Where unexplained delay in forwarding the First Information Report to the jurisdictional Magistrate is coupled with investigative lapses, contradictions in contemporaneous records, doubtful conduct of witnesses and circumstances suggestive of ante-timing or embellishment, the cumulative effect of such infirmities renders the prosecution case unreliable. In such circumstances, the accused is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt, and conviction cannot be sustained.

2026 INSC 707

Deo Prasad & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh

HEAD NOTES

A. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S.157 — First Information Report — Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate — Effect.

(Paras 43 to 53)

Held, delay in forwarding the First Information Report to the jurisdictional Magistrate is not, by itself, fatal to the prosecution. However, where such delay is accompanied by circumstances indicating possible ante-timing, unexplained investigative lapses, contradictions in the prosecution evidence or other suspicious features, it assumes considerable significance. The prosecution case must then be examined on the cumulative effect of all surrounding circumstances to determine its authenticity.

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B. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss.154 & 157 — FIR — Ante-timing — Circumstances creating doubt.

(Paras 43 to 53)

Held, where an FIR allegedly registered on the date of occurrence reaches the Magistrate after an unexplained delay of two days, coupled with contradictions regarding its lodging, unexplained delay in post-mortem and unusual investigative conduct, the possibility of ante-timing, embellishment or subsequent manipulation cannot be excluded, thereby seriously impairing the credibility of the prosecution case.

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C. Evidence Act, 1872 — Appreciation of Evidence — Interested eyewitnesses — Reliability.

(Paras 21 to 42)

Held, consistency of eyewitnesses on broad features alone is insufficient to sustain conviction. Their evidence must inspire confidence when tested against contemporaneous documentary evidence, medical evidence and surrounding circumstances. Material contradictions affecting the genesis of the prosecution case warrant cautious judicial scrutiny.

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D. Criminal Investigation — Delay in Inquest and Post-mortem — Effect.

(Paras 44 & 45)

Held, failure of the investigating agency to preserve the dead body, postponement of the inquest proceedings and unexplained delay of nearly forty-eight hours in conducting the post-mortem constitute serious investigative lapses. In the absence of satisfactory explanation, such lapses lend support to the defence and weaken the prosecution case.

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E. Evidence Act, 1872 — Medical Evidence vis-à-vis Ocular Evidence.

(Paras 31, 32 & 41 to 53)

Held, medical evidence is essentially corroborative. Where medical evidence, documentary record and surrounding circumstances collectively cast doubt upon the prosecution version, ocular testimony cannot be accepted mechanically and must be subjected to careful judicial scrutiny.

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F. Criminal Jurisprudence — Benefit of Doubt.

(Paras 41 to 53)

Held, the prosecution must establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Where the cumulative effect of the evidence raises genuine doubt regarding the genesis of the occurrence, fairness of investigation or authenticity of the First Information Report, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt.

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Analysis of Facts

The prosecution alleged that six accused persons, armed with deadly weapons, assaulted the deceased in broad daylight. The conviction recorded by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court rested principally upon the testimony of three alleged eyewitnesses corroborated by medical evidence.

The defence questioned the genuineness and timing of the First Information Report, the unexplained delay in forwarding the FIR to the Magistrate, the delay in holding the inquest and conducting the post-mortem, the existence of prior political rivalry and admitted enmity, material contradictions in the testimony of eyewitnesses and serious lapses in investigation.

The Supreme Court examined not merely individual discrepancies but the cumulative effect of all surrounding circumstances and found that the suspicious features appearing in the prosecution case substantially affected its credibility.

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Analysis of Law

The Court reiterated the settled principles governing appreciation of criminal evidence:

1. Prompt forwarding of the FIR to the jurisdictional Magistrate is an important safeguard against fabrication and subsequent manipulation.
2. Mere delay in forwarding the FIR does not by itself vitiate the prosecution case.
3. Where such delay is accompanied by suspicious circumstances indicating ante-timing, embellishment or manipulation, it assumes considerable evidentiary significance.
4. The credibility of eyewitnesses must be tested in the light of contemporaneous documentary evidence, medical evidence and the natural conduct of the parties.
5. Serious investigative lapses, when considered along with other suspicious circumstances, may render the prosecution version unsafe for sustaining conviction.
6. A criminal conviction can be sustained only when the prosecution proves its case beyond reasonable doubt.

