounds on the parietal and temporal regions with skull fracture and intracranial haemorrhage. The multiplicity, situs and severity of injuries on a vital part, inflicted by members of an unlawful assembly lying in wait, demonstrated intention to inflict the very injury found to be present, which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The High Court erred in treating the fatal injury as solitary and in downgrading the offence.

Ratio Decidendi: Where members of an unlawful assembly deliberately inflict repeated bone-deep injuries on the head, resulting in skull fracture and brain damage, the case squarely falls within Section 300 Thirdly IPC, irrespective of absence of explicit intention to kill.

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Penal Code, 1860 — Section 149 — Unlawful assembly — Vicarious liability — Identity of person inflicting fatal injury immaterial — Once common object to commit murder established, every member liable under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC. (Paras 43, 65–67, 69)

The existence of an unlawful assembly and participation of the accused stood concluded. The High Court’s reasoning that since the prosecution failed to establish which accused caused the fatal injury, conviction under Section 302/149 IPC was unsafe, was held legally unsustainable. Section 149 IPC embodies the principle of constructive liability. Once it is shown that the offence was committed in prosecution of the common object, individual attribution of the fatal blow becomes irrelevant.

Ratio Decidendi: In cases attracting Section 149 IPC, proof of the common object and participation in the unlawful assembly is sufficient to fasten liability for murder; specific attribution of the fatal injury is not necessary.

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Evidence — Post-mortem report admitted by defence — Non-examination of doctor — Evidentiary value — Held, where genuineness of post-mortem report is admitted under Section 294 CrPC, the report constitutes substantive evidence and absence of oral testimony of medical officer does not weaken prosecution case. (Paras 52, 63–64)

The defence admitted the post-mortem report (Exh.P/8), and consequently the doctor was not examined. The Court held that once genuineness is admitted, the contents stand proved and may be relied upon substantively. There was no suggestion of any intervening cause of death. The medical findings were corroborated by ocular evidence.

Ratio Decidendi: Admission of post-mortem report under Section 294 CrPC dispenses with formal proof; non-examination of the medical officer does not create infirmity where the report stands admitted and corroborated.

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Penal Law — Intention — Determination from surrounding circumstances — Premeditation — Road blockade, prior motive, concerted assault with lathis — No sudden provocation — No exception to Section 300 attracted. (Paras 58–60, 62)

The accused lay in wait after deliberately blocking the road by placing tube-well pipes, armed with lathis. The deceased had earlier intervened in a dispute involving the accused, furnishing motive. The assault was retaliatory and pre-planned, not the result of a sudden quarrel. Repeated blows were directed at the head. No Exception to Section 300 IPC was attracted.

Ratio Decidendi: Premeditated obstruction of victim’s passage followed by a coordinated assault with repeated blows on a vital part establishes requisite intention under Section 300 Thirdly IPC and rules out application of Exceptions.

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Appellate Interference — High Court downgrading conviction from Section 302/149 IPC to Section 304 Part II/149 IPC — Perverse appreciation of medical evidence — Held, finding that only one injury caused death contrary to record — Conviction and life sentence restored. (Paras 61, 68–71)

The High Court’s conclusion that death resulted from a solitary injury and not cumulative assault was found contrary to medical evidence indicating multiple bone-deep head injuries. Its approach was self-contradictory in affirming unlawful assembly while negating liability under Section 302/149 IPC. The Supreme Court restored the trial Court’s conviction and sentence of life imprisonment.

Ratio Decidendi: Appellate alteration of conviction from murder to culpable homicide is impermissible where medical and ocular evidence clearly establish injuries sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and common object under Section 149 IPC stands proved.

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Result: Appeals allowed. Conviction under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC and sentence of life imprisonment restored. Accused directed to surrender within eight weeks. (Paras 71–72)**

Civil Law — Hereditary pujari rights — Competing claims — Effect of earlier decree — Subsequent conduct inconsistent with decree — Filing of suit for possession by party claiming prior decree — Legal inference — Held, institution of a suit for possession by a party asserting prior decree of possession constitutes an admission that possession was not with such party at the relevant time — Subsequent conduct can dilute the practical effect of an earlier decree. (Paras 18, 19, 24) The appellants relied upon a decree in O.S. No. 287/1901. However, their predecessor instituted O.S. No. 88/1944 seeking possession of the very temple. The Court observed that a party in settled possession does not sue for possession. The filing of the 1944 suit was treated as a categorical admission that possession was not with the appellants’ predecessor at that time. The inconsistency between reliance on the 1901 decree and the subsequent suit seeking possession materially weakened the appellants’ claim. Ratio Decidendi: Where subsequent conduct of a party is inconsistent with rights claimed under an earlier decree, such conduct can be relied upon to draw adverse inference regarding possession and continuity of asserted rights.: Civil Law — Hereditary pujari rights — Competing c...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Civil Law — Hereditary pujari rights — Competing c...: advocatemmmohan Practice and Procedure — Article 136 of the Constitution — Interference with concurrent findings of fact — Scope of jurisdic...

