ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: After submission and judicial acceptance of a fina...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: After submission and judicial acceptance of a fina...: advocatemmmohan Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 173(8) — Further Investigation — Leave of Court Mandatory (Paras 27–33) Though Secti...

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 173(8) — Further Investigation — Leave of Court Mandatory

(Paras 27–33)

Though Section 173(8) CrPC does not expressly mandate prior leave of the Magistrate for conducting further investigation after submission of final report under Section 173(2), the settled legal position requires the investigating agency to seek permission of the Magistrate before undertaking further investigation. The requirement of judicial permission is implicit, flowing from long-standing practice and doctrine of contemporanea expositio, and stands affirmed in authoritative precedents.

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Power to Direct Further Investigation — Vested in Magistrate / Constitutional Courts — Not in Executive Authorities

(Paras 32–36)

The power to order further investigation rests with the Magistrate concerned or superior constitutional courts. Executive authorities, including Superintendent of Police or State Government officials, cannot direct further investigation on their own once a final report has been filed and accepted. Any such direction without judicial sanction is without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed.

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Acceptance of Closure Report — Effect — Further Investigation Only Through Judicial Route

(Paras 6–8, 34–36)

Where a final report under Section 173(2) CrPC is filed and accepted by the Magistrate after notice to the informant, the matter attains judicial closure subject to statutory remedies. Any further investigation thereafter must necessarily be preceded by an order of the competent court. Administrative directions for reopening investigation undermine judicial authority and are impermissible.

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Distinction — Further Investigation vs Fresh / De Novo Investigation

(Paras 29–31, 37)

“Further investigation” under Section 173(8) CrPC is a continuation of earlier investigation and does not amount to fresh or de novo investigation. While constitutional courts may order fresh or de novo investigation in appropriate cases, the investigating agency cannot unilaterally initiate further investigation after filing and acceptance of final report without court’s leave.

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NHRC Directions — No Override of Criminal Court’s Jurisdiction

(Paras 9–13, 34–36)

Directions issued pursuant to recommendations of the National Human Rights Commission cannot supplant or bypass the statutory scheme under the CrPC. Even if administrative authorities decide that further investigation is required, such decision must be placed before the Magistrate for judicial consideration under Section 173(8).

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

The appeal arose from FIR No. 70/2013 registered for offences under Sections 376D, 352, 504 and 506 IPC at Mahila Police Station, Firozabad.

After investigation by Crime Branch, Mathura, a final report dated 30.05.2014 was submitted stating that no offence was made out due to contradictions in statements and lack of corroborative evidence. The Judicial Magistrate, Firozabad, after issuing notices to the informant and finding no protest petition, accepted the closure report on 14.09.2015.

Subsequently, after approximately three years, a complaint was filed before the NHRC alleging lapses in investigation. The NHRC directed fact-finding inquiry and compensation. Acting upon this, the Under Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh, issued communication dated 06.06.2019 directing investigation by CBCID and recommended further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC.

An Inspector of CBCID sought permission from the Magistrate on 22.04.2021 to conduct further investigation. However, no judicial order granting such permission was passed. Despite this, the Superintendent of Police, vide communication dated 26.04.2021, directed expeditious completion of further investigation. DNA samples were collected and investigation proceeded.

The High Court declined to quash these communications. The Supreme Court examined whether further investigation could be ordered without judicial leave.

The Court analysed Section 173(8) CrPC and relied upon the binding precedent in Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali, where it was held that although Section 173(8) does not expressly require permission, it is a settled practice and legal necessity that investigating agencies seek leave of the court before conducting further investigation.

The Court further referred to Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya v. State of Gujarat and Peethambaran v. State of Kerala, which reaffirmed that the power to direct further investigation lies with the Magistrate or higher courts and not with executive police authorities.

The doctrine of contemporanea expositio was invoked to emphasize that long-standing judicial understanding requiring leave of court must be respected. The investigating agency cannot assume unfettered authority merely because Section 173(8) preserves its power to conduct further investigation.

The reliance placed by the State on Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana was distinguished. That case concerned exercise of constitutional powers to order de novo investigation and did not dilute the requirement of judicial oversight in ordinary further investigation under Section 173(8).

