Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (“PP Act”) vis-à-vis State Rent Control enactments — Whether PP Act (a central statute) overrides State rent control laws in respect of premises which fall within definition of “public premises” under s.2(e) — Whether two-Judge decision in Suhas H. Pophale (2014) drawing a prospective-only application and exempting tenants in occupation prior to 16-9-1958 (or prior to date premises became ‘public premises’) was correct — Held: Ashoka Marketing (Constitution Bench, 1990) and subsequent three-Judge authority(s) correctly decide law; PP Act is a special enactment whose object and policy demonstrate overriding operation over State Rent Control Acts to the extent premises fall within s.2(e); Suhas H. Pophale is overruled to the extent inconsistent. The PP Act applies to tenancies created either before or after coming into force of PP Act provided (i) the premises fall within s.2(e) and (ii) occupation is unauthorised (including where tenancy is terminated under s.106 T.P. Act). “Occupation” (continuous concept) and not merely “possession” is the relevant test.

Constitutional / Statutory Interpretation — Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (“PP Act”) vis-à-vis State Rent Control enactments — Whether PP Act (a central statute) overrides State rent control laws in respect of premises which fall within definition of “public premises” under s.2(e) — Whether two-Judge decision in Suhas H. Pophale (2014) drawing a prospective-only application and exempting tenants in occupation prior to 16-9-1958 (or prior to date premises became ‘public premises’) was correct — Held: Ashoka Marketing (Constitution Bench, 1990) and subsequent three-Judge authority(s) correctly decide law; PP Act is a special enactment whose object and policy demonstrate overriding operation over State Rent Control Acts to the extent premises fall within s.2(e); Suhas H. Pophale is overruled to the extent inconsistent. The PP Act applies to tenancies created either before or after coming into force of PP Act provided (i) the premises fall within s.2(e) and (ii) occupation is unauthorised (including where tenancy is terminated under s.106 T.P. Act). “Occupation” (continuous concept) and not merely “possession” is the relevant test.

RATIO / KEY POINTS

1. Primary holding: Where premises fall within the definition of “public premises” under Section 2(e) of the PP Act, and occupation of such premises is “unauthorised” within the meaning of Section 2(g) (for example, after termination of tenancy under Section 106, T.P. Act), the statutory machinery of the PP Act applies and will, by reason of its object, policy and later legislative will, override inconsistent provisions of State Rent Control legislation.

2. Status of Suhas H. Pophale (2014): The two-Judge Bench decision in Suhas H. Pophale, insofar as it held that PP Act applies only prospectively (i.e., excluding occupants in possession prior to 16-9-1958 or prior to date premises became public premises), stands in conflict with the Constitution-Bench decision in Ashoka Marketing (1990) and the three-Judge precedent in M/s. Jain Ink. The court holds Suhas H. Pophale incorrect and overrules it to the extent inconsistent.

3. Precedential hierarchy & stare decisis: A Bench of lesser strength cannot override or depart from law laid down by a larger Bench. Where the two-Judge view conflicts with earlier Constitution-Bench / three-Judge authorities on materially similar facts, the larger-Bench jurisprudence prevails.

4. Principles of statutory interpretation applied: Both PP Act and State Rent Control Acts are “special” enactments. When two special statutes overlap, conflict must be resolved by reference to (i) legislative purpose, (ii) policy and object, and (iii) clear intendment of the statutory language. The PP Act — designed to provide a special, speedy regime for eviction from public premises — must be given overriding effect to carry out its purpose.

5. Occupation vs. possession; continuity of occupation: The material inquiry for applicability of PP Act is whether the person was in “occupation” of the public premises when the PP Act was enacted and, later, whether occupation became “unauthorised.” The term “occupation” is continuous in nature and not limited to a discrete moment of entry or “possession.”

6. Two conditions for PP Act to apply: (i) the tenanted premises must fall within the scope of s.2(e) (i.e., belong to or be taken on lease by a Central Government entity or specified companies/corporations), and (ii) the occupation must have become unauthorised (e.g., upon expiry/termination of tenancy, including after issuance of a s.106 T.P. Act notice).

7. Termination of tenancy as a mode of rendering occupation “unauthorised”: Determination of tenancy (e.g., by notice under Section 106 T.P. Act) is one statutory mode which can render continued occupation “unauthorised” and thus attract PP Act eviction procedure.

8. Non-dependence on mere physical possession: Invocation of PP Act does not depend exclusively on the moment of taking physical possession; rather, the test is whether occupation is unauthorised within the statutory definition and the premises are public premises as defined.

