Judgment — Pronouncement in open Court — Whether oral dictation/transcript/video recording prevails over signed order — Held, No. The Court rejected the contention that transcript of oral dictation in Court, allegedly recorded from YouTube video proceedings, constituted the binding order. It was held that draft dictation remains subject to judicial correction and refinement before signing and uploading. The signed order embodies the final unalterable expression of the Court’s opinion. — Paras 5, 6, 27 to 29.

 apex court held that 

Supreme Court Rules, 2013 — Order XII Rules 1 & 3 — Constitution of India — Article 145(4) — Difference between dictated draft order and signed order — Signed order alone is final and binding.

The Supreme Court held that the digitally signed and uploaded order alone constitutes the final operative order of the Court. Dictation given in open Court to the Court Master is merely a draft order subject to correction, refinement, enhancement and removal of accidental omissions or inclusions before signing. Unless material changes affecting substantive rights are introduced, no rehearing is necessary prior to signing of the final order.
— Paras 15, 23 to 30.

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Practice and Procedure — Miscellaneous Application in disposed matters — Maintainability — Scope extremely limited.

The Court reiterated that miscellaneous applications in disposed matters are maintainable only for correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes or where executory directions have become impossible to implement due to subsequent events. A miscellaneous application seeking to rewrite or nullify a final signed order is not maintainable and amounts to abuse of process of Court.
— Paras 16 to 19.

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Judgment — Pronouncement in open Court — Whether oral dictation/transcript/video recording prevails over signed order — Held, No.

The Court rejected the contention that transcript of oral dictation in Court, allegedly recorded from YouTube video proceedings, constituted the binding order. It was held that draft dictation remains subject to judicial correction and refinement before signing and uploading. The signed order embodies the final unalterable expression of the Court’s opinion.
— Paras 5, 6, 27 to 29.

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Judicial Orders — Material change vis-à-vis correction/refinement — Test explained.

The Court held that changes between oral dictation and final signed order regarding disposal of writ petition and omission of “status quo” direction were merely corrections and refinements and not material changes altering the substantive outcome of the case. Therefore, rehearing of parties was unnecessary.
— Paras 23 to 25.

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Court Practice — Dictation in open Court — Practical necessity due to docket explosion — Judicial observations.

The Court recognised the practical necessity of dictating skeletal draft orders in open Court and later refining them in chambers because of heavy judicial workload and docket pressure. Such practice was held permissible so long as substantive/material alterations are not introduced without rehearing.
— Paras 27 to 29.

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Review/Clarification Application — Misconceived attempt to challenge final order under guise of clarification — Deprecated.

The Court held that an application seeking declaration that signed order “has no force of law” was thoroughly misconceived and amounted to an attempt to undermine dignity and authority of the Court. Filing of such miscellaneous applications in disposed matters was strongly deprecated.
— Paras 18, 19 & 30.

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Costs — Frivolous and abusive miscellaneous application — Exemplary costs imposed.

Finding the application frivolous and abusive, the Court imposed symbolic exemplary costs of ₹2,000 each on applicants payable to the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.
— Para 31.

Criminal Procedure — Quashing of FIR — Civil dispute and criminality — Mere pendency of civil proceedings does not exclude criminal prosecution where allegations disclose forgery, cheating and fraudulent alienation of property. The Court held that where allegations disclose repeated fraudulent sale of society properties on the basis of forged documents, pendency of civil disputes regarding management or title cannot by itself justify quashing criminal proceedings at threshold. Multiple FIRs alleging forgery, cheating and unauthorized sale of society lands across different States warranted thorough investigation. — Paras 9 to 13.

 

Constitution of India — Article 226 — Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — Section 193(3) — Interim orders in quashing petitions — High Court cannot ordinarily restrain filing of police report/charge-sheet while permitting investigation to continue.

The Supreme Court held that though the High Court may, in an appropriate case, protect an accused from coercive steps during pendency of proceedings under Article 226, a direction restraining the Investigating Officer from filing a police report under Section 193(3) BNSS while permitting investigation to continue is ordinarily unjustified. The Court held that the High Court misapplied the decision in Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra.
— Paras 14 to 16.

