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Monday, June 15, 2026

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: SERVICE LAW – BORDER SECURITY FORCE – DISMISSAL FR...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: SERVICE LAW – BORDER SECURITY FORCE – DISMISSAL FR...: advocatemmmohan Baksish Ahmad v. Union of India & Anr. 2026 INSC 630 – Supreme Court of India Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dipankar...

Baksish Ahmad v. Union of India & Anr.

2026 INSC 630 – Supreme Court of India
Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dipankar Datta and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Satish Chandra Sharma
Decided on: 09.06.2026

SERVICE LAW – BORDER SECURITY FORCE – DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE – WRIT JURISDICTION – TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF HIGH COURTS – ARTICLE 226(1) & (2) OF THE CONSTITUTION – DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS – SCOPE.

A BSF constable was dismissed from service for contracting a second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage without obtaining permission from the competent authority. His statutory petition was rejected. Challenging the dismissal and rejection order, he filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court. The Delhi High Court declined to entertain the petition applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens, holding that no part of the cause of action had arisen within Delhi and that the appropriate forums were elsewhere.

Held: The Delhi High Court possesses territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(1) of the Constitution where the Union of India and the Director General of BSF are situated within its territorial limits. In matters relating to members of Central Armed Police Forces, the situs of the offices of the Union of India and the Director General furnishes jurisdiction to the Delhi High Court notwithstanding that the cause of action may have arisen elsewhere. The doctrine of forum non conveniens cannot ordinarily be invoked to defeat a constitutional remedy under Article 226 when the Court otherwise possesses jurisdiction. The Delhi High Court erred in declining to exercise jurisdiction merely on the ground that other High Courts could also entertain the matter. The writ petition was directed to be restored and decided on merits.

A. CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950

Article 226(1) and Article 226(2) – Distinction.

Article 226(1) confers jurisdiction upon a High Court where the person or authority against whom relief is sought is located within its territorial limits.

Article 226(2) confers jurisdiction where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court.

The two clauses operate independently and confer distinct bases of jurisdiction. A writ petition may be maintainable either because the respondent authority is situated within the jurisdiction of the High Court or because part of the cause of action has arisen therein.

B. CENTRAL ARMED POLICE FORCES – BSF – SERVICE MATTERS.

Territorial Jurisdiction – Delhi High Court.

Held: In cases involving members of the BSF and other Central Armed Police Forces, the Delhi High Court would have territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(1) because the Union of India and the Director General of the concerned force are situated in Delhi. Such jurisdiction exists even if:

  • the disciplinary proceedings were conducted elsewhere;
  • the dismissal order was passed outside Delhi; and
  • the events constituting misconduct occurred outside Delhi.

C. FORUM NON CONVENIENS.

Applicability in Writ Proceedings.

Doctrine explained.

The doctrine applies where multiple competent forums are available and enables a court to decline jurisdiction if another forum is demonstrably more convenient and better suited to decide the dispute.

However, in proceedings under Article 226, particularly where jurisdiction is invoked under Article 226(1), the doctrine has only a limited role and should be applied sparingly. A litigant invoking a constitutional remedy before a High Court having jurisdiction cannot ordinarily be non-suited merely because another High Court may also entertain the matter.

D. PRECEDENTS – EXPLAINED AND APPLIED.

1. Abrar Ali v. CISF – Approved.

Held that the Delhi High Court possesses jurisdiction under Article 226(1) where the headquarters of the concerned Central Armed Police Force are located in Delhi. The principle laid down therein was affirmed.

2. Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 6 SCC 254.

Explained. The doctrine of forum conveniens discussed therein related to situations where cause of action arises in more than one State under Article 226(2) and does not govern cases founded upon jurisdiction under Article 226(1).

3. Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Micromax Informatics FZE.

Explained. The doctrine of forum non conveniens is applicable where multiple forums are available and a court must determine the more appropriate forum; however, the decision did not arise out of writ proceedings under Article 226.

E. HELD.

  1. Delhi High Court had territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(1).
  2. Application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens by the Delhi High Court was legally unsustainable.
  3. Order dismissing the writ petition was set aside.
  4. Writ petition stood restored to the file of the Delhi High Court for decision on merits.
  5. Appeal against dismissal of review petition was dismissed as not maintainable.

