Uttar Pradesh Industrial Training Institutes (Instructors) Service Rules, 2014 – Recruitment – Candidate participating in selection process – Whether estopped from challenging selection process after participation? – Held, Ordinarily Yes; however, not where the selection process itself is arbitrary or contrary to the statutory rules. The appellants, possessing Craft Instructor Training Scheme (CITS) certificates, applied pursuant to recruitment advertisements issued in 2014 and 2015 for appointment as Instructors in Industrial Training Institutes. They participated in the selection process without challenging the recruitment rules or the advertisements. Their candidature was rejected as they failed to secure the qualifying/cut-off marks fixed by the Selection Committee. The appellants challenged the selection contending that the Selection Committee had illegally prescribed qualifying/cut-off marks though the 2014 Rules did not authorise fixation of such cut-off marks, resulting in a large number of vacancies remaining unfilled. Whether candidates, having participated in the selection process without protest, are precluded from challenging the selection? – Held, Ordinarily Yes; however, not where the selection process is vitiated by arbitrariness or illegality. The Supreme Court held that although a candidate who knowingly participates in a selection process ordinarily cannot subsequently challenge it, such principle does not apply where the selection process itself suffers from arbitrariness or violates the statutory recruitment rules. The 2014 Rules permitted shortlisting only where applications were received in large numbers by restricting interview candidates to four times the vacancies. They did not authorise fixation of qualifying or cut-off marks for excluding otherwise eligible candidates. Since the Selection Committee introduced an unauthorised cut-off, excluded eligible candidates despite vacancies remaining unfilled, and thereby altered the prescribed procedure, the entire process stood vitiated by arbitrariness. The appellants were therefore entitled to appropriate relief notwithstanding their participation in the recruitment process. Ratio Decidendi A candidate who participates in a recruitment process without objection is ordinarily estopped from challenging the selection process after being unsuccessful. However, such estoppel does not apply where the selection authority acts arbitrarily or contrary to the statutory recruitment rules. Any procedure introduced by the Selection Committee beyond the recruitment rules, resulting in exclusion of otherwise eligible candidates, is illegal and liable to be set aside notwithstanding the candidates' participation in the selection process. 2026 INSC 741

Uttar Pradesh Industrial Training Institutes (Instructors) Service Rules, 2014 – Recruitment – Candidate participating in selection process – Whether estopped from challenging selection process after participation? – Held, Ordinarily Yes; however, not where the selection process itself is arbitrary or contrary to the statutory rules.

The appellants, possessing Craft Instructor Training Scheme (CITS) certificates, applied pursuant to recruitment advertisements issued in 2014 and 2015 for appointment as Instructors in Industrial Training Institutes. They participated in the selection process without challenging the recruitment rules or the advertisements. Their candidature was rejected as they failed to secure the qualifying/cut-off marks fixed by the Selection Committee. The appellants challenged the selection contending that the Selection Committee had illegally prescribed qualifying/cut-off marks though the 2014 Rules did not authorise fixation of such cut-off marks, resulting in a large number of vacancies remaining unfilled. Whether candidates, having participated in the selection process without protest, are precluded from challenging the selection? – Held, Ordinarily Yes; however, not where the selection process is vitiated by arbitrariness or illegality.

The Supreme Court held that although a candidate who knowingly participates in a selection process ordinarily cannot subsequently challenge it, such principle does not apply where the selection process itself suffers from arbitrariness or violates the statutory recruitment rules. The 2014 Rules permitted shortlisting only where applications were received in large numbers by restricting interview candidates to four times the vacancies. They did not authorise fixation of qualifying or cut-off marks for excluding otherwise eligible candidates. Since the Selection Committee introduced an unauthorised cut-off, excluded eligible candidates despite vacancies remaining unfilled, and thereby altered the prescribed procedure, the entire process stood vitiated by arbitrariness. The appellants were therefore entitled to appropriate relief notwithstanding their participation in the recruitment process.

Ratio Decidendi

A candidate who participates in a recruitment process without objection is ordinarily estopped from challenging the selection process after being unsuccessful. However, such estoppel does not apply where the selection authority acts arbitrarily or contrary to the statutory recruitment rules. Any procedure introduced by the Selection Committee beyond the recruitment rules, resulting in exclusion of otherwise eligible candidates, is illegal and liable to be set aside notwithstanding the candidates' participation in the selection process. 2026 INSC 741

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: 2026 INSC 737 Maharashtra Housing and Area Develo...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: 2026 INSC 737 Maharashtra Housing and Area Develo...: advocatemmmohan 2026 INSC 737 Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 – Redevelopment of Cessed Buildings – Permanent Alternate ...