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Ratio Decidendi

Where unexplained delay in forwarding the First Information Report to the jurisdictional Magistrate is coupled with investigative lapses, contradictions in contemporaneous records, doubtful conduct of witnesses and circumstances suggestive of ante-timing or embellishment, the cumulative effect of such infirmities renders the prosecution case unreliable. In such circumstances, the accused is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt, and conviction cannot be sustained.

Complaint Case—Offence exclusively triable by Court of Session—Section 244 Cr.P.C.—Inapplicability. Where a complaint discloses offences exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the Magistrate is not required to record prosecution evidence under Section 244 Cr.P.C. before committing the case under Section 209 Cr.P.C. The Magistrate's function at the stage of commitment is confined to statutory compliance and commitment of the case. (Paras 6–13) Section 209 Cr.P.C.—Commitment proceedings—Nature of Magistrate's jurisdiction. The role of the Magistrate at the stage of commitment under Section 209 Cr.P.C. is administrative and ministerial in character. The Magistrate is not expected to undertake an evaluation of the merits of the prosecution case or hold a pre-trial inquiry before committing the case to the Court of Session. (Paras 10–13)

 Case: Neeraj Gupta v. Pardeep Kumar Bansal & Ors.

Citation: 2026 INSC 660 | Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 776 of 2026 | Decided on 01.07.2026.

Headnotes

1. Complaint Case—Offence exclusively triable by Court of Session—Section 244 Cr.P.C.—Inapplicability.
   Where a complaint discloses offences exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the Magistrate is not required to record prosecution evidence under Section 244 Cr.P.C. before committing the case under Section 209 Cr.P.C. The Magistrate's function at the stage of commitment is confined to statutory compliance and commitment of the case. (Paras 6–13)
2. Section 209 Cr.P.C.—Commitment proceedings—Nature of Magistrate's jurisdiction.
   The role of the Magistrate at the stage of commitment under Section 209 Cr.P.C. is administrative and ministerial in character. The Magistrate is not expected to undertake an evaluation of the merits of the prosecution case or hold a pre-trial inquiry before committing the case to the Court of Session. (Paras 10–13)
3. Section 244 Cr.P.C.—Scope.
   Section 244 Cr.P.C. applies only to warrant cases instituted otherwise than on a police report which are triable by a Magistrate. It has no application where the offences are exclusively triable by the Court of Session. (Paras 7–9, 13)
4. Commitment Proceedings—No duplication of evidence.
   Acceptance of the view that prosecution evidence under Section 244 Cr.P.C. must be recorded even in Sessions triable complaint cases would unnecessarily compel witnesses to depose twice regarding the same facts, contrary to the legislative intent of expeditious criminal trials. (Para 9)
5. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973—Legislative scheme—Abolition of elaborate committal inquiry.
   The 1973 Code consciously abolished the elaborate committal inquiry contemplated under the Code of 1898. The Legislature intended to eliminate delay by restricting the Magistrate's role and leaving consideration of evidence and framing of charge to the Sessions Court. (Paras 12–13)
6. Magistrate—No adjudication on merits at commitment stage.
   At the stage of Sections 207 to 209 Cr.P.C., the Magistrate cannot examine the sufficiency of evidence, assess guilt, or determine whether additional accused should be added or excluded. Such questions fall within the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court. (Paras 10–12)
7. High Court—Remand to Magistrate for recording evidence under Section 244 Cr.P.C.—Unsustainable.
   The High Court erred in remanding the matter to the Magistrate for compliance with Section 244 Cr.P.C. The impugned order was set aside as being contrary to the statutory scheme governing commitment of Sessions triable offences. (Paras 13–14)
8. Revision—Challenge to discharge and framing of charge—Remand.
   Upon setting aside the erroneous remand order, the Supreme Court directed the High Court to decide afresh both the complainant's revision challenging discharge of two accused and the revision filed by the accused challenging the framing of charge, independently and expeditiously. (Paras 14–15)

