Prescription of minimum qualifying marks in the viva-voce for recruitment to the Higher Judicial Service is within the statutory competence of the rule-making authority and constitutes a valid criterion for assessing judicial suitability. A candidate who participates in the recruitment process with full knowledge of such rules is estopped from challenging them after being unsuccessful. Courts should not unsettle completed judicial appointments or grant retrospective relief where such interference would disturb settled seniority, prejudice serving judicial officers and undermine administrative finality.

 

2026 INSC 699

Manoj Goyal v. Rajasthan High Court & Ors.

HEAD NOTES 

A. Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010 — Rule 41 — Viva-voce qualifying marks — Validity.

(Paras 17–19, 28–31)

Held, prescription of minimum qualifying marks in the viva-voce for recruitment to the Higher Judicial Service is within the rule-making competence of the State and the High Court. Such requirement is neither arbitrary nor unconstitutional, being rationally connected with assessment of suitability for judicial office.

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B. Judicial Service Recruitment — Shetty Commission Recommendations — Legal status.

(Paras 17–18)

Held, recommendations of the Shetty Commission, though accepted by the Supreme Court, are essentially guiding principles. Once statutory recruitment rules are validly framed by the competent authority, the selection process must be governed by those statutory rules unless declared unconstitutional.

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C. Recruitment Process — Participation without protest — Doctrine of Estoppel.

(Paras 20–23, 30)

Held, a candidate who knowingly participates in a selection process under existing recruitment rules and takes a calculated chance cannot, after being unsuccessful, challenge the very rules governing the selection. The principle of approbation and reprobation squarely applies.

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D. Judicial Review — Completed Selection — Finality of Appointments.

(Paras 24–29)

Held, courts should be slow to unsettle appointments that have attained finality, particularly after long lapse of time. Granting retrospective appointments or seniority would seriously prejudice serving judicial officers, disturb settled service conditions and create administrative uncertainty.

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E. Service Law — Subsequent deletion of impugned Rule — Effect.

(Paras 15–16, 28)

Held, where the impugned statutory provision has subsequently been deleted and the recruitment process has long since concluded, the constitutional challenge may become academic, particularly when no effective relief can be granted without unsettling vested rights.

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F. Judicial Appointments — Viva-voce — Importance.

(Paras 19)

Held, for appointments to Higher Judicial Service, the interview is an indispensable component for evaluating qualities such as judicial temperament, alertness, resourcefulness, leadership, communication skills and decision-making ability, which cannot be adequately assessed through written examinations alone.

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G. Relief — Retrospective appointment — Refusal.

(Paras 24–29)

Held, retrospective appointment and consequential seniority cannot be granted where doing so would reopen a decade-old recruitment process, prejudice numerous serving judicial officers, disturb settled seniority and generate avoidable litigation.

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Analysis of Facts

The appellant participated in the recruitment process for appointment as Additional District Judge under the advocates' quota pursuant to the amended Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010.

Originally, Rule 41 did not prescribe any minimum qualifying marks in the interview. However, before the fresh recruitment process commenced, the Rule was amended in 2011 requiring every candidate to secure at least 25% marks in the viva-voce.

The appellant successfully cleared the written examination and secured higher aggregate marks than several selected candidates. However, he obtained only 7 out of 30 marks in the interview, falling short of the prescribed qualifying benchmark of 7.5 marks. Consequently, he was excluded from the select list.

He challenged the constitutional validity of the amended Rule and sought appointment based on aggregate marks. During pendency of the proceedings, the State deleted the impugned proviso in 2017. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the challenge had become academic and that the completed appointments could not be disturbed.

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the interview benchmark was a valid statutory requirement, the appellant was estopped from challenging the Rules after participating in the selection process, and no relief could be granted after more than a decade without seriously disrupting the judicial service.

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Analysis of Law

The Supreme Court laid down the following principles:

1. Recruitment to Higher Judicial Service is governed by statutory service rules framed by the competent authority.

2. Recommendations of the Shetty Commission operate as guiding principles and do not override subsequently enacted statutory rules.

3. Prescription of minimum qualifying marks in viva-voce is a valid method of assessing suitability for judicial office.

4. Candidates who participate in the selection process without objection cannot subsequently challenge the governing recruitment rules after failing in the selection.

