Section 340 CrPC is not attracted merely because a pleading contains an incorrect or wrong statement. Before directing prosecution for offences under Sections 193, 199 or 200 IPC, the Court must record a prima facie finding that the statement is deliberately false, made with the intention to mislead the Court, and must further be satisfied that prosecution is expedient in the interests of justice. Mere inadvertent, typographical or innocent mistakes do not constitute perjury, nor do they justify prosecution under Section 340 CrPC. 2026 INSC 724

  

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 340 & 341 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 193, 199 & 200 – Perjury – Wrong statement in pleadings – Whether every incorrect or wrong statement in pleadings justifies prosecution under Section 340 CrPC? – Held, No.

The respondents initiated proceedings under Section 340 CrPC alleging that the appellant and his advocate had made incorrect statements in a memorandum of appeal and stay application filed in civil proceedings. The appellate court found that "wrong statements" had been made and directed filing of a criminal complaint for offences under Sections 193, 199 and 200 IPC. The High Court affirmed the order and further observed that false affidavits had been filed. Whether the mere existence of wrong or incorrect statements in pleadings is sufficient to invoke Section 340 CrPC and direct prosecution for perjury? – Held, No.

The Supreme Court held that proceedings under Section 340 CrPC can be initiated only where the Court forms a prima facie opinion that a person has deliberately made a false statement or given false evidence attracting the offences specified in Section 195(1)(b) CrPC, and further records its satisfaction that prosecution is expedient in the interests of justice. There is a material distinction between a "wrong statement" and a "false statement". An incorrect or erroneous statement resulting from inadvertence, typographical error or mistake does not by itself constitute a false statement punishable under Sections 193, 199 or 200 IPC. The Court must also independently consider whether the alleged falsehood has a serious impact on the administration of justice. Since the trial court had merely recorded that "wrong statements" were made, had failed to record satisfaction regarding expediency in the interests of justice, and the mistakes had already been sought to be corrected by an application explaining them as typographical errors, the initiation of prosecution was legally unsustainable. The High Court further erred in improving the reasons of the trial court by recording findings of "false statements" which had never been recorded by the original court. The proceedings under Section 340 CrPC were therefore quashed.

Ratio Decidendi

Section 340 CrPC is not attracted merely because a pleading contains an incorrect or wrong statement. Before directing prosecution for offences under Sections 193, 199 or 200 IPC, the Court must record a prima facie finding that the statement is deliberately false, made with the intention to mislead the Court, and must further be satisfied that prosecution is expedient in the interests of justice. Mere inadvertent, typographical or innocent mistakes do not constitute perjury, nor do they justify prosecution under Section 340 CrPC.  2026 INSC 724 

A contractual clause stipulating refund of earnest money upon non-execution of a sale deed does not, by itself, bar a decree for specific performance under Section 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, unless the agreement clearly confers upon the defaulting party an option to substitute payment in lieu of performance. Further, in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, the High Court cannot reappreciate evidence or disturb concurrent findings of fact in the absence of perversity or a substantial question of law. 2026 INSC 700

 

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 23 – Agreement to Sell – Earnest Money Clause – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100 – Second Appeal – Whether a clause providing for refund of earnest money in the event of non-execution of the sale deed bars a decree for specific performance? – Held, No.

The appellant entered into an Agreement to Sell immovable property, paid substantial earnest money, and the parties twice extended the date for execution of the sale deed. The Trial Court found that the agreement was genuine and that the purchaser was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, but refused specific performance on the ground that the agreement merely provided for refund of the earnest money if the sale deed was not executed. The First Appellate Court reversed the decree and granted specific performance. In second appeal, the High Court, while affirming the concurrent findings regarding execution of the agreement and the purchaser's readiness and willingness, restored the Trial Court's decree by holding that the agreement did not contemplate specific performance and by drawing adverse inferences from collateral circumstances. Whether an earnest money clause providing for refund of the advance excludes the remedy of specific performance, and whether the High Court could reappreciate concurrent findings of fact in second appeal? – Held, No.

The Supreme Court held that Section 23 of the Specific Relief Act expressly permits specific performance notwithstanding a contractual stipulation for payment or refund of money upon breach, unless the contract clearly confers an option on the defaulting party to substitute payment in place of performance. A clause requiring refund of earnest money merely secures performance and does not confer an option to avoid the contract. The agreement contained no language enabling the vendor to discharge his obligation by refunding the advance. The High Court further exceeded the limited jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC by reappreciating evidence and disturbing concurrent findings of fact without recording any finding of perversity. Once execution of the agreement, payment of consideration, and the purchaser's readiness and willingness stood concurrently established, the High Court could not revisit those findings by relying upon collateral circumstances or fresh factual inferences. The decree for specific performance granted by the First Appellate Court was accordingly restored.

