Order VII Rule 11(d) — Rejection of plaint on ground of limitation — Scope of enquiry at threshold stage. For deciding rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC, only plaint averments and documents filed along with plaint can be considered. If limitation involves disputed questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact requiring evidence, plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold. — Paras 29 to 34.

 apex court held that 

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order VII Rule 11(d) — Rejection of plaint on ground of limitation — Scope of enquiry at threshold stage.

For deciding rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC, only plaint averments and documents filed along with plaint can be considered. If limitation involves disputed questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact requiring evidence, plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold.
— Paras 29 to 34.

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Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Suit for specific performance — Limitation under Article 54 of Limitation Act — Actual knowledge of refusal — Triable issue.

Where plaintiff specifically pleaded that knowledge of registered sale deeds and gift deed was acquired only in January, 2010 and suit was filed within three years thereof, the issue whether plaintiff had earlier notice or deemed notice was held to be a triable issue requiring evidence and could not be decided at the stage of registration of plaint.
— Paras 35 to 38.

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Limitation Act, 1963 — Article 54 — “Date fixed for performance” and “notice of refusal” — Distinction explained.

The High Court reiterated that Article 54 contains two distinct limbs. Where no specific date for performance is fixed in the agreement, limitation begins from the date when plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. Such date of refusal and date of knowledge are matters requiring adjudication on evidence.
— Paras 15 to 24.

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Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — Section 3 — Constructive/deemed notice — Registered document — Applicability at threshold stage.

The Court held that deemed notice under Section 3 and Explanation I of the Transfer of Property Act cannot automatically be imputed at the stage of Order VII Rule 11 CPC merely because sale deeds were registered. Whether plaintiff had actual knowledge earlier, or whether there was wilful abstention from enquiry or gross negligence, are matters requiring trial and evidence.
— Paras 25 to 28, 35 to 37.

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Constructive notice — Wilful abstention or gross negligence — Question of fact.

The Court reiterated that constructive notice under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act is ordinarily a question of fact or mixed question of fact and law dependent upon evidence and surrounding circumstances of each case.
— Paras 26 to 28.

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Specific Performance Suit — Registration stage — Trial Court exceeded jurisdiction in rejecting plaint.

The Trial Court rejected the plaint at SR stage holding that suit ought to have been filed within three years from date of registered sale deeds and gift deed executed in 2004. The High Court held that such rejection was unsustainable since plaint specifically pleaded actual knowledge only in January, 2010 and suit filed on 08.03.2010 was prima facie within limitation.
— Paras 7, 8, 35 to 39.

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Order VII Rule 11 CPC — Defence of defendants irrelevant at threshold stage.

At the stage of considering rejection of plaint, defence pleaded by defendants or grounds raised in written statement cannot be looked into. Plaint averments alone must be accepted as correct for deciding whether suit is barred by law.
— Paras 30 to 33.

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Plaint — Revival after wrongful rejection — Direction to register suit.

Upon setting aside rejection order, the High Court directed revival and registration of plaint with liberty to Trial Court to decide limitation issue independently during trial uninfluenced by observations in appellate judgment.
— Paras 39 to 41. 

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections ...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections ...: advocatemmmohan ap high court held that  Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 2(1)(e), 9, 20 & 42 — Seat of arbitration vis...

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 2(1)(e), 9, 20 & 42 — Seat of arbitration vis-à-vis venue/place of arbitration — Contra indicia clause — Exclusive civil court jurisdiction clause — Effect.

Where the arbitration clause provided that “arbitration proceedings shall be held in Hyderabad only”, but another clause specifically conferred exclusive jurisdiction upon Civil Courts in East Godavari District “to the exclusion of all other courts”, the High Court held that the latter clause constituted a “contra indicia” demonstrating that Hyderabad was only the venue/place of arbitration and not the juridical seat. Consequently, Courts in East Godavari District alone possessed territorial jurisdiction to entertain proceedings under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.
— Paras 21 to 24, 46 & 47.