5. Courts should preserve finality of completed recruitment processes and avoid disturbing settled appointments after considerable lapse of time.

6. Retrospective appointments affecting seniority and service structure should not ordinarily be granted where they would prejudice vested rights of existing officers.

7. Practical consequences and administrative stability are relevant considerations while exercising judicial review in service matters.

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Ratio Decidendi

Prescription of minimum qualifying marks in the viva-voce for recruitment to the Higher Judicial Service is within the statutory competence of the rule-making authority and constitutes a valid criterion for assessing judicial suitability. A candidate who participates in the recruitment process with full knowledge of such rules is estopped from challenging them after being unsuccessful. Courts should not unsettle completed judicial appointments or grant retrospective relief where such interference would disturb settled seniority, prejudice serving judicial officers and undermine administrative finality.

Section 299(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits the use of evidence recorded during the absence of an absconding accused in his subsequent trial, provided it is established that the accused had absconded, there was no immediate prospect of his arrest when such evidence was recorded, and the witness has thereafter become unavailable owing to death or any other circumstance specified in the statute. The provision does not require a prior formal judicial order recording such satisfaction, and an absconding accused cannot be permitted to benefit from his own evasion of the criminal process.

 

2026 INSC 718

State of West Bengal v. Kader Khan

HEAD NOTES 

A. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 299 — Evidence recorded in absence of absconding accused — Admissibility.

(Paras 12–22)

Held, evidence recorded during the trial of co-accused may be read against an absconding accused after his arrest if the requirements of Section 299(1) CrPC are satisfied, namely, (i) the accused had absconded and there was no immediate prospect of his arrest when the evidence was recorded, and (ii) the witness subsequently became unavailable due to death or any other circumstance specified in the Section.

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B. Section 299 CrPC — Preconditions — Formal judicial order — Necessity.

(Paras 14, 19–22)

Held, Section 299 does not mandate that the Trial Court must pass a formal order recording satisfaction regarding the accused having absconded and there being no immediate prospect of arrest before recording evidence. What is essential is that these jurisdictional facts actually existed when the witness was examined.

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C. Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 33 — Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 299 — Relationship.

(Paras 12–15)

Held, Section 299 CrPC constitutes a statutory exception to the general rule embodied in Section 33 of the Evidence Act requiring an opportunity of cross-examination. Being an exception, its conditions must be strictly proved before prior testimony can be admitted against an absconding accused.

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D. Absconding accused — Benefit of own wrong — Impermissibility.

(Paras 19–21)

Held, an accused who deliberately absconds cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own conduct by contending that evidence recorded during his absence cannot subsequently be used after material witnesses have died or become unavailable. Any contrary interpretation would encourage deliberate evasion of trial.

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E. Criminal Trial — Split-up case — Earlier deposition of deceased witness.

(Paras 15–22)

Held, where trial against absconding accused is separated from that of co-accused and the principal witness dies before the absconder is apprehended, the earlier deposition is admissible in the subsequent trial, subject to satisfaction of Section 299(1) CrPC.

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F. Statutory Interpretation — Purposive construction — Section 299 CrPC.

(Paras 19–21)

Held, Section 299 must receive an interpretation that advances its object of preserving prosecution evidence against absconding offenders. The provision cannot be construed so narrowly as to frustrate its purpose or incentivise accused persons to evade arrest until witnesses become unavailable.

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Analysis of Facts

The respondent was one of the accused in a gang rape case. While three co-accused were arrested and tried, the respondent absconded despite issuance of warrants and proclamation proceedings. Consequently, the trial against him was separated.

During the trial of the arrested accused, the prosecutrix gave extensive evidence and was cross-examined by the co-accused. Subsequently, she died before the respondent could be apprehended.

After the respondent's arrest, the prosecution sought permission under Section 299 CrPC to rely upon the deceased victim's earlier testimony. The Trial Court allowed the application. However, the High Court set aside the order holding that Section 299 required a prior judicial direction authorising recording of evidence against the absconding accused.

The Supreme Court reversed the High Court. It held that Section 299 does not require any formal judicial order before recording evidence. The only mandatory requirements are that the accused had absconded, there was no immediate prospect of his arrest when the witness was examined, and the witness later became unavailable. Since all these conditions stood established, the earlier deposition of the deceased victim was held admissible against the respondent.