Ratio Decidendi

Where the Union of India and the Director General of a Central Armed Police Force are situated within Delhi, the Delhi High Court possesses territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(1) to entertain a challenge to disciplinary or termination orders passed against members of such forces, and the doctrine of forum non conveniens cannot ordinarily be invoked to deny exercise of such constitutional jurisdiction.

Result

Civil Appeal allowed. Impugned judgment of the Delhi High Court set aside. Writ Petition restored for adjudication on merits.

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Wednesday, June 3, 2026

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Where agricultural land was governed by the Delhi ...Where agricultural land was governed by the Delhi Land Reforms Act and succession opened prior to 09.09.2005, rights devolve exclusively in accordance with Section 50 of the Act and become crystallised on the date of death of the Bhumidhar. Such vested rights are not affected by the subsequent amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, acquisition of land, or urbanisation. Further, a mere bald assertion that the property forms part of an HUF, unsupported by material pleadings showing when and how the HUF came into existence and how the property acquired HUF character, does not disclose a cause of action. A plaint founded upon such illusory pleadings is liable to rejection under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Paras 33–49.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Where agricultural land was governed by the Delhi ...: advocatemmmohan DELHI LAND REFORMS ACT, 1954 – Section 50 – Succession to agricultural land – Death of Bhumidhar prior to 09.09.2005 – Right...



DELHI LAND REFORMS ACT, 1954 – Section 50 – Succession to agricultural land – Death of Bhumidhar prior to 09.09.2005 – Rights crystallise under DLR Act.

Where succession to agricultural land opened upon the death of a Bhumidhar prior to 09.09.2005, succession is governed by Section 50 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 and not by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Rights of successors become crystallised on the date of death and cannot be disturbed by the subsequent amendment to the Hindu Succession Act in 2005. Paras 19–22, 27–33.

Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 – Section 50(a) – Male Bhumidhar – Succession by male lineal descendants.

Under Section 50(a) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, where a male Bhumidhar dies leaving male lineal descendants, the agricultural holding devolves upon such male descendants in the male line of descent. Other heirs can succeed only in the absence of heirs falling within the superior category prescribed by the statute. Paras 19, 20, 21.

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Section 4(2) (prior to omission) – Agricultural holdings – Exclusion of HSA.

Prior to its omission by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, Section 4(2) preserved special laws governing devolution of agricultural holdings. Consequently, succession to Bhumidhari rights was governed by Section 50 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act and not by the Hindu Succession Act. Paras 22–25.

Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 – Prospective operation – Agricultural land.

The omission of Section 4(2) of the Hindu Succession Act by the 2005 Amendment operates prospectively. The amendment applies only to successions opening on or after 09.09.2005 and does not reopen or alter successions that had already vested prior thereto. Paras 28–33.

Agricultural Land – Succession completed prior to 2005 Amendment – Rights not affected by subsequent urbanisation.

Where succession to agricultural land had already taken place under the Delhi Land Reforms Act, subsequent acquisition of the land or urbanisation of the village does not create or revive rights in favour of persons who had no inheritable interest at the time succession opened. Para 48.

ORDER VII RULE 11 CPC – Rejection of plaint – Agricultural land – Plaintiff having no inheritable right under governing succession law.

Where the averments in the plaint itself establish that the property was agricultural land, that the deceased Bhumidhar died in 2002 and that succession stood governed by Section 50 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, the suit claiming partition on the basis of equal inheritance is barred by law and the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Paras 16–21, 33, 49.

ORDER VII RULE 11 CPC – Scope of enquiry – Court confined to plaint and documents filed therewith.

For deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court is required to examine the plaint and the documents annexed thereto. If on a meaningful reading thereof the suit appears barred by law or discloses no cause of action, the plaint is liable to be rejected at the threshold. Paras 12, 41, 49.

HINDU UNDIVIDED FAMILY (HUF) – Mere assertion of existence of HUF – Insufficient.

A bare or bald averment that a property belongs to an HUF or that a deceased ancestor was Karta of an HUF does not create a cause of action. Specific pleadings must disclose when and how the HUF came into existence and how each property acquired the character of HUF property. Paras 35, 37, 38, 40.

HUF Property – Post-1956 position – No presumption of HUF from ancestral inheritance.

After enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, there is no presumption that inherited ancestral property automatically assumes the character of HUF property. Detailed pleadings are necessary to establish creation or existence of an HUF and the manner in which the property became HUF property. Paras 35, 45.

Cause of Action – HUF Claim – Material facts mandatory.

A plaint asserting HUF rights must contain material facts constituting the cause of action, including particulars regarding creation of the HUF, source of acquisition, and circumstances by which the property became HUF property. Omission of such material facts renders the plaint devoid of a cause of action. Paras 39, 40.

Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Clever drafting – Illusory cause of action.

A plaint cannot be permitted to survive merely because it contains a cleverly drafted assertion intended to create an illusion of a cause of action. Courts must examine whether a real right to sue is disclosed and reject plaints founded upon vague, unsupported or illusory pleadings. Paras 42, 43, 44.

HUF – Absence of documentary support – Claim liable to rejection.

Where no document evidencing existence of an HUF is produced, the revenue records do not record any HUF, and the plaint contains only a bald assertion regarding HUF status, the plea of HUF cannot furnish a valid cause of action for a partition suit. Paras 38, 46.

Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma – Applicability.

The principles relating to coparcenary rights of daughters under amended Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act apply only where coparcenary/HUF property is established. In the absence of pleadings and material establishing existence of an HUF, reliance upon Vineeta Sharma is misconceived. Paras 45, 47.

Ratio Decidendi

Where agricultural land was governed by the Delhi Land Reforms Act and succession opened prior to 09.09.2005, rights devolve exclusively in accordance with Section 50 of the Act and become crystallised on the date of death of the Bhumidhar. Such vested rights are not affected by the subsequent amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, acquisition of land, or urbanisation. Further, a mere bald assertion that the property forms part of an HUF, unsupported by material pleadings showing when and how the HUF came into existence and how the property acquired HUF character, does not disclose a cause of action. A plaint founded upon such illusory pleadings is liable to rejection under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Paras 33–49.

Cases Referred

  1. Nathu v. Hukam Singh – followed – Paras 23, 25.
  2. Ram Mehar v. Mst. Dakhan – followed – Paras 24, 25.
  3. Nirmala v. Government of NCT of Delhi – followed – Paras 29, 30.
  4. Har Naraini Devi v. Union of India – relied upon – Para 31.
  5. Surender Kumar v. Dhani Ram – followed – Paras 35, 45.
  6. Kuldeep Mansukhani v. Indira Jhangiani – followed – Para 36.
  7. Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Association – relied upon – Paras 39, 40.
  8. ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal – relied upon – Para 42.
  9. T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal – relied upon – Para 43.
  10. Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma – distinguished – Paras 45, 47.
  11. CWT v. Chander Sen – referred – Para 35.
  12. Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar – referred – Paras 35, 36.

Santra Devi v. Santosh Kaushik & Ors., CS(OS) 188/2024, decided on 30.05.2026, Delhi High Court (Mini Pushkarna, J.).

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NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES ACT, 1985 – Section 37 – Commercial Quantity – Grant of Bail – Mandatory satisfaction of twin conditions. In cases involving commercial quantity of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, satisfaction of the twin conditions prescribed under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is a sine qua non for grant of bail. The Court must record its satisfaction that (i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence, and (ii) he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Paras 13, 14, 15, 17.

 

NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES ACT, 1985 – Section 37 – Commercial Quantity – Grant of Bail – Mandatory satisfaction of twin conditions.

In cases involving commercial quantity of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, satisfaction of the twin conditions prescribed under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is a sine qua non for grant of bail. The Court must record its satisfaction that (i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence, and (ii) he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Paras 13, 14, 15, 17.

NDPS Act – Section 37 – Commercial Quantity – Liberal approach in bail matters impermissible.

Where the offence involves commercial quantity, a liberal approach ordinarily applicable to bail jurisprudence cannot be adopted by ignoring the statutory restrictions contained in Section 37. The legislative mandate must be strictly complied with before releasing an accused on bail. Paras 14, 15, 17.

Bail – NDPS Act – Failure to consider twin conditions under Section 37 – Order granting bail liable to be set aside.

