Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Sections 8, 10 and 19 – Succession to separate property of male Hindu dying intestate – Nature of rights acquired by widow and daughters – Tenants-in-common and not joint tenants – Legal necessity – Karta doctrine inapplicable.

 

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Sections 8, 10 and 19 – Succession to separate property of male Hindu dying intestate – Nature of rights acquired by widow and daughters – Tenants-in-common and not joint tenants – Legal necessity – Karta doctrine inapplicable.

Where a male Hindu dies intestate leaving separate/self-acquired property, succession opens under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. The widow and daughters succeed simultaneously as Class-I heirs and take definite shares in the property. By virtue of Section 19, they hold the property as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants. Consequently, the doctrine of survivorship has no application and each heir acquires a distinct and identifiable share. Paras 5, 6, 8.

---

Joint Tenancy and Tenancy-in-Common – Distinction explained.

In joint tenancy, ownership is joint and indivisible, governed by survivorship, and no co-owner possesses a separately inheritable share. In tenancy-in-common, each co-owner possesses a distinct though undivided share, which devolves upon his or her own heirs by succession. Hindu law generally recognizes joint tenancy only in the context of coparcenary, whereas succession under the Hindu Succession Act creates tenancy-in-common. Paras 7.

---

Hindu Law – Coparcenary – Property inherited under Section 8 – Whether becomes HUF property – No.

Property devolving upon an heir under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act is inherited in the heir's individual capacity and does not automatically acquire the character of coparcenary or Hindu Undivided Family property. Descendants do not obtain rights in such property by birth. The principles laid down in CWT v. Chander Sen, Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar and M. Arumugam v. Ammaniammal reaffirmed. Paras 7.

---

Karta – Alienation for legal necessity – Pre-condition – Existence of coparcenary/joint family property.

The power of a karta to alienate family property for legal necessity arises only in relation to joint family/coparcenary property. Where heirs succeed under Section 8 and hold the property as tenants-in-common with separate shares, no heir can claim authority as karta over the shares belonging to the others. Paras 7, 8.

---

Widow succeeding to intestate property – Extent of authority.

Upon intestate succession, the widow acquires only her own statutory share. She is competent to deal with or alienate only that share and has no authority to alienate the shares vested in other heirs on the plea of legal necessity. Para 8.

---

Partition Suit – Sale executed by widow claiming to act as karta for marriage expenses of daughter – Validity.

Where the deceased's separate property devolved equally upon widow and four daughters, each acquiring 1/5th share as tenants-in-common, the widow could not validly alienate the property as karta for meeting marriage expenses or any alleged legal necessity. Such alienation could operate, if at all, only to the extent of her own 1/5th share. Para 8.

---

Ratio Decidendi

Upon the death of Dajiba, his widow and four daughters succeeded to his separate property under Sections 8 and 10 of the Hindu Succession Act and became tenants-in-common under Section 19, each holding a distinct 1/5th share. Since the property was not coparcenary property and the heirs did not constitute a joint tenancy, the widow could not act as karta nor alienate the shares of the other heirs on the ground of legal necessity. The High Court rightly restored the trial court decree and the appeal was dismissed. Paras 5–9.

---

Cases Referred

1. Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ram Chund Dutt – referred – Para 7.
2. Nawab Nisar Ali Khan v. Sardar Nawazish Ali Khan – referred – Para 7.
3. Azizun Nisa v. Assistant Custodian – referred – Para 7.
4. In re Schar Midland Bank Executor and Trustee Co. Ltd. v. Damer – referred – Para 7.
5. CWT v. Chander Sen – relied on – Para 7.
6. Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar – relied on – Para 7.
7. M. Arumugam v. Ammaniammal – relied on – Para 7.