On facts, the Superintendent of Police proceeded to direct further investigation without any judicial order granting permission. The Magistrate had neither ordered nor sanctioned such further investigation. This amounted to executive overreach and encroachment upon judicial domain.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and quashed the communications dated 06.06.2019 and 26.04.2021.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

After submission and judicial acceptance of a final report under Section 173(2) CrPC, further investigation under Section 173(8) can be undertaken only with the leave of the Magistrate concerned. Executive authorities or police officers cannot unilaterally direct or commence further investigation without judicial sanction. The power to order further investigation rests with the Magistrate or constitutional courts, and compliance with judicial oversight is mandatory.

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RESULT

The appeal was allowed.
The impugned High Court judgment was set aside.
Communications dated 06.06.2019 and 26.04.2021 directing further investigation were quashed.
Observations made shall not prejudice pending criminal revision or related proceedings.
Pending applications stood disposed of.

In a suit for injunction and recovery of possession relating to immovable property, the plaintiff must establish through specific pleadings and proof (i) possession on the date of suit for injunction, and (ii) entitlement, date and mode of dispossession, and illegality of defendant’s possession for recovery. In absence of such foundational pleadings, the suit is liable to be dismissed irrespective of perceived weaknesses in the defendant’s case.

Perpetual Injunction — Requirement of Possession on Date of Suit

(Paras 11–12)

In a suit for perpetual injunction relating to immovable property, proof of actual possession on the date of institution of the suit is an essential prerequisite. Absence of pleading and proof of such possession is fatal to the relief of injunction.

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Recovery of Possession — Mandatory Pleadings — Specifics of Dispossession

(Paras 11–12)

In a suit seeking recovery of possession, the plaintiff must specifically plead and prove entitlement, manner of acquisition of title, date and mode of dispossession, and the illegality of the defendant’s possession. Absence of material particulars in the plaint renders the claim legally unsustainable.

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Burden of Proof — Plaintiff Must Stand on Own Pleadings

(Paras 11–13)

The plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own case. The burden cannot be shifted onto the defendant merely because the defendant’s plea is disbelieved. An appellate court errs if it reverses findings without examining whether the plaintiff discharged the foundational burden in accordance with the nature of the relief sought.

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Maintenance — Section 14(1), Hindu Succession Act, 1956

(Para 7.1 – Context)

Where property is granted to a female Hindu in lieu of maintenance, such right, being a pre-existing right under Shastric Hindu Law, may ripen into absolute ownership under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. However, such determination must arise within the proper framework of pleadings and relief claimed.

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

The appeal arose from proceedings concerning agricultural land measuring 8 Kanals 05 Marlas in District Una, Himachal Pradesh.

The original plaintiff filed a suit in 1990 for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with possession. The plaint was later amended to include a prayer for recovery of possession.

The plaintiff claimed ownership and asserted that the defendant’s possession, if any, was only Hisadari possession on his behalf. The first defendant, however, claimed possession in her own right, asserting that after the death of her husband Roshan Lal, her father-in-law, as Karta of the Joint Hindu Family, granted the suit property to her in lieu of maintenance. She contended that this right matured into absolute ownership under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

The Trial Court dismissed the suit. The First Appellate Court reversed the decree. The High Court, in Second Appeal, allowed the appeal and restored dismissal of the suit.

Before the Supreme Court, the principal contention of the appellants (plaintiff’s LRs) was that the plaintiff had a 1/6th share and that possession of the first defendant was not adverse but only on behalf of the plaintiff.

The Supreme Court examined the nature of the reliefs claimed:

First, as to perpetual injunction, the Court reiterated the settled principle that possession on the date of filing of the suit is indispensable. The concurrent findings showed that the plaintiff was not in possession. Hence, the injunction could not be granted.

Second, as to recovery of possession, the Court emphasised that the plaint must contain material particulars regarding entitlement, date and manner of dispossession, and the illegality of defendant’s possession. The plaint was found to be completely deficient in such foundational pleadings.

The Court relied upon Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeira to reiterate that pleadings in possession suits must be detailed and specific. Mere fragments of evidence cannot cure absence of pleadings.

The Supreme Court also observed that the First Appellate Court had erred by improperly shifting the burden onto the defendant and drawing adverse inferences, without first examining whether the plaintiff had established the essential ingredients of the relief claimed.

Given the fundamental pleading deficiencies, the suit was held to be rightly dismissed.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

In a suit for injunction and recovery of possession relating to immovable property, the plaintiff must establish through specific pleadings and proof (i) possession on the date of suit for injunction, and (ii) entitlement, date and mode of dispossession, and illegality of defendant’s possession for recovery. In absence of such foundational pleadings, the suit is liable to be dismissed irrespective of perceived weaknesses in the defendant’s case.