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Criminal Procedure — Quashing of FIR — Civil dispute and criminality — Mere pendency of civil proceedings does not exclude criminal prosecution where allegations disclose forgery, cheating and fraudulent alienation of property.

The Court held that where allegations disclose repeated fraudulent sale of society properties on the basis of forged documents, pendency of civil disputes regarding management or title cannot by itself justify quashing criminal proceedings at threshold. Multiple FIRs alleging forgery, cheating and unauthorized sale of society lands across different States warranted thorough investigation.
— Paras 9 to 13.

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Societies Registration Act, 1860 — Dispute regarding management of society — Unauthorized alienation of society property — Court’s concern regarding repeated fraudulent transfers.

The Court noticed that rival groups claiming management of the society were repeatedly alienating valuable lands of the society despite pendency of civil and criminal proceedings and subsisting court orders. The Court expressed serious concern regarding continuing sale of society lands contrary to the object and purpose of the society.
— Paras 12, 13 & 19.

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Investigation — Land scam/fraudulent alienation of property — Constitution of Special Investigation Team (SIT) — Scope.

Considering allegations of organized fraudulent sale of society lands through forged documents, the Supreme Court directed constitution of an SIT under supervision of Chief Secretary, Uttar Pradesh, with Registrar of Societies as one of the members, to conduct comprehensive fact-finding enquiry regarding alienation of society properties and fraudulent transfers.
— Paras 17 & 18.

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Criminal Investigation — SIT — Fair and unobstructed investigation — Duty to act uninfluenced and maintain rule of law.

The Court directed that the SIT shall investigate all stakeholders impartially and uninfluenced by extraneous considerations. The SIT was granted liberty to examine all transactions and submit report for further criminal action wherever fraudulent conduct involving mens rea is disclosed.
— Paras 18 & 19.

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Article 226 — Scope of jurisdiction after filing of charge-sheet/cognizance — Distinction between writ jurisdiction and inherent powers explained.

The Supreme Court clarified that before cognizance is taken, challenge to FIR/charge-sheet may lie under Article 226. However, once cognizance is taken, recourse ordinarily lies under Section 482 CrPC / Section 528 BNSS and not under Article 226. The Court explained the ratio of Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni.
— Paras 15 & 16.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Language rights — Rajasthani language — Exclusion ...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Language rights — Rajasthani language — Exclusion ...: advocatemmmohan Constitution of India — Articles 19(1)(a), 21, 21A, 41, 45, 51A(k), 350A & Part XVII — Right to education in mother tong...

apex court held that 

Constitution of India — Articles 19(1)(a), 21, 21A, 41, 45, 51A(k), 350A & Part XVII — Right to education in mother tongue/regional language — Constitutional significance of language — State obligation.

The Supreme Court held that language is not merely a means of communication but forms the essence of identity, comprehension and meaningful participation in society. The constitutional framework, particularly Articles 19(1)(a), 21A and 350A read with the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 and National Education Policy, 2020, recognises the importance of imparting education in the child’s mother tongue or regional language. The Court held that meaningful education necessarily requires instruction in a language intelligible to the child.
— Paras 3, 12 to 19, 34, 35 & 39 to 42.

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Constitution of India — Article 19(1)(a) — Freedom of speech and expression — Includes right to receive education in comprehensible language — Mother tongue instruction.

The Court reiterated that the right under Article 19(1)(a) includes not only the right to impart information but also the right to receive information in a meaningful and comprehensible manner. Education imparted in the mother tongue or language of choice enhances conceptual clarity and cognitive development. The Court affirmed that instruction in an unfamiliar language defeats meaningful access to education.
— Paras 21, 35, 42 & 43.

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Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 — Section 29(2)(f) — Medium of instruction — Mother tongue — Legislative mandate.

Section 29(2)(f) of the RTE Act, 2009 mandates that curriculum and evaluation procedures shall take into consideration that the medium of instruction should, as far as practicable, be in the child’s mother tongue. The Court held that this provision embodies the legislative intent to secure meaningful, inclusive and quality education through intelligible instruction.
— Paras 17, 37 & 39.

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National Education Policy, 2020 — Mother tongue-based education — Executive policy reinforcing constitutional mandate.

