Defamation — Slander and Libel — Pleadings Order VI Rules 2 & 4 CPC; Order VII Rule 11 CPC In a suit for defamation, the plaint must specifically plead the exact slanderous or libellous words, the persons to whom they were published, and the time and place of publication — Absence of such pleadings renders the plaint vague and liable to rejection for want of cause of action. [Paras 4, 9–12]

 

Defamation — Slander and Libel — Pleadings

Order VI Rules 2 & 4 CPC; Order VII Rule 11 CPC

In a suit for defamation, the plaint must specifically plead the exact slanderous or libellous words, the persons to whom they were published, and the time and place of publication — Absence of such pleadings renders the plaint vague and liable to rejection for want of cause of action.
[Paras 4, 9–12]

---

Defamation — Evidence cannot substitute pleadings

Cause of action for defamation must be disclosed in the plaint itself — Plaint cannot be saved by proposing to disclose defamatory statements later through evidence or witnesses.
[Paras 12, 29]

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Defamation — Corporate plaintiff — Separate legal personality

A company, being a juristic person distinct from its director, cannot claim defamation merely because allegations are made against its director — No cause of action arises to the company unless specific defamatory statements concerning it are pleaded.
[Para 13]

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Employer–Employee Relationship — Disclosure of reasons for termination

Qualified privilege

Communication by an employer to co-employees or prospective employers regarding reasons for termination of an employee, when made bona fide and in discharge of duty, is protected by qualified privilege and does not constitute defamation.
[Paras 18–24, 26–29]

---

Defamation — Reference checks by former employer

Honest disclosure by a former employer to a prospective employer regarding the antecedents and reasons for termination of an employee is permissible and in public interest — Such communication is privileged unless actuated by malice.
[Paras 19–27]

---

Defamation — Termination for misconduct — Finality

Where termination for misconduct has attained finality and has not been challenged, communication of such fact cannot be treated as defamatory.
[Paras 20–21, 26]

---

Limitation — Defamation and breach of contract

Articles 75, 76, 55 & 58, Limitation Act, 1963

Suit for compensation for libel or slander must be filed within one year from publication — Claims for breach of contract and declaration must be filed within three years — Suit filed beyond limitation is barred and not maintainable.
[Paras 30–31]

---

Interrogatories — Fishing enquiry

Order XI CPC

Interrogatories cannot be used to conduct a roving or fishing enquiry to discover a cause of action not pleaded in the plaint.
[Paras 4–8]

---

II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Mandatory Pleadings in Defamation Suits

The Court reiterates settled law that defamation actions demand strict pleadings. The defamatory words themselves are material facts and must be pleaded with specificity. Without such pleading, the defendant has no opportunity to answer the case, and no issue can arise for trial (Paras 4–12).

B. Evidence vs. Pleadings

The judgment strongly affirms that evidence cannot cure defective pleadings. A plaintiff cannot omit defamatory words from the plaint and attempt to introduce them through witness testimony or documents later (Paras 12, 29).

C. Qualified Privilege in Employment Context

A substantial portion of the judgment is devoted to the doctrine of qualified privilege. The Court holds that:

• Employers owe a duty to other employees and to prospective employers to disclose reasons for termination.

• Such disclosure, if honest and bona fide, is privileged.

• Privilege is defeated only by proof of malice (Paras 18–24).

D. Public Policy Considerations

The Court recognises that reference checks and internal disclosures are essential for professional and commercial integrity. Treating such communications as defamatory would be contrary to public interest and freedom of speech (Paras 19–21).

E. Corporate Plaintiff and Individual Defamation

The Court draws a clear line between an individual and a company. Even if a director is allegedly defamed, the company does not automatically acquire a cause of action (Para 13).

F. Limitation as an Independent Bar

Apart from lack of cause of action, the Court independently holds the suit to be time-barred, both for defamation (one year) and for breach of contract / declaration (three years) (Paras 30–31).

---

III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS PER RECORD)

• Plaintiff No.2 was a senior employee terminated for misconduct after disciplinary proceedings (Paras 1, 16).

• Termination order was not challenged and attained finality (Para 20).

• Alleged defamation was based on vague assertions that defendants made negative statements in the industry (Paras 1(xi), 9).

• No defamatory words, publication details, or named recipients were pleaded (Paras 9–12).

• Suit was instituted in January 2013, long after the alleged publications in 2009–2011 (Paras 30–31).

---

IV. FINAL HOLDING / RESULT

• Plaint, insofar as it related to defamation, did not disclose any cause of action.

• Claims were barred by limitation.