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Cases Referred

• Ajoy Kumar Ghose v. State of Jharkhand — distinguished; Section 244 applicable to Magistrate-triable warrant cases. (Para 8.1)
• Sunil Mehta v. State of Gujarat — distinguished. (Para 8.3)
• Harinarayan G. Bajaj v. State of Maharashtra — distinguished. (Para 8.2)
• Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab — followed on the limited role of the Magistrate at the commitment stage. (Para 10)
• Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Ashutosh Ghosh — followed; no evidence required before commitment. (Para 11)
• State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi — followed on the legislative object behind Section 209 Cr.P.C. and abolition of committal inquiry. (Para 12.1)
• Rattiram v. State of Madhya Pradesh — followed regarding the restricted role of the Magistrate in commitment proceedings. (Para 12.2)

BNSS—Sections 193(3), 193(8) and 230—Construction. Section 193(3) prescribes the essential contents of the police report; Section 193(8) requires filing of additional copies for supply to the accused; and Section 230 fixes the timeline for furnishing copies. Non-compliance with Section 193(8) or delay in supplying copies under Section 230 does not equate to non-filing of the police report for the purpose of default bail. (Paras 17–23) Default Bail—Right under Article 21—Nature. The right to default bail is an indefeasible statutory right flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution. However, the right is conditional and survives only until a valid police report is filed within the prescribed statutory period. (Paras 20–23) Charge-sheet—Incomplete filing of documents—Effect. Even where all documents relied upon by the prosecution do not accompany the charge-sheet, the police report is not rendered invalid. Such omission neither vitiates the charge-sheet nor revives the right to default bail. (Paras 22–25)

 ase: Shaurya Sunil Kumar Singh v. Central Bureau of Investigation

Citation: 2026 INSC 666 | Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4333 of 2026 | Decided on 01.07.2026.

Headnotes

1. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023—Section 187(3)—Default Bail—Scope.
   The indefeasible right to default bail arises only upon failure of the investigating agency to file the police report/charge-sheet within the prescribed period of sixty or ninety days. Once a charge-sheet complying with Section 193(3) BNSS is filed within the statutory period, the right to default bail stands extinguished. (Paras 19–23, 26)
2. BNSS—Section 193(8)—Non-filing of additional copies of charge-sheet—Effect.
   Failure to file additional indexed copies of the police report and accompanying documents as contemplated under Section 193(8) BNSS does not invalidate the charge-sheet and does not confer any right to default bail under Section 187(3) BNSS. (Paras 21–25, 27)
3. BNSS—Sections 193(3), 193(8) and 230—Construction.
   Section 193(3) prescribes the essential contents of the police report; Section 193(8) requires filing of additional copies for supply to the accused; and Section 230 fixes the timeline for furnishing copies. Non-compliance with Section 193(8) or delay in supplying copies under Section 230 does not equate to non-filing of the police report for the purpose of default bail. (Paras 17–23)
4. Default Bail—Right under Article 21—Nature.
   The right to default bail is an indefeasible statutory right flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution. However, the right is conditional and survives only until a valid police report is filed within the prescribed statutory period. (Paras 20–23)
5. Charge-sheet—Incomplete filing of documents—Effect.
   Even where all documents relied upon by the prosecution do not accompany the charge-sheet, the police report is not rendered invalid. Such omission neither vitiates the charge-sheet nor revives the right to default bail. (Paras 22–25)
6. Interpretation of procedural provisions—Section 193(8) BNSS.
   The requirement to furnish additional copies of the police report under Section 193(8) BNSS is procedural and cannot be construed so as to enlarge the scope of Section 187(3) BNSS relating to default bail. (Paras 23–25)
7. Default Bail—Cognizance taken—Effect.
   Where a charge-sheet complying with Section 193(3) BNSS has been filed within limitation and cognizance has been taken by the competent court, the accused cannot seek default bail on the ground that copies of the charge-sheet were supplied subsequently. (Paras 26–27)
8. Default Bail and Regular Bail—Distinct considerations.
   Consideration of default bail is independent of the merits of the prosecution case. Rejection of default bail does not preclude the accused from seeking regular bail, which must be considered independently on its own merits. (Para 28)