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Analysis of Law

The Supreme Court laid down the following principles:

1. Section 299 CrPC is a statutory exception to the normal rule requiring examination of witnesses in the presence of the accused.

2. The prosecution must establish:

   • that the accused had absconded;

   • that there was no immediate prospect of his arrest when the evidence was recorded; and

   • that the witness subsequently became unavailable due to death or other statutory reasons.

3. Section 299 does not require the Trial Court to pass a formal order recording satisfaction before evidence is recorded.

4. The existence of the jurisdictional facts—not the form of the order—is decisive.

5. The provision must be interpreted purposively to preserve evidence against absconding offenders.

6. An accused cannot derive advantage from his own deliberate abscondence by seeking exclusion of evidence rendered unavailable because of his conduct.

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Ratio Decidendi

Section 299(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits the use of evidence recorded during the absence of an absconding accused in his subsequent trial, provided it is established that the accused had absconded, there was no immediate prospect of his arrest when such evidence was recorded, and the witness has thereafter become unavailable owing to death or any other circumstance specified in the statute. The provision does not require a prior formal judicial order recording such satisfaction, and an absconding accused cannot be permitted to benefit from his own evasion of the criminal process.

A Recovery Certificate issued by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, prior to the insertion of Section 19(22A) by the 2016 Amendment, is not a "decree or order" within the meaning of Section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 and cannot form the basis for issuance of an insolvency notice. The subsequent statutory deeming fiction created by Section 19(22A) operates prospectively and cannot be retrospectively invoked to sustain insolvency proceedings instituted under the unamended law.

 

2026 INSC 688

HDFC Bank Ltd. v. Kishore K. Mehta (Dead) through LRs

HEAD NOTES 

A. Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 — Section 9(2) — Insolvency Notice — Recovery Certificate issued by Debts Recovery Tribunal — Maintainability.

(Paras 10–20)

Held, a Recovery Certificate issued by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, prior to insertion of Section 19(22A), is not a "decree or order" within the meaning of Section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 and, therefore, cannot constitute the foundation for issuance of an insolvency notice.

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B. Insolvency Law — Strict Construction — Civil consequences.

(Paras 10–12)

Held, provisions of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 must receive strict construction since adjudication of insolvency results in grave civil consequences affecting the legal status of the debtor. Courts cannot enlarge the scope of statutory expressions by implication.

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C. Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 — Section 19(22A) — Deeming fiction — Prospective operation.

(Paras 13–19)

Held, insertion of Section 19(22A) by the Amendment Act of 2016 expressly deeming a Recovery Certificate to be a decree or order for initiation of insolvency proceedings is legislative recognition that such equivalence did not exist earlier. The amendment is prospective and cannot validate insolvency proceedings initiated prior to its enactment.

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D. Statutory Interpretation — Casus Omissus — Judicial restraint.

(Paras 14 & 19)

Held, where Parliament subsequently inserts an express deeming provision, the Court cannot retrospectively supply the omission by interpretation. Courts cannot create a casus omissus under the guise of purposive construction.

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E. Civil Procedure — Rights of parties — Date of institution of proceedings.

(Paras 15–19)

Held, rights and liabilities of parties are ordinarily determined with reference to the law prevailing on the date of institution of proceedings. Subsequent statutory amendments, unless expressly retrospective, do not alter the legal character of proceedings already commenced.

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F. Precedent — Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd. — Applicability.

(Paras 10–12 & 20–21)

Held, the principle laid down in Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd. that an arbitral award is not a "decree or order" for purposes of Section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act is founded upon broader principles governing interpretation of insolvency law and equally applies to Recovery Certificates issued by the Debts Recovery Tribunal prior to the statutory amendment of 2016.

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Analysis of Facts

The appellant-bank obtained a Recovery Certificate from the Debts Recovery Tribunal against the respondent pursuant to default in repayment of credit facilities extended to a company whose directors had executed personal guarantees.

On the strength of the Recovery Certificate, the bank caused an insolvency notice to be issued under Section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909. The respondent challenged the notice before the Bombay High Court contending that a Recovery Certificate issued by the Debts Recovery Tribunal was not a "decree or order" contemplated by Section 9(2).

