Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order VI Rule 17 — Amendment of plaint — Suit for permanent injunction — Subsequent application seeking addition of prayer for declaration of title — Delay of nearly ten years after filing of written statement — Plaintiffs aware of defendant’s title claim since 2015 — Amendment rightly refused. Paras 3 and 6.

 Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order VI Rule 17 — Amendment of plaint — Suit for permanent injunction — Subsequent application seeking addition of prayer for declaration of title — Delay of nearly ten years after filing of written statement — Plaintiffs aware of defendant’s title claim since 2015 — Amendment rightly refused. Paras 3 and 6.

Civil Procedure — Due diligence requirement — Amendment after commencement of trial — Knowledge of material facts at initial stage — Held, amendment impermissible when facts were already within plaintiffs’ knowledge.

Where the defendant in written statement filed in 2015 specifically asserted title based on a settlement deed dated 29.03.2004, and plaintiffs sought amendment in July 2025 to include declaration of ownership, the plaintiffs failed to establish that despite due diligence such relief could not have been sought earlier. Paras 3 and 6.

Civil Procedure — Plea of minority — Relevance in explaining delay — One plaintiff major at institution of suit — Minority of co-plaintiff insufficient to justify decade-long delay in seeking declaratory relief. Paras 4 and 5.

Precedent — Reliance on Supreme Court decision permitting amendment at any stage — Applicability — Amendment permissible even at appellate stage subject to due diligence and absence of prejudice — Observations not absolute. Paras 5 and 6.

Held, the observations of the Supreme Court permitting amendment at any stage do not dispense with the requirement of showing due diligence and bona fides. In absence of new facts emerging during trial, and where plaintiffs were aware of rival title claim from inception, amendment cannot be allowed belatedly. Paras 5 and 6.

Result — Civil Revision Petition dismissed — No order as to costs. Paras 7 and 8.

────────────────────────────────────────
RATIO DECIDENDI
────────────────────────────────────────

The ratio of the decision is that amendment of a plaint to introduce a declaratory relief in a suit originally filed for permanent injunction cannot be permitted after long delay when the plaintiff was aware of the defendant’s rival title claim from the stage of written statement and fails to demonstrate that despite due diligence such amendment could not have been sought earlier.

The Court clarified that although amendments may be allowed at any stage of proceedings, including appellate stages, such latitude is subject to the statutory requirement of due diligence and absence of negligence. Where the foundational facts necessitating the amendment were already within the knowledge of the plaintiffs since the filing of the written statement, and no new facts emerged during trial, the belated amendment is liable to be rejected.

Further, the plea of minority cannot be invoked to justify delay when at least one plaintiff was a major at the time of institution of the suit and the cause for amendment arose contemporaneously with the filing of the written statement.

Whether police aid can be granted before disposal of injunction application — Depends on facts — In appropriate cases permissible. Held, though ordinarily courts must exercise caution in granting police aid solely on the basis of an ad-interim order passed without hearing the opposite party, where the defendants have been given opportunity, have filed written statement and counter, and have not pleaded independent possession or interest over the property, grant of limited police aid to prevent destruction of crop is justified. Paras 16 and 17. Civil Procedure — Temporary injunction — Enforcement — Police aid — Scope — Prejudice to opposite party — Determination. Grant of police aid must be assessed on likelihood of prejudice. Where defendants have not claimed any specific right, title, possession or enjoyment over the suit schedule property in their pleadings, and where immediate refusal would result in loss to the plaintiff due to destruction of crop, enforcement of interim protection through police assistance does not cause prejudice to defendants. Paras 16 and 17.

 Constitution of India — Article 227 — Supervisory jurisdiction — Interference with order refusing police aid — Ad-interim injunction in force — Standing crop likely to be destroyed — Trial Court failed to consider urgency and surrounding circumstances — Interference justified.

Held, where an ad-interim injunction restraining interference with possession is in force and the plaintiff demonstrates imminent risk of loss of standing crop, refusal to grant police aid without considering material circumstances amounts to improper exercise of discretion. Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 can be invoked to prevent miscarriage of justice. Paras 15 to 17, 20.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Section 151 — Inherent powers — Police aid to implement interim injunction — Maintainability — Whether police aid can be granted before disposal of injunction application — Depends on facts — In appropriate cases permissible.