An order granting bail in a case involving commercial quantity, without any discussion or satisfaction regarding the twin conditions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), is legally unsustainable and liable to be set aside. Para 17.

NDPS Act – Commercial Quantity – Meaning of “reasonable grounds”.

The expression “reasonable grounds” occurring in Section 37 contemplates something more than a prima facie case. It requires substantial and probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty and necessitates existence of facts and circumstances sufficient to justify such satisfaction. Para 14.

Bail – NDPS Act – Criminal antecedents – Relevance.

Where the accused has antecedents involving offences of a similar nature under the NDPS Act, it cannot readily be concluded that he is not likely to commit an offence while on bail. Such antecedents are a relevant consideration while applying the second limb of Section 37(1)(b)(ii). Para 18.

NDPS Act – Commercial Quantity – Bail – Mere completion of investigation or filing of charge-sheet not sufficient.

In offences involving commercial quantity, completion of investigation, filing of charge-sheet, or absence of recovery from the accused by themselves do not dilute the mandatory requirements of Section 37. The statutory conditions continue to govern the exercise of bail jurisdiction. Paras 17, 18.

Article 21 – Personal Liberty – Prolonged incarceration – NDPS offences.

Though prolonged incarceration may in appropriate cases justify grant of bail on constitutional grounds under Article 21, such principle is not of universal application and must be balanced against the restrictions imposed by special statutes and the nature of the offence involved. Paras 19, 20.

NDPS Act – Bail – Incarceration of one year and seven months – Not prolonged incarceration.

Where the accused had undergone custody for only one year and seven months and the offence carried a punishment extending up to twenty years' imprisonment, such custody could not be regarded as prolonged incarceration warranting relaxation of the rigours of Section 37 on Article 21 considerations. Para 19.

Bail Jurisprudence – Special Statutes – Need for uniformity.

The Supreme Court noted that application of the principle of prolonged incarceration in bail matters under special statutes has not been uniform and similarly situated accused persons have received differing outcomes. The issue concerning the intersection of Article 21, prolonged incarceration and statutory restrictions has been referred for authoritative consideration in Tasleem Ahmed v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi. Paras 20, 21, 22.

NDPS Act – Drug Trafficking – Threat to national interest.

Drug trafficking constitutes a serious threat affecting public health and the national economy. In balancing competing considerations, the interest of society and the nation assumes paramount importance, particularly in offences involving organised drug networks. Para 22.

Ratio Decidendi

In prosecutions under the NDPS Act involving commercial quantity, grant of bail is governed by the stringent restrictions contained in Section 37. Unless the Court records satisfaction that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail, release on bail is impermissible. Failure to consider and record satisfaction regarding these statutory twin conditions renders the bail order unsustainable. Criminal antecedents and the gravity of organised drug trafficking are relevant factors while applying Section 37. Paras 13–18.

Important Legal Principles

  1. Section 37 creates additional restrictions over ordinary bail principles. Paras 13, 15.
  2. Recording satisfaction regarding the twin conditions is mandatory. Paras 14, 17.
  3. “Reasonable grounds” means more than a prima facie view. Para 14.
  4. Criminal antecedents are relevant while assessing likelihood of reoffending. Para 18.
  5. One year and seven months' custody is not prolonged incarceration in a case punishable up to twenty years. Para 19.
  6. Drug trafficking poses a serious threat to society, public health and national interest. Para 22.

Cases Referred

  1. State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo – followed and relied upon – Paras 10, 14.
  2. Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh – followed – Paras 10, 15.
  3. Ashok Dhankad v. State (NCT of Delhi) – referred – Para 12.
  4. State by Inspector of Police v. B. Ramu – relied upon – Para 15.
  5. Union of India v. Namdeo Ashruba Nakade – relied upon – Paras 16, 21.
  6. Collector of Customs v. Ahmadalieva Nodira – referred regarding meaning of “reasonable grounds” – Para 14.
  7. Rabi Prakash v. State of Odisha – referred – Para 21.
  8. Ankur Chaudhary v. State of Madhya Pradesh – referred – Para 21.
  9. Narcotic Control Bureau v. Lakhwinder Singh – referred – Para 21.
  10. Badsha Sk. v. State of West Bengal – referred – Para 21.
  11. Tasleem Ahmed v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi – reference noticed – Para 22.