The Supreme Court held that NEP, 2020 strongly reinforces the constitutional and statutory vision favouring mother tongue or regional language instruction, especially at foundational stages. The Policy recognises that children grasp concepts more effectively in their home language and recommends instruction in such language at least up to Grade V and preferably beyond.
— Paras 18, 19 & 40.

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Language rights — Rajasthani language — Exclusion from educational curriculum — State’s inaction deprecated.

The Court deprecated the stand of the State of Rajasthan that only languages included in the Eighth Schedule to the Constitution could be taught in Government schools. The Court held that such a stand was pedantic and constitutionally unsustainable, particularly when Rajasthani language was already being taught in Universities across the State.
— Paras 46 & 50.

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Judicial review — Executive inaction — Constitutional duty of Court — Direction to frame policy.

The Court held that constitutional guarantees relating to meaningful and inclusive education cannot remain dormant for want of executive action. Though policy formulation ordinarily falls within executive domain, Courts cannot remain silent spectators where recognised constitutional rights are rendered illusory by State inaction. Accordingly, directions were issued to the State of Rajasthan to formulate a comprehensive policy for implementation of mother tongue-based education and to progressively introduce Rajasthani language in schools.
— Paras 47 to 51.

Election Law — Handbook issued by Election Commission — Nature of instructions — Whether mandatory or directory — Handbook vis-à-vis statutory Rules. The returned candidate contended that the Handbook for Returning Officers is merely a guiding document and cannot override the Representation of the People Act, 1951 or Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961. Reliance was placed on paragraph 1.2.1 of the Handbook stating that it is not a substitute for statutory provisions. The Court examined whether instructions contained in the Handbook regarding mandatory re-verification of postal ballots possess binding force. — Paras discussing Handbook and statutory scheme.

 Karnataka high court held that  ( apex court stayed it now)

Representation of the People Act, 1951 — Sections 81, 83 & 100 — Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 — Rules 54A & 63 — Election Petition — Recount of postal ballots — Mandatory re-verification — Victory margin less than rejected postal ballots — Effect.

Where the margin of victory was only 201 votes while 279 postal ballots were rejected, the petitioner contended that the Returning Officer was mandatorily required to re-verify all postal ballots before declaration of result. The Court considered the allegation that failure to conduct re-verification materially affected the election result and examined whether non-compliance with Election Commission guidelines and Rules regarding postal ballots justified recount or setting aside the election.
— Paras relating to Issues Nos.1, 2, 3 & 15.

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Election Law — Handbook issued by Election Commission — Nature of instructions — Whether mandatory or directory — Handbook vis-à-vis statutory Rules.

The returned candidate contended that the Handbook for Returning Officers is merely a guiding document and cannot override the Representation of the People Act, 1951 or Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961. Reliance was placed on paragraph 1.2.1 of the Handbook stating that it is not a substitute for statutory provisions. The Court examined whether instructions contained in the Handbook regarding mandatory re-verification of postal ballots possess binding force.
— Paras discussing Handbook and statutory scheme.

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Postal Ballots — Rejection of ballots — Requirement of recording reasons — Failure to maintain proper records — Effect on sanctity of counting process.

The petitioner alleged that 279 postal ballots were rejected without recording reasons as required under Rule 54A of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961. Evidence of the Returning Officer disclosed that reasons for rejection were not recorded in writing and no endorsement was made on rejected postal ballots. The Court examined whether such lapses vitiated the counting process.
— Relevant discussion in evidence of PW.2.

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Election Petition — Recount of votes — Conditions for grant — Fishing and roving inquiry impermissible.

The returned candidate contended that the application seeking recount was vague and based merely on “doubt” regarding postal ballots without specifying any illegality or irregularity. It was argued that recount cannot be ordered for conducting a fishing or roving enquiry in absence of material particulars.
— Paras discussing objections of respondent No.1.

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Corrupt Practice — Pleadings — Requirement of material facts and particulars — Vague allegations insufficient.

Allegations relating to bribery, paid news, excess expenditure, hate propaganda, duplicate voting and use of black money were held required to be pleaded with full particulars including names, dates, places and supporting affidavit in Form 25 under Rule 94A. General, vague and omnibus allegations without material particulars do not constitute valid pleadings of corrupt practice under Section 83 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
— Paras discussing Issues Nos.5 to 12.

