O. VII R. 11(d) — Rejection of plaint — Object and scope. The object of Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC is to terminate, at the threshold, civil proceedings which, on a meaningful reading of the plaint itself, are barred by law. The provision is intended to prevent abuse of the judicial process and avoid unnecessary trial in suits which are ex facie not maintainable. (Paras 18–21). (B) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. VII R. 11(d) — Limitation — Suit for specific performance — Article 54, Limitation Act, 1963. Where the foundation of the suit is an agreement to sell executed decades earlier and the plaint does not disclose any satisfactory explanation for failure to institute proceedings within the statutory period of three years prescribed under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by limitation and the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. (Paras 22, 25–28).

 (A) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. VII R. 11(d) — Rejection of plaint — Object and scope.

The object of Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC is to terminate, at the threshold, civil proceedings which, on a meaningful reading of the plaint itself, are barred by law. The provision is intended to prevent abuse of the judicial process and avoid unnecessary trial in suits which are ex facie not maintainable. (Paras 18–21).

(B) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. VII R. 11(d) — Limitation — Suit for specific performance — Article 54, Limitation Act, 1963.
Where the foundation of the suit is an agreement to sell executed decades earlier and the plaint does not disclose any satisfactory explanation for failure to institute proceedings within the statutory period of three years prescribed under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by limitation and the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. (Paras 22, 25–28).

(C) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. VII R. 11 — Rejection of plaint — Test to be applied.
While deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court must confine itself to the averments contained in the plaint read as a whole. The defence in the written statement or disputed questions of fact are wholly irrelevant. Where clever drafting creates an illusion of a cause of action or conceals a statutory bar, the Court must lift the veil and reject the plaint at the threshold. (Paras 19–21).

(D) Limitation — Specific performance — Right to sue — Accrual.
The period of limitation for a suit for specific performance commences when the right to sue first accrues. A subsequent judicial observation that no civil proceedings have yet been instituted does not create a fresh cause of action or revive a claim already barred by limitation. (Paras 24–25).

(E) Limitation — Delay of several decades — Effect.
A litigant who has remained silent for several decades without instituting proceedings cannot, as an afterthought, seek enforcement of an old agreement by ignoring the law of limitation. Such a suit is barred by law and constitutes an abuse of the process of Court. (Paras 22, 26–28).

(F) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. VII R. 11(d) — Rejection of plaint — Suit barred by limitation — Consequence.
Where the plaint itself discloses that the claim is hopelessly barred by limitation, the orders refusing rejection of the plaint are unsustainable and liable to be set aside, with rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. (Paras 26–28)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 166 and 168 — Compensation — Assessment of annual income — Income-tax Returns — Governing principles. There is no rigid or universal formula for determining the annual income of a deceased or injured claimant on the basis of Income-tax Returns (ITRs). The paramount consideration under the Motor Vehicles Act is the award of just, fair and reasonable compensation. ITRs constitute an important statutory indicator of income but must be assessed in the light of the facts and circumstances of each case. (Paras 15–20).

 

(A) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 166 and 168 — Compensation — Assessment of annual income — Income-tax Returns — Governing principles.

There is no rigid or universal formula for determining the annual income of a deceased or injured claimant on the basis of Income-tax Returns (ITRs). The paramount consideration under the Motor Vehicles Act is the award of just, fair and reasonable compensation. ITRs constitute an important statutory indicator of income but must be assessed in the light of the facts and circumstances of each case. (Paras 15–20).

(B) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Compensation — Salaried employees — Assessment of income.

For salaried persons, ordinarily the Income-tax Return of the immediately preceding assessment year constitutes the appropriate basis for determining annual income. Where the deceased or claimant had recently received a promotion and the enhanced income is not reflected in the return, the Court may rely upon the promotion order and other corroborative financial material. (Para 18).

(C) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Compensation — Self-employed persons and business income — Assessment of income.

