In a commercial suit governed by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, the mandatory timeline prescribed under the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies equally to the filing of a written statement by the plaintiff in answer to a defendant's counter-claim by virtue of Order VIII Rule 6G CPC. Such written statement must ordinarily be filed within 30 days and, for sufficient cause, may be accepted only up to a maximum of 120 days, beyond which the right to file stands forfeited. Further, an order refusing leave to file such delayed written statement is not appealable under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act as it is not an order enumerated under Order XLIII CPC or Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

 

2026 INSC 684

A.K. Ghosh & Company & Ors. v. Biman Bose & Ors.

HEAD NOTES 

A. Commercial Courts Act, 2015 — Order VIII Rules 1, 6A, 6G & 10 CPC — Written statement to counter-claim — Limitation.

(Paras 27–33)

Held, in a commercial suit, the mandatory timeline prescribed by the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 CPC applies equally to a written statement filed by the plaintiff in answer to the defendant's counter-claim. Such written statement must ordinarily be filed within 30 days and, for sufficient cause, may be extended up to a maximum of 120 days, beyond which the right to file stands forfeited.

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B. Order VIII Rule 6G CPC — Interpretation.

(Paras 27–33)

Held, Rule 6G expressly extends all rules governing a defendant's written statement to a plaintiff's written statement in answer to a counter-claim. The provision applies not merely to the contents of the written statement but also to the statutory time limits governing its filing.

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C. Order VIII Rule 6A(3) CPC — Court's power to fix time — Effect.

(Paras 29–32)

Held, though Rule 6A(3) empowers the Court to fix the time for filing a written statement to a counter-claim, failure of the Court to prescribe such time does not leave the plaintiff free to file the written statement at any time. In such a situation, Rule 6G read with the proviso to Rule 1 governs the outer limitation.

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D. Commercial Courts Act, 2015 — Object — Expeditious disposal.

(Paras 26–33)

Held, the amendments introduced by the Commercial Courts Act are intended to ensure strict adherence to procedural timelines for speedy adjudication of commercial disputes. Any interpretation diluting the mandatory timeline would defeat the legislative object of expeditious disposal.

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E. Order VIII Rule 10 CPC — Consequence of default.

(Paras 20, 32–33)

Held, failure to file a written statement within the prescribed period attracts the consequences contemplated under Rule 10 CPC, including forfeiture of the right to file the written statement in commercial suits after expiry of 120 days.

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F. Commercial Courts Act — Appeal — Section 13 — Maintainability.

(Paras 34–37)

Held, an appeal under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act is maintainable only against orders specifically enumerated under Order XLIII CPC or Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. An order refusing permission to file a belated written statement under Order VIII CPC is not appealable.

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G. Appeal — Statutory right.

(Paras 35–37)

Held, the right of appeal is purely statutory. Where the Commercial Courts Act constitutes a self-contained code restricting appellate remedies, no appeal lies except in the manner expressly provided by the statute.

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Analysis of Facts

The plaintiffs instituted a commercial suit for recovery of money against the defendants.

The contesting defendants filed their written statement together with a counter-claim, copies whereof were served upon the plaintiffs. Despite receipt of the counter-claim, the plaintiffs did not file their written statement within the statutory period and sought leave to do so after a delay of 238 days.

The Commercial Division of the Calcutta High Court rejected the application, holding that the mandatory time limit under the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 CPC applied equally to a written statement filed in answer to a counter-claim.

The Commercial Appellate Division dismissed the appeal both on the ground of maintainability and on merits.

Before the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs contended that Order VIII Rule 6A(3) CPC left the matter entirely to the discretion of the Court and, since no time had been fixed by the Court, the statutory period of 120 days could not apply.

Rejecting the contention, the Supreme Court held that Rule 6G expressly incorporates all rules governing written statements, including the mandatory timeline prescribed under Rule 1. The Court further held that failure of the Court to specify the period under Rule 6A(3) does not suspend the statutory outer limit of 120 days.

The Court also affirmed that an order refusing permission to file a delayed written statement under Order VIII CPC is not appealable under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act.