2026 INSC 737

Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 – Redevelopment of Cessed Buildings – Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreement (PAAA) – Certified Occupant – Whether a developer, after obtaining possession of the occupant's premises for redevelopment under the statutory scheme, can deny the occupant's status and refuse to honour the Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreement? – Held, No.

The appellants were recognised as certified occupants of a cessed building in the records of MHADA and the developer. Pursuant to redevelopment under the MHADA Act and the Development Control Regulations, the developer obtained their consent, accepted vacant possession of the old premises, and executed a Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreement (PAAA) promising permanent alternate accommodation in the redeveloped building. After completion of the project, the developer refused to execute the PAAA and deliver possession, alleging that the agreement was invalid, that the first appellant was not an occupant, and that reduction in permissible FSI prevented allotment of the agreed area. The High Court treated the PAAA as a private contractual arrangement and relegated the parties to a civil suit. Whether the developer can, after obtaining possession under a statutory redevelopment scheme, resile from the PAAA by disputing the occupant's status or relying upon subsequent reduction in FSI? – Held, No.

The Supreme Court held that the PAAA was executed as an integral part of the statutory redevelopment scheme governed by the MHADA Act and the Development Control Regulations and was not a mere private contract. The developer itself had consistently recognised the first appellant as an occupant in contemporaneous records, obtained consent and possession on that basis, and completed redevelopment under MHADA's supervision. Having enjoyed the benefits of redevelopment, the developer was estopped from disputing the appellant's status or avoiding its obligation under the PAAA. Internal disputes between partners, subsequent management decisions, or reduction in fungible FSI could not defeat the statutory and contractual rights of certified occupants. The orders passed by MHADA directing execution of the PAAA and delivery of possession were upheld, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the developer was directed to execute the PAAA and hand over possession of the three flats. The civil suit instituted by the developer challenging the PAAA was held to be misconceived and mala fide.

Ratio Decidendi

A developer undertaking redevelopment under the MHADA Act who obtains possession of an occupant's premises on the basis of a Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreement executed pursuant to the statutory redevelopment scheme cannot subsequently dispute the occupant's status or resile from its obligation to provide the agreed permanent alternate accommodation. The PAAA forms part of the statutory redevelopment process, and neither internal disputes of the developer nor reduction in permissible FSI can defeat the enforceable rights of certified occupants

In the absence of any statutory mechanism governing appointment of a guardian for a person lying in a vegetative/comatose state, the High Court may invoke its parens patriae jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to appoint an appropriate guardian. Such guardianship shall ordinarily be confined to specified properties or bank accounts, shall be exercised solely in the best interests of the incapacitated person, and shall remain subject to continuing judicial supervision and accountability until comprehensive legislation occupies the field.

 

advocatemmmohan

Singavaram Nagamma & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.

2026:APHC:16788 | Andhra Pradesh High Court | W.P. No.8729 of 2026 | Decided on 06.04.2026

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HEAD NOTES 

A. Constitution of India—Article 226—Parens Patriae Jurisdiction—Comatose Person.

Where no statutory mechanism exists for appointment of a guardian to a person lying in a vegetative/comatose state, the High Court can invoke its parens patriae jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to protect the interests of such person.

Held: Extraordinary jurisdiction is maintainable in the absence of an effective statutory remedy.

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B. Guardian—Person in Vegetative/Comatose State—Appointment.

The spouse or other close legal heir may be appointed as guardian for the limited purpose of operating bank accounts and managing specified properties of a person in a vegetative/comatose state, subject to judicial supervision.

Held: Wife appointed guardian to operate the bank account of her comatose husband.

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C. Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016—Mental Healthcare Act, 2017—Legislative Vacuum.

Neither the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 nor the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 provides a procedure for appointment of a guardian to a person in a vegetative/comatose state.

Held: Constitutional jurisdiction fills the legislative vacuum until suitable legislation is enacted.

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D. Parens Patriae—Guidelines.

Pending legislative intervention, the Court may prescribe procedural safeguards governing appointment, powers, duties, supervision and accountability of guardians appointed for persons in a vegetative/comatose state.

Held: Kerala High Court guidelines substantially adopted with suitable modifications.

