Section 125 CrPC is a measure of social justice intended to prevent vagrancy and destitution and therefore deserves liberal interpretation. Long cohabitation raises a strong presumption of marriage unless rebutted by convincing evidence. A man should not be permitted to enjoy the benefits of a de facto marital relationship while escaping the corresponding legal obligation of maintenance. Since earlier Supreme Court decisions held that "wife" means only a legally wedded wife, the Bench referred the conflict to a larger Bench instead of deciding it.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 125 – Maintenance – Long cohabitation – Presumption of marriage – Scope of expression "wife" – Reference to Larger Bench

Question of Law

Whether a woman who has lived with a man as his wife for a considerable period, though unable to establish a strictly valid marriage, is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC.

Held

The Bench expressed the view that the expression "wife" in Section 125 CrPC deserves a broad and purposive interpretation in light of the social object of the provision and the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. However, since earlier coordinate Bench decisions (Yamunabai and Savitaben) had taken a contrary view, the matter was referred to a larger Bench for authoritative determination.

---

Ratio (Persuasive)

1. Section 125 CrPC is a measure of social justice intended to prevent vagrancy and destitution and therefore deserves liberal interpretation.
2. Long cohabitation raises a strong presumption of marriage unless rebutted by convincing evidence.
3. A man should not be permitted to enjoy the benefits of a de facto marital relationship while escaping the corresponding legal obligation of maintenance.
4. Since earlier Supreme Court decisions held that "wife" means only a legally wedded wife, the Bench referred the conflict to a larger Bench instead of deciding it.

Supreme Court of India

Chanmuniya vs Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha & Anr on 7 October, 2010

 2010 AIR SCW 6497, 2011 (1) SCC 141, 2011 CRI. L. J. 96, AIR 2010 SC (SUPP) 29, (2010) 4 RECCRIR 704, (2013) 1 DMC 131

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Penal Code, 1860 – Section 498A – Husband – Void m... Penal Code, 1860 – Section 498A – Husband – Void marriage – Suppression of subsisting first marriage – Whether accused can avoid prosecution by pleading that second marriage is void – Held, No. Question of Law Whether a man who suppresses his subsisting first marriage, induces a woman into a void marriage and thereafter subjects her to cruelty can avoid prosecution under Section 498A IPC on the ground that the second marriage is void in law. Held – No. The expression "husband" occurring in Section 498A IPC cannot be construed in a narrow technical sense so as to defeat the object of the provision. A man who deceives a woman into a marital relationship by concealing his earlier subsisting marriage cannot escape criminal liability by relying upon the invalidity of the very marriage brought about by his own fraud. Section 498A extends to void or voidable marriages and relationships in the nature of marriage, provided the ingredients of cruelty are otherwise established. Ratio Decidendi A beneficial penal provision enacted to suppress social evil must receive a purposive interpretation. The accused cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong by pleading that the marriage is void because of his own suppression of the earlier marriage. The expression "husband" in Section 498A is not confined to a legally valid marriage but extends to void, voidable and relationship-in-the-nature-of-marriage cases where cruelty is alleged. Karnataka High Court Dr Lokesh B H vs The State Of Karnataka on 18 November, 2025

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Penal Code, 1860 – Section 498A – Husband – Void m...: advocatemmmohan Penal Code, 1860 – Section 498A – Husband – Void marriage – Suppression of subsisting first marriage – Whether accused can a...

Penal Code, 1860 – Section 498A – Husband – Void marriage – Suppression of subsisting first marriage – Whether accused can avoid prosecution by pleading that second marriage is void – Held, No.

Question of Law

Whether a man who suppresses his subsisting first marriage, induces a woman into a void marriage and thereafter subjects her to cruelty can avoid prosecution under Section 498A IPC on the ground that the second marriage is void in law.

Held – No.

The expression "husband" occurring in Section 498A IPC cannot be construed in a narrow technical sense so as to defeat the object of the provision. A man who deceives a woman into a marital relationship by concealing his earlier subsisting marriage cannot escape criminal liability by relying upon the invalidity of the very marriage brought about by his own fraud. Section 498A extends to void or voidable marriages and relationships in the nature of marriage, provided the ingredients of cruelty are otherwise established.

