ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Where a prosecutrix is a legally married woman awa...Where a prosecutrix is a legally married woman aware of the subsistence of her marriage, and the alleged promise of marriage is legally incapable of performance, consensual sexual relations between adults cannot be retrospectively characterised as rape on the ground of false promise of marriage. In absence of material showing that the promise was false from inception and intended solely to obtain consent, the offence under Section 376(2)(n) IPC is not made out. Criminal proceedings in such circumstances are liable to be quashed under the principles laid down in Bhajan Lal.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Where a prosecutrix is a legally married woman awa...: advocatemmmohan Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 375, 376(2)(n) — Rape on false promise of marriage — Married prosecutrix — Promise legall...

Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 375, 376(2)(n) — Rape on false promise of marriage — Married prosecutrix — Promise legally incapable of performance — Whether consent vitiated by misconception of fact — Held, No — Where prosecutrix was aware of subsisting marriage and legal impediment to remarriage, allegation of false promise cannot sustain offence — Consensual relationship turned acrimonious — FIR and chargesheet quashed (Paras 19–24, 27–28).

Consent — Section 90 IPC — Misconception of fact — Distinction between false promise and breach of promise — Promise must be false from inception with intent to deceive — Mere failure to marry insufficient — Reiterated (Paras 17–18, 23).

Section 376(2)(n) IPC — “Repeatedly” — Requires multiple distinct acts of sexual assault — Not attracted to long-standing consensual relationship absent coercion or deception from inception (Paras 15–16, 22).

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — Section 5(i) — Subsisting marriage — Legal bar to second marriage — Promise to marry during subsistence of first marriage legally unenforceable — Relevance in determining quality of consent (Paras 19–20).

Criminal Proceedings — Quashing — Article 226 / Inherent jurisdiction — Application of Bhajan Lal principles — Where allegations even if taken at face value do not disclose offence — Continuation of proceedings amounts to abuse of process (Paras 26–28).

Broken relationship — Criminalisation — Caution — Courts must distinguish genuine sexual exploitation from consensual relationships turning sour — Misuse of rape provision deprecated (Paras 21–25).

Result — Impugned High Court order set aside — FIR No. 213/2025, Chargesheet No. 269/2025 and Sessions Case No. 89/2025 quashed (Para 28).

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS

The appeal arose from the refusal of the High Court of Chhattisgarh to quash FIR No. 213/2025 registered under Section 376(2)(n) IPC.

The complainant, a 33-year-old married advocate with a child, had matrimonial disputes with her husband; divorce proceedings were pending but no decree had been granted. She met the accused, also an advocate, in September 2022. A relationship developed.

The FIR alleged that the accused induced her into sexual relations on a false promise of marriage, repeatedly engaged in intercourse, impregnated her, forced abortion, and later refused marriage.

The accused contended that:

The relationship was consensual.

The complainant was fully aware of her marital status and the legal impediment to remarriage.

The allegations arose after personal discord.

The High Court granted anticipatory bail but refused to quash the FIR, observing that the question of “misconception of fact” required investigation.

The chargesheet was subsequently filed and Sessions Case instituted.

The Supreme Court examined whether, even taking the FIR at face value, ingredients of Section 376(2)(n) IPC were disclosed.

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ANALYSIS OF LAW

I. Scope of Section 376(2)(n) IPC

Section 376(2)(n) IPC deals with repeated commission of rape on the same woman. The Court clarified that “repeatedly” implies multiple distinct acts of sexual assault, not a continuous consensual relationship.

In genuine cases under this provision, there is usually an initial assault followed by repeated acts under coercion, fear, or deception rendering the victim vulnerable.

The Court found no such pattern here.

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II. False Promise of Marriage and Consent

The Court reiterated settled principles:

A distinction exists between a false promise and breach of promise.

A false promise must be made from inception with no intention to marry, solely to obtain consent.

Consent under Section 90 IPC is vitiated only when based on such initial fraudulent intention.

Reliance was placed on:

Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385

Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398

The Court emphasised that not every failed relationship amounts to rape.

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III. Legal Impossibility of Marriage

A crucial factor was that the complainant’s marriage subsisted throughout the alleged period of sexual relationship.