Practice and Procedure — Article 136 of the Constitution — Interference with concurrent findings of fact — Scope of jurisdiction — Held, the jurisdiction under Article 136 is to be exercised sparingly, particularly where concurrent findings of fact have been recorded by the First Appellate Court and the High Court — Unless such findings are manifestly perverse or based on no evidence, this Court would be slow to interfere — In the present case, no perversity demonstrated — Interference declined. (Paras 16, 17, 24)

The Court reiterated that Article 136 does not confer a regular appellate jurisdiction. Where the High Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently appreciated documentary and oral evidence and arrived at consistent conclusions, interference is unwarranted unless the findings suffer from perversity. The concurrent findings in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs were found to be based on proper appreciation of pleadings, documentary evidence and admissions.

Ratio Decidendi: Concurrent findings of fact, supported by evidence and free from perversity, are not liable to be disturbed under Article 136 of the Constitution.

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Civil Law — Hereditary pujari rights — Competing claims — Effect of earlier decree — Subsequent conduct inconsistent with decree — Filing of suit for possession by party claiming prior decree — Legal inference — Held, institution of a suit for possession by a party asserting prior decree of possession constitutes an admission that possession was not with such party at the relevant time — Subsequent conduct can dilute the practical effect of an earlier decree. (Paras 18, 19, 24)

The appellants relied upon a decree in O.S. No. 287/1901. However, their predecessor instituted O.S. No. 88/1944 seeking possession of the very temple. The Court observed that a party in settled possession does not sue for possession. The filing of the 1944 suit was treated as a categorical admission that possession was not with the appellants’ predecessor at that time. The inconsistency between reliance on the 1901 decree and the subsequent suit seeking possession materially weakened the appellants’ claim.

Ratio Decidendi: Where subsequent conduct of a party is inconsistent with rights claimed under an earlier decree, such conduct can be relied upon to draw adverse inference regarding possession and continuity of asserted rights.

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Civil Procedure — Withdrawal of suit with liberty to file fresh suit — Failure to institute fresh suit for prolonged period — Adverse inference — Held, where liberty is obtained to institute a fresh suit but no such suit is filed for over three decades and no explanation is forthcoming, the Court may draw an inference that the party accepted the prevailing factual position. (Para 20)

The appellants’ predecessor withdrew Civil Appeal No. 118 of 1945 with liberty to file a fresh suit, which liberty was granted in 1946. No fresh suit was instituted for approximately thirty-six years. The absence of explanation for such prolonged inaction was treated as significant conduct indicative of acquiescence in the existing state of affairs.

Ratio Decidendi: Prolonged failure to act upon liberty granted to institute a fresh suit, without explanation, permits the drawing of adverse inference against the party asserting rights.

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Evidence — Revenue records — Record of Rights (RTC) — Evidentiary value in establishing hereditary service rights — Admissions in cross-examination — Held, revenue entries reflecting grant of land in lieu of temple service and showing names of respondents’ ancestors constitute relevant and cogent evidence — Absence of appellants’ names in such records, coupled with admission of cultivation by respondents, strengthens respondents’ claim. (Paras 21, 22, 24)

The High Court examined RTC entries demonstrating that lands were granted by the British Government in lieu of services rendered to the temple and that the respondents’ ancestors were reflected in such records. The appellants’ names were absent. Further, D.W.1 admitted that the lands were being cultivated by the respondents. The Supreme Court affirmed that these documentary records and admissions constituted substantial evidence supporting the respondents’ hereditary pujari claim.

Ratio Decidendi: Long-standing revenue records indicating service tenure and admissions of cultivation are material evidence in determining hereditary religious service rights.

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Pleadings — Necessity of specific pleadings in assertion of hereditary rights — Oral evidence cannot substitute pleadings — Held, a party asserting hereditary rights must plead material particulars including commencement of possession, performance of duties, and interference — In absence of foundational pleadings, oral evidence attempting to supplement deficiencies must be disregarded. (Para 23)

The appellants’ written statement lacked specific pleadings regarding the commencement of possession, performance of puja, and obstruction by respondents. The Court held that a case not pleaded cannot be built solely on oral testimony. Evidence beyond pleadings is impermissible.

Ratio Decidendi: Oral evidence cannot be permitted to fill gaps in pleadings; a party must succeed or fail on the case pleaded.