Ratio Decidendi

• A beneficial penal provision enacted to suppress social evil must receive a purposive interpretation.
• The accused cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong by pleading that the marriage is void because of his own suppression of the earlier marriage.
• The expression "husband" in Section 498A is not confined to a legally valid marriage but extends to void, voidable and relationship-in-the-nature-of-marriage cases where cruelty is alleged. 

Karnataka High Court

Dr Lokesh B H vs The State Of Karnataka on 18 November, 2025

Section 10(2) — Mere expression of willingness to rejoin is not a valid ground for rescission: A party against whom a decree for judicial separation has been passed cannot claim rescission of the decree under Section 10(2) merely by expressing willingness or an honest desire to go back and live with the other spouse. To grant relief, the court must be satisfied that it is "just and reasonable" to do so based on material circumstances, not a simple unilateral change of heart. (Paras 5 & 6)

 

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — Section 10(2) — Rescission of decree for judicial separation — Mere willingness of spouse to rejoin insufficient

• Section 10(2) — Mere expression of willingness to rejoin is not a valid ground for rescission: A party against whom a decree for judicial separation has been passed cannot claim rescission of the decree under Section 10(2) merely by expressing willingness or an honest desire to go back and live with the other spouse. To grant relief, the court must be satisfied that it is "just and reasonable" to do so based on material circumstances, not a simple unilateral change of heart. (Paras 5 & 6)
  
  
• Section 10(2) — Exercise of judicial discretion and statutory intent: Unlike Section 26 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, or Section 12(3) of the UK Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965 (which restrict rescission to specific grounds like ex-parte decrees or reasonable cause for desertion), Section 10(2) grants broader discretion. However, this power must be exercised with great circumspection. Allowing a defeated spouse to routinely annul a separation decree simply by claiming readiness to cohabit would undermine the liberty secured by the innocent spouse and frustrate the right to seek divorce under Section 13(1-A)(i). (Paras 5 & 6)
  
  
• Section 10(2) — Error in granting rescission without change in circumstances: Where the trial court rescinded a judicial separation decree merely to give the wife "one more chance" without requiring proof of justifying circumstances beyond her willingness to meet marital obligations, the court acted in error. The order of rescission was set aside and the petition under Section 10(2) was dismissed. (Paras 3, 7 & 8)
  
  

Cases Referred to:

• Godabai v. Narayan Zingaji, AIR 1973 MP 4 (Para 6)

Karnataka High Court

S. Narasimha Bhandary vs V. Vijaya Bai on 2 February, 1978

Equivalent citations: AIR1978KANT115, ILR1978KAR752, 1978(1)KARLJ429, AIR 1978 KARNATAKA 115, ILR (1978) 1 KANT 752 1978 MATLR 358, 1978 MATLR 358

Author: E.S. Venkataramiah

Bench: E.S. Venkataramiah

JUDGMENT


 

 Venkataramiah, J.
 

1. The appellant is the husband of the respondent. They were married on 4-12-1966. The appellant filed a petition under Section 10(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in M. C. 3 of T971 on the file of the Civil Judge, Mangalore, for judicial separation from the respondent on the ground that the respondent had without any justifiable reason deserted him. The respondent contested the petition. In the course of her statement of objections filed in that case, she pleaded that she was staying away from her husband on account of cruelty on the part of her husband and that she was not willing to stay with him. The court ultimately upheld the case of the appellant and passed a decree for judicial separation on 17-7-1972.

2. The respondent, thereafter filed a petition under Section 10(2) of the Act on the file of the Civil Judge, Mangalore, out of which this appeal arises, requesting the Court to rescind the decree for judicial separation. In the course of that petition, she pleaded that on 'deep reflection' she felt that she had committed a mistake in not going back to her husband's house when he asked her to do so before the petition for judicial separation was filed and that she was willing to rejoin her husband and live with him. The rest of the allegations in the petition related to the allegations and counter-allegations which had been made in the previous case. The appellant opposed the petition filed under Section 10(2) of the Act.