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Cases Referred

• Saravanan v. State — right to default bail under Article 21. (Para 20)
• Fakhrey Alam v. State of Uttar Pradesh — default bail as an indefeasible right. (Para 20)
• State v. T. Gangi Reddy — object of default bail. (Para 20)
• Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain v. State of Maharashtra — right ceases on filing of charge-sheet. (Para 20)
• SFIO v. Rahul Modi — filing of charge-sheet extinguishes default bail. (Para 20)
• Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam — application for default bail may be oral. (Para 20)
• Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab — liberal approach in matters of personal liberty. (Para 20)
• Judgebir Singh v. National Investigation Agency — filing of police report extinguishes right to default bail. (Para 21)
• Central Bureau of Investigation v. Kapil Wadhawan — non-filing of all documents does not invalidate charge-sheet. (Para 22)
• Central Bureau of Investigation v. R.S. Pai — requirement to file supporting documents is directory. (Para 24)
• Narendra Kumar Amin v. Central Bureau of Investigation — filing of police report complying with statutory requirements defeats claim for default bail. (Para 25)

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Will—Registration—Effect. Registration of a Will d...Will—Registration—Effect. Registration of a Will does not by itself remove suspicious circumstances or dispense with the obligation of the propounder to establish its genuineness. Even a registered Will must satisfy the judicial conscience of the Court where suspicious features exist. (Paras 17–18, 32)

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Will—Registration—Effect. Registration of a Will d...: advocatemmmohan Case: Sardari Lal v. Bishan Dass & Ors. Citation: 2026 INSC 669 | Civil Appeal No. 10990 of 2016 Headnotes Will—P...

Case: Sardari Lal v. Bishan Dass & Ors.
Citation: 2026 INSC 669 | Civil Appeal No. 10990 of 2016

Headnotes

1. Will—Proof—Burden of proof—Propounder.
   The burden of proving a Will lies upon its propounder. Proof of execution under Section 63 of the Succession Act and Section 68 of the Evidence Act is only the first step. The propounder must further satisfy the judicial conscience of the Court that the Will represents the free and conscious testamentary act of the testator. (Paras 27–32)
2. Will—Suspicious circumstances—Duty of propounder.
   Where suspicious circumstances surround the execution of a Will, the propounder must satisfactorily explain such circumstances and dispel all legitimate doubts before the Will can be accepted as genuine. Mere formal proof of execution is insufficient. (Paras 28–32, 38–40)
3. Will—Meaning of "suspicious circumstances".
   Suspicious circumstances include any legitimate circumstance creating doubt regarding the genuineness of the Will, such as unjust exclusion of natural heirs, unnatural disposition, doubtful execution, participation of beneficiaries, unexplained alterations or any circumstance inconsistent with the normal course of human conduct. Such suspicion must be real and not the product of conjecture or fanciful imagination. (Paras 30–32, 38–40)
4. Will—Disinheritance of wife—Suspicious circumstance.
   Where a testator disinherits his wife, who had cordial relations with him and cared for him throughout his lifetime, in favour of distant relatives or strangers without convincing justification, such exclusion constitutes a significant suspicious circumstance requiring satisfactory explanation. (Paras 41–45)
5. Will—Reasons assigned in testament—Court's scrutiny.
   Although a testator is not legally bound to record reasons for making a bequest, where reasons are stated in the Will, the Court is entitled to examine whether they are genuine or merely a facade to justify an otherwise suspicious disposition. (Paras 43–45)
6. Will—Registration—Effect.
   Registration of a Will does not by itself remove suspicious circumstances or dispense with the obligation of the propounder to establish its genuineness. Even a registered Will must satisfy the judicial conscience of the Court where suspicious features exist. (Paras 17–18, 32)
7. Will—Unexplained alterations in registration endorsement.
   Material and unexplained cuttings or alterations in the registration endorsement, particularly regarding the identity of the executant, constitute serious suspicious circumstances. Failure to explain such alterations may justify rejection of the Will. (Paras 14, 40)
8. Civil Procedure—Admissions—Alternative pleadings.
   A plaintiff may raise inconsistent or alternative pleas. An alternative plea that a Will is vitiated by fraud, undue influence or coercion does not amount to an admission of its execution where the principal plea is that no Will was ever executed. (Paras 35–37)
9. Evidence—Admissions—Doctrine of non-traverse.
   Facts specifically pleaded in the plaint and not specifically denied in the written statement stand admitted under Order VIII Rule 5 CPC and ordinarily require no further proof. (Paras 37)
10. Evidence—Failure of plaintiff to enter witness box.
    Where the plaintiff's title is founded upon admitted facts and the defendant seeks to defeat that title by propounding a Will, mere non-examination of the plaintiff or other witnesses does not relieve the propounder of the burden of proving the Will in accordance with law. (Paras 37–38)
11. Second Appeal—Section 100 CPC—Concurrent findings regarding suspicious circumstances.
    Findings regarding existence of suspicious circumstances surrounding a Will and the sufficiency of their explanation are primarily findings of fact. Interference in second appeal is impermissible unless a substantial question of law genuinely arises. (Issue 4; Paras 25, 32 and subsequent discussion)
12. Will—Judicial conscience—Governing principle.
    In cases involving disputed Wills, the ultimate test is whether the evidence inspires confidence and satisfies the judicial conscience of the Court that the testament truly represents the free and informed intention of the testator. (Paras 28–32, 38–40)