Held, though ordinarily courts must exercise caution in granting police aid solely on the basis of an ad-interim order passed without hearing the opposite party, where the defendants have been given opportunity, have filed written statement and counter, and have not pleaded independent possession or interest over the property, grant of limited police aid to prevent destruction of crop is justified. Paras 16 and 17.

Civil Procedure — Temporary injunction — Enforcement — Police aid — Scope — Prejudice to opposite party — Determination.

Grant of police aid must be assessed on likelihood of prejudice. Where defendants have not claimed any specific right, title, possession or enjoyment over the suit schedule property in their pleadings, and where immediate refusal would result in loss to the plaintiff due to destruction of crop, enforcement of interim protection through police assistance does not cause prejudice to defendants. Paras 16 and 17.

Civil Procedure — Agricultural land — Standing crop — Court’s duty to prevent irreparable loss — Expedite disposal of injunction application.

When standing crop is ripe for harvest and delay would cause irreversible loss, the Trial Court ought to take cognizance of urgency and dispose of the main injunction application expeditiously instead of confining itself narrowly to the police aid petition. Paras 15 and 20.

Result — Revision allowed — Order dismissing police aid petition set aside — Police directed to assist for one week — Trial Court directed to dispose of injunction application expeditiously. Para 20.

────────────────────────────────────────
RATIO DECIDENDI
────────────────────────────────────────

The ratio of the decision is that while courts must ordinarily exercise restraint in granting police aid solely on the basis of an ad-interim injunction passed ex parte, such restraint is not absolute. Where the opposite party has subsequently entered appearance, filed pleadings, and has not asserted any independent right, title, possession, or claim over the disputed property, and where a standing crop is at risk of destruction causing irreparable loss, the court may, in exercise of inherent powers under Section 151 CPC and supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, grant limited police assistance to enforce the subsisting interim order.

The determining factors are absence of demonstrable prejudice to the defendants, existence of an operative interim injunction, urgency arising from the nature of the crop, and likelihood of irreversible loss if protection is denied. In such circumstances, refusal to grant police aid amounts to improper exercise of discretion warranting interference.

Civil Procedure — Suit based on promissory note — Denial of execution by defendant — Application seeking comparison of signatures — Registered documents of earlier years treated as contemporaneous — Legality of reference to expert upheld. Where the disputed promissory note is of the year 2020 and the admitted signatures relied upon are contained in registered cancellation deeds of 2016 and 2019, such documents are sufficiently proximate in time and may be regarded as contemporaneous for the purpose of comparison of signatures. The Trial Court committed no illegality in allowing the application. Paras 7 and 9.

 Constitution of India — Article 227 — Scope of supervisory jurisdiction — Interference with interlocutory orders — Order directing comparison of disputed signature with admitted signatures — No jurisdictional error, perversity, or illegality established — Interference declined.

Held, the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is confined to cases of jurisdictional error, patent illegality, or perversity. Where the Trial Court, upon consideration of the pleadings and admitted signatures, directs comparison of disputed signatures with admitted signatures for expert opinion, and no prejudice or legal infirmity is demonstrated, such discretionary order does not warrant interference. Paras 7 to 10.

Civil Procedure — Suit based on promissory note — Denial of execution by defendant — Application seeking comparison of signatures — Registered documents of earlier years treated as contemporaneous — Legality of reference to expert upheld.

Where the disputed promissory note is of the year 2020 and the admitted signatures relied upon are contained in registered cancellation deeds of 2016 and 2019, such documents are sufficiently proximate in time and may be regarded as contemporaneous for the purpose of comparison of signatures. The Trial Court committed no illegality in allowing the application. Paras 7 and 9.

Evidence — Comparison of disputed signature with admitted signature — Documents executed in favour of third parties — Relevance — Admitted signatures therein sufficient for expert comparison.

The contention that the cancellation deeds were not inter se between the parties is immaterial once it is not disputed that the documents contain the admitted signatures of the defendant. For the purpose of comparison of signatures, the existence of admitted signatures is the relevant consideration. Para 8.