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RESULT

The Civil Appeal was dismissed. No order as to costs. Pending applications stood disposed of.

In proceedings where scientific or statistical evaluation is integral to adjudication or to the functioning of a court-constituted or court-monitored body, the Supreme Court may appoint a qualified technical expert and direct the concerned executive authority to provide necessary institutional support, infrastructure, and remuneration to give effect to such appointment.

Interlocutory Jurisdiction — Power to Appoint Technical Expert — Court-Monitored Process

(Paras 2–3)

In proceedings involving technical evaluation of survey data by a National Task Force, the Supreme Court, in exercise of its interlocutory jurisdiction, may appoint an independent expert as Technical Consultant to ensure comprehensive and scientific analysis. Such appointment is justified to preserve objectivity, credibility, and methodological rigour in court-monitored processes.

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Appointment of Technical Consultant — Former Chief Statistician — Institutional Support

(Paras 2–3)

Where the application seeks appointment of a qualified expert with domain expertise in statistics and data analysis, and the Court finds such appointment necessary for effective functioning of a National Task Force, it may direct the concerned Ministry to formally appoint the expert, extend administrative and infrastructural support, grant access to data, and provide remuneration in accordance with prevailing norms.

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Ministry’s Obligation — Compliance with Court Directions — Administrative Facilitation

(Para 3)

Upon judicial direction, the concerned Ministry is obligated to issue the order of appointment expeditiously and ensure full administrative cooperation, including infrastructure, data access, and honorarium, to facilitate execution of the mandate assigned by the Court.

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

The interlocutory application was filed in pending criminal appellate proceedings seeking the appointment of Dr. T.C.A. Anant, former Chief Statistician of India, as Technical Consultant to the National Task Force for comprehensive and scientific analysis of survey data. The application also sought directions to the Ministry of Education, Union of India, to provide administrative support, infrastructure, data access, and remuneration.

The matter was heard with assistance from learned Amicus Curiae and the learned Additional Solicitor General for the Union of India.

The Supreme Court considered the nature of the relief sought and found it appropriate to appoint Dr. T.C.A. Anant as Technical Consultant. The order reflects judicial recognition that analysis of survey data in complex matters requires specialised statistical expertise and independent oversight to maintain scientific integrity and credibility.

Accordingly, the Court directed:

First, appointment of Dr. T.C.A. Anant as Technical Consultant to the National Task Force.

Second, the Ministry of Education to formally issue the order of appointment at the earliest.

Third, the Ministry to extend all necessary administrative support, infrastructure, and data access, and to provide appropriate remuneration/honorarium as per prevailing norms.

The order demonstrates the Court’s supervisory role in ensuring that technical aspects of policy-linked or data-intensive matters are handled with professional competence and institutional backing.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

In proceedings where scientific or statistical evaluation is integral to adjudication or to the functioning of a court-constituted or court-monitored body, the Supreme Court may appoint a qualified technical expert and direct the concerned executive authority to provide necessary institutional support, infrastructure, and remuneration to give effect to such appointment.

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RESULT

The interlocutory application was allowed to the extent indicated. Dr. T.C.A. Anant was directed to be appointed as Technical Consultant to the National Task Force, and the Ministry of Education, Union of India, was directed to provide administrative support, data access, and remuneration. The application stood disposed of accordingly.

Where Article 243-O of the Constitution applies and the State Legislature has enacted a law providing for an election petition as the exclusive remedy to challenge election-related grievances, including improper rejection of nomination, the High Court cannot exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 to interfere with the electoral process. The constitutional embargo mandates that election disputes be addressed only through the statutory mechanism, and judicial intervention during or after the process, outside that framework, is impermissible.

Constitution of India — Article 243-O — Bar to Judicial Interference in Panchayat Elections — Scope

(Paras 8.1, 9 to 9.4, 12)

Article 243-O(b) imposes an express constitutional embargo that no election to any Panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in the manner provided by State law. Where the State Legislature has enacted a law providing a complete and efficacious mechanism for challenging election-related grievances, the High Court is precluded from exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 to interfere with the electoral process.

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Article 226 — Judicial Review in Electoral Matters — Self-Imposed Restraint — Non-Obstante Clause

(Paras 9.3, 12)

Though judicial review forms part of the basic structure, Article 243-O opens with a non-obstante clause and mandates that election disputes be channelled through the statutory mechanism. High Courts must exercise great circumspection and refrain from granting interim reliefs that disrupt an ongoing or concluded election process when an alternative statutory remedy exists.