State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh @ Billa, Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.896 of 2026, decided on 02.06.2026 (Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.). 

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Casual Labourers (Grant of Temporary Status and Regularisation) Scheme, 1991 – Temporary Status Casual Labourers – Pensionary Benefits – Entitlement despite absence of formal regularisation. A temporary status casual labourer who, after conferment of temporary status, completed three years of continuous service and became entitled to benefits admissible to temporary Group ‘D’ employees, is entitled to pensionary benefits on superannuation even in the absence of a formal order of regularisation. Paras 75, 76.

 

SERVICE LAW – Casual Labourers (Grant of Temporary Status and Regularisation) Scheme, 1991 – Temporary Status Casual Labourers – Pensionary Benefits – Entitlement despite absence of formal regularisation.

A temporary status casual labourer who, after conferment of temporary status, completed three years of continuous service and became entitled to benefits admissible to temporary Group ‘D’ employees, is entitled to pensionary benefits on superannuation even in the absence of a formal order of regularisation. Paras 75, 76.

Department of Posts – Casual Labourers (Grant of Temporary Status and Regularisation) Scheme, 1991 – Beneficial Scheme – Liberal Interpretation.

The 1991 Scheme is a beneficial and progressive framework intended to gradually integrate casual labourers into the regular service structure by extending service conditions and benefits associated with Group ‘D’ employees. The Scheme cannot be interpreted restrictively so as to defeat its object. Paras 52, 55.

Temporary Status Casual Labourers – Completion of three years’ service – Parity with temporary Group ‘D’ employees.

Upon completion of three years of continuous service after conferment of temporary status, casual labourers are to be treated at par with temporary Group ‘D’ employees and become entitled to all benefits admissible to such employees. The parity contemplated is parity of benefits and service conditions, though not identity of service status. Paras 49, 65, 68, 69.

Pension – Not dependent upon regularisation – Formal regularisation not a condition precedent.

Pensionary entitlement of temporary status casual labourers flows independently from the Scheme and the departmental circular dated 30.11.1992. Formal regularisation is not a condition precedent for entitlement to pension. Paras 57, 75, 76.

Casual Labourers (Grant of Temporary Status and Regularisation) Scheme, 1991 – Clause 6 – Interpretation.

Clause 6, which provides for counting 50% of temporary status service for retirement benefits after regularisation, does not create pensionary entitlement. It merely confers an additional benefit in cases where regularisation occurs. Absence of regularisation cannot extinguish the underlying entitlement to pension. Paras 56, 57.

Departmental Circular dated 30.11.1992 – Expression “such as” – Scope.

The expression “benefits admissible to temporary Group ‘D’ employees such as” employed in the circular dated 30.11.1992 is illustrative and not exhaustive. The benefits listed therein cannot be treated as a closed category. Pensionary benefits available to temporary Group ‘D’ employees are also covered by the parity contemplated under the Scheme. Paras 54, 55.

Temporary Status Casual Labourers – Long and uninterrupted service – Social security benefits.

Employees who have rendered long, continuous and uninterrupted service, have been conferred temporary status and have discharged duties identical to regular employees, cannot be denied pensionary and social security benefits merely because the employer failed to issue formal orders of regularisation. Paras 38, 40, 42.

Article 14 – Equality – State as model employer.

The State cannot continue to extract services of a permanent and continuous nature from employees while denying corresponding service benefits. Such action is contrary to the constitutional mandate of equality and the obligation of the State as a model employer. Paras 39, 40.

Pension – Constitutional status – Property under Article 300A.

Pension is not a bounty or gratuitous payment. It is a vested constitutional right and constitutes property within the meaning of Article 300A of the Constitution. Such right cannot be defeated by administrative inaction or denied on the plea of financial burden. Paras 41, 42, 74.

CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 – Rule 10(1-B) – Temporary Government Servants – Pension.

Rule 10(1-B) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 recognises entitlement of temporary Government servants who have rendered not less than ten years of service to superannuation pension, retirement gratuity and family pension under the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. Paras 71, 72.

Temporary Status Casual Labourers – Distinction between status and benefits.

Conferment of temporary status does not convert a casual labourer into a temporary Government servant. Nevertheless, after completion of three years’ service under temporary status, the employee becomes entitled to all benefits admissible to temporary Group ‘D’ employees. The distinction that survives is one of nomenclature and mode of regularisation, not of service benefits. Paras 67, 68.