Civil Procedure — Expert opinion — Procedural stage — No prejudice caused by sending document for comparison — Right to object to expert report preserved.

Sending the disputed promissory note for expert comparison does not cause prejudice at the interlocutory stage, as the party retains the right to raise objections to the expert’s report and to cross-examine the expert during trial. Para 10.

Result — Civil Revision Petition dismissed — No order as to costs. Para 11.

────────────────────────────────────────
RATIO DECIDENDI
────────────────────────────────────────

The ratio of the decision is that an order permitting comparison of disputed signatures with admitted signatures through expert opinion is a procedural and discretionary step taken in aid of adjudication of the suit and does not determine substantive rights of the parties. When execution of a promissory note is denied, the Trial Court is justified in directing comparison with admitted signatures appearing on registered documents of reasonably proximate years, which may be treated as contemporaneous. The fact that such documents were executed in favour of third parties does not affect their utility for comparison once the signatures therein are admitted.

Further, supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be invoked to reappreciate or interfere with such discretionary interlocutory orders in the absence of patent illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error. Since no prejudice is caused and the party retains the right to challenge the expert evidence at trial, interference is unwarranted.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 199(2) & (4) — Defamation of public servant — Complaint by Public Prosecutor — Maintainability — “Person aggrieved” — Government as complainant — Held, Government not a “person” within meaning of Section 199(2) CrPC — State cannot maintain criminal defamation unless specific constitutional authority/public servant covered under Section 199(2) is defamed — Complaints filed by “State Public Prosecutor” without statutory authority — Not maintainable — Cognizance set aside.

 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 199(2) & (4) — Defamation of public servant — Complaint by Public Prosecutor — Maintainability — “Person aggrieved” — Government as complainant — Held, Government not a “person” within meaning of Section 199(2) CrPC — State cannot maintain criminal defamation unless specific constitutional authority/public servant covered under Section 199(2) is defamed — Complaints filed by “State Public Prosecutor” without statutory authority — Not maintainable — Cognizance set aside.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Sections 200 and 202 — Mandatory compliance — Accused residing beyond territorial jurisdiction — Post-2005 amendment — Inquiry under Section 202 mandatory before issuance of process — Failure to conduct inquiry — Vitiates cognizance — Proceedings void ab initio.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 199(2) — Special procedure — Role of Public Prosecutor — Must act independently — Cannot act as “post office” of Government — Absence of independent scrutiny — Sanction mechanically granted — Prosecution unsustainable.

Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 499, 500, 501, 502 — Criminal defamation — Essential ingredient — Mens rea — Intention to harm reputation — Generalised criticism of Government — Not defamation — Government as abstract entity not defamable — Unless specific official targeted.

Constitution of India — Articles 19(1)(a), 19(2), 21 — Freedom of press — Criminal defamation — Balance between reputation and free speech — Legitimate criticism of governance protected — Prosecution to silence dissent impermissible.

Criminal Revision — Order taking cognizance — Nature — Intermediate order — Revisable — Maintainability affirmed following Girish Kumar Suneja and Madhu Limaye.

Sanction for prosecution — Mechanical sanction — Non-application of mind — Vitiates entire proceedings.

Result — Criminal Revision Cases allowed — Cognizance and consequential proceedings quashed.

Hindu Joint Family Property — Suit for Partition — Burden of Proof — Proof of Nucleus — Admissions — Scope. In a suit for partition, there is no presumption that property is joint family property merely because a joint Hindu family exists. The initial burden lies upon the plaintiff to establish that the property is joint family property or that there existed sufficient nucleus from which acquisitions could have been made. Upon proof of nucleus, the burden shifts to the person asserting self-acquisition. Admission of a party in pleadings or evidence is not conclusive proof but is a substantive piece of evidence and must be weighed with other material on record. Relied on: D. S. Lakshmaiah v. L. Balasubramanyam Appasaheb Peerappa Chandgade v. Devendra Peerappa Chandgade Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar Bhagwat Sharan v. Purushottam Held, the trial Court failed to consider material admissions of DW-1 and did not properly determine existence of joint family nucleus or apply settled burden-shifting principles. Findings on Issue Nos.2 to 5 held unsustainable.