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Analysis of Law

The Supreme Court laid down the following principles:

1. A counter-claim is treated as a cross-suit and the plaintiff's reply thereto is a written statement.

2. Order VIII Rule 6G applies the entire scheme governing written statements, including limitation, to replies filed against counter-claims.

3. In commercial suits, the plaintiff must ordinarily file the written statement to the counter-claim within 30 days.

4. For sufficient cause, the Court may extend the period, but not beyond 120 days from service of summons or receipt of the counter-claim.

5. Failure of the Court to prescribe a timeline under Rule 6A(3) does not eliminate the statutory limitation prescribed by Rule 1 read with Rule 6G.

6. The Commercial Courts Act mandates strict procedural discipline to ensure speedy disposal of commercial litigation.

7. Orders refusing leave to file a delayed written statement are not appealable under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, as they are not covered by Order XLIII CPC or Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

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Ratio Decidendi

In a commercial suit governed by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, the mandatory timeline prescribed under the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies equally to the filing of a written statement by the plaintiff in answer to a defendant's counter-claim by virtue of Order VIII Rule 6G CPC. Such written statement must ordinarily be filed within 30 days and, for sufficient cause, may be accepted only up to a maximum of 120 days, beyond which the right to file stands forfeited. Further, an order refusing leave to file such delayed written statement is not appealable under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act as it is not an order enumerated under Order XLIII CPC or Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

An application for probate is governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, but the right to apply does not necessarily accrue on the death of the testator. It accrues when circumstances make it necessary for the executor to obtain probate, such as upon assertion of hostile rights against the Will. Since determination of such accrual ordinarily involves mixed questions of law and fact, a probate petition cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC on the ground of limitation, nor can the Court examine the merits or suspicious circumstances of the Will at the threshold stage.

 

2026 INSC 708

Sanjay Sharma @ Sanjay Bhardwaj v. Krishnadhan Khaware & Ors.

HEAD NOTES 

A. Indian Succession Act, 1925 — Probate — Limitation — Article 137, Limitation Act, 1963 — Right to apply.

(Paras 3–6)

Held, the Indian Succession Act prescribes no specific period of limitation for filing an application for probate. Consequently, Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies. However, the right to apply for probate does not necessarily accrue on the death of the testator; it accrues when it becomes necessary for the executor to seek probate, such as when the Will is disputed or hostile claims are asserted.

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B. Probate Proceedings — Continuous right — Delay in filing.

(Paras 5–6)

Held, the executor's right to seek probate is a continuing right which survives so long as the object of the Will remains to be executed. Mere delay in seeking probate does not create an absolute bar of limitation, though unexplained delay may invite greater judicial scrutiny regarding the genuineness of the Will.

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C. Order VII Rule 11(d), Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Rejection of plaint/petition — Limitation — Mixed question of law and fact.

(Para 7)

Held, where limitation depends upon the date on which the right to apply accrued or the date of knowledge of hostile action, the issue becomes a mixed question of law and fact. Such questions cannot be decided summarily under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC without permitting parties to lead evidence.

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D. Order VII Rule 11 CPC — Scope — Merits of Will.

(Para 7)

Held, while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court cannot adjudicate upon the genuineness, validity or suspicious circumstances surrounding a Will. Such issues require full trial after appreciation of evidence and lie beyond the limited jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11.

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E. Probate — Cause of action — Hostile assertion of rights.

(Paras 5–6)

Held, where the executor remains undisputed, limitation begins only when a hostile act inconsistent with the Will necessitates obtaining probate. In the present case, execution of a General Power of Attorney contrary to the Will constituted the event giving rise to the right to apply.

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F. Rejection under Order VII Rule 11 — Impropriety.

(Paras 7–8)

Held, rejection of the probate petition at the threshold on the ground of limitation was legally unsustainable since the issue required adjudication on evidence. The Courts below exceeded their jurisdiction by entering into the merits of the Will while exercising powers under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

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Analysis of Facts

The executor under a Will dated 15 April 1995 filed an application for probate on 31 August 2005 before the District Judge, Deoghar.

The objectors sought rejection of the probate petition under Order VII Rule 11 CPC contending that the application was barred by limitation because it had been filed nearly ten years after the death of the testator.