Section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 prohibits marriage if either party has a living spouse.

Thus, even assuming there was a promise, such promise was legally incapable of performance at the relevant time.

The Court reasoned that:

The complainant, being an advocate, was presumed aware of the legal position.

Both parties knew of her subsisting marriage.

Therefore, it was implausible that she was induced into sexual relations under a legally enforceable expectation of marriage.

This rendered the allegation of misconception untenable.

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IV. Nature of Relationship

The Court characterised the case as:

A consensual relationship between adults.

Relationship turning sour.

Personal dispute given criminal colour.

The Court cautioned against the “disquieting tendency” of converting failed relationships into rape prosecutions.

The offence of rape, being grave, must be confined to cases involving genuine absence of free consent.

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V. Application of Bhajan Lal Principles

The Court applied categories laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.

It held that:

Even if allegations are accepted at face value, no offence under Section 376(2)(n) is made out.

Continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of process.

Thus, the case fell within categories warranting quashing.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

Where a prosecutrix is a legally married woman aware of the subsistence of her marriage, and the alleged promise of marriage is legally incapable of performance, consensual sexual relations between adults cannot be retrospectively characterised as rape on the ground of false promise of marriage. In absence of material showing that the promise was false from inception and intended solely to obtain consent, the offence under Section 376(2)(n) IPC is not made out. Criminal proceedings in such circumstances are liable to be quashed under the principles laid down in Bhajan Lal.

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OPERATIVE DIRECTIONS

The impugned order of the High Court dated 03.03.2025 was set aside.

FIR No. 213/2025 dated 06.02.2025 registered at Sarkanda Police Station, District Bilaspur,

Chargesheet No. 269/2025, and

Sessions Case No. 89/2025

were quashed.

The appeal was allowed.

spectrum, being a natural resource held by the Union in public trust under Section 4 of the Telegraph Act, does not vest ownership rights in Telecom Service Providers. The licence confers only a limited, conditional and revocable right to use. Mere accounting treatment as an intangible asset does not create proprietary interest. Since the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code applies only to assets over which the corporate debtor has ownership rights, spectrum and spectrum usage rights cannot be included in the insolvency estate. Consequently, spectrum cannot be subjected to insolvency or liquidation proceedings, nor can insolvency resolution plans restructure or extinguish statutory dues arising from telecom law. The regulatory regime governing spectrum prevails, and IBC cannot be invoked to override sovereign control or public trust obligations.

Natural Resources – Spectrum – Public Trust Doctrine – Ownership and Control – Spectrum held by Union of India as trustee for the people – License confers only limited right to use – No proprietary or ownership interest created in favour of Telecom Service Providers (TSPs) – Spectrum remains material resource of the community within Article 39(b) – Paras 13–17, 20, 33–36, 69(A).

Telegraph Act, 1885 – Section 4 – Exclusive privilege of Union – Grant of licence is sovereign/statutory in character though contractual in form – License conditions govern use, transfer, revocation – Clearance of dues mandatory prior to trading – Regulatory supremacy preserved – Paras 18, 32–36, 26–30.

Spectrum Trading Guidelines, 2015 – Transfer conditional upon prior clearance of dues and approval of Licensor – Insolvency proceedings cannot bypass statutory regulatory conditions – Dues cannot be wiped out under Resolution Plan – Paras 26–30.

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 18 and 36 – Insolvency estate includes only assets over which corporate debtor has ownership rights – Assets held under contractual arrangements without transfer of title excluded – Mere accounting recognition as intangible asset insufficient – Paras 59–63.

Accounting Standards – AS 26 / Ind AS 38 – Recognition of intangible asset based on control and future economic benefits – Ownership not necessary for accounting recognition – Accounting treatment not determinative of legal ownership – Paras 46–58.

Conflict of Statutes – Harmonious Construction – IBC cannot override special statutory regime governing telecom sector – Telegraph Act and TRAI Act constitute complete code for spectrum – Insolvency framework cannot re-write sovereign and regulatory control over natural resources – Paras 64–68.

IBC – Objective of revival and value maximisation – Cannot be invoked to restructure ownership/control of natural resources – Moratorium does not create new rights – Public law functions of State remain unaffected – Paras 40–42, 65–68.