3. The Court below allowed the petition. In the course of its order, it observed as follows :

"The sworn testimony of the petitioner goes to show that notwithstanding the past illtreatment of her husband and his mother, she is prepared to have one more chance and I do not find as to why she should not be provided with one more opportunity and find, whether her husband is prepared to meet the marital obligation. I am not convinced that because the petitioner has not proved change in circumstances, she is not entitled to get the relief sought for. The petitioner has proved that she most honestly feels and desires to go to her husband and live with him and I find that the petition should be allowed."

4. Aggrieved by the order of the court below the appellant has filed this appeal.

5. It is seen from the pleadings filed in the case and the evidence adduced by the parties that the only ground made out by the respondent for claiming relief under Section 10(2) of the Act is that as she was willing to go back and live with her husband, she was entitled to rescission of the decree for judicial separation. Section 10(2) of the Act provides that "Where a decree for judicial separation has been passed, it shall no longer "be obligatory for the petitioner to cohabit with the respondent, but the court may, on the application by petition of either party and on being satisfied of the truth of the statements made in such petition, rescind the decree if it considers it just and reasonable to do so." Unless the court considers that it is just and reasonable to rescind the decree, the application made under Section 10(2) of the Act cannot succeed. It follows that a party to a decree for judicial separation cannot by merely expressing his or her willingness to live with the other spouse claim the rescission of the decree for judicial separation. A decree for judicial separation secures the liberty to the petitioner to live away from the respondent. Either party to the decree would also be entitled to file a petition for dissolution of marriage under Section 13(1-A)(i) of the Act, if there has been no resumption of cohabitation as between the parties to the marriage for a period of one year or^ upwards after the passing of a decree. If the contention urged on behalf of the respondent is to be accepted, then it would be open to the respondent in a petition for judicial separation who has contested it and failed ultimately to secure rescission of the decree for judicial separation by merely filing a petition under Section 10(2) of the Act expressing his or her willingness to live with the other spouse. We do not think that the Parliament intended that such a result should flow from Section 10(2) of the Act.

6. At this stage it is appropriate to refer to corresponding provisions in the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 and the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965 which is in fores in England, Section 26 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 reads as follows:

"26. Decree of separation obtained during absence of husband or wife may be reversed: -- Any husband or wife, upon the application of whose wife or husband, as the case may be, a decree of judicial separation has been pronounced, may, at any time thereafter, present a petition to the Court by which the decree was pronounced, praying for a reversal of such decree, on the ground that it was obtained in his or her absence, and that there was reasonable excuse for the alleged desertion, where desertion was the ground of such decree.

The Court may, on being satisfied of the truth of the allegations of such petition, reverse the decree accordingly; but such reversal shall not prejudice or affect the rights or remedies which any other person would have had, in case it had not been decreed, in respect of any debts, contracts, or acts of the wife incurred, entered into, or done between the times of the sentence of separation and of the reversal thereof."

The relevant part of S. 12 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965 reads:

................

12 (3). The court may, on an application by petition of the spouse against whom a decree of judicial separation has been made and on being satisfied that the allegations in the petition are true, rescind the decree at any time on the ground that it was obtained in the absence of the applicant, or if desertion was the ground of the decree, that there was reasonable cause for the alleged desertion."

It is seen from the above provisions in the Indian Divorce Act and the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965 that an application for rescission of a decree of judicial separation can be made only on two specific grounds mentioned therein. Section 10(2) of the Act, however, empowers the Court to rescind the decree for judicial separation if it considers it just and reasonable to do so. The statute no doubt, does not refer to any specific grounds on which the decree for judicial separation can be annulled or rescinded. But from a reading of Section 10(2) of the Act, we are of the opinion that a party against whom a decree for judicial separation is passed cannot succeed in getting the decree rescinded, in the absence of other circumstances which justify an order of rescission to be passed, merely by saying that he or she is willing to rejoin and live with the other spouse. The power conferred on the court under Section 10(2) of the Act has to be exercised with great circumspection. In Godabai v. Narayan Zingaji, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has taken more or less the same view.