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Arbitration Agreement — Interpretation of arbitration clause and jurisdiction clause — Harmonious construction — Both clauses must be given effect.

The Court held that Clause 57 (arbitration clause) and Clause 58 (exclusive jurisdiction clause) must be read conjointly and harmoniously. An interpretation treating Hyderabad as the juridical seat would render Clause 58 otiose. The parties’ intention, gathered from the agreement as a whole, showed that Hyderabad was intended merely as a convenient venue for arbitral sittings while jurisdiction was consciously vested in Courts at East Godavari District alone.
— Paras 21 to 24.

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Commercial Courts — Arbitration proceedings — Territorial jurisdiction — Commercial Court wrongly declined jurisdiction.

The High Court held that the Commercial Court erred in dismissing the Section 9 petition for lack of territorial jurisdiction on the assumption that Hyderabad was the seat of arbitration. Since exclusive jurisdiction was vested in Civil Courts at East Godavari District, the Commercial Court at Visakhapatnam had jurisdiction to entertain the petition.
— Paras 9 to 12, 24 & 46.

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Seat of arbitration — Mere use of expression “arbitration proceedings shall be held at…” not always determinative of juridical seat.

The Court reiterated that merely stating that arbitration proceedings “shall be held” at a particular place does not conclusively determine the juridical seat where other clauses in the agreement indicate a contrary intention. Presence of an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of another court operates as significant contra indicia negating inference of seat.
— Paras 22 to 24.

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Arbitration and Conciliation Act — Section 9 proceedings — Territorial jurisdiction governed by contractual intention of parties.

The Court held that in arbitration matters, territorial jurisdiction depends upon the juridical seat chosen by parties or the court expressly vested with exclusive jurisdiction under the agreement. Jurisdiction clauses excluding all other courts are enforceable and binding.
— Paras 11, 12, 21 to 24.

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Development Agreement-cum-General Power of Attorney (DAGPA) — Delay in project — Section 9 petition seeking injunction against alienation and development — Maintainability.

The appellant filed Section 9 proceedings seeking injunction restraining alienation, encumbrance and development of scheduled property and seeking deposit of sale consideration amount pending arbitration. The Commercial Court dismissed the petition solely on territorial jurisdiction without adjudicating merits. The High Court examined only jurisdictional issue arising from Clauses 57 and 58 of DAGPA.
— Paras 1 to 9.

Judgment — Pronouncement in open Court — Whether oral dictation/transcript/video recording prevails over signed order — Held, No. The Court rejected the contention that transcript of oral dictation in Court, allegedly recorded from YouTube video proceedings, constituted the binding order. It was held that draft dictation remains subject to judicial correction and refinement before signing and uploading. The signed order embodies the final unalterable expression of the Court’s opinion. — Paras 5, 6, 27 to 29.

 apex court held that 

Supreme Court Rules, 2013 — Order XII Rules 1 & 3 — Constitution of India — Article 145(4) — Difference between dictated draft order and signed order — Signed order alone is final and binding.

The Supreme Court held that the digitally signed and uploaded order alone constitutes the final operative order of the Court. Dictation given in open Court to the Court Master is merely a draft order subject to correction, refinement, enhancement and removal of accidental omissions or inclusions before signing. Unless material changes affecting substantive rights are introduced, no rehearing is necessary prior to signing of the final order.
— Paras 15, 23 to 30.

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Practice and Procedure — Miscellaneous Application in disposed matters — Maintainability — Scope extremely limited.

The Court reiterated that miscellaneous applications in disposed matters are maintainable only for correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes or where executory directions have become impossible to implement due to subsequent events. A miscellaneous application seeking to rewrite or nullify a final signed order is not maintainable and amounts to abuse of process of Court.
— Paras 16 to 19.

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Judgment — Pronouncement in open Court — Whether oral dictation/transcript/video recording prevails over signed order — Held, No.