Delay and Laches – Pension claims – Continuing cause of action.

A claim relating to pension constitutes a continuing cause of action and cannot be rejected solely on the ground of delay. However, arrears may be restricted in accordance with settled principles governing service jurisprudence. Para 81.

Pension – Arrears – Limitation.

Though entitlement to pension survives notwithstanding delay, arrears shall ordinarily be confined to three years and two months preceding the institution of proceedings before the Tribunal. Para 81.

Ratio Decidendi

A temporary status casual labourer under the Department of Posts, who after conferment of temporary status completed three years of continuous service and thereby became entitled to benefits admissible to temporary Group ‘D’ employees, is entitled to pensionary and retiral benefits under Rule 10(1-B) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 even in the absence of formal regularisation. The beneficial Scheme of 1991 and the departmental circular dated 30.11.1992 must be interpreted liberally to extend all benefits available to temporary Group ‘D’ employees, including pension. Administrative failure to regularise an employee cannot defeat a vested pensionary right earned through long years of service. Paras 55–57, 67–75, 76.

Important Principles Summarised

  1. Pension is a constitutional and statutory right, not a bounty. Paras 41, 42.
  2. Temporary status employees completing three years' service acquire parity of benefits with temporary Group ‘D’ employees. Paras 49, 65.
  3. Formal regularisation is not a prerequisite for pension. Paras 57, 75, 76.
  4. Clause 6 of the Scheme grants an additional benefit and does not restrict pensionary entitlement. Paras 56, 57.
  5. Pension claims constitute a continuing cause of action. Para 81.
  6. State cannot rely upon its own failure to regularise employees to deny pensionary benefits. Paras 40, 42, 75.

Cases Referred

  1. Jagrit Mazdoor Union v. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. – followed and relied upon – Paras 34, 43, 55, 56.
  2. Vinod Kumar v. Union of India – relied upon – Paras 35, 23.
  3. Jaggo v. Union of India – relied upon – Paras 36, 23.
  4. Yashwant Hari Katakkar v. Union of India – relied upon – Para 37.
  5. State of Jharkhand v. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava – relied upon – Paras 41, 74.
  6. M.L. Patil v. State of Goa – relied upon regarding continuing cause of action – Para 18, 81.
  7. Indian Council of Agricultural Research v. Santosh – distinguished/not accepted – Para 30.

Bhikhani Devi & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 28802-28804 of 2019, decided on 01.06.2026 (Sanjay Karol and Augustine George Masih, JJ.).

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Fair Price Shop Dealership – Compassionate/Dependent Quota – Exclusion of married daughter from definition of “family” – Constitutional validity. Exclusion of a married daughter from the definition of “family” for the purpose of allotment of a fair price shop under the dependent quota, solely on the basis of marital status, is constitutionally impermissible. Dependency, financial need, residence and ability to run the dealership are the relevant considerations. Marital status bears no rational nexus with the object of the scheme. Paras 18, 19, 22,

 

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA – Articles 14, 15(1), 21 and 39(a) – Fair Price Shop Dealership – Compassionate/Dependent Quota – Exclusion of married daughter from definition of “family” – Constitutional validity.

Exclusion of a married daughter from the definition of “family” for the purpose of allotment of a fair price shop under the dependent quota, solely on the basis of marital status, is constitutionally impermissible. Dependency, financial need, residence and ability to run the dealership are the relevant considerations. Marital status bears no rational nexus with the object of the scheme. Paras 18, 19, 22, 23.

Article 14 – Reasonable Classification – Married daughter excluded while married son included – Gender stereotype – Invalid classification.

A classification which treats a married daughter differently from a married son and proceeds on the assumption that upon marriage a daughter ceases to belong to her parental family is founded upon gender stereotypes and historical notions of inequality. Such classification lacks an intelligible differentia having rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved and violates Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution. Paras 19, 20, 23.

Dependency – Question of fact – Cannot be determined solely by marital status.

Dependency is a factual issue which must be determined on the basis of actual circumstances. It cannot be conclusively presumed that a married daughter is not dependent upon her parents merely because she is married. Equally, inclusion of a son cannot automatically establish dependency. Para 19.