7. We, therefore, feel that in the circumstances of this case, the court below was in error in passing an order under Section 10(2) of the Act rescinding the decree for judicial separation. The order of the court below is set aside and the application made under Section 10(2) of the Act is dismissed. The appeal is accordingly allowed.

8. Appeal allowed.

S. 13(1)(ia) — Divorce — Cruelty — Mental and Physical Cruelty — Throwing away of Mangalasutra, abusive behavior, and false criminal litigation — Husband sought dissolution of marriage on grounds of cruelty alleging that the wife insulted him, used abusive language, threw away her 'Mangalasutra', broke household articles, falsely suspected his character, and voluntarily deserted him leaving behind an infant child — Wife filed multiple criminal proceedings under S. 498-A/363 IPC, Domestic Violence Act, and Human Rights Commission complaints, most of which were dismissed or non-prosecuted — Evidence of mediator (PW-2) confirmed holding mediations and advising the wife to wear 'Mangalasutra' after she threw it away — No specific cross-examination or denial was put to the husband regarding the incident of throwing 'Mangalasutra' — Maintenance petition filed by wife under S. 125 Cr.P.C. was previously dismissed holding she left the husband without justifiable cause — Held, unprovoked abusive conduct, public humiliation, throwing away 'Mangalasutra', abandonment of an infant child, combined with a barrage of false and unsubstantiated criminal litigation, amounts to mental cruelty — Family Court erred in dismissing the divorce petition — Decree of divorce granted.

 (TELANGANA HIGH COURT)

K. LAKSHMAN AND B.R. MADHUSUDHAN RAO, JJ.

F.C.A. No. 241 of 2011, D/- 31-10-2025.

HEADNOTES

(A) Hindu Marriage Act (25 of 1955), S. 13(1)(ia) — Divorce — Cruelty — Mental and Physical Cruelty — Throwing away of Mangalasutra, abusive behavior, and false criminal litigation — Husband sought dissolution of marriage on grounds of cruelty alleging that the wife insulted him, used abusive language, threw away her 'Mangalasutra', broke household articles, falsely suspected his character, and voluntarily deserted him leaving behind an infant child — Wife filed multiple criminal proceedings under S. 498-A/363 IPC, Domestic Violence Act, and Human Rights Commission complaints, most of which were dismissed or non-prosecuted — Evidence of mediator (PW-2) confirmed holding mediations and advising the wife to wear 'Mangalasutra' after she threw it away — No specific cross-examination or denial was put to the husband regarding the incident of throwing 'Mangalasutra' — Maintenance petition filed by wife under S. 125 Cr.P.C. was previously dismissed holding she left the husband without justifiable cause — Held, unprovoked abusive conduct, public humiliation, throwing away 'Mangalasutra', abandonment of an infant child, combined with a barrage of false and unsubstantiated criminal litigation, amounts to mental cruelty — Family Court erred in dismissing the divorce petition — Decree of divorce granted.

(Paras 3.1, 3.3, 20.3, 27.1, 35, 36, 37)

(B) Hindu Marriage Act (25 of 1955), S. 13(1)(ia) — Family Courts Act (66 of 1984), S. 19 — Divorce — Mental Cruelty — Prolonged separation and irreparable breakdown of marriage — Consideration as an auxiliary factor — Parties resided together for barely 2 years and 3 months and had been living separately for over 16 years (since 2008) — Wife filed a series of criminal proceedings but never sought restitution of conjugal rights under S. 9 of the Act, despite claiming willingness to join the husband — Held, although High Court/Family Court cannot dissolve a marriage solely on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, long continuous separation coupled with total absence of cohabitation, mutual acrimony, and failure to seek restitution can be considered as an auxiliary factor alongside proved acts of mental cruelty to hold that the marriage has broken down beyond repair — Order of Family Court set aside.