The Court rejected the contention that transcript of oral dictation in Court, allegedly recorded from YouTube video proceedings, constituted the binding order. It was held that draft dictation remains subject to judicial correction and refinement before signing and uploading. The signed order embodies the final unalterable expression of the Court’s opinion.
— Paras 5, 6, 27 to 29.

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Judicial Orders — Material change vis-à-vis correction/refinement — Test explained.

The Court held that changes between oral dictation and final signed order regarding disposal of writ petition and omission of “status quo” direction were merely corrections and refinements and not material changes altering the substantive outcome of the case. Therefore, rehearing of parties was unnecessary.
— Paras 23 to 25.

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Court Practice — Dictation in open Court — Practical necessity due to docket explosion — Judicial observations.

The Court recognised the practical necessity of dictating skeletal draft orders in open Court and later refining them in chambers because of heavy judicial workload and docket pressure. Such practice was held permissible so long as substantive/material alterations are not introduced without rehearing.
— Paras 27 to 29.

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Review/Clarification Application — Misconceived attempt to challenge final order under guise of clarification — Deprecated.

The Court held that an application seeking declaration that signed order “has no force of law” was thoroughly misconceived and amounted to an attempt to undermine dignity and authority of the Court. Filing of such miscellaneous applications in disposed matters was strongly deprecated.
— Paras 18, 19 & 30.

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Costs — Frivolous and abusive miscellaneous application — Exemplary costs imposed.

Finding the application frivolous and abusive, the Court imposed symbolic exemplary costs of ₹2,000 each on applicants payable to the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.
— Para 31.

Criminal Procedure — Quashing of FIR — Civil dispute and criminality — Mere pendency of civil proceedings does not exclude criminal prosecution where allegations disclose forgery, cheating and fraudulent alienation of property. The Court held that where allegations disclose repeated fraudulent sale of society properties on the basis of forged documents, pendency of civil disputes regarding management or title cannot by itself justify quashing criminal proceedings at threshold. Multiple FIRs alleging forgery, cheating and unauthorized sale of society lands across different States warranted thorough investigation. — Paras 9 to 13.

 

Constitution of India — Article 226 — Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — Section 193(3) — Interim orders in quashing petitions — High Court cannot ordinarily restrain filing of police report/charge-sheet while permitting investigation to continue.

The Supreme Court held that though the High Court may, in an appropriate case, protect an accused from coercive steps during pendency of proceedings under Article 226, a direction restraining the Investigating Officer from filing a police report under Section 193(3) BNSS while permitting investigation to continue is ordinarily unjustified. The Court held that the High Court misapplied the decision in Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra.
— Paras 14 to 16.

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Criminal Procedure — Quashing of FIR — Civil dispute and criminality — Mere pendency of civil proceedings does not exclude criminal prosecution where allegations disclose forgery, cheating and fraudulent alienation of property.

The Court held that where allegations disclose repeated fraudulent sale of society properties on the basis of forged documents, pendency of civil disputes regarding management or title cannot by itself justify quashing criminal proceedings at threshold. Multiple FIRs alleging forgery, cheating and unauthorized sale of society lands across different States warranted thorough investigation.
— Paras 9 to 13.

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Societies Registration Act, 1860 — Dispute regarding management of society — Unauthorized alienation of society property — Court’s concern regarding repeated fraudulent transfers.

The Court noticed that rival groups claiming management of the society were repeatedly alienating valuable lands of the society despite pendency of civil and criminal proceedings and subsisting court orders. The Court expressed serious concern regarding continuing sale of society lands contrary to the object and purpose of the society.
— Paras 12, 13 & 19.

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Investigation — Land scam/fraudulent alienation of property — Constitution of Special Investigation Team (SIT) — Scope.

Considering allegations of organized fraudulent sale of society lands through forged documents, the Supreme Court directed constitution of an SIT under supervision of Chief Secretary, Uttar Pradesh, with Registrar of Societies as one of the members, to conduct comprehensive fact-finding enquiry regarding alienation of society properties and fraudulent transfers.
— Paras 17 & 18.