Held – Spectrum allocated to TSPs cannot be subjected to insolvency/liquidation proceedings under IBC – Appeals by financial creditors and resolution professionals dismissed – Appeal by Union of India partly allowed – Para 69.

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS

The controversy arose from insolvency proceedings initiated against telecom companies of the Aircel Group. These entities had acquired spectrum through auction conducted by the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) and had also borrowed substantial sums from financial institutions, including the State Bank of India.

Upon default in payment of licence fees and spectrum usage charges, the corporate debtors invoked voluntary Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process under Section 10 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The Resolution Plans treated DoT as an operational creditor and proposed settlement of its dues under the statutory waterfall mechanism.

In parallel, this Court in earlier AGR litigation had determined that licence dues were payable as calculated by DoT. When recovery proceedings were sought to be enforced, TSPs contended that moratorium under Section 14 of IBC barred such recovery.

Given the magnitude of dues and the broader implications for spectrum ownership, this Court referred multiple fundamental questions to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). The NCLAT delivered a mixed verdict, holding spectrum to be a natural resource yet also an intangible asset of the corporate debtor, capable of insolvency treatment, though subject to payment of dues.

Appeals were filed by financial creditors, resolution professionals, and the Union of India challenging different portions of the NCLAT judgment. The central question before the Supreme Court was whether spectrum could be treated as an asset of the corporate debtor amenable to insolvency proceedings.

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ANALYSIS OF LAW

The Court began by reaffirming the constitutional position declared in earlier decisions including Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India and Natural Resources Allocation, In re, that spectrum is a scarce and finite natural resource held by the State in public trust. Ownership vests in the people, with the Union acting as trustee.

Section 4 of the Telegraph Act vests exclusive privilege in the Central Government to establish and operate telecommunication systems. The licence issued thereunder, though contractual in form, emanates from sovereign authority. As explained in Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. Union of India, such licence is a form of State largesse and does not confer proprietary title.

The Court examined the Spectrum Trading Guidelines, 2015 and held that transfer of spectrum is conditional upon clearance of dues and prior governmental approval. These regulatory conditions are mandatory and cannot be bypassed by insolvency mechanisms.

A significant portion of the judgment addressed the argument that spectrum appears as an “intangible asset” in the balance sheet of TSPs under Accounting Standards. The Court carefully distinguished accounting recognition from legal ownership. AS 26 and Ind AS 38 recognise assets based on control over economic benefits, not ownership. Therefore, inclusion in the balance sheet does not establish proprietary rights.

Turning to IBC, Sections 18 and 36 were analysed. The insolvency estate includes only assets over which the corporate debtor has ownership rights. Assets held under contractual arrangements without transfer of title are expressly excluded. Since spectrum remains vested in the Union and only a conditional right to use is granted, it cannot form part of the insolvency estate.

The Court applied principles of harmonious construction between special statutes. The Telegraph Act and TRAI Act constitute a complete and special regime governing telecom. The IBC, though special in insolvency matters, cannot override sovereign control over natural resources. The Court held that applying IBC to spectrum would amount to permitting a general insolvency framework to rewrite a constitutional and statutory public trust regime.

The Court relied upon its reasoning in Embassy Property Developments Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka to reiterate that insolvency tribunals cannot adjudicate matters falling within sovereign and public law domains.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

The decisive principle laid down is that spectrum, being a natural resource held by the Union in public trust under Section 4 of the Telegraph Act, does not vest ownership rights in Telecom Service Providers. The licence confers only a limited, conditional and revocable right to use. Mere accounting treatment as an intangible asset does not create proprietary interest.

Since the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code applies only to assets over which the corporate debtor has ownership rights, spectrum and spectrum usage rights cannot be included in the insolvency estate. Consequently, spectrum cannot be subjected to insolvency or liquidation proceedings, nor can insolvency resolution plans restructure or extinguish statutory dues arising from telecom law.

The regulatory regime governing spectrum prevails, and IBC cannot be invoked to override sovereign control or public trust obligations.