• Employer communications were held to be privileged.

• Suit and counter-claim both dismissed.

• Defendants bound by prior statement not to defame.
  [Paras 29–34]

---

Ratio (Concise)

In defamation suits arising from employment termination, absence of specific pleadings of defamatory words is fatal; bona fide disclosures by an employer to co-employees or prospective employers are protected by qualified privilege, and stale claims are barred by limitation.

Comparative Advertising — Disparagement — Injunction Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC While comparative advertising is permissible, an advertiser cannot denigrate or disparage the goods of a rival — Puffery is allowed; slander of a competitor’s product is impermissible — Where prima facie disparagement is shown, injunction can be granted. [Paras 17–21, 29]

 

Comparative Advertising — Disparagement — Injunction

Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC

While comparative advertising is permissible, an advertiser cannot denigrate or disparage the goods of a rival — Puffery is allowed; slander of a competitor’s product is impermissible — Where prima facie disparagement is shown, injunction can be granted.
[Paras 17–21, 29]

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Advertisement — Test of Disparagement

Intent, manner, storyline and overall effect

Advertisement must be viewed as a whole — Court must examine intent, storyline, overall effect and message conveyed to an average consumer — Minute dissection is impermissible.
[Paras 17–21, 22]

---

Commercial Speech — Article 19(1)(a)

Advertising is protected commercial speech — Protection does not extend to false, misleading, unfair or deceptive advertising — Untruthful disparagement is not protected.
[Paras 17–21]

---

Trademark — Trade Dress — Bottle Shape

Deceptive similarity

Depiction of a bottle deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s registered trade dress, coupled with portrayal of such product as inferior or “ordinary”, prima facie amounts to denigration and infringement.
[Paras 25–27, 29]

---

Interim Injunction — Balance of Convenience

Where advertisements prima facie denigrate a rival’s product, and disputed questions of technical superiority require trial, balance of convenience lies in restraining dissemination pending adjudication.
[Paras 26, 29]

---

Comparative Advertising — Permissible Limits

A trader may state that his product is better, but cannot say that the competitor’s product is bad, inferior, or undesirable — Truthful comparison is permissible; defamatory comparison is not.
[Paras 17–21]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Governing Principles on Comparative Advertising

The Court undertakes an extensive survey of precedent, reaffirming settled principles:

1. Puffery is permissible — claiming superiority of one’s product.

2. Disparagement is impermissible — portraying a rival product as inferior, ineffective, or undesirable.

3. Truthful disparagement may be arguable, but untruthful disparagement is barred.

4. Advertisement must be assessed from the perspective of an average consumer, not a hypersensitive trader.

These principles are drawn from Colgate, Dabur, Pepsi, and allied Division Bench rulings (Paras 17–21).

---

B. Test Applied by the Court

The Court applies the following four-fold test:

• Intent of the advertisement

• Storyline and message

• Overall effect

• Manner of depiction

A holistic view, rather than frame-by-frame analysis, is adopted (Paras 17–22).

---

C. Commercial Speech and Its Limits

While acknowledging advertising as commercial speech protected under Article 19(1)(a), the Court reiterates that such protection does not extend to advertising which is:

• false,

• misleading,

• unfair,

• deceptive, or

• disparaging of rival goods (Paras 17–21).

---

D. Trade Dress and Bottle Shape

A crucial legal finding is that:

• Plaintiff’s bottle shape is a registered trademark.

• Depiction of a deceptively similar bottle as an “ordinary toilet cleaner” incapable of removing odour/stains prima facie denigrates the plaintiff’s product.

This takes the impugned advertisements beyond permissible comparative advertising (Paras 25–27).

---

E. Patent Defence — Disputed Questions

Defendant’s reliance on patented technology was held to raise disputed questions of fact:

• Technical superiority cannot be assumed at the interim stage.

• Burden lies on the defendant to prove such superiority at trial (Para 26).

---

III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS FOUND)

• Plaintiff Reckitt Benckiser India Private Limited is proprietor of the HARPIC trademark and registered bottle shape.

• Defendant Hindustan Unilever Limited launched five advertisements promoting DOMEX.

• One TVC was held not prima facie disparaging (Para 22).

• Four advertisements (second, third, fourth, fifth) were found to:

  • depict a bottle deceptively similar to HARPIC,

  • label it as an “ordinary toilet cleaner”,

  • suggest inferiority and inefficacy (Paras 25–29).

---

IV. FINAL HOLDING / OPERATIVE DIRECTIONS

• TVC: No prima facie disparagement — no injunction.