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E. Guardianship—Best Interest Principle.

The guardian must act exclusively in the best interests of the person lying in a vegetative/comatose state, and management of property must remain subject to continuous judicial oversight.

Held: Periodical statements and supervision by the High Court directed.

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS

The petitioners were the wife and children of Sri Singavaram Subhan Singh, who suffered a severe cerebrovascular accident, underwent neurosurgery, and thereafter remained in a permanent vegetative/comatose state.

Medical evidence established that he required continuous medical treatment and was incapable of managing his affairs. Though substantial funds remained in his Axis Bank account, the family could not operate the account without legal authority.

Since no statute provided any mechanism for appointment of a guardian in such circumstances, the petitioners invoked the parens patriae jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 seeking appointment of the wife as guardian for the limited purpose of operating the bank account and meeting medical expenses.

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ANALYSIS OF LAW

(i) Maintainability under Article 226

The Court held that the writ petition was maintainable because there exists no statutory procedure governing appointment of a guardian for a person lying in a vegetative/comatose state.

Following the Delhi High Court decision in Professor Alka Acharya, the Court held that the High Court retains constitutional power to exercise parens patriae jurisdiction in appropriate cases.

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(ii) Legislative Vacuum

The Court observed that neither the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, nor any other legislation provides an effective procedure for appointment of a guardian for a person in a vegetative state.

Until Parliament or the Legislature enacts an appropriate law, constitutional courts must protect such vulnerable persons by exercising equitable jurisdiction.

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(iii) Adoption of Judicial Guidelines

The Court extensively relied upon:

• Professor Alka Acharya v. Government of NCT of Delhi

• Shobha Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala

• Rajni Hariom Sharma v. Union of India

• S. Sasikala v. State of Tamil Nadu

• Epari Sushma v. State of Odisha

and substantially adopted the procedural safeguards evolved by the Kerala High Court regarding:

• medical examination by competent Medical Board,

• appointment of close relatives,

• limitation of guardianship to specified assets,

• periodical reporting,

• judicial supervision,

• removal of guardian in case of misuse,

• requirement of Court permission for transfer outside jurisdiction.

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(iv) Wife as Natural Guardian under Parens Patriae

The Court observed that where the husband has completely lost the ability to make decisions owing to a vegetative state, there can ordinarily be no person more naturally, morally or legally suited than the wife to protect his interests.

Referring to the Indian philosophical concept of "Ardhangini", the Court held that the wife is the most appropriate person to act as guardian in such circumstances, subject to judicial control.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

In the absence of any statutory mechanism governing appointment of a guardian for a person lying in a vegetative/comatose state, the High Court may invoke its parens patriae jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to appoint an appropriate guardian. Such guardianship shall ordinarily be confined to specified properties or bank accounts, shall be exercised solely in the best interests of the incapacitated person, and shall remain subject to continuing judicial supervision and accountability until comprehensive legislation occupies the field.

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FINAL HOLDING

• Writ Petition allowed.

• Petitioner No.1 (wife) declared guardian of her husband.

• Authority granted to operate Axis Bank Account No. 913010036494989 solely for the benefit of the comatose patient.

• Guardian directed to produce updated bank statements before the Registrar Judicial every three months for one year or until any major medical event, whichever occurs earlier.

• Registry directed to forward a copy of the judgment to the Secretary, Department of Justice, Government of Andhra Pradesh for appropriate consideration regarding legislative measures.

• No order as to costs.

The expression "legal representative" under the Motor Vehicles Act receives a liberal and expansive interpretation consistent with the object of providing just compensation. A father-in-law who establishes that he was dependent upon his deceased daughter-in-law and who answers the description of a legal representative is entitled to maintain a claim for compensation. Even otherwise, a non-dependent legal representative is competent to institute proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act, dependency being relevant only for determination of compensation and not for maintainability of the claim.

 

advocatemmmohan

S. Khader Basha v. APSRTC

2026:APHC:14860 | Andhra Pradesh High Court | M.A.C.M.A. No.2084 of 2012 | Decided on 10.04.2026

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HEAD NOTES (AIR STYLE)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Section 163-A—Compensation—Father-in-law of deceased daughter-in-law.

A father-in-law is entitled to maintain a claim for compensation on account of the death of his daughter-in-law if the evidence establishes that he was dependent upon her and is also her legal representative.