Where the existence of the arbitration agreement itself is seriously disputed on credible allegations of forgery and fabrication, and substantial material casts grave doubt on its genuineness, the dispute is non-arbitrable at the threshold. Courts cannot refer the matter to arbitration under Section 8 nor appoint an arbitrator under Section 11 in such circumstances.

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 8 and 11 — Reference to arbitration — Disputed existence of arbitration agreement

(Paras 2, 11, 16–24)

Where the very existence and execution of the document containing the arbitration clause is seriously disputed on allegations of forgery and fabrication, and substantial material casts grave doubt on its genuineness, the dispute is non-arbitrable at the threshold stage. Appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11 or reference under Section 8 would be legally impermissible.

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Impact of fraud on arbitrability — Fraud going to root of arbitration clause

(Paras 12–15)

Mere allegation of fraud simpliciter does not render disputes non-arbitrable. However, where the allegation of fraud permeates the entire contract and, above all, the arbitration agreement itself, such that the very existence of the arbitration agreement is in serious doubt, the matter falls within the category of non-arbitrable disputes.

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Section 8(2) — Requirement of production of original or certified copy of arbitration agreement

(Paras 6, 21)

Failure to produce the original arbitration agreement or a certified copy thereof, as mandated under Section 8(2) of the Act, coupled with serious allegations of forgery, justifies rejection of the application seeking reference to arbitration.

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Article 227 of the Constitution — Scope of supervisory jurisdiction

(Para 22)

Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is not appellate in nature and does not permit reappreciation of evidence or interference with concurrent findings of fact, particularly where such findings are grounded in material on record and statutory requirements.

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS

The dispute arose out of a partnership firm “M/s RDDHI Gold” constituted in 2005. Respondent Rajia Begum claimed induction into the firm by virtue of a Deed of Admission and Retirement dated 17.04.2007 (“Admission Deed”), allegedly executed pursuant to a power of attorney granted by two original partners.

Barnali Mukherjee denied execution of the Admission Deed and asserted that it was a forged and fabricated document. The respondent claimed majority stake (50.33%) in 2016, nearly nine years after the alleged execution.

Proceedings unfolded in three parallel tracks:

1. Section 9 application — High Court (04.05.2018) refused interim protection, holding that existence of the Admission Deed was doubtful. The Supreme Court dismissed the SLP, thereby lending finality to that prima facie finding.

2. Section 8 application — In a civil suit seeking declaration that the Admission Deed was forged, the respondent sought reference to arbitration. The Trial Court and First Appellate Court rejected the application, citing serious allegations of fraud and failure to produce the original document. However, the High Court under Article 227 set aside those orders and referred the matter to arbitration.

3. Section 11 application — Respondent sought appointment of arbitrator. The High Court declined, holding that existence of arbitration agreement was in serious doubt.

Thus, the High Court rendered contradictory conclusions: refusing appointment under Section 11 but directing arbitration under Section 8.

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ANALYSIS OF LAW

The Court examined settled jurisprudence on fraud and arbitrability.

The principles in A. Ayyasamy, Avitel Post Studioz Ltd., and subsequent decisions were reiterated:

Fraud simpliciter is arbitrable.
However, fraud that permeates the entire contract and especially the arbitration clause itself renders the dispute non-arbitrable.

Two tests were emphasized:

First, whether the arbitration agreement itself cannot be said to exist in a clear case.
Second, whether the allegations extend into public law domain or affect third-party rights.

The Court found that the case satisfied the first test. The arbitration clause was embedded in the Admission Deed, whose execution was seriously disputed. The material circumstances included:

Inconsistent admissions regarding continuation of partners after 2007.
Nine-year silence regarding the Admission Deed.
Contemporaneous banking documents showing respondent’s role only as guarantor, not partner.
Failure to produce the original or certified copy under Section 8(2).

The Court held that arbitration is founded on consent. Where consent itself is in serious doubt, arbitral jurisdiction cannot be invoked.

The prior prima facie finding in Section 9 proceedings, which attained finality, was a relevant consideration. Though Section 9 findings are prima facie, once final, they cannot be ignored in subsequent proceedings involving identical foundational issues.

On Article 227, the Court held that the High Court exceeded supervisory jurisdiction by overturning concurrent factual findings and directing arbitration despite serious jurisdictional doubts.