• Four advertisements (2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th):
  Restrained from publication until all references to:

  • HARPIC, or

  • deceptively similar bottle/trade dress
    are removed.

• Balance of convenience held in favour of plaintiff.

• Application disposed of accordingly.
  [Paras 29–30]

---

Ratio (Concise)

Comparative advertising is permissible only so long as it promotes one’s own product without portraying the rival’s product as inferior; depiction of a deceptively similar trade dress as “ordinary” and ineffective constitutes actionable disparagement warranting injunction.

Defamation — Libel — Corporate reputation In a suit for damages for libel, the plaintiff must establish that the impugned statements are false, defamatory, and have the tendency to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society or injure its trade, business, or goodwill. [Paras: discussion following evidence; principles stated mid-judgment]

 

Defamation — Libel — Corporate reputation

In a suit for damages for libel, the plaintiff must establish that the impugned statements are false, defamatory, and have the tendency to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society or injure its trade, business, or goodwill.
[Paras: discussion following evidence; principles stated mid-judgment]

---

Defamation — Statements in legal / statutory proceedings

Allegations made in correspondence and proceedings under the Right to Information Act, 2005 do not ipso facto constitute libel — Mere use of expressions such as “fraud” or “vested interest” in a legally recognised proceeding does not automatically amount to defamation.
[Paras dealing with RTI proceedings and evidence]

---

Defamation — Proof of injury to reputation — Burden of proof

Even in an undefended suit, the plaintiff must prove by cogent evidence that the alleged libellous statements caused injury to reputation or goodwill — Absence of proof of actual or probable damage is fatal to the claim.
[Paras on evidentiary burden; concluding findings]

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Defamation — Corporate plaintiff — Evidence of loss

Where documentary evidence on record (annual reports) demonstrates continued prosperity and rise in turnover, allegation of reputational damage remains unsubstantiated — No presumption of damage arises merely from allegations.
[Paras referring to annual reports and turnover]

---

Civil Procedure — Undefended suit — Standard of proof

In an undefended suit, plaintiff is not absolved of the obligation to prove the case — Court must still be satisfied on evidence that cause of action is made out.
[Initial principles applied before dismissal]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Essential Ingredients of Libel

The Court reiterates classical principles of defamation law:

• Libel consists of written statements exposing a person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or injuring reputation in trade or profession.

• Test is whether the words would lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society, read as a whole and in their natural meaning.

The Court distinguishes libel from slander and emphasises that the distinction is real, not artificial.

---

B. Statements Made in Statutory / Legal Proceedings

A significant legal finding is that:

• Statements made in RTI proceedings and related correspondence, even if harsh or accusatory, are part of a legally recognised process.

• Such statements cannot automatically be branded as defamatory merely because they allege fraud or irregularity.

The Court implicitly recognises the need to balance freedom to ventilate grievances through lawful channels against protection of reputation.

---

C. Burden of Proving Reputational Damage

The judgment places strong emphasis on proof of injury:

• Plaintiff must demonstrate how reputation or goodwill was actually affected.

• Mere assertion that reputation “may be affected” is insufficient.

• No witness evidence or documentary proof was produced to show that any third party’s perception of the plaintiff changed adversely.

---

D. Corporate Defamation and Financial Indicators

The Court relies on objective indicators:

• Annual reports showed increasing turnover and commercial prosperity.

• This directly undermined the claim that the company’s reputation or goodwill suffered.

Thus, financial performance evidence became decisive against the plaintiff.

---

E. Undefended Suit — No Automatic Decree

Despite non-appearance of defendants:

• Court refused to decree the suit mechanically.

• Reinforced principle that undefended does not mean unproved.

---

III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS FOUND)

• Plaintiff Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers Ltd., a public sector undertaking, sued for ₹50 crores as damages for defamation.

• Alleged defamatory letters were written by defendants in connection with:

  • Sale of non-performing land asset;

  • Complaints and appeals under the RTI Act, 2005;

  • Allegations of irregularity and fraud.

• Defendants did not contest the suit.

• Plaintiff relied mainly on correspondence and annual reports.

• Evidence showed continued growth and profitability.

• No evidence of actual reputational harm was adduced.

---

IV. FINAL HOLDING

• Plaintiff failed to establish that statements constituted libel.

• No proof of injury to reputation or goodwill.

• Statements in RTI proceedings not per se defamatory.

• Suit dismissed; no order as to costs.