Accepting the objection, the District Judge rejected the probate petition. The High Court affirmed the order.

Before the Supreme Court, it was contended that the necessity to seek probate arose only when the widow of the testator executed a General Power of Attorney on 8 August 2005 asserting rights inconsistent with the Will.

The Supreme Court accepted this contention. It held that probate proceedings are governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, but limitation commences only when the right to apply accrues, namely, when obtaining probate becomes necessary. Since the probate petition was filed shortly after the hostile act, it was within limitation.

The Court further held that both the Trial Court and the High Court had exceeded the limited scope of Order VII Rule 11 CPC by making observations on the suspicious nature and merits of the Will without recording evidence. The orders were therefore set aside and the matter was remanded for trial.

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Analysis of Law

The Supreme Court laid down the following principles:

1. The Indian Succession Act contains no prescribed limitation period for filing a probate petition.

2. Article 137 of the Limitation Act governs probate applications.

3. The right to apply for probate is a continuing right and does not automatically arise on the death of the testator.

4. Limitation begins when circumstances make it necessary for the executor to seek probate, particularly upon hostile assertion of rights adverse to the Will.

5. Delay in seeking probate is not an absolute legal bar, though it may require satisfactory explanation.

6. Order VII Rule 11 CPC permits rejection only where the bar is apparent on the face of the pleadings.

7. Questions relating to accrual of cause of action or limitation involving disputed facts cannot be decided summarily.

8. The validity, genuineness or suspicious circumstances surrounding a Will cannot be examined while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

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Ratio Decidendi

An application for probate is governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, but the right to apply does not necessarily accrue on the death of the testator. It accrues when circumstances make it necessary for the executor to obtain probate, such as upon assertion of hostile rights against the Will. Since determination of such accrual ordinarily involves mixed questions of law and fact, a probate petition cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC on the ground of limitation, nor can the Court examine the merits or suspicious circumstances of the Will at the threshold stage.

Prescription of minimum qualifying marks in the viva-voce for recruitment to the Higher Judicial Service is within the statutory competence of the rule-making authority and constitutes a valid criterion for assessing judicial suitability. A candidate who participates in the recruitment process with full knowledge of such rules is estopped from challenging them after being unsuccessful. Courts should not unsettle completed judicial appointments or grant retrospective relief where such interference would disturb settled seniority, prejudice serving judicial officers and undermine administrative finality.

 

2026 INSC 699

Manoj Goyal v. Rajasthan High Court & Ors.

HEAD NOTES 

A. Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010 — Rule 41 — Viva-voce qualifying marks — Validity.

(Paras 17–19, 28–31)

Held, prescription of minimum qualifying marks in the viva-voce for recruitment to the Higher Judicial Service is within the rule-making competence of the State and the High Court. Such requirement is neither arbitrary nor unconstitutional, being rationally connected with assessment of suitability for judicial office.

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B. Judicial Service Recruitment — Shetty Commission Recommendations — Legal status.

(Paras 17–18)

Held, recommendations of the Shetty Commission, though accepted by the Supreme Court, are essentially guiding principles. Once statutory recruitment rules are validly framed by the competent authority, the selection process must be governed by those statutory rules unless declared unconstitutional.

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C. Recruitment Process — Participation without protest — Doctrine of Estoppel.

(Paras 20–23, 30)

Held, a candidate who knowingly participates in a selection process under existing recruitment rules and takes a calculated chance cannot, after being unsuccessful, challenge the very rules governing the selection. The principle of approbation and reprobation squarely applies.

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D. Judicial Review — Completed Selection — Finality of Appointments.

(Paras 24–29)

Held, courts should be slow to unsettle appointments that have attained finality, particularly after long lapse of time. Granting retrospective appointments or seniority would seriously prejudice serving judicial officers, disturb settled service conditions and create administrative uncertainty.

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E. Service Law — Subsequent deletion of impugned Rule — Effect.

(Paras 15–16, 28)

Held, where the impugned statutory provision has subsequently been deleted and the recruitment process has long since concluded, the constitutional challenge may become academic, particularly when no effective relief can be granted without unsettling vested rights.