Conversely, the High Court’s refusal to appoint an arbitrator under Section 11 was upheld as correct.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

Where the existence of the arbitration agreement itself is seriously disputed on credible allegations of forgery and fabrication, and substantial material casts grave doubt on its genuineness, the dispute is non-arbitrable at the threshold. Courts cannot refer the matter to arbitration under Section 8 nor appoint an arbitrator under Section 11 in such circumstances.

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RESULT

The appeal challenging the Section 11 rejection was dismissed.
The appeal challenging the Section 8 reference was allowed.

The High Court’s order directing arbitration under Article 227 was quashed.

No order as to costs.

An application under Section 29A(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for extension of the mandate of the arbitral tribunal is maintainable even after expiry of the statutory period and even after an award has been rendered beyond the mandate. Such an award is unenforceable, but the Court’s jurisdiction under Section 29A remains intact. The termination under Section 29A(4) is not absolute and is subject to judicial extension upon sufficient cause.

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 29A — Extension of mandate after award

(Paras 1–2, 14–23)

An application under Section 29A(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for extension of the mandate of the arbitral tribunal is maintainable even after expiry of the statutory period of twelve months (extendable by six months by consent) and even where an award has been rendered after expiry of the mandate.

An award rendered after expiry of the mandate is unenforceable under Section 36 and does not attain the status of a decree; however, such unilateral act of the arbitrator does not denude the Court of its jurisdiction under Section 29A(4) and (5) to extend the mandate upon sufficient cause being shown.

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Nature of termination under Section 29A(4) — Not absolute or irretrievable

(Paras 16–18)

The termination of the arbitrator’s mandate under Section 29A(4) upon expiry of time is not final or irreversible. The expression “terminate” in the context of Section 29A is transitory and subject to judicial intervention. The legislative scheme, including continuation of proceedings pending extension application and power of substitution under Section 29A(6), demonstrates the intention to preserve and not abort arbitral proceedings.

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Court’s powers under Section 29A — Toolkit for ensuring efficiency and integrity

(Paras 20–23)

While considering extension under Section 29A, the Court may reduce arbitral fees, impose costs, substitute arbitrators, and impose appropriate terms and conditions. The power of substitution is discretionary and fact-dependent. The statutory scheme reflects a balance between expeditious resolution and procedural integrity.

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS

The dispute arose out of three agreements to sell between the parties. A sole arbitrator was appointed by the High Court under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Pleadings were completed on 20.08.2022, triggering the twelve-month period under Section 29A(1). By consent under Section 29A(3), the mandate was extended by six months till 20.02.2024.

Though arguments were concluded and the matter reserved for award, settlement negotiations intervened. Ultimately, the arbitrator passed the award on 11.05.2024, i.e., after expiry of the extended mandate on 20.02.2024.

The respondent challenged the award under Section 34 on the ground that it was rendered after expiry of mandate. The appellant filed an application under Section 29A seeking extension of mandate. The High Court dismissed the Section 29A application as not maintainable and allowed the Section 34 petition, holding that an award passed after expiry of mandate is a nullity and mandate cannot be extended post-award.

The Supreme Court was thus called upon to decide whether extension under Section 29A can be granted even after an award has been rendered beyond the statutory timeline.

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ANALYSIS OF LAW

The Court undertook a structural and purposive interpretation of Section 29A.

Under the Arbitration Act, 1940, Section 28 expressly empowered the Court to enlarge time whether or not the award had been made. The 1996 Act initially did not prescribe timelines, which led to delay. The Law Commission’s 176th Report recommended structured timelines but emphasized continuation of arbitral proceedings even where delay occurred.

Section 29A, introduced by amendment, prescribes:

twelve months from completion of pleadings;
six months’ consensual extension;
further extension only by Court upon sufficient cause;
continuation of mandate pending extension application;
power of substitution;
power to reduce fees and impose costs.

The Court held that Section 29A does not expressly bar post-award extension. The phrase “if an award is not made” in Section 29A(4) merely identifies the contingency for termination; it does not prohibit extension after an award is rendered.

The Court clarified that:

An award passed after expiry of mandate is unenforceable under Section 36 and need not necessarily be challenged under Section 34 merely for that reason.