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Conclusion — Hereditary pujari rights — Concurrent findings upheld — Civil Appeals dismissed — No order as to costs. (Paras 24–26)

Upon comprehensive appreciation of the factual matrix, documentary evidence, admissions, and conduct of parties, the Court found no infirmity or perversity in the High Court’s judgment decreeing the suit in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs.

Ratio Decidendi (Composite): In disputes relating to hereditary religious service rights, consistent documentary evidence, revenue records, admissions, and subsequent conduct of parties outweigh reliance on an isolated historical decree; concurrent findings based on such appreciation are not liable to interference under Article 136.

విశ్వంభర

విశ్వంభర

విశ్వంభర వీణా తంత్రుల  పై,
కాలమనే గీతాన్ని ఆలపించాను…
దిగ్దిగంతములు ఓంకార నాదాలతో నిండెలా…

భువనమోహన వేణువు పై,
వేదనాద స్వరాలు వినిపించాను…
ఈ విశ్వమంతా సమ్మోహనాస్త్రాలై కమ్ముకొనెలా…

కడలి ఒడిని  ఒడిసిపట్టి,
అంతరంగ తరంగాల చీకట్లు చిలికి చిలికి,
విరజిమ్మాను ఈ భువనమంతా రత్నగర్భ రాసులని…

అరుణగిరి సువర్ణరేఖల అంచులపై,
సప్తాశ్వముల స్వర్ణరథం గూర్చి,
వీనిలాకాశమంత బంగారు కిరణాలతో నింపాను…

చంద్రచారికలను చేరి,
నిశ్శబ్ద నిశీథులను చీల్చి ,
చందనామృతాలు పంచాను లోకమంతా…

భువనైక మోహనమై,
సకల చరాచరుల   ప్రాణమై…
ఉచ్శ్వాస  నిశ్వాసల జీవమై…
జ్ఞానానంద  పరంజ్యోతి మయమై…  వెలుగొందు వేల్పునేను 

                                                  - ఎం. మురళీ మోహన్

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order XVI Rule 1(2) read with Section 151 — Summoning of witness and production of documents — Suit for permanent injunction — Plaintiffs seeking to summon records of third-party institution to establish possession — Not proper mode of proof — Application rightly dismissed. Paras 2 and 7. Civil Procedure — Suit for permanent injunction — Burden of proving possession — Nature of evidence — Plaintiffs must establish possession through cogent and direct evidence — Summoning documents of unrelated third party institution insufficient to establish possession. Paras 6 and 7. Evidence — Relevance and necessity — Documents pertaining to third party — Whether essential for adjudication — Held, summoning third-party records to disprove defendant’s stand or to establish plaintiffs’ possession, when plaintiffs can lead direct evidence, is not warranted. Paras 4 and 7.

 Constitution of India — Article 227 — Supervisory jurisdiction — Interference with discretionary orders — Application to summon third party documents and witness — No illegality or perversity — Interference declined.

Held, where the Trial Court exercises discretion in refusing to summon documents and witnesses of a third party in a suit for injunction, and such refusal does not suffer from illegality or perversity, supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be invoked to reappreciate the matter. Paras 5 and 7.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order XVI Rule 1(2) read with Section 151 — Summoning of witness and production of documents — Suit for permanent injunction — Plaintiffs seeking to summon records of third-party institution to establish possession — Not proper mode of proof — Application rightly dismissed. Paras 2 and 7.

Civil Procedure — Suit for permanent injunction — Burden of proving possession — Nature of evidence — Plaintiffs must establish possession through cogent and direct evidence — Summoning documents of unrelated third party institution insufficient to establish possession. Paras 6 and 7.

Evidence — Relevance and necessity — Documents pertaining to third party — Whether essential for adjudication — Held, summoning third-party records to disprove defendant’s stand or to establish plaintiffs’ possession, when plaintiffs can lead direct evidence, is not warranted. Paras 4 and 7.

Result — Civil Revision Petition dismissed — No order as to costs. Para 8.

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RATIO DECIDENDI
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The ratio of the decision is that in a suit for permanent injunction, the burden lies upon the plaintiff to establish actual possession and enjoyment of the suit property through cogent and legally admissible evidence. An application under Order XVI Rule 1(2) CPC to summon documents and witnesses of a third party, when such documents are not directly essential for adjudication of possession and are sought merely to counter the defendant’s stand, cannot be treated as a necessary step in proving possession.

Where the Trial Court, upon examining the pleadings and nature of relief sought, refuses to summon such third-party records and finds that plaintiffs must independently prove their case, such order does not suffer from illegality or perversity. Consequently, the High Court, in exercise of its limited supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, will not interfere with such discretionary orders.