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Criminal Investigation — SIT — Fair and unobstructed investigation — Duty to act uninfluenced and maintain rule of law.

The Court directed that the SIT shall investigate all stakeholders impartially and uninfluenced by extraneous considerations. The SIT was granted liberty to examine all transactions and submit report for further criminal action wherever fraudulent conduct involving mens rea is disclosed.
— Paras 18 & 19.

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Article 226 — Scope of jurisdiction after filing of charge-sheet/cognizance — Distinction between writ jurisdiction and inherent powers explained.

The Supreme Court clarified that before cognizance is taken, challenge to FIR/charge-sheet may lie under Article 226. However, once cognizance is taken, recourse ordinarily lies under Section 482 CrPC / Section 528 BNSS and not under Article 226. The Court explained the ratio of Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni.
— Paras 15 & 16.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Language rights — Rajasthani language — Exclusion ...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Language rights — Rajasthani language — Exclusion ...: advocatemmmohan Constitution of India — Articles 19(1)(a), 21, 21A, 41, 45, 51A(k), 350A & Part XVII — Right to education in mother tong...

apex court held that 

Constitution of India — Articles 19(1)(a), 21, 21A, 41, 45, 51A(k), 350A & Part XVII — Right to education in mother tongue/regional language — Constitutional significance of language — State obligation.

The Supreme Court held that language is not merely a means of communication but forms the essence of identity, comprehension and meaningful participation in society. The constitutional framework, particularly Articles 19(1)(a), 21A and 350A read with the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 and National Education Policy, 2020, recognises the importance of imparting education in the child’s mother tongue or regional language. The Court held that meaningful education necessarily requires instruction in a language intelligible to the child.
— Paras 3, 12 to 19, 34, 35 & 39 to 42.

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Constitution of India — Article 19(1)(a) — Freedom of speech and expression — Includes right to receive education in comprehensible language — Mother tongue instruction.

The Court reiterated that the right under Article 19(1)(a) includes not only the right to impart information but also the right to receive information in a meaningful and comprehensible manner. Education imparted in the mother tongue or language of choice enhances conceptual clarity and cognitive development. The Court affirmed that instruction in an unfamiliar language defeats meaningful access to education.
— Paras 21, 35, 42 & 43.

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Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 — Section 29(2)(f) — Medium of instruction — Mother tongue — Legislative mandate.

Section 29(2)(f) of the RTE Act, 2009 mandates that curriculum and evaluation procedures shall take into consideration that the medium of instruction should, as far as practicable, be in the child’s mother tongue. The Court held that this provision embodies the legislative intent to secure meaningful, inclusive and quality education through intelligible instruction.
— Paras 17, 37 & 39.

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National Education Policy, 2020 — Mother tongue-based education — Executive policy reinforcing constitutional mandate.

The Supreme Court held that NEP, 2020 strongly reinforces the constitutional and statutory vision favouring mother tongue or regional language instruction, especially at foundational stages. The Policy recognises that children grasp concepts more effectively in their home language and recommends instruction in such language at least up to Grade V and preferably beyond.
— Paras 18, 19 & 40.

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Language rights — Rajasthani language — Exclusion from educational curriculum — State’s inaction deprecated.

The Court deprecated the stand of the State of Rajasthan that only languages included in the Eighth Schedule to the Constitution could be taught in Government schools. The Court held that such a stand was pedantic and constitutionally unsustainable, particularly when Rajasthani language was already being taught in Universities across the State.
— Paras 46 & 50.

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Judicial review — Executive inaction — Constitutional duty of Court — Direction to frame policy.

The Court held that constitutional guarantees relating to meaningful and inclusive education cannot remain dormant for want of executive action. Though policy formulation ordinarily falls within executive domain, Courts cannot remain silent spectators where recognised constitutional rights are rendered illusory by State inaction. Accordingly, directions were issued to the State of Rajasthan to formulate a comprehensive policy for implementation of mother tongue-based education and to progressively introduce Rajasthani language in schools.
— Paras 47 to 51.