Held: Dismissal of the claim merely because the claimant had already received compensation for the death of his son was erroneous.

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B. Motor Vehicles Act—Legal Representative—Meaning.

The expression "legal representative" occurring in the Motor Vehicles Act has a wider meaning than under the Fatal Accidents Act and includes every legal representative who suffers loss due to the death of the victim.

Held: Even persons other than spouse, parent or children can maintain a claim if they answer the description of legal representative.

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C. Motor Vehicles Act—Dependency.

Dependency is a question of fact to be determined from evidence. Joint residence, financial support and absence of contrary evidence sufficiently establish dependency.

Held: The claimant proved dependency on the deceased daughter-in-law.

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D. Motor Vehicles Act—Non-dependent Legal Heir.

Even a non-dependent legal representative is competent to maintain a claim under the Motor Vehicles Act. Dependency affects the quantum of compensation and not the maintainability of the claim.

Held: Right to claim compensation is not confined only to dependants.

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E. Motor Accident Claims—Dismissal—Impropriety.

Where evidence regarding dependency remains unrebutted and the Tribunal itself assesses compensation, dismissal of the claim on technical grounds is unsustainable.

Held: Tribunal's order set aside and compensation awarded.

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS

The appellant's son and daughter-in-law died in the same motor vehicle accident involving an APSRTC bus. Separate claim petitions were filed in respect of both deaths.

The Tribunal awarded compensation for the death of the son but dismissed the claim relating to the death of the daughter-in-law on the ground that the father-in-law was neither her dependent nor entitled to compensation.

The claimant challenged the dismissal, contending that both the deceased and the claimant lived together as a joint family, that the daughter-in-law contributed to the family income through tailoring and milk business, and that after the death of both his son and daughter-in-law he had no one to support him.

The High Court examined the oral evidence and found that the claimant's dependency was never seriously disputed in cross-examination.

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ANALYSIS OF LAW

(i) Meaning of "Legal Representative"

Relying upon Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, the Court reiterated that the expression "legal representative" under the Motor Vehicles Act is of wider import and cannot be restricted to the categories mentioned in the Fatal Accidents Act.

The object of the legislation is to provide just compensation to every legal representative suffering loss because of the death of the victim.

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(ii) Dependency is a Question of Evidence

The Court found that the claimant and the deceased daughter-in-law were living together in a joint family.

Evidence established that she earned income by tailoring and milk supply and contributed to the family.

The respondent failed to challenge the claimant's evidence regarding dependency by effective cross-examination.

Accordingly, dependency stood proved.

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(iii) Non-dependent Legal Representatives

Following Montford Brothers of St. Gabriel v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and the Full Bench decision in Dr. Gangaraju Sowmini v. Alavala Sudhakar Reddy, the Court held that even a non-dependent legal representative is entitled to maintain a claim.

Dependency is relevant only while assessing compensation and does not affect the right to institute the proceedings.

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(iv) Entitlement to Compensation

The Tribunal had already assessed the compensation payable at ₹3,65,000.

Once maintainability and dependency were established, there was no legal justification for dismissing the petition.

The claimant was therefore held entitled to the assessed compensation together with interest.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

The expression "legal representative" under the Motor Vehicles Act receives a liberal and expansive interpretation consistent with the object of providing just compensation. A father-in-law who establishes that he was dependent upon his deceased daughter-in-law and who answers the description of a legal representative is entitled to maintain a claim for compensation. Even otherwise, a non-dependent legal representative is competent to institute proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act, dependency being relevant only for determination of compensation and not for maintainability of the claim.

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FINAL HOLDING

• Appeal allowed.

• Judgment of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal dismissing M.V.O.P. No.327 of 2009 set aside.

• Claim petition allowed.

• Claimant held entitled to compensation of ₹3,65,000/-.

• Interest awarded at 6% per annum from the date of the petition till realization.

• APSRTC directed to deposit the compensation within two months.

• No order as to costs.

A Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal may review its award where an error apparent on the face of the record has resulted in incorrect determination of compensation. Benefits such as family pension and compassionate appointment are not deductible as pecuniary advantages while assessing compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. The appellate Court, in discharge of its statutory obligation to award just compensation, may enhance the compensation even in an appeal filed solely by the insurer where the evidence on record demonstrates entitlement to a higher amount.

 

advocatemmmohan

The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Guddu Gurramma & Ors.

2026:APHC:14858 (A.P.)