The unilateral act of the arbitrator in rendering such an award cannot curtail the Court’s statutory power.

Termination under Section 29A(4) is conditional and subject to judicial revival.

The power to extend exists both prior to and after expiry of mandate.

International jurisprudence was referred to, including developments under English law, to demonstrate that courts retain retrospective power to enlarge time in appropriate cases.

The Court approved earlier observations in Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd., 2024 SCC Online SC 2494, and clarified that Parliament intended Section 29A to safeguard arbitration from technical collapse due to delay, not to render proceedings futile.

The Court emphasized that extension is not automatic. The Court must examine sufficient cause and may impose costs, reduce fees, or substitute arbitrators where warranted.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

An application under Section 29A(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for extension of the mandate of the arbitral tribunal is maintainable even after expiry of the statutory period and even after an award has been rendered beyond the mandate. Such an award is unenforceable, but the Court’s jurisdiction under Section 29A remains intact. The termination under Section 29A(4) is not absolute and is subject to judicial extension upon sufficient cause.

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RESULT

The judgment of the High Court dismissing the Section 29A application was set aside. The application was restored for fresh consideration in accordance with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court.

The appeal was allowed.

Transgender Rights — Institutional Representation in Advisory Mechanism (Paras 3–4) In matters concerning transgender rights and allied constitutional protections, representation of institutional scholarship and domain expertise in advisory bodies constituted by the Court is essential for informed policy and rights-based deliberation.

Advisory Committee — Continuity of Member Despite Change in Institutional Affiliation

(Paras 2–3)

Where a member of an Advisory Committee constituted by judicial order ceases to be affiliated with the institution she was originally nominated to represent, such cessation does not automatically disqualify her from continuing as a member, particularly when her expertise and prior contribution to the subject matter are substantial and relevant to the functioning of the Committee.

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Power of Court in Original Jurisdiction — Modification/Clarification of Earlier Order

(Paras 1, 4)

In exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, the Court may clarify, supplement, or modify earlier directions to ensure effective functioning of a Committee constituted by it, including appointment of additional members representing institutional expertise.

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Transgender Rights — Institutional Representation in Advisory Mechanism

(Paras 3–4)

In matters concerning transgender rights and allied constitutional protections, representation of institutional scholarship and domain expertise in advisory bodies constituted by the Court is essential for informed policy and rights-based deliberation.

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

By judgment dated 17.10.2025 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1405 of 2023, the Supreme Court had constituted an Advisory Committee and appointed Ms. Nithya Rajshekhar as a member representing the Centre for Law and Policy Research.

Subsequently, a Miscellaneous Application was moved by the learned Amicus Curiae seeking inclusion of Ms. Aparna Mehrotra, Senior Associate at the Centre for Law and Policy Research, as a member of the Advisory Committee.

The factual premise was that Ms. Nithya Rajshekhar was no longer associated with the Centre. However, the Court took note of her extensive and substantive work in the field of transgender rights. The Court thus held that institutional dissociation did not dilute her expertise or suitability as a member of the Advisory Committee.

At the same time, to ensure continued institutional representation of the Centre’s scholarship and research in transgender rights, the Court appointed Ms. Aparna Mehrotra as an additional member of the Advisory Committee.

The order reflects two doctrinal aspects:

First, the Court retains continuing supervisory jurisdiction in matters where it has issued structural or institutional directions, especially in public law and rights-based adjudication.

Second, the Court recognizes that advisory bodies constituted under judicial directions must function effectively, and composition may be modified to preserve expertise, continuity, and institutional depth.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

Cessation of institutional affiliation does not ipso facto disqualify a member of a judicially constituted Advisory Committee where the appointment was premised on subject-matter expertise. The Court, in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, may appoint additional members to ensure effective functioning and institutional representation.

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RESULT

Ms. Nithya Rajshekhar shall continue as a member of the Advisory Committee.

Ms. Aparna Mehrotra, Senior Associate, Centre for Law and Policy Research, is appointed as an additional member of the Advisory Committee to represent the Centre and its scholarship in transgender rights.

The Miscellaneous Application stands disposed of accordingly.