Civil Law — Hereditary pujari rights — Competing claims — Effect of earlier decree — Subsequent conduct inconsistent with decree — Filing of suit for possession by party claiming prior decree — Legal inference — Held, institution of a suit for possession by a party asserting prior decree of possession constitutes an admission that possession was not with such party at the relevant time — Subsequent conduct can dilute the practical effect of an earlier decree. (Paras 18, 19, 24) The appellants relied upon a decree in O.S. No. 287/1901. However, their predecessor instituted O.S. No. 88/1944 seeking possession of the very temple. The Court observed that a party in settled possession does not sue for possession. The filing of the 1944 suit was treated as a categorical admission that possession was not with the appellants’ predecessor at that time. The inconsistency between reliance on the 1901 decree and the subsequent suit seeking possession materially weakened the appellants’ claim. Ratio Decidendi: Where subsequent conduct of a party is inconsistent with rights claimed under an earlier decree, such conduct can be relied upon to draw adverse inference regarding possession and continuity of asserted rights.: Civil Law — Hereditary pujari rights — Competing c...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Civil Law — Hereditary pujari rights — Competing c...: advocatemmmohan Practice and Procedure — Article 136 of the Constitution — Interference with concurrent findings of fact — Scope of jurisdic...

Practice and Procedure — Article 136 of the Constitution — Interference with concurrent findings of fact — Scope of jurisdiction — Held, the jurisdiction under Article 136 is to be exercised sparingly, particularly where concurrent findings of fact have been recorded by the First Appellate Court and the High Court — Unless such findings are manifestly perverse or based on no evidence, this Court would be slow to interfere — In the present case, no perversity demonstrated — Interference declined. (Paras 16, 17, 24)

The Court reiterated that Article 136 does not confer a regular appellate jurisdiction. Where the High Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently appreciated documentary and oral evidence and arrived at consistent conclusions, interference is unwarranted unless the findings suffer from perversity. The concurrent findings in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs were found to be based on proper appreciation of pleadings, documentary evidence and admissions.

Ratio Decidendi: Concurrent findings of fact, supported by evidence and free from perversity, are not liable to be disturbed under Article 136 of the Constitution.

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Civil Law — Hereditary pujari rights — Competing claims — Effect of earlier decree — Subsequent conduct inconsistent with decree — Filing of suit for possession by party claiming prior decree — Legal inference — Held, institution of a suit for possession by a party asserting prior decree of possession constitutes an admission that possession was not with such party at the relevant time — Subsequent conduct can dilute the practical effect of an earlier decree. (Paras 18, 19, 24)

The appellants relied upon a decree in O.S. No. 287/1901. However, their predecessor instituted O.S. No. 88/1944 seeking possession of the very temple. The Court observed that a party in settled possession does not sue for possession. The filing of the 1944 suit was treated as a categorical admission that possession was not with the appellants’ predecessor at that time. The inconsistency between reliance on the 1901 decree and the subsequent suit seeking possession materially weakened the appellants’ claim.

Ratio Decidendi: Where subsequent conduct of a party is inconsistent with rights claimed under an earlier decree, such conduct can be relied upon to draw adverse inference regarding possession and continuity of asserted rights.

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Civil Procedure — Withdrawal of suit with liberty to file fresh suit — Failure to institute fresh suit for prolonged period — Adverse inference — Held, where liberty is obtained to institute a fresh suit but no such suit is filed for over three decades and no explanation is forthcoming, the Court may draw an inference that the party accepted the prevailing factual position. (Para 20)

The appellants’ predecessor withdrew Civil Appeal No. 118 of 1945 with liberty to file a fresh suit, which liberty was granted in 1946. No fresh suit was instituted for approximately thirty-six years. The absence of explanation for such prolonged inaction was treated as significant conduct indicative of acquiescence in the existing state of affairs.

Ratio Decidendi: Prolonged failure to act upon liberty granted to institute a fresh suit, without explanation, permits the drawing of adverse inference against the party asserting rights.