9. Practical consequence: Where both statutes arguably cover the same premises, occupants in unauthorised occupation of public premises cannot successfully invoke protections of State Rent Control Acts against eviction under the PP Act; the Estate Officer’s summary machinery under PP Act is available to central/public entities for recovery of possession.

10. Scope preserved: The judgment preserves that the PP Act operates only when both statutory conditions are met and leaves open other remedies where PP Act is inapplicable (e.g., proceedings under Rent Control Act or Small Causes Court where appropriate).

Criminal Law — Homicide — IPC, S.300 Exceptions 1, 2 & 4 — Whether conviction for murder (S.302 IPC) could be reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder — facts: four knife-blows to vital parts (common carotid & subclavian arteries cut) — no defence evidence, accused’s s.313 denial only — whether plea of self-defence / sudden fight / grave provocation available — held: no mitigating exception available; substantial injuries on vital parts, absence of evidence of exchange of blows or deceased being armed, lack of plea or proof of sudden loss of self-control; accused rightly convicted under s.302; appeal dismissed.

Criminal Law — Homicide — IPC, S.300 Exceptions 1, 2 & 4 — Whether conviction for murder (S.302 IPC) could be reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder — facts: four knife-blows to vital parts (common carotid & subclavian arteries cut) — no defence evidence, accused’s s.313 denial only — whether plea of self-defence / sudden fight / grave provocation available — held: no mitigating exception available; substantial injuries on vital parts, absence of evidence of exchange of blows or deceased being armed, lack of plea or proof of sudden loss of self-control; accused rightly convicted under s.302; appeal dismissed.

RATIO / KEY POINTS

1. Standard for applicability of Exceptions to S.300 IPC (Exceptions 1, 2, 4):
   — Exception 2 (exceeding right of private defence) requires a foundation that the accused or his property was being attacked; mere allegation of quarrel or shouts is insufficient. Where there is no evidence that the deceased attacked or threatened the accused, Exception 2 is inapplicable.
   — Exception 4 (sudden fight) postulates a bilateral exchange of blows — a “fight” — not merely a quarrel or verbal duel. If the assailant is armed and the deceased unarmed, Exception 4 will not ordinarily apply. (Bhagwan Munjaji Pawade v. State of Maharashtra followed; Awadhesh Kumar affirmed.)

2. Nature and gravity of injuries decisive:
   — Infliction of multiple knife-blows on vital parts (here four blows cutting common carotid and subclavian arteries) ordinarily establishes that the act would in the ordinary course cause death; such injuries are indicative of lethal intent and/or cruel manner of attack, militating against classification as culpable homicide in sudden fight or mere excess of private defence.

3. Requirement of contemporaneous or proximate provocation for Exception 1:
   — Exception 1 (grave and sudden provocation) requires that provocation be so grave and sudden as to deprive the accused of self-control. Mere antecedent quarrel or shouting (or general allegation of addiction and shouts) without evidence that provocation was immediate and of such quality is insufficient to attract Exception 1.

4. Procedural and evidentiary posture:
   — Where no defence evidence is led and the accused’s statement under s.313 CrPC contains only denial (no plea of self-defence or that deceased attacked), court cannot conjure missing factual substratum necessary to draw Exceptions to S.300 in favour of accused.

5. Conclusion on sentencing/conviction:
   — In absence of (i) evidence of deceased attacking accused, (ii) bilateral exchange of force, or (iii) grave and sudden provocation, and on the presence of multiple lethal blows to vital parts, benefit of Exceptions 1, 2 or 4 cannot be extended. Conviction under S.302 IPC stands; appeal to reduce offence is rightly dismissed.

Criminal Law – Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 3, 11 – Omission of accused’s name in FIR based on eyewitness account – effect – subsequent improvements and embellishments – Test Identification Parade held despite eyewitness knowing accused – evidentiary value – recovery of blood-stained articles where blood group not established – conviction based solely on untrustworthy and materially improved testimony liable to be set aside.