The Single Judge accepted the contention and quashed the insolvency notice. The Division Bench affirmed the decision.

Before the Supreme Court, the bank argued that the expression "decree or order" should receive a wider construction so as to include Recovery Certificates, particularly because the Debts Recovery Tribunal exercises adjudicatory powers similar to those of a civil court.

The Supreme Court rejected the contention, holding that the law declared in Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd. governed the issue. The Court further held that insertion of Section 19(22A) into the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act in 2016 expressly deeming a Recovery Certificate to be a decree for insolvency proceedings demonstrated that no such legal fiction existed previously. Since the amendment was prospective, it could not apply to proceedings initiated before its enactment.

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Analysis of Law

The Supreme Court reaffirmed the following principles:

1. Insolvency legislation, because of its severe civil consequences, requires strict interpretation.

2. A Recovery Certificate issued by the Debts Recovery Tribunal prior to insertion of Section 19(22A) is not equivalent to a decree or order under Section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act.

3. Parliament's subsequent insertion of a deeming provision indicates that such equivalence did not previously exist.

4. Courts cannot supply legislative omissions or create legal fictions through interpretation.

5. Rights of litigating parties are ordinarily determined according to the law prevailing on the date the proceedings are instituted.

6. Subsequent amendments without retrospective operation cannot validate proceedings which lacked statutory foundation when initiated.

7. The ratio of Paramjeet Singh Patheja extends beyond arbitral awards and governs interpretation of the expression "decree or order" under Section 9(2).

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Ratio Decidendi

A Recovery Certificate issued by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, prior to the insertion of Section 19(22A) by the 2016 Amendment, is not a "decree or order" within the meaning of Section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 and cannot form the basis for issuance of an insolvency notice. The subsequent statutory deeming fiction created by Section 19(22A) operates prospectively and cannot be retrospectively invoked to sustain insolvency proceedings instituted under the unamended law.

The constitutional guarantee of life and dignity under Article 21 extends fully to convicted prisoners. Continued incarceration of elderly or terminally ill prisoners without an effective, transparent and humane mechanism for compassionate or premature release is inconsistent with constitutional values. While prison administration falls within the legislative domain of the States, constitutional courts may direct States and Union Territories to establish institutional frameworks that ensure dignity, proportionality and humane treatment of such vulnerable prisoners in accordance with Articles 21, 32 and 142 of the Constitution.

 

2026 INSC 713

National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India & Ors.

HEAD NOTES 

A. Constitution of India — Articles 21, 32 & 142 — Elderly and terminally ill prisoners — Right to dignity — Compassionate release.

(Paras 25–41)

Held, incarceration does not extinguish the prisoner's fundamental right to live with dignity under Article 21. Continued imprisonment of prisoners suffering from terminal illness or advanced age, without appropriate mechanisms for compassionate or premature release, may amount to unconstitutional deprivation of dignity and humane treatment. The State is constitutionally obliged to evolve policies ensuring humane treatment of such vulnerable prisoners.

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B. Prison Administration — Constitutional obligation — State Governments — Duty to frame policy.

(Paras 37–40)

Held, since "Prisons and persons detained therein" fall within the legislative domain of the States, every State and Union Territory is obliged to formulate a comprehensive policy governing early, premature or compassionate release of elderly and terminally ill prisoners. Failure to operationalise such mechanisms undermines Article 21.

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C. Article 21 — Right to life — Prisoners — Human dignity.

(Paras 26–36)

Held, punishment cannot degenerate into cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Constitutional protection of dignity survives conviction and incarceration. Advanced age, terminal illness, and irreversible physical incapacity are constitutionally relevant considerations in determining continued detention.

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D. Constitutional Courts — Judicial restraint — Judicial intervention.

(Paras 37–40)

Held, although prison administration primarily lies within the legislative and executive domain, constitutional courts are duty-bound to intervene where executive inaction results in continuing violation of fundamental rights. Appropriate directions ensuring effective implementation of constitutional guarantees may therefore be issued under Articles 32 and 142.

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E. Premature release — Medical Boards — Transparent procedure.

(Para 40)

Held, every State and Union Territory shall constitute independent Medical Boards, prescribe objective criteria for determining terminal illness, establish transparent and time-bound procedures for compassionate release, integrate such process with Under Trial Review Committees, and ensure judicially reviewable decisions.