Darubai & Anr. v. Kamalabai & Ors., Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.13232 of 2022, decided on 01-06-2026, Supreme Court of India (Sanjay Karol & Augustine George Masih, JJ.)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Ss.34 and 37 — Scope of interference with arbitral award — Re-appreciation of evidence — Computational objection — Adjustment of mobilization advance. Jurisdiction under Section 37 being narrower than jurisdiction under Section 34, appellate Court cannot undertake fresh factual determination or re-appreciation of evidence relating to computation and reconciliation of accounts between parties. Where arbitral award and material on record disclosed that mobilization advance and recoveries thereof had been duly accounted for, challenge alleging excess award on account of non-adjustment, founded merely on speculative apprehension and not on demonstrable patent illegality, does not warrant interference under Sections 34 or 37. (Paras 23 to 40)

 Delhi High Court held that 

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Ss.34 and 37 — Scope of interference with arbitral award — Re-appreciation of evidence — Computational objection — Adjustment of mobilization advance.

Jurisdiction under Section 37 being narrower than jurisdiction under Section 34, appellate Court cannot undertake fresh factual determination or re-appreciation of evidence relating to computation and reconciliation of accounts between parties. Where arbitral award and material on record disclosed that mobilization advance and recoveries thereof had been duly accounted for, challenge alleging excess award on account of non-adjustment, founded merely on speculative apprehension and not on demonstrable patent illegality, does not warrant interference under Sections 34 or 37.
(Paras 23 to 40)

---

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Ss.34 and 37 — Patent illegality — Scope.

Interference with arbitral award under Sections 34 and 37 is confined to cases involving patent illegality, perversity, jurisdictional error or violation of fundamental legal principles. Appellate Court under Section 37 does not sit in appeal over findings of arbitral tribunal and cannot substitute its own view on facts or computation.
(Paras 23 to 29, 42)

---

FACTS OF THE CASE

1. Disputes arose between parties out of contract agreement relating to execution of works and same were referred to arbitration in terms of arbitration clause contained in contract.
   
2. Arbitral Tribunal passed award granting various claims in favour of claimant including Claim No.6 relating to wrongful encashment of Performance Bank Guarantee (PBG).
   
3. Employer challenged arbitral award under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act contending that while awarding amount under Claim No.6, Arbitrator failed to account for adjustment of mobilization advance, thereby resulting in excess payment.
   
4. Learned Single Judge dismissed Section 34 petition holding that plea regarding adjustment had not been raised before Arbitrator and that findings of Arbitrator did not warrant interference under Section 34.
   
5. In appeal under Section 37, challenge was confined only to Claim No.6 and appellant contended that amount awarded suffered from computational illegality due to alleged duplication and non-adjustment of mobilization advance.
   
6. Respondent asserted that mobilization advance had already been fully adjusted and accounted for in arbitral award including through recoveries made from running account bills and encashment of bank guarantee.
   

---

ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

The Division Bench undertook detailed examination of the limited scope of appellate interference under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

The Court reiterated settled principle that jurisdiction under Section 37 is even more circumscribed than jurisdiction under Section 34 and does not permit appellate Court to reassess evidence or substitute its own factual conclusions for those of arbitral tribunal.

Relying upon precedents including MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., UHL Power Co. Limited v. State of Himachal Pradesh and NHAI v. M. Hakeem, the Court held that interference is permissible only in cases involving patent illegality, perversity or jurisdictional infirmity.

The Court then examined contention relating to alleged non-adjustment of mobilization advance. It noted that Claim No.6 related to wrongful invocation of Performance Bank Guarantee whereas Claim No.7 independently dealt with recovery and adjustment of mobilization advance.

The Court found from arbitral award and affidavit filed by respondent that recoveries towards mobilization advance, including recoveries through running account bills and encashment of bank guarantee, had already been taken into account by Arbitrator while computing amounts payable.

The Division Bench held that appellant’s plea essentially invited Court to undertake fresh reconciliation of accounts and re-appreciation of computation, which is impermissible within narrow scope of Sections 34 and 37.

The Court further observed that challenge rested merely on speculative apprehension regarding duplication and not upon any demonstrable patent illegality apparent on face of award. Consequently, no ground for interference was made out.