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Ratio (Concise)

Allegations made in statutory proceedings, without proof of reputational injury, do not constitute actionable libel; even in undefended defamation suits, strict proof of damage to reputation is mandatory.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Damages — Loss of reputation — Defamation — Pleadi...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Damages — Loss of reputation — Defamation — Pleadi...: advocatemmmohan Contract of Employment — Private employment — Termination — Remedies Private employment is governed purely by contractual t...

Contract of Employment — Private employment — Termination — Remedies

Private employment is governed purely by contractual terms — Principles of public law and administrative law are inapplicable — Employment not protected under Article 12 of the Constitution.
[Paras 2, 4, 8(i)]

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Termination Clause — Notice period — Damages

Where the employment contract provides termination by notice or salary in lieu thereof, even illegal termination entitles the employee only to salary for the notice period — No further damages permissible.
[Paras 2, 3, 6, 8(ii)]

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Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Sections 14(1)(b), 14(1)(c), 41(e)

Contract of personal service under private employment cannot be specifically enforced — Determinable contracts are incapable of specific performance — Injunction or declaration indirectly enforcing such contracts is barred.
[Paras 5, 8(iii)]

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Damages — Loss of reputation — Defamation — Pleadings

Claim for damages on the ground of defamation, loss of goodwill, or mental agony must be supported by specific pleadings — Absence of material particulars under Order VI Rule 4 CPC is fatal — Bald assertions insufficient.
[Para 7]

---

Mitigation of Damages — Contract Act, 1872 — Section 73

Employee alleging illegal termination must plead and prove steps taken to mitigate damages — Cannot sit idle and claim extended compensation.
[Paras 3–5 (as discussed through precedents)]

---

Relief — Scope

Even assuming termination to be illegal, relief is confined strictly to notice period salary with interest — Claims for continuation in service, superannuation benefits, loss of career prospects, or mental agony are not maintainable.
[Paras 6, 8]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Nature of Private Employment

The Court reiterates that private employment stands on a completely different footing from public employment. Since the employer is neither the State nor an instrumentality under Article 12, constitutional protections relating to service law do not apply (Paras 2, 4).

B. Determinable Contract and Bar on Specific Performance

Relying upon Sections 14(1)(b) and 14(1)(c) of the Specific Relief Act, the Court holds that:

• Contracts of personal service are not enforceable;

• Determinable contracts cannot be specifically enforced;

• Declaratory and injunctive reliefs that effectively compel continuation of service are impermissible (Paras 5, 8(iii)).

C. Measure of Damages for Illegal Termination

Following the ratio of S.S. Shetty v. Bharat Nidhi Ltd., the Court affirms that:

• Even where termination is illegal, damages are confined to the notice period;

• Notice period reflects the parties’ understanding of reasonable time for alternative employment (Paras 3, 6, 8(ii)).

D. Defamation and Loss of Reputation — Pleading Deficiency

The Court subjects the claim for Rs.1 crore damages to strict scrutiny and finds:

• No pleadings identifying defamatory publication;

• No averments showing lowering of reputation in the eyes of right-thinking members of society;

• Non-compliance with Order VI Rule 4 CPC.
  Consequently, the claim is rejected in limine (Para 7).

E. Mental Agony and Distress

The Court holds that mental agony and distress cannot be independently compensated when the law itself restricts monetary relief to notice period salary (Para 7).

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III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS

• Plaintiff was a private employee governed by an employment contract containing a three-month notice clause (Paras 2, 6).

• Defendant paid salary in lieu of notice, satisfying contractual obligation (Para 6).

• Suit sought declarations of illegality, Rs.1 crore damages, and consequential reliefs (Para 5).

• No factual foundation was laid for defamation or reputational loss (Para 7).

• Court confined relief strictly to three months’ salary with interest, dismissing all other claims (Paras 6, 8).

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IV. FINAL HOLDING (AS PER JUDGMENT)

• Suit dismissed except to the limited extent of directing payment of three months’ salary with interest @ 9% p.a., escalating to 18% p.a. on default.

• No declaration of illegality, no damages for reputation, goodwill, or mental agony.

• Parties left to bear their own costs.
  [Paras 8–10]

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: “bulldozer justice” has no sanction under the Cons...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: “bulldozer justice” has no sanction under the Cons...: advocatemmmohan Constitution of India — Arts. 14, 21, 32, 142 Demolition of property of accused / convict — Without due process — Unconstit...