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Election Law — False affidavit regarding assets and liabilities — Suppression of material financial information — Effect on election.

The petitioner alleged that the returned candidate suppressed material particulars relating to financial dealings and acquisition of estate properties through partnership firms while filing affidavit under Rule 4A of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961. It was contended that non-disclosure of substantial assets and financial transactions amounts to corrupt practice and materially affects the electoral choice of voters.
— Paras discussing Exs.P9 to P27.

Advocates Act, 1961 — Sections 35, 36, 37 & 38 — Constitution of India — Articles 129 & 142 — Contempt jurisdiction of Supreme Court — Whether Supreme Court can suspend licence of advocate while punishing for contempt — Held, No — Exclusive jurisdiction vests in Bar Councils under Advocates Act. The Constitution Bench held that though the Supreme Court, being a Court of Record under Article 129, possesses inherent power to punish for contempt of itself, such power does not extend to suspending or debarring an advocate from practice. Suspension or removal from practice is a statutory punishment specifically provided under the Advocates Act, 1961 and can be imposed only by the disciplinary authorities constituted under the Act after following the prescribed procedure. The Supreme Court cannot, while exercising contempt jurisdiction under Articles 129 and 142, assume disciplinary jurisdiction vested exclusively in Bar Councils. — Paras relating to discussion on Articles 129 & 142 and Advocates Act.

 apex court held that 

Advocates Act, 1961 — Sections 35, 36, 37 & 38 — Constitution of India — Articles 129 & 142 — Contempt jurisdiction of Supreme Court — Whether Supreme Court can suspend licence of advocate while punishing for contempt — Held, No — Exclusive jurisdiction vests in Bar Councils under Advocates Act.

The Constitution Bench held that though the Supreme Court, being a Court of Record under Article 129, possesses inherent power to punish for contempt of itself, such power does not extend to suspending or debarring an advocate from practice. Suspension or removal from practice is a statutory punishment specifically provided under the Advocates Act, 1961 and can be imposed only by the disciplinary authorities constituted under the Act after following the prescribed procedure. The Supreme Court cannot, while exercising contempt jurisdiction under Articles 129 and 142, assume disciplinary jurisdiction vested exclusively in Bar Councils.
— Paras relating to discussion on Articles 129 & 142 and Advocates Act.

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Constitution of India — Article 142 — Scope and limitations — Power to do complete justice — Cannot override substantive statutory provisions — Article 142 supplementary and curative, not destructive of statutory scheme.

The Court held that powers under Article 142 are supplementary and intended to do complete justice in causes or matters pending before the Court. Such powers cannot be exercised to supplant substantive law or to create a jurisdiction contrary to statute. The Court clarified that Article 142 cannot be used to suspend an advocate’s licence when the Advocates Act expressly vests such power in Bar Councils.
— Discussion on Prem Chand Garg, A.R. Antulay, Union Carbide and related cases.

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Contempt of Court — Nature and object — Jurisdiction sui generis — Intended to protect administration of justice and majesty of law — Not adversarial litigation.

The Court reiterated that contempt jurisdiction is a special jurisdiction exercised to uphold the majesty of law, maintain public confidence in judicial institutions, and prevent obstruction to administration of justice. Contempt proceedings are matters between the Court and contemner and not strictly adversarial proceedings between litigating parties.
— Relevant discussion on contempt jurisdiction.

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Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — Punishments recognised — Fine, imprisonment, detention in civil prison — No new punishment can be created by Court.

The Constitution Bench held that the recognised punishments for contempt under common law and statutory law are imprisonment, fine, sequestration, or detention in civil prison. Suspension of professional licence is not a recognised punishment for contempt either under common law or under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Courts cannot create a new category of punishment while exercising contempt jurisdiction.
— Discussion on Sections 10 & 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act.

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Advocates — Professional misconduct — Jurisdiction of Bar Council and contempt jurisdiction of Court are distinct and independent.

The Court held that though an act constituting contempt may also amount to professional misconduct, both jurisdictions operate independently. Punishment for professional misconduct can be imposed only after inquiry by the competent disciplinary committee under the Advocates Act and Rules framed thereunder.
— Relevant discussion on separate jurisdictions.