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Evidence — Revenue records — Record of Rights (RTC) — Evidentiary value in establishing hereditary service rights — Admissions in cross-examination — Held, revenue entries reflecting grant of land in lieu of temple service and showing names of respondents’ ancestors constitute relevant and cogent evidence — Absence of appellants’ names in such records, coupled with admission of cultivation by respondents, strengthens respondents’ claim. (Paras 21, 22, 24)

The High Court examined RTC entries demonstrating that lands were granted by the British Government in lieu of services rendered to the temple and that the respondents’ ancestors were reflected in such records. The appellants’ names were absent. Further, D.W.1 admitted that the lands were being cultivated by the respondents. The Supreme Court affirmed that these documentary records and admissions constituted substantial evidence supporting the respondents’ hereditary pujari claim.

Ratio Decidendi: Long-standing revenue records indicating service tenure and admissions of cultivation are material evidence in determining hereditary religious service rights.

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Pleadings — Necessity of specific pleadings in assertion of hereditary rights — Oral evidence cannot substitute pleadings — Held, a party asserting hereditary rights must plead material particulars including commencement of possession, performance of duties, and interference — In absence of foundational pleadings, oral evidence attempting to supplement deficiencies must be disregarded. (Para 23)

The appellants’ written statement lacked specific pleadings regarding the commencement of possession, performance of puja, and obstruction by respondents. The Court held that a case not pleaded cannot be built solely on oral testimony. Evidence beyond pleadings is impermissible.

Ratio Decidendi: Oral evidence cannot be permitted to fill gaps in pleadings; a party must succeed or fail on the case pleaded.

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Conclusion — Hereditary pujari rights — Concurrent findings upheld — Civil Appeals dismissed — No order as to costs. (Paras 24–26)

Upon comprehensive appreciation of the factual matrix, documentary evidence, admissions, and conduct of parties, the Court found no infirmity or perversity in the High Court’s judgment decreeing the suit in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs.

Ratio Decidendi (Composite): In disputes relating to hereditary religious service rights, consistent documentary evidence, revenue records, admissions, and subsequent conduct of parties outweigh reliance on an isolated historical decree; concurrent findings based on such appreciation are not liable to interference under Article 136.

విశ్వంభర

విశ్వంభర

విశ్వంభర వీణా తంత్రుల  పై,
కాలమనే గీతాన్ని ఆలపించాను…
దిగ్దిగంతములు ఓంకార నాదాలతో నిండెలా…

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ఈ విశ్వమంతా సమ్మోహనాస్త్రాలై కమ్ముకొనెలా…

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అంతరంగ తరంగాల చీకట్లు చిలికి చిలికి,
విరజిమ్మాను ఈ భువనమంతా రత్నగర్భ రాసులని…

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వీనిలాకాశమంత బంగారు కిరణాలతో నింపాను…

చంద్రచారికలను చేరి,
నిశ్శబ్ద నిశీథులను చీల్చి ,
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జ్ఞానానంద  పరంజ్యోతి మయమై…  వెలుగొందు వేల్పునేను 

                                                  - ఎం. మురళీ మోహన్

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order XVI Rule 1(2) read with Section 151 — Summoning of witness and production of documents — Suit for permanent injunction — Plaintiffs seeking to summon records of third-party institution to establish possession — Not proper mode of proof — Application rightly dismissed. Paras 2 and 7. Civil Procedure — Suit for permanent injunction — Burden of proving possession — Nature of evidence — Plaintiffs must establish possession through cogent and direct evidence — Summoning documents of unrelated third party institution insufficient to establish possession. Paras 6 and 7. Evidence — Relevance and necessity — Documents pertaining to third party — Whether essential for adjudication — Held, summoning third-party records to disprove defendant’s stand or to establish plaintiffs’ possession, when plaintiffs can lead direct evidence, is not warranted. Paras 4 and 7.

 Constitution of India — Article 227 — Supervisory jurisdiction — Interference with discretionary orders — Application to summon third party documents and witness — No illegality or perversity — Interference declined.