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F. Prison Reforms — Digital governance — e-Prisons Portal.

(Para 40)

Held, applications for compassionate, premature or early release shall be digitally processed through the National e-Prisons Portal with end-to-end electronic tracking, monitoring, transparency, accountability and periodic compliance reporting while preserving medical confidentiality.

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G. International Human Rights — Persuasive value.

(Paras 35–36)

Held, international standards including the Nelson Mandela Rules, UNODC Handbook on Prisoners with Special Needs and other human rights instruments provide persuasive guidance for evolving humane prison administration consistent with Article 21 and Article 51(c) of the Constitution.

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Analysis of Facts

NALSA invoked the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 highlighting the plight of prisoners above the age of seventy years and prisoners suffering from terminal illnesses who continued to remain incarcerated despite deteriorating health conditions and inadequate prison healthcare facilities.

Pursuant to a nationwide Special Campaign conducted between December 2024 and March 2025, NALSA identified 5,393 vulnerable prisoners, including elderly and terminally ill inmates. Among them, 95 convicted prisoners from various States and Union Territories required immediate consideration for compassionate release.

The material placed before the Court demonstrated that although Government advisories regarding terminally ill prisoners existed since 2010, implementation remained inconsistent across States. The Court treated the issue not merely as individual claims for release but as a systemic constitutional concern affecting prison administration nationwide.

Recognising that prison administration falls within the legislative competence of the States, the Supreme Court refrained from framing substantive policy itself but exercised its constitutional jurisdiction to issue binding directions requiring every State and Union Territory to formulate comprehensive policies governing compassionate and premature release of elderly and terminally ill prisoners.

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Analysis of Law

The Supreme Court laid down the following principles:

1. Article 21 guarantees dignity even after lawful conviction and imprisonment.

2. Continued incarceration of terminally ill and elderly prisoners without humane safeguards may violate constitutional guarantees.

3. Prison administration falls within the State List, but constitutional courts may intervene where executive inaction infringes fundamental rights.

4. Every State and Union Territory must formulate comprehensive compassionate release policies within the prescribed timeframe.

5. Independent Medical Boards must objectively certify terminal illness and medical vulnerability.

6. Under Trial Review Committees should periodically review cases involving elderly, terminally ill and physically incapacitated prisoners.

7. Digital processing through the National e-Prisons Portal is essential for transparency, accountability and timely decision-making.

8. International human rights norms serve as persuasive constitutional standards for humane prison administration.

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Ratio Decidendi

The constitutional guarantee of life and dignity under Article 21 extends fully to convicted prisoners. Continued incarceration of elderly or terminally ill prisoners without an effective, transparent and humane mechanism for compassionate or premature release is inconsistent with constitutional values. While prison administration falls within the legislative domain of the States, constitutional courts may direct States and Union Territories to establish institutional frameworks that ensure dignity, proportionality and humane treatment of such vulnerable prisoners in accordance with Articles 21, 32 and 142 of the Constitution.

The determination contemplated under Section 19(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is a mandatory jurisdictional safeguard. After receiving the Juvenile Justice Board's preliminary assessment under Section 15, the Children's Court must independently decide, by a reasoned order, whether the child should be tried as an adult or as a child. In the absence of such determination, the Court lacks jurisdiction to conduct an adult criminal trial, rendering the entire proceedings, conviction and sentence legally unsustainable.

 

2026 INSC 692

Sagar v. State of Haryana

HEAD NOTES 

A. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 — Sections 15, 18 & 19 — Heinous offence by child above 16 years — Duty of Children's Court — Mandatory determination under Section 19(1).

(Paras 8–10.8)

Held, after receiving the preliminary assessment of the Juvenile Justice Board under Section 15, the Children's Court is under a mandatory obligation to independently determine under Section 19(1) whether the child should be tried as an adult or as a child. Such determination is a jurisdictional prerequisite and cannot be dispensed with before proceeding with the trial.

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B. Interpretation of Statute — Word "may" — Construed as "shall".

