For a mining lease, where the value of the subject matter is indeterminate at the time of execution, stamp duty is chargeable on the basis of the estimated or anticipated royalty under the proviso to Section 26 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, and not merely on the basis of dead rent. Dead rent constitutes only the minimum guaranteed payment under the lease, whereas anticipated royalty reflects the estimated economic value of the mining rights and is the statutory yardstick for determining stamp duty. 2026 INSC 738.

 

Indian Stamp Act, 1899 – Section 26 – Mining Lease – Stamp Duty – Whether stamp duty on a mining lease is to be computed on the basis of dead rent or anticipated royalty? – Held, Anticipated royalty.

The appellant was granted a mining lease for extraction of limestone by the State of Madhya Pradesh. At the time of execution of the lease, the Collector demanded stamp duty computed on the basis of the anticipated royalty payable under the lease instead of the dead rent. The appellant challenged the demand contending that stamp duty could be levied only on the basis of dead rent, which alone was ascertainable at the time of execution of the lease, and that the executive circular prescribing anticipated royalty was without statutory authority. Whether stamp duty payable on a mining lease is to be calculated on the basis of dead rent or anticipated royalty? – Held, Anticipated royalty.

The Supreme Court held that Section 26 of the Indian Stamp Act specifically deals with instruments where the value of the subject matter is indeterminate at the time of execution. In the case of a mining lease, the proviso to Section 26 expressly provides that stamp duty shall be computed on the basis of the estimated or anticipated royalty, to be assessed by the Collector where the Government is the lessor. "Dead rent" is merely the minimum guaranteed payment based on the leased area, whereas "royalty" represents the actual economic value of the lease, being directly linked to the quantity of minerals likely to be extracted. The statutory Form-K prescribed under the Mineral Concession Rules also expressly stipulates that anticipated royalty shall be the basis for computation of stamp duty. The executive circular was consistent with the statutory scheme and valid. Accordingly, the demand of stamp duty based on anticipated royalty was upheld and the appeal was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

For a mining lease, where the value of the subject matter is indeterminate at the time of execution, stamp duty is chargeable on the basis of the estimated or anticipated royalty under the proviso to Section 26 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, and not merely on the basis of dead rent. Dead rent constitutes only the minimum guaranteed payment under the lease, whereas anticipated royalty reflects the estimated economic value of the mining rights and is the statutory yardstick for determining stamp duty. 2026 INSC 738.

The power of TRAI under Sections 11 and 13 of the TRAI Act to issue directions for securing compliance with statutory regulations is regulatory in nature and does not amount to adjudication of disputes between service providers. TRAI may enforce compliance and initiate prosecution for violation of its lawful directions, but it cannot determine contractual rights or adjudicate inter se disputes, which fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of TDSAT under Section 14, while criminal liability under Sections 29 and 34 is to be determined only by the competent criminal court. 2026 INSC 742.

 

Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 – Sections 11, 13, 14, 29, 34 & 36 – Regulatory powers of TRAI – Whether issuance of directions to enforce compliance with statutory regulations amounts to adjudication of disputes between service providers? – Held, No.

Disputes arose between a Multi-System Operator (MSO) and several Local Cable Operators (LCOs) regarding disconnection of cable television signals. Acting on complaints and pursuant to the directions of the Madras High Court, TRAI issued directions under Sections 11 and 13 of the TRAI Act requiring the MSO to comply with the Interconnection Regulations. Upon receiving a report indicating non-compliance, TRAI issued a show-cause notice proposing prosecution under Sections 29 and 34 of the Act. The Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) quashed the directions and the show-cause notice holding that TRAI had assumed adjudicatory jurisdiction exclusively vested in TDSAT. Whether issuance of regulatory directions and initiation of enforcement proceedings by TRAI amount to adjudication of disputes between service providers? – Held, No.

The Supreme Court held that the functions performed by TRAI under Sections 11 and 13 are regulatory and administrative, whereas adjudication of disputes between service providers is exclusively vested in TDSAT under Section 14. A direction issued by TRAI to secure compliance with statutory regulations neither determines the contractual rights of the parties nor adjudicates their inter se disputes. Likewise, issuance of a show-cause notice proposing prosecution for violation of statutory directions is merely a step towards regulatory enforcement and does not amount to adjudication. TRAI may issue binding directions, record a prima facie opinion regarding non-compliance, and initiate prosecution under Section 34, but it cannot finally determine disputes, award damages, quantify claims, entertain counterclaims, or mould relief, all of which remain within the exclusive jurisdiction of TDSAT or the competent criminal court. The judgment of TDSAT was accordingly set aside.