Cases Referred

• H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma
• Rani Purnima Debi v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb
• Jaswant Kaur v. Amrit Kaur
• Kalyan Singh v. Chhoti
• Shivakumar v. Sharanabasappa
• Lilian Coelho v. Myra Philomena Coelho
• Madhukar D. Shende v. Tarabai Aba Shedage

Artificial Intelligence — Judicial use — Human control. Artificial Intelligence may legitimately assist judicial administration and legal research; however, adjudication, legal reasoning and decision-making must remain under complete human supervision. AI is only an aid and cannot substitute judicial application of mind. (Paras 1–6).

 (A) Artificial Intelligence (AI) — Judicial adjudication — Use of AI-generated material — Zero tolerance.

Courts must adopt a policy of zero tolerance towards the production, citation or reliance upon AI-generated fake, non-existent or hallucinated precedents. Any decision founded, even partly, upon such material undermines the integrity of the adjudicatory process and cannot be sustained. (Paras 6–9, 15–17).

(B) Judicial Decision-making — AI-generated fake precedents — Effect.
A judgment or order based upon fake, hallucinated or non-existent judicial precedents is no decision in the eye of law. Such use contaminates the decision-making process, subverts the rule of law and renders the judgment liable to be set aside irrespective of the extent of its influence on the final decision. (Paras 7, 15–18).

(C) Advocates — Professional misconduct — Citation of AI-generated fake precedents.
It constitutes professional misconduct for an advocate to cite AI-generated fake or hallucinated precedents without proper verification. The Bar Council of India was directed to formulate appropriate guidelines and disciplinary norms to prevent such misconduct. (Paras 7–9).

(D) Judges and Tribunals — Reliance on AI-generated material — Duty of verification.
Reliance by a Judge or Tribunal upon fake or hallucinated AI-generated material amounts to a serious judicial lapse. While AI may be used as an aid to research, every precedent and legal proposition must be independently verified before being relied upon in judicial determination. (Paras 1–7, 15–17).

(E) Artificial Intelligence — Judicial use — Human control.
Artificial Intelligence may legitimately assist judicial administration and legal research; however, adjudication, legal reasoning and decision-making must remain under complete human supervision. AI is only an aid and cannot substitute judicial application of mind. (Paras 1–6).

(F) Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — S. 7 — Orders of NCLT and NCLAT based on fake precedents — Validity.
Where the National Company Law Tribunal relied upon fake, non-existent and AI-generated precedents and the error escaped scrutiny before the Appellate Tribunal, both orders were vitiated and liable to be set aside. The Section 7 application was restored to the file of the Adjudicating Authority for fresh consideration on merits uninfluenced by the earlier orders. (Paras 15–20).

(G) Judicial Process — Integrity of adjudication — Paramount consideration.
Maintenance of the purity and integrity of judicial decision-making is paramount. Any contamination of the adjudicatory process by fabricated or hallucinated legal authorities strikes at the root of the rule of law and warrants immediate corrective action by the appellate court. (Paras 6–9, 17–20).