---

RATIO DECIDENDI

In proceedings under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Court cannot undertake fresh factual determination, re-appreciation of evidence or reconciliation of accounts relating to arbitral computation, and where arbitral award together with material on record demonstrates that recoveries and adjustments have been duly accounted for, a challenge alleging excess award founded only on speculative apprehension and not on demonstrable patent illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error, does not warrant interference with the arbitral award.
(Paras 23 to 42)

Anticipatory bail — Scope of jurisdiction while deciding bail application — Departmental enquiry against police officials — Judicial overreach. While considering application for anticipatory bail, Court is confined to question of grant or refusal of bail and cannot travel beyond scope of proceedings by directing departmental enquiry against police officials, monitoring disciplinary proceedings or passing adverse remarks unrelated to adjudication of bail application. After disposal of anticipatory bail application, Court becomes functus officio and cannot continue proceedings by calling status reports or supervising departmental action. (Paras 12 to 18)

 

Delhi High Court 

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S.438 — Anticipatory bail — Scope of jurisdiction while deciding bail application — Departmental enquiry against police officials — Judicial overreach.

While considering application for anticipatory bail, Court is confined to question of grant or refusal of bail and cannot travel beyond scope of proceedings by directing departmental enquiry against police officials, monitoring disciplinary proceedings or passing adverse remarks unrelated to adjudication of bail application. After disposal of anticipatory bail application, Court becomes functus officio and cannot continue proceedings by calling status reports or supervising departmental action.
(Paras 12 to 18)

---

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Judicial discipline — Adverse remarks against public officials — Principles of natural justice.

Adverse or disparaging remarks against police officials cannot be made without affording opportunity of hearing, particularly where such remarks prejudge conduct of officials and affect disciplinary proceedings. Courts should refrain from unnecessary castigatory observations regarding investigation unless absolutely necessary for adjudication of lis.
(Paras 9, 15 to 17)

---

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Bail proceedings — Scope — Functus officio.

Once anticipatory bail application stands finally disposed of, nothing survives before Court and continuation of proceedings thereafter by summoning officials, calling explanations or monitoring disciplinary proceedings is wholly without jurisdiction.
(Paras 14 and 15)

---

FACTS OF THE CASE

1. FIR was registered under Section 363 IPC concerning missing minor girl and during investigation offences under Sections 328 and 376 IPC and Section 4 of POCSO Act were added.
   
2. Investigation was conducted by different Investigating Officers from time to time and during pendency of investigation one co-accused moved application for anticipatory bail before Sessions Court.
   
3. While disposing of anticipatory bail application, Sessions Court called for status reports regarding delay in investigation and directed appearance of previous IOs and SHOs.
   
4. Subsequently, Sessions Court ordered departmental enquiry against concerned police officials and called for explanations from supervisory officers regarding alleged delay in investigation.
   
5. Petitioners challenged said orders contending that after disposal of anticipatory bail application the Sessions Court had become functus officio and exceeded jurisdiction by continuing proceedings and directing disciplinary action.
   
6. Petitioners further contended that adverse remarks and directions for departmental enquiry were issued without affording them opportunity of hearing, thereby violating principles of natural justice.
   

---

ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

The High Court examined permissible scope of jurisdiction exercised by a Court while deciding an application for anticipatory bail.

The Court reiterated that while adjudicating a bail application, jurisdiction of the Court remains confined to determination whether bail ought to be granted or refused. Bail proceedings cannot be converted into supervisory proceedings concerning administration of police department or disciplinary control over investigating officials.

Relying upon decision of the Supreme Court in State v. M. Murugesan, the Court held that even laudable objectives cannot justify exercise of jurisdiction beyond statutory limits while deciding bail matters.

The Court further held that once anticipatory bail application stood finally disposed of, the Sessions Court became functus officio and no proceedings survived thereafter. Consequently, continuation of proceedings by calling status reports, summoning police officials, directing departmental enquiries and monitoring such proceedings was wholly impermissible.