In the case of self-employed persons or persons carrying on business, annual income should ordinarily be assessed with reference to the average income disclosed in the Income-tax Returns of the preceding three years. The Court must also consider surrounding circumstances including the nature of business, growth pattern, future potential, initial losses, geographical factors and other relevant circumstances affecting earning capacity. (Paras 19–20).

(D) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Income-tax Returns filed after death or injury — Evidentiary value.

Where Income-tax Returns are filed after the death or injury of the claimant, the Court must scrutinise them with greater care. If supported by balance sheets and other financial records, such returns may be relied upon; otherwise, surrounding business circumstances become decisive in assessing true income. (Para 20).

(E) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Compensation — Determination of business income — Judicial discretion.

Assessment of business income cannot rest upon a mechanical average of Income-tax Returns alone. The Court is empowered to determine a realistic annual income after considering the nature and potential of the business so as to ensure award of just compensation. (Paras 21–23).

(F) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Compensation — Insurance Agent — Assessment of income.

In the case of an Insurance Agent whose income is performance-oriented, averaging Income-tax Returns beyond the previous three years is unjustified. Income should be assessed keeping in view the fluctuating nature of commission-based earnings and the average of the immediately preceding three years. (Paras 9–12 of Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 3088 of 2025).

(G) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Compensation — Self-employed trader — Income-tax Returns filed after death.

Where recent Income-tax Returns were filed after the death of the deceased and supporting financial records were unavailable, remand was considered inappropriate. Having regard to the available Income-tax Returns and the nature of the wholesale grocery business, the Court determined a reasonable annual income to ensure just compensation. (Paras 10–14 of Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 7735 of 2025). 

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Ss. 200, 209 and 244 — Complaint case exclusively triable by Court of Session — Recording of evidence by Magistrate before commitment — Not required. In a complaint case involving offences exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the Magistrate is not required to record prosecution evidence under Section 244 CrPC before committing the case under Section 209 CrPC. The duty of the Magistrate is confined to complying with the statutory requirements of commitment. (Paras 6–13).

 (A) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Ss. 200, 209 and 244 — Complaint case exclusively triable by Court of Session — Recording of evidence by Magistrate before commitment — Not required.

In a complaint case involving offences exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the Magistrate is not required to record prosecution evidence under Section 244 CrPC before committing the case under Section 209 CrPC. The duty of the Magistrate is confined to complying with the statutory requirements of commitment. (Paras 6–13).

(B) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — S. 209 — Commitment proceedings — Scope of Magistrate's jurisdiction.
At the stage of commitment under Section 209 CrPC, the Magistrate performs a limited statutory function. The Magistrate is not required to examine the merits of the prosecution case or evaluate the sufficiency of evidence, but only to ascertain whether the offence is exclusively triable by the Court of Session and thereafter commit the case in accordance with law. (Paras 7.2, 10–12).

(C) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — S. 244 — Applicability.
Section 244 CrPC applies to warrant cases instituted otherwise than on a police report which are triable by a Magistrate. The provision has no application where the complaint relates to offences exclusively triable by the Court of Session. (Paras 7.3, 8.1–8.3, 13).

(D) Criminal Procedure — Commitment proceedings — Legislative object.
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 deliberately abolished the elaborate pre-committal inquiry under the old Code of 1898 with the object of expeditious disposal of criminal cases. Requiring recording of prosecution evidence before commitment would defeat the legislative intent and revive a procedure consciously omitted by Parliament. (Paras 11–12.2).

(E) Criminal Procedure — Commitment — Duplication of evidence — Impermissibility.
Acceptance of the view that prosecution evidence under Section 244 CrPC must be recorded before commitment in Sessions triable complaint cases would compel witnesses to depose twice on the same facts without statutory sanction and would unnecessarily delay criminal trials. (Para 9).