Constitution of India — Arts. 14, 21, 32, 142

Demolition of property of accused / convict — Without due process — Unconstitutional

Demolition of residential or commercial property by State machinery merely because a person is an accused or a convict, and that too without following the due process prescribed by law, is wholly unconstitutional — Executive cannot act as judge and impose punishment — Such action violates rule of law and doctrine of separation of powers — Accountability of public officials mandated.
[Paras 53, 54, 71]

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Rule of Law — Foundation of democratic governance — Abuse of power

Rule of law is an umbrella concept to protect citizens against abuse of State power — No person can be punished in body or goods except in accordance with law established by ordinary courts — Executive excesses amounting to arbitrariness have no place in a constitutional system.
[Paras 14–19, 30, 33]

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Separation of Powers — Executive overreach

Executive cannot usurp judicial functions by declaring guilt or inflicting punishment — Demolition of property as a penal measure transgresses constitutional limits of executive power.
[Paras 44, 71]

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Criminal Law — Presumption of innocence — Natural justice

Accused is presumed innocent unless proven guilty in a court of law — Penal consequences cannot be imposed on the basis of accusation or suspicion — Fair trial and due process are indispensable.
[Paras 63, 64, 66, 75]

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Right to Life — Right to shelter — Art. 21

Right to shelter is a facet of right to life — House is not merely property but embodies dignity, security, and socio-economic aspirations — Deprivation of shelter without due process is unconstitutional.
[Paras 76, 78, 84, 86]

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Collective Punishment — Impermissibility

Demolition of a house occupied by family members on the ground that one resident is accused or convicted amounts to collective punishment — Such punishment is alien to constitutional and criminal jurisprudence.
[Paras 76, 88]

---

Mala fides — Selective demolition — Pick and choose

Where similarly situated structures are left untouched and property of an accused alone is demolished, a presumption of punitive intent arises — Authorities must rebut presumption of mala fides.
[Para 82]

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Demolition — Proportionality — Last resort

Demolition can be undertaken only when it is the sole option available — Authorities must consider compounding or partial demolition — Extreme step must be justified with reasons.
[Paras 84, 86]

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Constitution of India — Art. 142

Directions to prevent arbitrary demolitions

Mandatory procedural safeguards laid down — Prior show-cause notice, personal hearing, reasoned order, opportunity for appeal, time to vacate, videography of demolition — Non-compliance to entail contempt, restitution, and personal liability of officers.
[Paras 90–94]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Rule of Law as Controlling Principle

The Court reiterates that rule of law is part of the basic structure and exists to restrain arbitrary State power. Any punitive action affecting life or property must be rooted in law and adjudicated by courts, not executive fiat (Paras 14–23).

B. Separation of Powers and Executive Limits

By demolishing property on the ground of criminal accusation, the executive assumes the role of judge and executioner. Such conduct directly violates the constitutional demarcation between executive and judiciary (Paras 44, 71).

C. Criminal Jurisprudence and Presumption of Innocence

The judgment emphatically affirms that punishment cannot precede adjudication. Even convicts cannot be subjected to demolition without statutory authority and due process; a fortiori, accused persons cannot be so punished (Paras 63–75).

D. Right to Shelter under Article 21

The Court elevates shelter beyond a property right, recognising it as intrinsic to dignity and life. Arbitrary demolition, therefore, strikes at the core of Article 21 (Paras 76–86).

E. Collective Punishment and Innocent Family Members

The Court categorically rejects penalisation of spouses, children, parents, or co-owners for acts they are not accused of. Such action is described as anarchy and unconstitutional (Paras 76, 88).

F. Arbitrariness and Mala Fides

Selective targeting of properties associated with accused persons, while ignoring similarly placed structures, invites a presumption of malice in law. The burden shifts to the State to justify bona fides (Para 82).

G. Binding Directions under Article 142

Recognising systemic abuse, the Court issues pan-India binding directions to institutionalise transparency, fairness, and accountability, including personal liability of erring officers and restitution at personal cost (Paras 90–94).

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III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS PER RECORD)

• The writ petitions were filed under Article 32 complaining of demolitions carried out without due process, allegedly on the ground of involvement of occupants in criminal cases (Paras 1–3).

• Interim protection was granted, and the Court stayed demolitions nationwide except for public encroachments and court-ordered demolitions (Paras 6–7).

• The Court considered extensive material, affidavits, and suggestions from States, Union of India, and intervenors, leading to formulation of uniform safeguards (Paras 8–12).

• The factual matrix demonstrated a pattern capable of abuse, necessitating constitutional intervention (Paras 12–13).

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Conclusion

The judgment establishes that “bulldozer justice” has no sanction under the Constitution. Any demolition affecting life or shelter must strictly comply with statutory procedure, constitutional guarantees, and the binding directions issued by the Court.