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Election Law — Rejection of Nomination — Remedy — Election Petition Only

(Paras 10 to 10.5)

Where the grievance relates to improper rejection of nomination, the sole remedy lies by way of an election petition under the governing statute. Such grievance cannot be agitated in writ proceedings during the currency of the election process. The statutory scheme must be strictly adhered to.

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Uttarakhand Panchayati Raj Act, 2016 — Section 131H — Improper Rejection of Nomination — Prescribed Authority — Exclusive Jurisdiction

(Paras 10 to 10.4)

Section 131H provides a complete code for challenging elections, including cases where the result is materially affected by improper acceptance or rejection of nomination. The election petition must be presented before the prescribed authority, namely the Assistant Collector (First Class) or Pargana Magistrate, with further revision before the District Judge. Recourse to writ jurisdiction is impermissible when such statutory remedy is available.

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Electoral Process — Declaration of Candidate as Elected Unopposed — Judicial Interference — Impermissibility

(Paras 3.3, 11)

Once a candidate has been declared elected unopposed in accordance with the election process, the High Court cannot, in writ or intra-court appeal, direct reopening of the electoral process or permit participation of a disqualified candidate, particularly without impleading or hearing the elected candidate.

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

The appellant was declared elected unopposed as Zila Panchayat Member from Constituency No. 11 – Bharhgaon, District Pithoragarh, after the Returning Officer rejected the nomination of respondent No. 1 for non-disclosure.

Respondent No. 1 challenged the rejection of his nomination by filing a writ petition before the High Court of Uttarakhand. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that, once the election process had commenced, the writ court ought not to interfere in view of Article 243-O of the Constitution and the availability of an election petition under Section 131H of the Uttarakhand Panchayati Raj Act, 2016.

In intra-court appeal, the Division Bench stayed the order of the Single Judge and directed the Returning Officer to allot a symbol to respondent No. 1 and permit him to contest the election. Notably, the present appellant, already declared elected unopposed, was not impleaded.

The Supreme Court examined the constitutional and statutory scheme governing Panchayat elections.

Article 243-O(b), inserted by the Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act, 1992, provides that no election to any Panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in the manner provided by State law. The State of Uttarakhand has enacted the Uttarakhand Panchayati Raj Act, 2016, which under Section 131H provides a comprehensive mechanism to challenge election results, including improper rejection of nomination.

The Court relied upon established election jurisprudence including:

• Harnek Singh v. Charanjit Singh

• N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency

• Laxmibai v. Collector

These authorities reiterate that election disputes must be raised only through the statutorily prescribed election petition after completion of the election process. Even High Courts cannot entertain writ petitions during the pendency of the election process to challenge rejection of nomination.

The Supreme Court held that the Division Bench committed three manifest errors:

First, it acted in disregard of the constitutional embargo under Article 243-O.

Second, it interfered with a process that had already culminated in the appellant being declared elected unopposed.

Third, it granted relief adverse to the appellant without impleading or hearing him, thereby violating principles of natural justice.

The Court emphasised that the right to contest or question an election is purely statutory and must be exercised strictly in accordance with the statute. Liberal interim reliefs that disrupt the election process undermine public interest and constitutional design.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

Where Article 243-O of the Constitution applies and the State Legislature has enacted a law providing for an election petition as the exclusive remedy to challenge election-related grievances, including improper rejection of nomination, the High Court cannot exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 to interfere with the electoral process. The constitutional embargo mandates that election disputes be addressed only through the statutory mechanism, and judicial intervention during or after the process, outside that framework, is impermissible.

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RESULT

The Supreme Court set aside the interim order dated 18 July 2025 passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand in Special Appeal No. 192 of 2025. The writ appeal was dismissed, and the appellant’s election as Zila Panchayat Member remained undisturbed. The civil appeal was allowed. Pending applications stood disposed of.

Where the Code of Civil Procedure provides a specific remedy, particularly under Order VII Rule 11 for rejection of plaint, the High Court cannot exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to strike off the plaint. Article 227 jurisdiction is exceptional, supervisory and not to be invoked to bypass or supplant statutory remedies. The existence of alternative remedy under the CPC constitutes a near total bar to such exercise.