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F. Judicial Appointments — Viva-voce — Importance.

(Paras 19)

Held, for appointments to Higher Judicial Service, the interview is an indispensable component for evaluating qualities such as judicial temperament, alertness, resourcefulness, leadership, communication skills and decision-making ability, which cannot be adequately assessed through written examinations alone.

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G. Relief — Retrospective appointment — Refusal.

(Paras 24–29)

Held, retrospective appointment and consequential seniority cannot be granted where doing so would reopen a decade-old recruitment process, prejudice numerous serving judicial officers, disturb settled seniority and generate avoidable litigation.

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Analysis of Facts

The appellant participated in the recruitment process for appointment as Additional District Judge under the advocates' quota pursuant to the amended Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010.

Originally, Rule 41 did not prescribe any minimum qualifying marks in the interview. However, before the fresh recruitment process commenced, the Rule was amended in 2011 requiring every candidate to secure at least 25% marks in the viva-voce.

The appellant successfully cleared the written examination and secured higher aggregate marks than several selected candidates. However, he obtained only 7 out of 30 marks in the interview, falling short of the prescribed qualifying benchmark of 7.5 marks. Consequently, he was excluded from the select list.

He challenged the constitutional validity of the amended Rule and sought appointment based on aggregate marks. During pendency of the proceedings, the State deleted the impugned proviso in 2017. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the challenge had become academic and that the completed appointments could not be disturbed.

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the interview benchmark was a valid statutory requirement, the appellant was estopped from challenging the Rules after participating in the selection process, and no relief could be granted after more than a decade without seriously disrupting the judicial service.

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Analysis of Law

The Supreme Court laid down the following principles:

1. Recruitment to Higher Judicial Service is governed by statutory service rules framed by the competent authority.

2. Recommendations of the Shetty Commission operate as guiding principles and do not override subsequently enacted statutory rules.

3. Prescription of minimum qualifying marks in viva-voce is a valid method of assessing suitability for judicial office.

4. Candidates who participate in the selection process without objection cannot subsequently challenge the governing recruitment rules after failing in the selection.

5. Courts should preserve finality of completed recruitment processes and avoid disturbing settled appointments after considerable lapse of time.

6. Retrospective appointments affecting seniority and service structure should not ordinarily be granted where they would prejudice vested rights of existing officers.

7. Practical consequences and administrative stability are relevant considerations while exercising judicial review in service matters.

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Ratio Decidendi

Prescription of minimum qualifying marks in the viva-voce for recruitment to the Higher Judicial Service is within the statutory competence of the rule-making authority and constitutes a valid criterion for assessing judicial suitability. A candidate who participates in the recruitment process with full knowledge of such rules is estopped from challenging them after being unsuccessful. Courts should not unsettle completed judicial appointments or grant retrospective relief where such interference would disturb settled seniority, prejudice serving judicial officers and undermine administrative finality.

Section 299(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits the use of evidence recorded during the absence of an absconding accused in his subsequent trial, provided it is established that the accused had absconded, there was no immediate prospect of his arrest when such evidence was recorded, and the witness has thereafter become unavailable owing to death or any other circumstance specified in the statute. The provision does not require a prior formal judicial order recording such satisfaction, and an absconding accused cannot be permitted to benefit from his own evasion of the criminal process.

 

2026 INSC 718

State of West Bengal v. Kader Khan

HEAD NOTES 

A. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 299 — Evidence recorded in absence of absconding accused — Admissibility.

(Paras 12–22)

Held, evidence recorded during the trial of co-accused may be read against an absconding accused after his arrest if the requirements of Section 299(1) CrPC are satisfied, namely, (i) the accused had absconded and there was no immediate prospect of his arrest when the evidence was recorded, and (ii) the witness subsequently became unavailable due to death or any other circumstance specified in the Section.

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B. Section 299 CrPC — Preconditions — Formal judicial order — Necessity.

(Paras 14, 19–22)

Held, Section 299 does not mandate that the Trial Court must pass a formal order recording satisfaction regarding the accused having absconded and there being no immediate prospect of arrest before recording evidence. What is essential is that these jurisdictional facts actually existed when the witness was examined.