Ratio Decidendi

The power of TRAI under Sections 11 and 13 of the TRAI Act to issue directions for securing compliance with statutory regulations is regulatory in nature and does not amount to adjudication of disputes between service providers. TRAI may enforce compliance and initiate prosecution for violation of its lawful directions, but it cannot determine contractual rights or adjudicate inter se disputes, which fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of TDSAT under Section 14, while criminal liability under Sections 29 and 34 is to be determined only by the competent criminal court. 2026 INSC 742.

Uttar Pradesh Industrial Training Institutes (Instructors) Service Rules, 2014 – Recruitment – Candidate participating in selection process – Whether estopped from challenging selection process after participation? – Held, Ordinarily Yes; however, not where the selection process itself is arbitrary or contrary to the statutory rules. The appellants, possessing Craft Instructor Training Scheme (CITS) certificates, applied pursuant to recruitment advertisements issued in 2014 and 2015 for appointment as Instructors in Industrial Training Institutes. They participated in the selection process without challenging the recruitment rules or the advertisements. Their candidature was rejected as they failed to secure the qualifying/cut-off marks fixed by the Selection Committee. The appellants challenged the selection contending that the Selection Committee had illegally prescribed qualifying/cut-off marks though the 2014 Rules did not authorise fixation of such cut-off marks, resulting in a large number of vacancies remaining unfilled. Whether candidates, having participated in the selection process without protest, are precluded from challenging the selection? – Held, Ordinarily Yes; however, not where the selection process is vitiated by arbitrariness or illegality. The Supreme Court held that although a candidate who knowingly participates in a selection process ordinarily cannot subsequently challenge it, such principle does not apply where the selection process itself suffers from arbitrariness or violates the statutory recruitment rules. The 2014 Rules permitted shortlisting only where applications were received in large numbers by restricting interview candidates to four times the vacancies. They did not authorise fixation of qualifying or cut-off marks for excluding otherwise eligible candidates. Since the Selection Committee introduced an unauthorised cut-off, excluded eligible candidates despite vacancies remaining unfilled, and thereby altered the prescribed procedure, the entire process stood vitiated by arbitrariness. The appellants were therefore entitled to appropriate relief notwithstanding their participation in the recruitment process. Ratio Decidendi A candidate who participates in a recruitment process without objection is ordinarily estopped from challenging the selection process after being unsuccessful. However, such estoppel does not apply where the selection authority acts arbitrarily or contrary to the statutory recruitment rules. Any procedure introduced by the Selection Committee beyond the recruitment rules, resulting in exclusion of otherwise eligible candidates, is illegal and liable to be set aside notwithstanding the candidates' participation in the selection process. 2026 INSC 741

Uttar Pradesh Industrial Training Institutes (Instructors) Service Rules, 2014 – Recruitment – Candidate participating in selection process – Whether estopped from challenging selection process after participation? – Held, Ordinarily Yes; however, not where the selection process itself is arbitrary or contrary to the statutory rules.

The appellants, possessing Craft Instructor Training Scheme (CITS) certificates, applied pursuant to recruitment advertisements issued in 2014 and 2015 for appointment as Instructors in Industrial Training Institutes. They participated in the selection process without challenging the recruitment rules or the advertisements. Their candidature was rejected as they failed to secure the qualifying/cut-off marks fixed by the Selection Committee. The appellants challenged the selection contending that the Selection Committee had illegally prescribed qualifying/cut-off marks though the 2014 Rules did not authorise fixation of such cut-off marks, resulting in a large number of vacancies remaining unfilled. Whether candidates, having participated in the selection process without protest, are precluded from challenging the selection? – Held, Ordinarily Yes; however, not where the selection process is vitiated by arbitrariness or illegality.