(F) Criminal Procedure — Sessions triable complaint case — High Court — Remand to Magistrate for recording evidence under S. 244 CrPC — Legality.
The High Court erred in remanding the complaint to the Magistrate for compliance with Section 244 CrPC. Such remand being contrary to the scheme of the Code was liable to be set aside. The High Court was directed to decide the pending criminal revisions afresh on merits. (Paras 13–14). 

(A) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. XXIII R. 3 — Compromise decree — Essential requirements. After the 1976 amendment to the Code, a lawful compromise can be recorded only if it is in writing and signed by the parties or by a duly authorised representative. Compliance with the mandatory requirements of Order XXIII Rule 3 is a condition precedent for passing a valid compromise decree. (Paras 5.1–5.2). (B) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. XXIII R. 3 — Compromise by Advocate — Authority to compromise. An advocate has no implied authority to surrender or conclude the substantive rights of the client by entering into a compromise unless expressly authorised or justified by exigent circumstances. In the absence of express authorisation or proof of necessity, a compromise signed or accepted on behalf of the client is invalid. (Paras 5.2(f), 5.3–5.6). (C) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. XXIII R. 3 — Compromise decree — Duty of Court. While recording a compromise, the Court is not a mere recording authority. It must apply its judicial mind to satisfy itself that the compromise is lawful, voluntary and in conformity with the requirements of Order XXIII Rule 3 before affixing its seal of approval. (Paras 5.2(e), (g), 5.6). (D) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. XXIII R. 3 — Voluntary consent — Absence of signature of party. Where the compromise petition does not bear the signature of the concerned party and there is no material establishing express authorisation to counsel, the voluntary consent contemplated by Order XXIII Rule 3 is absent and the compromise decree is contrary to law. (Paras 5.3–5.6). (E) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — S. 151 — Compromise decree obtained by fraud — Recall — Delay. The inherent power under Section 151 CPC may be exercised to recall a compromise decree alleged to have been obtained by fraud. Mere delay, however long, cannot be permitted to perpetuate an illegal or fraudulent decree where substantive rights are affected. (Paras 6.1–6.7). (F) Limitation — Fraud — Delay of 25 years — Effect. Though limitation is an important principle of law, it cannot be employed to defeat substantive rights or perpetuate an illegality. Where fraud is alleged, the compromise is prima facie contrary to law, and foundational facts remain seriously disputed, extraordinary delay may, in the facts of the case, be condoned. Such indulgence is not to be treated as a general rule but depends upon the facts of each case. (Paras 6.3–6.7). (G) Partition Suit — Compromise decree set aside — Consequence. Where the compromise decree is found to be invalid for non-compliance with Order XXIII Rule 3 and material factual disputes remain unresolved, the proper course is to set aside the compromise decree and direct adjudication of the partition suit by a full-fledged trial on evidence. (Para 6.7).

 (A) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. XXIII R. 3 — Compromise decree — Essential requirements.

After the 1976 amendment to the Code, a lawful compromise can be recorded only if it is in writing and signed by the parties or by a duly authorised representative. Compliance with the mandatory requirements of Order XXIII Rule 3 is a condition precedent for passing a valid compromise decree. (Paras 5.1–5.2).

(B) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. XXIII R. 3 — Compromise by Advocate — Authority to compromise.
An advocate has no implied authority to surrender or conclude the substantive rights of the client by entering into a compromise unless expressly authorised or justified by exigent circumstances. In the absence of express authorisation or proof of necessity, a compromise signed or accepted on behalf of the client is invalid. (Paras 5.2(f), 5.3–5.6).

(C) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. XXIII R. 3 — Compromise decree — Duty of Court.
While recording a compromise, the Court is not a mere recording authority. It must apply its judicial mind to satisfy itself that the compromise is lawful, voluntary and in conformity with the requirements of Order XXIII Rule 3 before affixing its seal of approval. (Paras 5.2(e), (g), 5.6).