Compassionate/Dependent Allotment Scheme – Object of scheme.

The purpose of allotment of a fair price shop under the dependent quota is not to create a right of inheritance or succession in the dealership but to provide immediate financial relief to the dependent family of the deceased dealer and to ensure continuity of the public distribution system. Paras 15, 22.

Local Residence Requirement – Married daughter – Blanket exclusion impermissible.

Whether a married daughter satisfies the requirement of local residence is a matter to be determined on the facts of each case. A blanket exclusion of all married daughters on the speculative assumption that they necessarily reside in their matrimonial homes is constitutionally unsustainable. Para 21.

Doctrine of Purposive Construction – Welfare legislation – Interpretation consistent with constitutional values.

Where literal interpretation of a provision produces a result inconsistent with constitutional guarantees of equality and non-discrimination, the Court must adopt a purposive interpretation which advances the object of the scheme and avoids arbitrary or unjust consequences. Paras 24, 25.

Purposive Interpretation – Expression ‘unmarried, legally separated and widowed daughters’ – Inclusion of married daughters.

The expression “unmarried, legally separated and widowed daughters” occurring in the definition of family is illustrative and not exhaustive. In the context of a welfare-oriented scheme, the expression must be construed to include married daughters who establish dependency and satisfy all other eligibility requirements. Paras 25, 26.

Welfare Schemes – Constitutional Interpretation – Gender Equality.

Welfare schemes must be interpreted in a manner consistent with constitutional commitments to substantive equality and social justice. Marital status cannot constitute a valid ground to deny benefits to an otherwise eligible daughter where dependency remains established. Paras 14, 23, 25, 27.

Public Distribution System – Fair Price Shop – Married daughter residing with deceased dealer and assisting in shop operations – Entitlement.

Where a married daughter continued to reside with her mother even after marriage, actively assisted in operating the fair price shop, remained dependent upon the family and assumed responsibility of maintaining other dependent sisters after the mother's death, rejection of her claim solely on the ground of marriage was arbitrary and illegal. Paras 28, 29.

Constitutional Law – Manifest Arbitrariness – Gender-based presumptions.

State action founded upon presumptions that a married daughter automatically ceases to be part of her parental family and loses all dependency upon it is manifestly arbitrary and violative of constitutional guarantees of equality. Paras 19, 20, 23.

Ratio Decidendi

For the purpose of allotment of a fair price shop under the dependent quota, dependency and fulfilment of eligibility conditions are the governing considerations. Exclusion of a married daughter solely on the basis of marital status is founded upon impermissible gender stereotypes, violates Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution and frustrates the object of the welfare scheme. The expression “daughter” in Clause 2(p) of the Uttar Pradesh Essential Commodities (Regulation of Sale and Distribution) Control Order, 2016 includes a married daughter who establishes dependency, local residence and satisfies other prescribed eligibility conditions. Paras 18–26.

Principles of Law Declared

  1. Marital status is not a valid criterion to determine dependency. Para 19.
  2. Married daughters cannot be excluded from welfare benefits solely because of marriage. Paras 20, 23.
  3. Dependency is a factual issue requiring individual determination. Paras 19, 21.
  4. Welfare schemes must be interpreted consistently with Articles 14 and 15. Paras 14, 24, 25.
  5. Purposive interpretation must prevail where literal interpretation produces unconstitutional results. Paras 24, 25.
  6. The expression “daughter” includes married daughters if dependency and other eligibility conditions are established. Paras 25, 26.

Cases Referred

  1. Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar – relied upon – Para 17.
  2. Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar – relied upon – Para 17.
  3. Shayara Bano v. Union of India – referred – Para 17.
  4. K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India – referred – Para 17.
  5. Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India – referred – Para 17.
  6. Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishan Lulla – relied upon – Para 24.
  7. Vimla Srivastava v. State of U.P. – approved – Para 27.
  8. Saida Begum v. State of U.P. – overruled – Para 27.
  9. Smt. Kusumlata v. State of U.P. – overruled – Para 27.

Kulsum Nisha v. State of U.P. & Ors., Civil Appeal No.7667 of 2025, decided on 02-06-2026 (Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Alok Aradhe, JJ.). 

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