Held, where the Trial Court exercises discretion in refusing to summon documents and witnesses of a third party in a suit for injunction, and such refusal does not suffer from illegality or perversity, supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be invoked to reappreciate the matter. Paras 5 and 7.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order XVI Rule 1(2) read with Section 151 — Summoning of witness and production of documents — Suit for permanent injunction — Plaintiffs seeking to summon records of third-party institution to establish possession — Not proper mode of proof — Application rightly dismissed. Paras 2 and 7.

Civil Procedure — Suit for permanent injunction — Burden of proving possession — Nature of evidence — Plaintiffs must establish possession through cogent and direct evidence — Summoning documents of unrelated third party institution insufficient to establish possession. Paras 6 and 7.

Evidence — Relevance and necessity — Documents pertaining to third party — Whether essential for adjudication — Held, summoning third-party records to disprove defendant’s stand or to establish plaintiffs’ possession, when plaintiffs can lead direct evidence, is not warranted. Paras 4 and 7.

Result — Civil Revision Petition dismissed — No order as to costs. Para 8.

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RATIO DECIDENDI
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The ratio of the decision is that in a suit for permanent injunction, the burden lies upon the plaintiff to establish actual possession and enjoyment of the suit property through cogent and legally admissible evidence. An application under Order XVI Rule 1(2) CPC to summon documents and witnesses of a third party, when such documents are not directly essential for adjudication of possession and are sought merely to counter the defendant’s stand, cannot be treated as a necessary step in proving possession.

Where the Trial Court, upon examining the pleadings and nature of relief sought, refuses to summon such third-party records and finds that plaintiffs must independently prove their case, such order does not suffer from illegality or perversity. Consequently, the High Court, in exercise of its limited supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, will not interfere with such discretionary orders.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order VI Rule 17 — Amendment of plaint — Suit for permanent injunction — Subsequent application seeking addition of prayer for declaration of title — Delay of nearly ten years after filing of written statement — Plaintiffs aware of defendant’s title claim since 2015 — Amendment rightly refused. Paras 3 and 6.

 Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order VI Rule 17 — Amendment of plaint — Suit for permanent injunction — Subsequent application seeking addition of prayer for declaration of title — Delay of nearly ten years after filing of written statement — Plaintiffs aware of defendant’s title claim since 2015 — Amendment rightly refused. Paras 3 and 6.

Civil Procedure — Due diligence requirement — Amendment after commencement of trial — Knowledge of material facts at initial stage — Held, amendment impermissible when facts were already within plaintiffs’ knowledge.

Where the defendant in written statement filed in 2015 specifically asserted title based on a settlement deed dated 29.03.2004, and plaintiffs sought amendment in July 2025 to include declaration of ownership, the plaintiffs failed to establish that despite due diligence such relief could not have been sought earlier. Paras 3 and 6.

Civil Procedure — Plea of minority — Relevance in explaining delay — One plaintiff major at institution of suit — Minority of co-plaintiff insufficient to justify decade-long delay in seeking declaratory relief. Paras 4 and 5.

Precedent — Reliance on Supreme Court decision permitting amendment at any stage — Applicability — Amendment permissible even at appellate stage subject to due diligence and absence of prejudice — Observations not absolute. Paras 5 and 6.

Held, the observations of the Supreme Court permitting amendment at any stage do not dispense with the requirement of showing due diligence and bona fides. In absence of new facts emerging during trial, and where plaintiffs were aware of rival title claim from inception, amendment cannot be allowed belatedly. Paras 5 and 6.

Result — Civil Revision Petition dismissed — No order as to costs. Paras 7 and 8.

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RATIO DECIDENDI
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The ratio of the decision is that amendment of a plaint to introduce a declaratory relief in a suit originally filed for permanent injunction cannot be permitted after long delay when the plaintiff was aware of the defendant’s rival title claim from the stage of written statement and fails to demonstrate that despite due diligence such amendment could not have been sought earlier.