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C. Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 33 — Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 299 — Relationship.

(Paras 12–15)

Held, Section 299 CrPC constitutes a statutory exception to the general rule embodied in Section 33 of the Evidence Act requiring an opportunity of cross-examination. Being an exception, its conditions must be strictly proved before prior testimony can be admitted against an absconding accused.

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D. Absconding accused — Benefit of own wrong — Impermissibility.

(Paras 19–21)

Held, an accused who deliberately absconds cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own conduct by contending that evidence recorded during his absence cannot subsequently be used after material witnesses have died or become unavailable. Any contrary interpretation would encourage deliberate evasion of trial.

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E. Criminal Trial — Split-up case — Earlier deposition of deceased witness.

(Paras 15–22)

Held, where trial against absconding accused is separated from that of co-accused and the principal witness dies before the absconder is apprehended, the earlier deposition is admissible in the subsequent trial, subject to satisfaction of Section 299(1) CrPC.

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F. Statutory Interpretation — Purposive construction — Section 299 CrPC.

(Paras 19–21)

Held, Section 299 must receive an interpretation that advances its object of preserving prosecution evidence against absconding offenders. The provision cannot be construed so narrowly as to frustrate its purpose or incentivise accused persons to evade arrest until witnesses become unavailable.

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Analysis of Facts

The respondent was one of the accused in a gang rape case. While three co-accused were arrested and tried, the respondent absconded despite issuance of warrants and proclamation proceedings. Consequently, the trial against him was separated.

During the trial of the arrested accused, the prosecutrix gave extensive evidence and was cross-examined by the co-accused. Subsequently, she died before the respondent could be apprehended.

After the respondent's arrest, the prosecution sought permission under Section 299 CrPC to rely upon the deceased victim's earlier testimony. The Trial Court allowed the application. However, the High Court set aside the order holding that Section 299 required a prior judicial direction authorising recording of evidence against the absconding accused.

The Supreme Court reversed the High Court. It held that Section 299 does not require any formal judicial order before recording evidence. The only mandatory requirements are that the accused had absconded, there was no immediate prospect of his arrest when the witness was examined, and the witness later became unavailable. Since all these conditions stood established, the earlier deposition of the deceased victim was held admissible against the respondent.

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Analysis of Law

The Supreme Court laid down the following principles:

1. Section 299 CrPC is a statutory exception to the normal rule requiring examination of witnesses in the presence of the accused.

2. The prosecution must establish:

   • that the accused had absconded;

   • that there was no immediate prospect of his arrest when the evidence was recorded; and

   • that the witness subsequently became unavailable due to death or other statutory reasons.

3. Section 299 does not require the Trial Court to pass a formal order recording satisfaction before evidence is recorded.

4. The existence of the jurisdictional facts—not the form of the order—is decisive.

5. The provision must be interpreted purposively to preserve evidence against absconding offenders.

6. An accused cannot derive advantage from his own deliberate abscondence by seeking exclusion of evidence rendered unavailable because of his conduct.

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Ratio Decidendi

Section 299(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits the use of evidence recorded during the absence of an absconding accused in his subsequent trial, provided it is established that the accused had absconded, there was no immediate prospect of his arrest when such evidence was recorded, and the witness has thereafter become unavailable owing to death or any other circumstance specified in the statute. The provision does not require a prior formal judicial order recording such satisfaction, and an absconding accused cannot be permitted to benefit from his own evasion of the criminal process.

A Recovery Certificate issued by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, prior to the insertion of Section 19(22A) by the 2016 Amendment, is not a "decree or order" within the meaning of Section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 and cannot form the basis for issuance of an insolvency notice. The subsequent statutory deeming fiction created by Section 19(22A) operates prospectively and cannot be retrospectively invoked to sustain insolvency proceedings instituted under the unamended law.

 

2026 INSC 688

HDFC Bank Ltd. v. Kishore K. Mehta (Dead) through LRs

HEAD NOTES 

A. Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 — Section 9(2) — Insolvency Notice — Recovery Certificate issued by Debts Recovery Tribunal — Maintainability.