(Paras 14.1, 17, 31, 33, 38, 39, 40, 41)

Cases Referred:

1. Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511 (Relied on) — Paras 3.4, 14.2

2. Rakesh Raman v. Kavita, AIR 2023 SC 2144 (Relied on) — Paras 3.4, 15

3. C. Sivakumar v. A. Srividhya, MANU/TN/5183/2022 (Referenced) — Para 3.4

4. Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli, (2006) 4 SCC 558 (Relied on) — Paras 3.4, 16

5. Prabin Gopal v. Meghna, MANU/KE/1505/2021 (Relied on) — Paras 3.4, 17

6. Durga Prasanna Tripathy v. Arundhati Tripathy, (2005) 7 SCC 353 (Relied on) — Para 18

Hindu Marriage Act (25 of 1955), S. 9, S. 13(1)(i-a) — Rejection of Plaint — Res Judicata — Ex-parte decree for Restitution of Conjugal Rights — Subsequent petition for Divorce on ground of cruelty — Maintainability — Husband obtained an ex-parte decree for restitution of conjugal rights — Wife subsequently filed a petition seeking dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty — Husband filed an application under O. 7 R. 11(d) read with S. 11 CPC seeking rejection of the wife’s petition as barred by res judicata — Held, the reliefs sought, the issues framed, and the matters to be adjudicated in a petition for restitution of conjugal rights under S. 9 and a petition for divorce under S. 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act are distinct and divergent — An ex-parte decree for restitution of conjugal rights does not operate as res judicata to bar a subsequent petition for divorce on the ground of cruelty — Application under O. 7 R. 11(d) rightly dismissed by Family Court.

 

2025 NC: 2025:KHC:26167

(HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU)

LALITHA KANNEGANTI, J.

Writ Petition No. 1456 of 2025 (GM-FC), D/- 15-7-2025.

HEADNOTES

(A) Code of Civil Procedure (5 of 1908), Order 7, Rule 11(d), S. 11 — Hindu Marriage Act (25 of 1955), S. 9, S. 13(1)(i-a) — Rejection of Plaint — Res Judicata — Ex-parte decree for Restitution of Conjugal Rights — Subsequent petition for Divorce on ground of cruelty — Maintainability — Husband obtained an ex-parte decree for restitution of conjugal rights — Wife subsequently filed a petition seeking dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty — Husband filed an application under O. 7 R. 11(d) read with S. 11 CPC seeking rejection of the wife’s petition as barred by res judicata — Held, the reliefs sought, the issues framed, and the matters to be adjudicated in a petition for restitution of conjugal rights under S. 9 and a petition for divorce under S. 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act are distinct and divergent — An ex-parte decree for restitution of conjugal rights does not operate as res judicata to bar a subsequent petition for divorce on the ground of cruelty — Application under O. 7 R. 11(d) rightly dismissed by Family Court.

(Paras 3, 10)

(B) Code of Civil Procedure (5 of 1908), S. 11 — Res Judicata — Cause of Action — Restitution of Conjugal Rights vs. Divorce on Ground of Cruelty — Distinction — Husband contended that the cause of action for both proceedings arose on the date of marriage and the date the wife left the matrimonial home, thus hitting the subsequent divorce suit by res judicata — Held, the contention is unsustainable — While a petition for restitution of conjugal rights centers on withdrawal from society without reasonable excuse, a petition for divorce on the ground of cruelty involves multiple, distinct factual instances constituting cruelty — The cause of action and issues directly and substantially in dispute in both proceedings have no nexus — Principles of res judicata are inapplicable.

(Para 10)

Cases Referred:

1. State of Maharashtra and Anr. v. M/s National Construction Company, Bombay and Anr., AIR 1996 SC 2367 (Referenced) — Para 4

2. Guda Vijayalakshmi v. Guda Ramachandra Sekhara Sastry, (1981) 2 SCC 646 (Referenced) — Para 5

3. C. Sarala v. K. Nalinakshan, AIR 1991 Ker 362 (Referenced) — Para 5

4. Balveer Singh v. Harjeet Kaur, AIR 2017 Uttarakhand 175 (Relied on) — Paras 7, 10