Criminal Law – Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 3, 11 – Omission of accused’s name in FIR based on eyewitness account – effect – subsequent improvements and embellishments – Test Identification Parade held despite eyewitness knowing accused – evidentiary value – recovery of blood-stained articles where blood group not established – conviction based solely on untrustworthy and materially improved testimony liable to be set aside.
Wife of deceased claimed to be an eyewitness; however, the earliest version (merg and FIR) narrated by her to informant-father-in-law did not contain the name of the accused; assailants described only as unknown masked persons. Later statements under Sections 161/164 CrPC introduced new facts: mask allegedly fell; identification by voice; three assailants instead of two. These constituted material improvements. FIR omission held fatal, particularly where the witness had narrated every other minute detail. No medical evidence supported prosecution theory that witness was too ill to disclose identity. TIP of accused, admittedly known to eyewitness, held meaningless. Recoveries of blood-stained articles inconclusive, blood group not proved; link evidence not established. Held, prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt; conviction set aside; accused acquitted. (Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of M.P., applied.)

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. A material omission in the FIR regarding identity of assailants, when the FIR is based on the eyewitness’s own narration, is a circumstance directly relevant under Section 11 of the Evidence Act and fundamentally undermines the credibility of later identifications.
   – Where the eyewitness provided detailed particulars (time, appearance, sequence, actions) but omitted the accused’s name, later assertions of identification are inherently doubtful.

2. Subsequent improvements in police statements—such as new assertions that mask fell off or identification by voice—are material embellishments and cannot form the basis of conviction.
   – Improvements introduced after a delay, without plausible medical or factual justification, are unreliable.

3. Test Identification Parade is meaningless where the witness already knew the accused; holding a TIP after naming the accused in a Section 161 statement casts further doubt on the genuineness of that statement.

4. Recoveries under Section 27 IPC lose probative value when blood detected on the seized weapons/clothes is only identified as “human blood” and not correlated with the deceased, and when link evidence remains unproved.

5. In cases resting solely on eyewitness testimony, courts must subject such testimony to rigorous scrutiny when prior enmity exists; if the foundational version is untrustworthy, the entire prosecution case collapses.

6. Conviction cannot rest on conjectures or cumulative suspicion; failure to prove identity of assailant beyond reasonable doubt mandates acquittal.

Arbitration — Section 11(4), Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 — joinder of non-signatory / “veritable party” test — prima facie satisfaction required — referral refused.

Arbitration — Section 11(4), Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 — joinder of non-signatory / “veritable party” test — prima facie satisfaction required — referral refused.
Where party BCL (non-signatory to HPCL–AGC purchase order) contended it was entitled to invoke arbitration clause in HPCL tender based on a back-to-back contract with AGC and a later settlement-cum-assignment, High Court allowed Section 11 petition and directed constitution of arbitral tribunal to decide arbitrability as preliminary issue. Supreme Court held that referral court must be prima facie satisfied that an arbitration agreement exists and that the non-signatory is a veritable party before directing arbitration; on the facts there was no prima facie material to show privity, consent to assignment or any intention to bind BCL to HPCL–AGC contract (clauses in tender expressly prohibit subcontract/assignment without written owner consent), and the Section 11 petition was dismissed. Referral court cannot abdicate its limited duty to examine existence of arbitration agreement; competence-competence does not relieve referral court from requiring a prima facie showing of a real connection.

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. A Section 11 referral court must examine, prima facie, whether an arbitration agreement exists and whether a non-signatory is a “veritable” party to that agreement; this is a limited inspection — not a full contested inquiry — but it must go beyond mere assertion. (Cox & Kings; Interplay; SBI General; Ajay Madhusudan Patel.)

2. Mere commercial or legal connection between signatory and non-signatory, or production of post-hoc assignment/settlement, is insufficient absent prima facie evidence of intent/consent to bind the non-signatory or of a valid assignment in accordance with contractual prohibitions on subletting/assignment.

3. Where the prima facie threshold is not met, the referral court should refuse to refer the non-signatory to arbitration; competence-competence and the remit of the arbitral tribunal do not justify devolving the prima facie screening function entirely to the tribunal.

ISSUE → HOLDING → REASONS

ISSUE
Whether the High Court (referral court) was correct in directing arbitration by appointing an arbitrator under Section 11(4) where the claimant (BCL) was a non-signatory to the HPCL–AGC contract and relied upon a back-to-back agreement, escrow/communications and a later Settlement-cum-Assignment to claim rights “through or under” AGC.

HOLDING
No. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred. On prima facie examination the respondent (BCL) failed to establish that it was a veritable party to the HPCL–AGC arbitration agreement and hence was not entitled to a mandatory Section 11 referral. The Section 11 petition was dismissed.