The judgment also emphasized principles of natural justice governing adverse judicial remarks against public officials. The Court held that disparaging remarks affecting reputation and disciplinary prospects of officials cannot be made without giving them opportunity of hearing.

The High Court further observed that unnecessary castigatory observations against investigating officers are to be avoided, particularly where such remarks are not essential for adjudication of controversy before Court.

Accordingly, impugned orders directing departmental enquiry and all consequential proceedings were set aside and adverse remarks expunged.

---

RATIO DECIDENDI

While adjudicating an application for anticipatory bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the jurisdiction of the Court is confined solely to consideration of grant or refusal of bail, and after disposal of the bail application the Court becomes functus officio and cannot continue proceedings by directing or monitoring departmental enquiries against police officials, calling status reports or passing adverse remarks unrelated to adjudication of bail; and disparaging remarks affecting public officials cannot be made without affording them an opportunity of hearing in conformity with principles of natural justice.
(Paras 12 to 19)

Cross-examination — Closure of opportunity — One final opportunity — Grant of costs. Where party failed to cross-examine defence witness despite earlier opportunities, High Court in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 granted one final opportunity for cross-examination subject to payment of costs, holding that denial of opportunity would cause grave prejudice and that interests of justice would be adequately balanced by compensating opposite party through costs. (Paras 6 to 8)

 

Delhi High Court held that 

Constitution of India — Art.227 — Supervisory jurisdiction — Cross-examination — Closure of opportunity — One final opportunity — Grant of costs.

Where party failed to cross-examine defence witness despite earlier opportunities, High Court in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 granted one final opportunity for cross-examination subject to payment of costs, holding that denial of opportunity would cause grave prejudice and that interests of justice would be adequately balanced by compensating opposite party through costs.
(Paras 6 to 8)

---

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Procedural law — Opportunity to lead evidence and cross-examination — Approach of Court.

Procedural rules are intended to advance cause of justice. Opportunity to cross-examine material witness may be granted upon terms where refusal would result in prejudice and inconvenience caused to opposite party can be compensated monetarily.
(Para 8)

---

FACTS OF THE CASE

1. Petitioner invoked supervisory jurisdiction of High Court under Article 227 of Constitution challenging orders passed by Trial Court dismissing applications for bringing additional documents on record and for striking off defence.
2. During hearing before High Court, petitioner confined relief only to grant of opportunity to cross-examine DW-1.
3. Petitioner contended that denial of opportunity to cross-examine defence witness would cause grave prejudice to its case.
4. Respondents opposed petition contending that sufficient opportunities had already been granted earlier and petitioner failed to avail same.
5. High Court considered rival submissions and examined whether further opportunity ought to be granted in interests of justice.

---

ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

The High Court exercised supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution in relation to procedural orders passed by the Trial Court.

The Court noticed that though the petitioner had earlier failed to cross-examine DW-1 despite opportunities granted by the Trial Court, complete denial of opportunity to cross-examine the witness could seriously prejudice adjudication of the petitioner’s case.

The Court adopted a balanced procedural approach by recognizing two competing considerations:

• necessity to avoid prejudice caused by denial of cross-examination; and
• need to compensate opposite party for delay and inconvenience caused by repeated defaults.

The judgment reflects settled procedural jurisprudence that rules of procedure are intended to facilitate adjudication on merits and not to defeat substantive justice.

Accordingly, while disapproving petitioner’s earlier conduct, the Court held that interests of justice would be sufficiently protected by granting one final opportunity for cross-examination subject to payment of costs to respondents.

The Court therefore granted a single effective opportunity to cross-examine DW-1 upon payment of Rs.3,000/- as costs.