The Supreme Court held that although a candidate who knowingly participates in a selection process ordinarily cannot subsequently challenge it, such principle does not apply where the selection process itself suffers from arbitrariness or violates the statutory recruitment rules. The 2014 Rules permitted shortlisting only where applications were received in large numbers by restricting interview candidates to four times the vacancies. They did not authorise fixation of qualifying or cut-off marks for excluding otherwise eligible candidates. Since the Selection Committee introduced an unauthorised cut-off, excluded eligible candidates despite vacancies remaining unfilled, and thereby altered the prescribed procedure, the entire process stood vitiated by arbitrariness. The appellants were therefore entitled to appropriate relief notwithstanding their participation in the recruitment process.

Ratio Decidendi

A candidate who participates in a recruitment process without objection is ordinarily estopped from challenging the selection process after being unsuccessful. However, such estoppel does not apply where the selection authority acts arbitrarily or contrary to the statutory recruitment rules. Any procedure introduced by the Selection Committee beyond the recruitment rules, resulting in exclusion of otherwise eligible candidates, is illegal and liable to be set aside notwithstanding the candidates' participation in the selection process. 2026 INSC 741

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: 2026 INSC 737 Maharashtra Housing and Area Develo...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: 2026 INSC 737 Maharashtra Housing and Area Develo...: advocatemmmohan 2026 INSC 737 Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 – Redevelopment of Cessed Buildings – Permanent Alternate ...

2026 INSC 737

Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 – Redevelopment of Cessed Buildings – Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreement (PAAA) – Certified Occupant – Whether a developer, after obtaining possession of the occupant's premises for redevelopment under the statutory scheme, can deny the occupant's status and refuse to honour the Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreement? – Held, No.

The appellants were recognised as certified occupants of a cessed building in the records of MHADA and the developer. Pursuant to redevelopment under the MHADA Act and the Development Control Regulations, the developer obtained their consent, accepted vacant possession of the old premises, and executed a Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreement (PAAA) promising permanent alternate accommodation in the redeveloped building. After completion of the project, the developer refused to execute the PAAA and deliver possession, alleging that the agreement was invalid, that the first appellant was not an occupant, and that reduction in permissible FSI prevented allotment of the agreed area. The High Court treated the PAAA as a private contractual arrangement and relegated the parties to a civil suit. Whether the developer can, after obtaining possession under a statutory redevelopment scheme, resile from the PAAA by disputing the occupant's status or relying upon subsequent reduction in FSI? – Held, No.

The Supreme Court held that the PAAA was executed as an integral part of the statutory redevelopment scheme governed by the MHADA Act and the Development Control Regulations and was not a mere private contract. The developer itself had consistently recognised the first appellant as an occupant in contemporaneous records, obtained consent and possession on that basis, and completed redevelopment under MHADA's supervision. Having enjoyed the benefits of redevelopment, the developer was estopped from disputing the appellant's status or avoiding its obligation under the PAAA. Internal disputes between partners, subsequent management decisions, or reduction in fungible FSI could not defeat the statutory and contractual rights of certified occupants. The orders passed by MHADA directing execution of the PAAA and delivery of possession were upheld, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the developer was directed to execute the PAAA and hand over possession of the three flats. The civil suit instituted by the developer challenging the PAAA was held to be misconceived and mala fide.

Ratio Decidendi

A developer undertaking redevelopment under the MHADA Act who obtains possession of an occupant's premises on the basis of a Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreement executed pursuant to the statutory redevelopment scheme cannot subsequently dispute the occupant's status or resile from its obligation to provide the agreed permanent alternate accommodation. The PAAA forms part of the statutory redevelopment process, and neither internal disputes of the developer nor reduction in permissible FSI can defeat the enforceable rights of certified occupants

In the absence of any statutory mechanism governing appointment of a guardian for a person lying in a vegetative/comatose state, the High Court may invoke its parens patriae jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to appoint an appropriate guardian. Such guardianship shall ordinarily be confined to specified properties or bank accounts, shall be exercised solely in the best interests of the incapacitated person, and shall remain subject to continuing judicial supervision and accountability until comprehensive legislation occupies the field.

 

advocatemmmohan

Singavaram Nagamma & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.

2026:APHC:16788 | Andhra Pradesh High Court | W.P. No.8729 of 2026 | Decided on 06.04.2026

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HEAD NOTES 

A. Constitution of India—Article 226—Parens Patriae Jurisdiction—Comatose Person.

Where no statutory mechanism exists for appointment of a guardian to a person lying in a vegetative/comatose state, the High Court can invoke its parens patriae jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to protect the interests of such person.

Held: Extraordinary jurisdiction is maintainable in the absence of an effective statutory remedy.