(D) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. XXIII R. 3 — Voluntary consent — Absence of signature of party.
Where the compromise petition does not bear the signature of the concerned party and there is no material establishing express authorisation to counsel, the voluntary consent contemplated by Order XXIII Rule 3 is absent and the compromise decree is contrary to law. (Paras 5.3–5.6).

(E) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — S. 151 — Compromise decree obtained by fraud — Recall — Delay.
The inherent power under Section 151 CPC may be exercised to recall a compromise decree alleged to have been obtained by fraud. Mere delay, however long, cannot be permitted to perpetuate an illegal or fraudulent decree where substantive rights are affected. (Paras 6.1–6.7).

(F) Limitation — Fraud — Delay of 25 years — Effect.
Though limitation is an important principle of law, it cannot be employed to defeat substantive rights or perpetuate an illegality. Where fraud is alleged, the compromise is prima facie contrary to law, and foundational facts remain seriously disputed, extraordinary delay may, in the facts of the case, be condoned. Such indulgence is not to be treated as a general rule but depends upon the facts of each case. (Paras 6.3–6.7).

(G) Partition Suit — Compromise decree set aside — Consequence.
Where the compromise decree is found to be invalid for non-compliance with Order XXIII Rule 3 and material factual disputes remain unresolved, the proper course is to set aside the compromise decree and direct adjudication of the partition suit by a full-fledged trial on evidence. (Para 6.7).

(E) Precedent — Larger Bench decision — Binding effect. A Bench of lesser or co-equal strength cannot disregard the ratio of an earlier larger Bench. Where an earlier three-Judge Bench has authoritatively declared the source of power under a remission policy, a later inconsistent decision of a smaller Bench is liable to be treated as per incuriam. (Paras 14–15).

(A) Constitution of India — Art. 161 — Remission — Haryana Remission Policy, 2002 — Nature of power — Constitutional power of Governor.
The Haryana Remission Policy dated 12-04-2002 is an exercise of the Governor's constitutional power under Article 161. A subsequent statutory remission policy issued under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot override, supersede or curtail the constitutional power exercisable under Article 161. (Paras 9–13, 16).

(B) Constitution of India — Art. 161 — CrPC, 1973 — Ss. 432, 433 — Remission — Constitutional and statutory powers — Distinction.
The power of remission under Article 161 is distinct, independent and superior to the statutory powers under Sections 432 and 433 CrPC. A statutory policy framed under the Code cannot abrogate or supersede a remission policy operating under Article 161 of the Constitution. (Paras 9–10, 12–13, 16).

(C) Remission — Applicable Policy — Beneficial policy — Life convict.
Where the earlier remission policy is constitutional in character under Article 161, its operation is not displaced by a later statutory policy. The convict is entitled to consideration under the more beneficial constitutional policy. (Paras 10, 12–13, 16).

(D) Precedent — Per incuriam — Principles governing.
A judgment is per incuriam where its ratio is irreconcilable with an earlier decision rendered by a Bench of equal or larger strength, or where a binding statutory provision or binding precedent has not been noticed. The doctrine is an exception to stare decisis and must be invoked sparingly. Judicial discipline requires adherence to decisions of larger Benches. (Paras 14–15).

(E) Precedent — Larger Bench decision — Binding effect.
A Bench of lesser or co-equal strength cannot disregard the ratio of an earlier larger Bench. Where an earlier three-Judge Bench has authoritatively declared the source of power under a remission policy, a later inconsistent decision of a smaller Bench is liable to be treated as per incuriam. (Paras 14–15).

(F) Remission — Haryana Remission Policies, 2002 and 2008 — Applicability.
The observation in the 2008 statutory policy that it supersedes the 2002 Policy is ineffective insofar as the 2002 Policy derives its authority from Article 161 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the appellant's remission application is required to be considered under the 2002 Policy. (Paras 16–18).

(G) Prospective operation — Remission.
The declaration of law shall operate prospectively and shall not reopen remission applications already decided. The State may thereafter maintain separate constitutional and statutory remission policies. (Para 17).