 

Hindu Joint Family Property — Suit for Partition — Burden of Proof — Proof of Nucleus — Admissions — Scope.

In a suit for partition, there is no presumption that property is joint family property merely because a joint Hindu family exists. The initial burden lies upon the plaintiff to establish that the property is joint family property or that there existed sufficient nucleus from which acquisitions could have been made. Upon proof of nucleus, the burden shifts to the person asserting self-acquisition.

Admission of a party in pleadings or evidence is not conclusive proof but is a substantive piece of evidence and must be weighed with other material on record.

Relied on:
D. S. Lakshmaiah v. L. Balasubramanyam
Appasaheb Peerappa Chandgade v. Devendra Peerappa Chandgade
Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar
Bhagwat Sharan v. Purushottam

Held, the trial Court failed to consider material admissions of DW-1 and did not properly determine existence of joint family nucleus or apply settled burden-shifting principles. Findings on Issue Nos.2 to 5 held unsustainable.

---

Co-ownership — Joint Possession — Ouster — Court Fee.

In law, possession of one co-owner is possession of all, unless clear ouster is pleaded and proved. Mere non-residence or separate employment does not amount to exclusion from joint possession. Absence of actual physical possession does not disentitle a coparcener from seeking partition nor justify adverse inference regarding court fee.

Relied on:
Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil v. Balwant
Neelavathi v. N. Natarajan

Held, finding of trial Court that plaintiff was not in joint possession solely because he was residing elsewhere was contrary to settled law.

---

Hindu Succession — Property standing in name of father/mother — Intestate death — Right of legal heirs.

Where property stands in the name of the father and/or mother and death is intestate, legal heirs succeed in accordance with statutory succession. Trial Court erred in holding that property recorded in individual name could not be subject matter of partition without applying principles under succession law.

Held, non-consideration of statutory rights under succession amounted to error of law.

---

Will — Proof — Suspicious Circumstances — Amendment to plead Will.

A Will must be proved in accordance with Section 63 of the Succession Act and Section 68 of the Evidence Act. Execution after institution of suit is not per se a ground to refuse amendment seeking to plead such Will. Amendment cannot be rejected merely because document is subsequent to filing of suit.

Relied on:
Meena Pradhan v. Kamla Pradhan
Shivakumar v. Sharanabasappa

Held, rejection of amendment relating to Will was unsustainable.

---

Amendment of Pleadings — Order VI Rule 17 CPC — Scope — Due Diligence — Court not to decide merits at amendment stage.

At the stage of considering amendment, the Court must examine whether amendment is necessary for effective adjudication of real controversy. Merits or correctness of proposed plea are not to be adjudicated at that stage. Delay alone is not a ground for rejection. Even after commencement of trial, amendment may be allowed if due diligence is shown.

Relied on:
Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal v. K. K. Modi
Andhra Bank v. ABN Amro Bank N. V.
J. Samuel v. Gattu Mahesh
Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand
Basavaraj v. Indiara

Held, trial Court conducted a mini-trial at amendment stage and rejected applications on unsustainable grounds; Orders set aside.

---

RATIO DECIDENDI

The trial Court failed to apply fundamental principles governing partition of joint Hindu family property, burden of proof regarding nucleus, evidentiary value of admissions, co-ownership possession, proof of Will, and scope of amendment under Order VI Rule 17 CPC. Material evidence, including admissions of DW-1, was not properly appreciated. Findings (except on Issue No.1) suffered from legal infirmity and perversity.

---

FINAL ORDER

Appeal allowed. Judgment and decree dated 22-11-2017 in O.S. No.94 of 2010 set aside except finding on Issue No.1. Matter remanded for fresh decision in accordance with law.

C.R.P. No.3813 of 2017 and C.R.P. No.5818 of 2017 allowed; impugned orders in I.A. Nos.492 of 2014 and 986 of 2017 set aside and applications restored for fresh consideration.

C.R.P. No.5836 of 2017 dismissed as infructuous.

No order as to costs. Trial Court directed to dispose of suit expeditiously within one year.