Ratio Decidendi

A contractual clause stipulating refund of earnest money upon non-execution of a sale deed does not, by itself, bar a decree for specific performance under Section 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, unless the agreement clearly confers upon the defaulting party an option to substitute payment in lieu of performance. Further, in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, the High Court cannot reappreciate evidence or disturb concurrent findings of fact in the absence of perversity or a substantial question of law.

Under Section 19 of the POCSO Act, the statutory duty to report arises immediately upon a person, including the head or persons in charge of an educational institution, acquiring knowledge of the commission of a POCSO offence through the child's disclosure or other credible information. The institution has no authority to conduct an internal fact-finding inquiry, assess the truthfulness of the allegation, or delay reporting until it reaches its own satisfaction. Failure to promptly report such information attracts liability under Section 21 of the POCSO Act, and where the prosecution materials disclose a strong suspicion of deliberate suppression of the offence, discharge at the threshold is impermissible. 2026 INSC 675

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – Sections 19 & 21 – Mandatory reporting of child sexual abuse – School authorities – Discharge – Whether a school authority, on receiving information from the child regarding sexual assault, can withhold reporting by first conducting its own internal inquiry to ascertain the truth of the allegation? – Held, No.

The victim, an eight-year-old school student, disclosed to her elder sister that she had been sexually assaulted by a senior student in the school premises. The information was conveyed to the Head Girl and thereafter to the school authorities. Instead of reporting the incident to the police as mandated under Section 19 of the POCSO Act, the school authorities allegedly examined the child, questioned the juvenile offender, constituted an internal committee to observe the conduct of the victim and the offender, and instructed students not to disclose the incident. The Trial Court discharged the school authorities of offences under Sections 176, 201 and 120-B IPC read with Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act, and the High Court affirmed the discharge holding that the authorities lacked "knowledge" of the offence. Whether school authorities, after receiving information from the child regarding sexual assault, can avoid their statutory duty to report by conducting an internal inquiry or by concluding that the allegation was not established? – Held, No.

The Supreme Court held that the expression "knowledge" occurring in Section 19 of the POCSO Act must receive a purposive interpretation consistent with the object of protecting children from sexual abuse. The statutory obligation to report arises once a person receives credible information from the child or otherwise becomes aware of the commission of a POCSO offence. The Act does not authorise school authorities or institutional heads to undertake their own inquiry, assess the truthfulness of the complaint, or postpone reporting until they are personally satisfied that an offence has occurred. Such an approach defeats the legislative mandate of prompt reporting and timely intervention for the protection of the child. At the stage of framing of charge, the Court is only required to determine whether the materials collected during investigation raise a strong suspicion regarding commission of the offence and not whether the prosecution case is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Since the police report and statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 CrPC disclosed prima facie material suggesting deliberate suppression of the complaint and failure to report the offence despite knowledge thereof, the discharge of the school authorities was unsustainable. The orders of the Trial Court and the High Court were accordingly set aside and the matter was remitted for trial.

Ratio Decidendi

Under Section 19 of the POCSO Act, the statutory duty to report arises immediately upon a person, including the head or persons in charge of an educational institution, acquiring knowledge of the commission of a POCSO offence through the child's disclosure or other credible information. The institution has no authority to conduct an internal fact-finding inquiry, assess the truthfulness of the allegation, or delay reporting until it reaches its own satisfaction. Failure to promptly report such information attracts liability under Section 21 of the POCSO Act, and where the prosecution materials disclose a strong suspicion of deliberate suppression of the offence, discharge at the threshold is impermissible.  2026 INSC 675

For a mining lease, where the value of the subject matter is indeterminate at the time of execution, stamp duty is chargeable on the basis of the estimated or anticipated royalty under the proviso to Section 26 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, and not merely on the basis of dead rent. Dead rent constitutes only the minimum guaranteed payment under the lease, whereas anticipated royalty reflects the estimated economic value of the mining rights and is the statutory yardstick for determining stamp duty. 2026 INSC 738.

 

Indian Stamp Act, 1899 – Section 26 – Mining Lease – Stamp Duty – Whether stamp duty on a mining lease is to be computed on the basis of dead rent or anticipated royalty? – Held, Anticipated royalty.