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B. Guardian—Person in Vegetative/Comatose State—Appointment.

The spouse or other close legal heir may be appointed as guardian for the limited purpose of operating bank accounts and managing specified properties of a person in a vegetative/comatose state, subject to judicial supervision.

Held: Wife appointed guardian to operate the bank account of her comatose husband.

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C. Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016—Mental Healthcare Act, 2017—Legislative Vacuum.

Neither the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 nor the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 provides a procedure for appointment of a guardian to a person in a vegetative/comatose state.

Held: Constitutional jurisdiction fills the legislative vacuum until suitable legislation is enacted.

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D. Parens Patriae—Guidelines.

Pending legislative intervention, the Court may prescribe procedural safeguards governing appointment, powers, duties, supervision and accountability of guardians appointed for persons in a vegetative/comatose state.

Held: Kerala High Court guidelines substantially adopted with suitable modifications.

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E. Guardianship—Best Interest Principle.

The guardian must act exclusively in the best interests of the person lying in a vegetative/comatose state, and management of property must remain subject to continuous judicial oversight.

Held: Periodical statements and supervision by the High Court directed.

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS

The petitioners were the wife and children of Sri Singavaram Subhan Singh, who suffered a severe cerebrovascular accident, underwent neurosurgery, and thereafter remained in a permanent vegetative/comatose state.

Medical evidence established that he required continuous medical treatment and was incapable of managing his affairs. Though substantial funds remained in his Axis Bank account, the family could not operate the account without legal authority.

Since no statute provided any mechanism for appointment of a guardian in such circumstances, the petitioners invoked the parens patriae jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 seeking appointment of the wife as guardian for the limited purpose of operating the bank account and meeting medical expenses.

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ANALYSIS OF LAW

(i) Maintainability under Article 226

The Court held that the writ petition was maintainable because there exists no statutory procedure governing appointment of a guardian for a person lying in a vegetative/comatose state.

Following the Delhi High Court decision in Professor Alka Acharya, the Court held that the High Court retains constitutional power to exercise parens patriae jurisdiction in appropriate cases.

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(ii) Legislative Vacuum

The Court observed that neither the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, nor any other legislation provides an effective procedure for appointment of a guardian for a person in a vegetative state.

Until Parliament or the Legislature enacts an appropriate law, constitutional courts must protect such vulnerable persons by exercising equitable jurisdiction.

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(iii) Adoption of Judicial Guidelines

The Court extensively relied upon:

• Professor Alka Acharya v. Government of NCT of Delhi

• Shobha Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala

• Rajni Hariom Sharma v. Union of India

• S. Sasikala v. State of Tamil Nadu

• Epari Sushma v. State of Odisha

and substantially adopted the procedural safeguards evolved by the Kerala High Court regarding:

• medical examination by competent Medical Board,

• appointment of close relatives,

• limitation of guardianship to specified assets,

• periodical reporting,

• judicial supervision,

• removal of guardian in case of misuse,

• requirement of Court permission for transfer outside jurisdiction.

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(iv) Wife as Natural Guardian under Parens Patriae

The Court observed that where the husband has completely lost the ability to make decisions owing to a vegetative state, there can ordinarily be no person more naturally, morally or legally suited than the wife to protect his interests.

Referring to the Indian philosophical concept of "Ardhangini", the Court held that the wife is the most appropriate person to act as guardian in such circumstances, subject to judicial control.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

In the absence of any statutory mechanism governing appointment of a guardian for a person lying in a vegetative/comatose state, the High Court may invoke its parens patriae jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to appoint an appropriate guardian. Such guardianship shall ordinarily be confined to specified properties or bank accounts, shall be exercised solely in the best interests of the incapacitated person, and shall remain subject to continuing judicial supervision and accountability until comprehensive legislation occupies the field.

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FINAL HOLDING

• Writ Petition allowed.

• Petitioner No.1 (wife) declared guardian of her husband.

• Authority granted to operate Axis Bank Account No. 913010036494989 solely for the benefit of the comatose patient.

• Guardian directed to produce updated bank statements before the Registrar Judicial every three months for one year or until any major medical event, whichever occurs earlier.

• Registry directed to forward a copy of the judgment to the Secretary, Department of Justice, Government of Andhra Pradesh for appropriate consideration regarding legislative measures.

• No order as to costs.