(Paras 10.3–10.4)

Held, although Section 19(1) employs the expression "may", the legislative scheme, the serious consequences flowing from the decision, and Rule 13 of the Juvenile Justice Model Rules, 2016 require the expression to be construed as mandatory. The Children's Court must record a reasoned order deciding whether the child is to be tried as an adult or as a child.

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C. Juvenile Justice Act — Children's Court — Jurisdiction — Distinction between adult trial and child inquiry.

(Paras 10.3–10.5)

Held, jurisdiction of the Children's Court to conduct a Sessions trial arises only after a reasoned determination under Section 19(1)(i). Where it concludes that trial as an adult is unnecessary, it must itself function as the Juvenile Justice Board and conduct an inquiry in accordance with Sections 18 and 19(1)(ii). The two procedures are fundamentally distinct and cannot be interchanged.

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D. Non-compliance with Section 19(1) — Effect.

(Paras 11–14)

Held, failure of the Children's Court to pass an order under Section 19(1) strikes at the root of jurisdiction and vitiates the entire trial. Conviction and sentence rendered without complying with the mandatory statutory safeguard cannot be sustained.

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E. Juvenile Justice Act — Heinous offences — Protective scheme.

(Paras 9–10.5)

Held, the Act creates a carefully structured mechanism balancing child rehabilitation with criminal accountability. The preliminary assessment under Section 15 and independent scrutiny under Section 19 constitute substantive safeguards ensuring that no child is subjected to an adult criminal trial without judicial determination.

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F. Remand — Refusal — Passage of time.

(Paras 12–14)

Held, where the accused has already crossed the age of 24 years and has undergone substantial incarceration, remanding the matter for fresh determination under Section 19 would serve no meaningful purpose since an effective assessment of the child's mental capacity at the time of the offence is no longer feasible.

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G. Practice Direction — Children's Courts.

(Para 15)

Held, every Children's Court, immediately upon receipt of a case transferred under Section 18(3), must first pass a reasoned order under Section 19(1) before proceeding further. Compliance with this statutory mandate is obligatory.

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Analysis of Facts

The appellant, aged about 16½ years on the date of the alleged offence, was accused of committing murder along with other assailants. The Juvenile Justice Board conducted the mandatory preliminary assessment under Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 and concluded that he possessed sufficient mental and physical capacity to be tried as an adult. Accordingly, the case was transferred to the Children's Court under Section 18(3).

The Children's Court, however, proceeded directly to conduct a Sessions trial, convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC, and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for fourteen years with directions regarding detention in a place of safety. The High Court affirmed the conviction.

Before the Supreme Court, it was noticed that although the Juvenile Justice Board had complied with Section 15, the Children's Court had never independently passed the mandatory order contemplated by Section 19(1) determining whether the appellant should indeed be tried as an adult.

The Supreme Court held that omission to pass such an order was a jurisdictional defect which vitiated the entire trial. Since the appellant had already attained the age of twenty-four years and had undergone more than six years of incarceration, remanding the matter for a fresh assessment would be futile. Consequently, the conviction and sentence were set aside.

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Analysis of Law

The Supreme Court laid down the following principles:

1. Section 19(1) of the Juvenile Justice Act is mandatory and not merely procedural.

2. The expression "may" occurring in Section 19(1) must be interpreted as "shall" because the determination directly affects the forum of trial, procedure, punishment and rehabilitation.

3. The Children's Court must independently apply its mind even after receiving the Juvenile Justice Board's preliminary assessment under Section 15.

4. Trial as an adult and inquiry as a child involve entirely different statutory procedures and consequences.

5. The Children's Court acquires jurisdiction to conduct a Sessions trial only after recording a reasoned determination under Section 19(1)(i).

6. Failure to comply with Section 19(1) renders the entire criminal trial void and vitiates the conviction.

7. Where remand has become impracticable because of passage of time and attainment of adulthood, the conviction cannot be sustained merely by modifying the sentence.

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Ratio Decidendi

The determination contemplated under Section 19(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is a mandatory jurisdictional safeguard. After receiving the Juvenile Justice Board's preliminary assessment under Section 15, the Children's Court must independently decide, by a reasoned order, whether the child should be tried as an adult or as a child. In the absence of such determination, the Court lacks jurisdiction to conduct an adult criminal trial, rendering the entire proceedings, conviction and sentence legally unsustainable.