---

RATIO DECIDENDI

In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, High Court may grant one final opportunity to cross-examine a witness despite earlier defaults by the party, where denial of such opportunity would cause grave prejudice to adjudication of the case, and inconvenience caused to opposite party can be adequately compensated by imposition of costs.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order XII Rule 6 — Judgment on admissions — Scope — Recovery suit — Admissions in e-mails — Refund of advance amount — Preliminary decree. Where correspondence exchanged through e-mails clearly disclosed unequivocal admission by defendant regarding refund of specified amount after agreed deductions towards modification charges, Court was justified in passing decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC to extent of admitted liability, while leaving disputed balance claims for trial. Conditional stipulation regarding time of repayment did not dilute clear admission of liability to refund admitted amount. (Paras 51 to 56)

 

Delhi High Court held that

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order XII Rule 6 — Judgment on admissions — Scope — Recovery suit — Admissions in e-mails — Refund of advance amount — Preliminary decree.

Where correspondence exchanged through e-mails clearly disclosed unequivocal admission by defendant regarding refund of specified amount after agreed deductions towards modification charges, Court was justified in passing decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC to extent of admitted liability, while leaving disputed balance claims for trial. Conditional stipulation regarding time of repayment did not dilute clear admission of liability to refund admitted amount.
(Paras 51 to 56)

---

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order XII Rule 6 — Admission — Nature of admission required.

For exercise of jurisdiction under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, admission must be clear, categorical and unambiguous. Once defendant unequivocally admits liability to refund definite amount, Court can decree suit to that extent notwithstanding subsisting disputes relating to remaining claims or allegations regarding breach of contract.
(Paras 51 to 55)

---

FACTS OF THE CASE

1. Plaintiff instituted suit for recovery of amounts arising out of transactions relating to supply of screen-printing and allied machinery pursuant to purchase orders issued in favour of defendant.
   
2. Plaintiff alleged delay and failure in supply of one of machines and consequently cancelled purchase order seeking refund of advance amount paid to defendant.
   
3. Defendant contended that delay occurred due to non-payment of second instalment by plaintiff and asserted that substantial expenditure had already been incurred towards manufacture and modification of machinery.
   
4. Plaintiff filed application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC relying upon e-mail correspondence wherein defendant agreed to refund advance amount after deduction of specified sum towards modification charges.
   
5. Trial Court found clear admission regarding refund of Rs.4,98,500/- and passed preliminary decree to that extent while directing trial to continue regarding remaining disputed claims.
   
6. Defendants challenged decree contending that correspondence did not constitute unequivocal admission and that several disputed questions required adjudication after full trial.
   

---

ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

The High Court examined scope of Order XII Rule 6 CPC relating to judgment on admissions.

The Court undertook detailed analysis of e-mail correspondence exchanged between parties after cancellation of purchase order. The Court found that defendant had consistently acknowledged receipt of advance amount and had expressly agreed to refund the amount after deduction of Rs.2,10,000/- towards modification costs required for converting specially manufactured machinery into standard form for sale to another customer.

The Court observed that e-mail dated 14.12.2015 specifically stated that advance would be refunded after deducting Rs.2,10,000/- and thereby unequivocally admitted liability to refund balance amount of Rs.4,98,500/-.

The judgment clarifies that existence of disputes regarding breach of contract, delay in delivery or entitlement to additional claims does not preclude passing of decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC where part liability stands clearly admitted.

The Court further held that stipulation regarding timing of repayment, namely refund upon securing another customer or before end of financial year, merely qualified the mode or timing of payment and did not dilute substantive admission of liability itself.

Accordingly, Trial Court was justified in partly decreeing suit to extent of admitted amount while leaving remaining disputed claims to be adjudicated after evidence.

---

RATIO DECIDENDI

Where correspondence exchanged between parties contains clear and unequivocal admission by defendant acknowledging liability to refund a definite amount after agreed deductions, Court is empowered under Order XII Rule 6 CPC to pass decree to extent of such admitted liability notwithstanding pendency of disputes relating to remaining claims, and a stipulation regarding timing or manner of repayment does not detract from the unequivocal nature of the admission.
(Paras 51 to 56)