The Court clarified that although amendments may be allowed at any stage of proceedings, including appellate stages, such latitude is subject to the statutory requirement of due diligence and absence of negligence. Where the foundational facts necessitating the amendment were already within the knowledge of the plaintiffs since the filing of the written statement, and no new facts emerged during trial, the belated amendment is liable to be rejected.

Further, the plea of minority cannot be invoked to justify delay when at least one plaintiff was a major at the time of institution of the suit and the cause for amendment arose contemporaneously with the filing of the written statement.

Whether police aid can be granted before disposal of injunction application — Depends on facts — In appropriate cases permissible. Held, though ordinarily courts must exercise caution in granting police aid solely on the basis of an ad-interim order passed without hearing the opposite party, where the defendants have been given opportunity, have filed written statement and counter, and have not pleaded independent possession or interest over the property, grant of limited police aid to prevent destruction of crop is justified. Paras 16 and 17. Civil Procedure — Temporary injunction — Enforcement — Police aid — Scope — Prejudice to opposite party — Determination. Grant of police aid must be assessed on likelihood of prejudice. Where defendants have not claimed any specific right, title, possession or enjoyment over the suit schedule property in their pleadings, and where immediate refusal would result in loss to the plaintiff due to destruction of crop, enforcement of interim protection through police assistance does not cause prejudice to defendants. Paras 16 and 17.

 Constitution of India — Article 227 — Supervisory jurisdiction — Interference with order refusing police aid — Ad-interim injunction in force — Standing crop likely to be destroyed — Trial Court failed to consider urgency and surrounding circumstances — Interference justified.

Held, where an ad-interim injunction restraining interference with possession is in force and the plaintiff demonstrates imminent risk of loss of standing crop, refusal to grant police aid without considering material circumstances amounts to improper exercise of discretion. Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 can be invoked to prevent miscarriage of justice. Paras 15 to 17, 20.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Section 151 — Inherent powers — Police aid to implement interim injunction — Maintainability — Whether police aid can be granted before disposal of injunction application — Depends on facts — In appropriate cases permissible.

Held, though ordinarily courts must exercise caution in granting police aid solely on the basis of an ad-interim order passed without hearing the opposite party, where the defendants have been given opportunity, have filed written statement and counter, and have not pleaded independent possession or interest over the property, grant of limited police aid to prevent destruction of crop is justified. Paras 16 and 17.

Civil Procedure — Temporary injunction — Enforcement — Police aid — Scope — Prejudice to opposite party — Determination.

Grant of police aid must be assessed on likelihood of prejudice. Where defendants have not claimed any specific right, title, possession or enjoyment over the suit schedule property in their pleadings, and where immediate refusal would result in loss to the plaintiff due to destruction of crop, enforcement of interim protection through police assistance does not cause prejudice to defendants. Paras 16 and 17.

Civil Procedure — Agricultural land — Standing crop — Court’s duty to prevent irreparable loss — Expedite disposal of injunction application.

When standing crop is ripe for harvest and delay would cause irreversible loss, the Trial Court ought to take cognizance of urgency and dispose of the main injunction application expeditiously instead of confining itself narrowly to the police aid petition. Paras 15 and 20.

Result — Revision allowed — Order dismissing police aid petition set aside — Police directed to assist for one week — Trial Court directed to dispose of injunction application expeditiously. Para 20.

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RATIO DECIDENDI
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The ratio of the decision is that while courts must ordinarily exercise restraint in granting police aid solely on the basis of an ad-interim injunction passed ex parte, such restraint is not absolute. Where the opposite party has subsequently entered appearance, filed pleadings, and has not asserted any independent right, title, possession, or claim over the disputed property, and where a standing crop is at risk of destruction causing irreparable loss, the court may, in exercise of inherent powers under Section 151 CPC and supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, grant limited police assistance to enforce the subsisting interim order.

The determining factors are absence of demonstrable prejudice to the defendants, existence of an operative interim injunction, urgency arising from the nature of the crop, and likelihood of irreversible loss if protection is denied. In such circumstances, refusal to grant police aid amounts to improper exercise of discretion warranting interference.