Constitution of India — Article 227 — Supervisory Jurisdiction — Availability of Specific Remedy under CPC — Near Total Bar

(Paras 5 to 9)

Where a specific statutory remedy is available under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, particularly under Order VII Rule 11 for rejection of plaint, the High Court ought not to invoke its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to strike off the plaint. The availability of such remedy under the CPC constitutes a near total bar to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, except in rare and exceptional cases involving grave miscarriage of justice.

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Article 227 — Scope and Limits — Not an Appellate or Corrective Jurisdiction

(Paras 5.1 to 5.7, 7)

The power of superintendence under Article 227 is supervisory and extraordinary, to be exercised sparingly and with judicial discipline. It is not meant to correct mere errors or to function as an appellate forum. It cannot be exercised as a cloak of appeal in disguise or to supplant statutory remedies expressly provided under the CPC.

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Order VII Rule 11 CPC — Rejection of Plaint — Statutory Grounds — Factual Inquiry Involved

(Paras 6.2 to 6.2.3)

Order VII Rule 11 CPC provides specific and enumerated grounds for rejection of plaint. Determination of such grounds ordinarily involves consideration of factual aspects. Where such statutory mechanism exists, the High Court cannot bypass it by exercising Article 227 jurisdiction to strike off the plaint.

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Order VI Rule 16 CPC — Striking Out Pleadings — Limited Scope — Cannot Be Used to Strike Entire Plaint

(Paras 6.1 to 6.4.1)

Order VI Rule 16 CPC permits striking out unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous, vexatious or abusive pleadings. It does not empower the court to strike down the entire plaint. Rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 is distinct from striking out pleadings under Order VI Rule 16. The latter cannot be invoked to justify striking off the plaint through Article 227.

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Civil Disputes Involving Title — Disputed Questions of Fact — Inappropriate for Article 227 Interference

(Paras 6.3 to 6.3.2)

Title disputes and civil controversies ordinarily involve disputed questions of fact requiring trial and evidence. The High Court ought not to entertain Article 227 petitions in routine civil matters such as property disputes, particularly where factual adjudication is necessary.

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

The appellant-plaintiff instituted a suit for permanent injunction before the District Munsif Court, Tambaram, claiming possession and enjoyment of the suit property based on inheritance from his mother, who had allegedly purchased the property through a registered sale deed of 1975.

The defendants disputed the sale transaction, alleging fabrication and fraud, and contended that the certified copy of the sale deed relied upon by the plaintiff pertained to another transaction. They claimed title and possession in themselves.

Instead of filing an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC before the trial court for rejection of plaint, the defendants approached the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution by filing a Civil Revision Petition. The High Court, upon examining the material, recorded findings that the sale deed was forged, that the suit was fraudulent, and that continuation of the suit was unnecessary. Consequently, it struck off the plaint in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court examined whether such invocation of Article 227 was legally permissible when a specific statutory remedy existed under the CPC.

The Court reiterated settled principles governing Article 227 jurisdiction, drawing support from precedents including:

• Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil

• Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai v. Tuticorin Educational Society

• Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath

• K. Valarmathi v. Kumaresan

The Court emphasized that Article 227 is not meant to substitute statutory remedies. Order VII Rule 11 CPC provides specific grounds for rejection of plaint, and the defendants ought to have invoked that provision before the trial court.

The Court further clarified that Order VI Rule 16 CPC, which permits striking out pleadings, cannot be stretched to justify striking down the entire plaint. Rejection of plaint and striking out pleadings are conceptually and legally distinct.

Since the dispute involved questions of title and allegations of fraud, factual adjudication through trial was necessary. The High Court, by recording findings of forgery and fraud under Article 227, effectively assumed a role akin to an appellate court, which is impermissible.

The Supreme Court held that availability of alternative remedy under the CPC must be treated as a near total bar against invocation of Article 227 in civil matters governed by the Code.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

Where the Code of Civil Procedure provides a specific remedy, particularly under Order VII Rule 11 for rejection of plaint, the High Court cannot exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to strike off the plaint. Article 227 jurisdiction is exceptional, supervisory and not to be invoked to bypass or supplant statutory remedies. The existence of alternative remedy under the CPC constitutes a near total bar to such exercise.

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RESULT

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court of Madras dated 03.06.2025 striking off the plaint, restored the suit to the file of the trial court, and granted liberty to the defendants to file an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC to be decided in accordance with law. There was no order as to costs.