The appellant was granted a mining lease for extraction of limestone by the State of Madhya Pradesh. At the time of execution of the lease, the Collector demanded stamp duty computed on the basis of the anticipated royalty payable under the lease instead of the dead rent. The appellant challenged the demand contending that stamp duty could be levied only on the basis of dead rent, which alone was ascertainable at the time of execution of the lease, and that the executive circular prescribing anticipated royalty was without statutory authority. Whether stamp duty payable on a mining lease is to be calculated on the basis of dead rent or anticipated royalty? – Held, Anticipated royalty.

The Supreme Court held that Section 26 of the Indian Stamp Act specifically deals with instruments where the value of the subject matter is indeterminate at the time of execution. In the case of a mining lease, the proviso to Section 26 expressly provides that stamp duty shall be computed on the basis of the estimated or anticipated royalty, to be assessed by the Collector where the Government is the lessor. "Dead rent" is merely the minimum guaranteed payment based on the leased area, whereas "royalty" represents the actual economic value of the lease, being directly linked to the quantity of minerals likely to be extracted. The statutory Form-K prescribed under the Mineral Concession Rules also expressly stipulates that anticipated royalty shall be the basis for computation of stamp duty. The executive circular was consistent with the statutory scheme and valid. Accordingly, the demand of stamp duty based on anticipated royalty was upheld and the appeal was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

For a mining lease, where the value of the subject matter is indeterminate at the time of execution, stamp duty is chargeable on the basis of the estimated or anticipated royalty under the proviso to Section 26 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, and not merely on the basis of dead rent. Dead rent constitutes only the minimum guaranteed payment under the lease, whereas anticipated royalty reflects the estimated economic value of the mining rights and is the statutory yardstick for determining stamp duty. 2026 INSC 738.

The power of TRAI under Sections 11 and 13 of the TRAI Act to issue directions for securing compliance with statutory regulations is regulatory in nature and does not amount to adjudication of disputes between service providers. TRAI may enforce compliance and initiate prosecution for violation of its lawful directions, but it cannot determine contractual rights or adjudicate inter se disputes, which fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of TDSAT under Section 14, while criminal liability under Sections 29 and 34 is to be determined only by the competent criminal court. 2026 INSC 742.

 

Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 – Sections 11, 13, 14, 29, 34 & 36 – Regulatory powers of TRAI – Whether issuance of directions to enforce compliance with statutory regulations amounts to adjudication of disputes between service providers? – Held, No.

Disputes arose between a Multi-System Operator (MSO) and several Local Cable Operators (LCOs) regarding disconnection of cable television signals. Acting on complaints and pursuant to the directions of the Madras High Court, TRAI issued directions under Sections 11 and 13 of the TRAI Act requiring the MSO to comply with the Interconnection Regulations. Upon receiving a report indicating non-compliance, TRAI issued a show-cause notice proposing prosecution under Sections 29 and 34 of the Act. The Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) quashed the directions and the show-cause notice holding that TRAI had assumed adjudicatory jurisdiction exclusively vested in TDSAT. Whether issuance of regulatory directions and initiation of enforcement proceedings by TRAI amount to adjudication of disputes between service providers? – Held, No.

The Supreme Court held that the functions performed by TRAI under Sections 11 and 13 are regulatory and administrative, whereas adjudication of disputes between service providers is exclusively vested in TDSAT under Section 14. A direction issued by TRAI to secure compliance with statutory regulations neither determines the contractual rights of the parties nor adjudicates their inter se disputes. Likewise, issuance of a show-cause notice proposing prosecution for violation of statutory directions is merely a step towards regulatory enforcement and does not amount to adjudication. TRAI may issue binding directions, record a prima facie opinion regarding non-compliance, and initiate prosecution under Section 34, but it cannot finally determine disputes, award damages, quantify claims, entertain counterclaims, or mould relief, all of which remain within the exclusive jurisdiction of TDSAT or the competent criminal court. The judgment of TDSAT was accordingly set aside.

Ratio Decidendi

The power of TRAI under Sections 11 and 13 of the TRAI Act to issue directions for securing compliance with statutory regulations is regulatory in nature and does not amount to adjudication of disputes between service providers. TRAI may enforce compliance and initiate prosecution for violation of its lawful directions, but it cannot determine contractual rights or adjudicate inter se disputes, which fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of TDSAT under Section 14, while criminal liability under Sections 29 and 34 is to be determined only by the competent criminal court. 2026 INSC 742.