(Paras 10–20)

Held, a Recovery Certificate issued by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, prior to insertion of Section 19(22A), is not a "decree or order" within the meaning of Section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 and, therefore, cannot constitute the foundation for issuance of an insolvency notice.

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B. Insolvency Law — Strict Construction — Civil consequences.

(Paras 10–12)

Held, provisions of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 must receive strict construction since adjudication of insolvency results in grave civil consequences affecting the legal status of the debtor. Courts cannot enlarge the scope of statutory expressions by implication.

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C. Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 — Section 19(22A) — Deeming fiction — Prospective operation.

(Paras 13–19)

Held, insertion of Section 19(22A) by the Amendment Act of 2016 expressly deeming a Recovery Certificate to be a decree or order for initiation of insolvency proceedings is legislative recognition that such equivalence did not exist earlier. The amendment is prospective and cannot validate insolvency proceedings initiated prior to its enactment.

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D. Statutory Interpretation — Casus Omissus — Judicial restraint.

(Paras 14 & 19)

Held, where Parliament subsequently inserts an express deeming provision, the Court cannot retrospectively supply the omission by interpretation. Courts cannot create a casus omissus under the guise of purposive construction.

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E. Civil Procedure — Rights of parties — Date of institution of proceedings.

(Paras 15–19)

Held, rights and liabilities of parties are ordinarily determined with reference to the law prevailing on the date of institution of proceedings. Subsequent statutory amendments, unless expressly retrospective, do not alter the legal character of proceedings already commenced.

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F. Precedent — Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd. — Applicability.

(Paras 10–12 & 20–21)

Held, the principle laid down in Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd. that an arbitral award is not a "decree or order" for purposes of Section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act is founded upon broader principles governing interpretation of insolvency law and equally applies to Recovery Certificates issued by the Debts Recovery Tribunal prior to the statutory amendment of 2016.

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Analysis of Facts

The appellant-bank obtained a Recovery Certificate from the Debts Recovery Tribunal against the respondent pursuant to default in repayment of credit facilities extended to a company whose directors had executed personal guarantees.

On the strength of the Recovery Certificate, the bank caused an insolvency notice to be issued under Section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909. The respondent challenged the notice before the Bombay High Court contending that a Recovery Certificate issued by the Debts Recovery Tribunal was not a "decree or order" contemplated by Section 9(2).

The Single Judge accepted the contention and quashed the insolvency notice. The Division Bench affirmed the decision.

Before the Supreme Court, the bank argued that the expression "decree or order" should receive a wider construction so as to include Recovery Certificates, particularly because the Debts Recovery Tribunal exercises adjudicatory powers similar to those of a civil court.

The Supreme Court rejected the contention, holding that the law declared in Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd. governed the issue. The Court further held that insertion of Section 19(22A) into the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act in 2016 expressly deeming a Recovery Certificate to be a decree for insolvency proceedings demonstrated that no such legal fiction existed previously. Since the amendment was prospective, it could not apply to proceedings initiated before its enactment.

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Analysis of Law

The Supreme Court reaffirmed the following principles:

1. Insolvency legislation, because of its severe civil consequences, requires strict interpretation.

2. A Recovery Certificate issued by the Debts Recovery Tribunal prior to insertion of Section 19(22A) is not equivalent to a decree or order under Section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act.

3. Parliament's subsequent insertion of a deeming provision indicates that such equivalence did not previously exist.

4. Courts cannot supply legislative omissions or create legal fictions through interpretation.

5. Rights of litigating parties are ordinarily determined according to the law prevailing on the date the proceedings are instituted.

6. Subsequent amendments without retrospective operation cannot validate proceedings which lacked statutory foundation when initiated.

7. The ratio of Paramjeet Singh Patheja extends beyond arbitral awards and governs interpretation of the expression "decree or order" under Section 9(2).

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Ratio Decidendi

A Recovery Certificate issued by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, prior to the insertion of Section 19(22A) by the 2016 Amendment, is not a "decree or order" within the meaning of Section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 and cannot form the basis for issuance of an insolvency notice. The subsequent statutory deeming fiction created by Section 19(22A) operates prospectively and cannot be retrospectively invoked to sustain insolvency proceedings instituted under the unamended law.