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HEAD NOTES 

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Motor Accident Claims Tribunal—Power of Review—Section 114 & Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC.

A Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal possesses the power to review its award where the ingredients of Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC are satisfied, particularly where there exists an error apparent on the face of the record resulting in manifest injustice.

Held: Correction of the deceased's age from 56 years to 53 years and application of the correct multiplier constituted an error apparent on the face of the record, justifying review.

(Paras 14–18)

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B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Compensation—Pension and Compassionate Appointment.

Family pension received by the widow and compassionate appointment granted or likely to be granted to a dependent are not "pecuniary advantages" liable to be deducted while determining compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.

Held: Such statutory or service benefits are independent of compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act and cannot diminish the claimants' entitlement.

(Paras 20–24)

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C. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Just Compensation—Conventional Heads.

While computing compensation, the Tribunal and the appellate Court are bound to award compensation under the conventional heads in accordance with the principles laid down in Pranay Sethi and Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd., including consortium, loss of estate and funeral expenses.

(Paras 25–28)

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D. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Appeal by Insurance Company—Enhancement of Compensation.

In an appeal preferred by the insurer, the appellate Court is not precluded from enhancing compensation, even in the absence of an appeal or cross-objections by the claimants, if the evidence on record establishes entitlement to higher just compensation.

Held: Duty to award just compensation overrides procedural limitations.

(Paras 29 & 30)

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E. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Beneficial legislation.

The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial and welfare-oriented legislation. Courts must adopt a liberal approach to ensure payment of just and reasonable compensation and should not permit technical objections to defeat substantive justice.

(Paras 25–30)

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS

The claimants sought compensation for the death of Gurappa, a Railway Watchman, who died in a motor accident caused by the rash and negligent driving of a car insured with the appellant Insurance Company. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal initially awarded compensation by adopting an incorrect multiplier owing to an erroneous recording of the deceased's age. Upon review, the Tribunal corrected the age from 56 years to 53 years and enhanced the compensation. Challenging both the review jurisdiction and the quantum of compensation, the Insurance Company preferred the present appeal.

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ANALYSIS OF LAW

(i) Review Jurisdiction of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal

The High Court held that a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has jurisdiction to review its own award where there is an error apparent on the face of the record within the meaning of Section 114 and Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC.

The incorrect adoption of the deceased's age and multiplier constituted a patent error resulting in substantial injustice. The Tribunal rightly exercised review jurisdiction to rectify the mistake.

(Paras 14–18)

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(ii) Pension and Compassionate Appointment

Rejecting the Insurance Company's contention, the Court reiterated that:

• family pension;

• compassionate appointment;

• provident fund;

• insurance benefits; and

• other service benefits

are independent statutory entitlements and cannot be treated as "pecuniary advantages" for deduction from compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.

(Paras 20–24)

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(iii) Computation of Compensation

Applying the principles laid down in Sarla Verma, Pranay Sethi, and Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd., the Court reassessed compensation by:

• adopting multiplier 11;

• adding 15% future prospects;

• awarding spousal consortium to the widow;

• awarding parental consortium to each child;

• awarding compensation towards loss of estate and funeral expenses.

The Court found that the Tribunal had omitted proper compensation under several conventional heads.

(Paras 25–28)

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(iv) Power to Enhance Compensation

The Court reiterated that the statutory obligation under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to award just compensation. Consequently, even where only the Insurance Company has filed an appeal, the appellate Court is empowered to enhance the compensation if the evidence so warrants, notwithstanding the absence of an appeal or cross-objections by the claimants.

(Paras 29 & 30)

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RATIO DECIDENDI

A Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal may review its award where an error apparent on the face of the record has resulted in incorrect determination of compensation. Benefits such as family pension and compassionate appointment are not deductible as pecuniary advantages while assessing compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. The appellate Court, in discharge of its statutory obligation to award just compensation, may enhance the compensation even in an appeal filed solely by the insurer where the evidence on record demonstrates entitlement to a higher amount.

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FINAL HOLDING

• Appeal filed by the Insurance Company dismissed.

• Tribunal's exercise of review jurisdiction upheld.

• Compensation enhanced from Rs.20,38,715/- to Rs.24,18,311/-.

• Enhanced compensation awarded with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the petition until realization.

• Insurance Company held liable to satisfy the award under the policy.

• Enhanced compensation directed to be apportioned to the widow's share.

• No order as to costs.

(Paras 28–30)