REASONS (condensed)
• Statutory and precedential frame: Section 11(6-A)/11(4) requires the referral court to examine existence of an arbitration agreement (Interplay; SBI General). Cox & Kings and subsequent decisions recognise that complex joinder questions often better suit the tribunal, but that does not remove the referral court’s prima facie duty to satisfy itself that a non-signatory is a veritable party.
• Prima facie test applied: BCL failed the prima facie test. There was no contractual privity between HPCL and BCL; the back-to-back contract expressly restricted BCL’s direct dealings with HPCL (Project Manager not to communicate with HPCL without AGC’s prior written approval); the tender expressly prohibited subletting/assignment without HPCL’s prior written consent (clauses 3.17 / 5.c.1).
• Settlement/assignment insufficient: The Settlement-cum-Assignment (31.10.2023) transferring receivables from AGC to BCL did not, by itself, create a pre-existing arbitration agreement between HPCL and BCL, nor did it show consent to bind BCL at the time of contract formation. Clause 2.2 of settlement did not, prima facie, convert BCL into a veritable party to the HPCL–AGC arbitration clause.
• Policy / limits: Allowing mere commercial linkages, emails or escrow arrangements to suffice would abrogate privity and party autonomy; referral court must refuse referrals where there is no prima facie showing of veritable party status.
• Conclusion: On the facts, referral was improper; the CAA is dismissed (no need to decide time-bar point).

SC/ST Act (Section 3(1)(s)) — “place within public view” — summoning order quashed in part. Complainant alleged caste-based abuse, assault and related acts occurring partly inside her house and partly outside; Trial Court summoned accused for offences under Sections 323, 504 IPC and s.3(1)(s) of the SC/ST (PoA) Act; High Court upheld summons. Supreme Court held that an essential ingredient of s.3(1)(s) — that abuse be made “in any place within public view” — was not made out on the face of the complaint where averments indicated the caste-based abuse occurred within the four corners of the complainant’s premises (not in public view). The Court quashed proceedings under s.3(1)(s) but declined to interfere with summoning on ordinary IPC counts; appellate interference confined to absence of prima facie case as to the statutory ingredient.

SC/ST Act (Section 3(1)(s)) — “place within public view” — summoning order quashed in part.
Complainant alleged caste-based abuse, assault and related acts occurring partly inside her house and partly outside; Trial Court summoned accused for offences under Sections 323, 504 IPC and s.3(1)(s) of the SC/ST (PoA) Act; High Court upheld summons. Supreme Court held that an essential ingredient of s.3(1)(s) — that abuse be made “in any place within public view” — was not made out on the face of the complaint where averments indicated the caste-based abuse occurred within the four corners of the complainant’s premises (not in public view). The Court quashed proceedings under s.3(1)(s) but declined to interfere with summoning on ordinary IPC counts; appellate interference confined to absence of prima facie case as to the statutory ingredient.

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST (PoA) Act requires that caste-based abuse be uttered “in any place within public view”; where complaint and material on file do not aver that the abuse occurred in a location where members of public could witness/ hear it, the statutory ingredient of “public view” is not satisfied.

2. At summoning stage the court must examine the complaint prima facie; if an essential ingredient of the statutory offence is absent on the face of the complaint, the appellate court may quash the summoning order insofar as that statutory count is concerned without reopening factual credibility.

3. Appellate power to interfere with summoning orders must be exercised sparingly but will be used where, on a prima facie reading, the requisite ingredient of an offence is missing.

ISSUE → HOLDING → REASONS

ISSUE
Whether the offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST (PoA) Act was made out on a prima facie basis where the complaint averred caste-based abuse primarily within the complainant’s house (and related incidents), and whether the High Court erred in refusing to quash the summoning order on that count.

HOLDING
Yes. The Supreme Court held that, on the face of the complaint, the element “in any place within public view” under s.3(1)(s) is not satisfied; accordingly, the summoning order is set aside insofar as proceedings under Section 3(1)(s) are concerned. Proceedings on the IPC counts (Sections 323 and 504) continue.

REASONS (condensed)
• Statutory meaning: “place within public view” requires the utterance to be in a location open to public observation/hearing; an occurrence confined within the four walls of a private residence ordinarily is not within public view (relying on prior decisions including Karuppudayar and Hitesh Verma).
• Factual matrix: the complaint and Section 156(3) material alleged that caste-based abuses were uttered inside the complainant’s premises; there was no specific averment that the abuse was made in a public place or exposed to public view.
• Summoning-stage standard: appellate courts should not probe credibility but must ensure essential elements of charged offences are prima facie pleaded; absent such elements, summoning for that statutory offence is unsustainable.
• Limited interference: Court exercised appellate power narrowly — quashing only the SC/ST Act count while permitting trial to proceed on remaining IPC charges.