Overlooking material evidence already on record constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record and justifies exercise of review jurisdiction under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In motor accident claims, the obligation of the Court is to award just compensation, even exceeding the claim amount, when supported by evidence. Where litigation has remained pending for decades, review and modification based on existing material is preferable to remand or reopening of evidence.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 114 — Order 47 Rule 1 — Review — Scope

Power of review is not an appellate power. Review is permissible only on discovery of new and important matter or evidence, or on account of mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason. Re-appreciation of evidence or rehearing of the matter on merits is impermissible under review jurisdiction.

(Paras 14, 15, 16)

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Review — Error apparent on face of record — Overlooking material evidence

Where material evidence available on record is overlooked by the Tribunal as well as by the High Court while deciding the appeal, such omission constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record, warranting exercise of review jurisdiction.

(Paras 16–22)

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Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Compensation — Review — Permissibility

In motor accident claims, where important documentary and oral evidence regarding employment and income of the deceased was already on record but was ignored, the High Court is justified in reviewing and modifying its earlier judgment instead of remanding the matter, particularly when the litigation is pending for more than two decades.

(Paras 21–22)

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Additional evidence — Order 41 Rule 27 CPC — Review stage — Maintainability

Additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC can be considered only when the appeal is pending. After disposal of the appeal, additional evidence cannot be introduced by linking it with a review application, as the same amounts to putting the cart before the horse.

(Paras 10–11)

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Motor accident compensation — Enhancement of claim — Stage of proceedings

Enhancement of claim amount is permissible while the matter is pending. After disposal of the appeal, entertaining an application for enhancement in review proceedings is impermissible and amounts to lack of due diligence.

(Paras 12–13)

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Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Just compensation — Claim exceeding amount claimed

There is no legal bar to awarding compensation in excess of the amount claimed, if the claimants are otherwise entitled to just compensation. The duty of the Court is to determine compensation which appears to be just under Section 168 of the Act.

(Paras 12, 24)

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Income of deceased — Salary certificate — Appreciation of evidence

Where the widow of the deceased deposed regarding employment and income of the deceased and the salary certificate was marked without dispute, absence of further cross-examination on employment and earnings renders the evidence reliable. Overlooking such evidence constitutes manifest error.

(Paras 18–21)

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Inquest report — Evidentiary value

Statements recorded in the inquest report regarding occupation and nature of duty of the deceased, entered in due discharge of official functions, constitute important material evidence and cannot be ignored while assessing income.

(Para 21)

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Future prospects — Addition — Government employment

For a deceased aged between 40–50 years in permanent employment, 30% addition towards future prospects is mandatory as per the principles laid down in Pranay Sethi.

(Paras 23–25)

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Multiplier — Selection — Sarla Verma principles

Multiplier has to be applied strictly in accordance with the age of the deceased as prescribed in Sarla Verma v. DTC. For the age group of 41–45 years, the appropriate multiplier is 14.

(Paras 23, 25)

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Consortium — Entitlement — Wife and children

Compensation under the head of loss of consortium is payable not only to the spouse but also to children under the head of parental consortium, in terms of Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram.

(Para 26)

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Motor accident compensation — Long pendency — Interest

Considering the long lapse of time in adjudication, interest can be reasonably reduced while enhancing compensation in review proceedings.

(Paras 27–28)

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RATIO DECIDENDI

1. Overlooking material evidence already on record constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record and justifies exercise of review jurisdiction under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

2. In motor accident claims, the obligation of the Court is to award just compensation, even exceeding the claim amount, when supported by evidence.

3. Where litigation has remained pending for decades, review and modification based on existing material is preferable to remand or reopening of evidence.

After completion of investigation and filing of charge-sheet, bail cannot be denied solely on speculative apprehension of threat to the victim unless supported by concrete material. Objections of the complainant under Section 15-A of the SC/ST (PoA) Act must be substantiated by factual evidence and cannot override the fundamental right to personal liberty. Prolonged judicial custody without demonstrable risk of interference with justice renders refusal of bail arbitrary.

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SC/ST (PoA) Act — Section 15-A — Right of victim to notice — Compliance — Effect

Issuance of notice to the victim under Section 15-A of the SC/ST (PoA) Act satisfies statutory compliance; however, opposition by the victim must still be supported by material facts. Objections unsupported by evidence cannot by themselves justify denial of bail.

(Paras 6–8)

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Bail — Custodial detention — Prolonged incarceration — Consideration

Where the accused are in judicial custody for a substantial period and investigation stands concluded, continued detention without cogent reasons amounts to unjustified curtailment of personal liberty.

(Paras 4, 5, 7–9)

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Bail — Conditions — Safeguards

While granting bail, the Court may impose appropriate conditions including:

• execution of personal bonds and sureties;

• restriction on leaving the country;

• prohibition on intimidating or influencing the victim; and

• liberty to the prosecution to seek cancellation upon violation.

(Para 10)

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

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Facts

• FIR registered on 22.09.2025 in Crime No.228 of 2025 of Nandyal Taluk Urban Police Station.

• Alleged offences under:

  • Sections 118(1), 118(2) r/w 5 BNS, 2023, and

  • Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST (PoA) Amendment Act, 2015.

• Accused (A-1 to A-3) arrested on 02.12.2025 and remanded to judicial custody.

• Bail application under Section 483 BNSS, 2023 dismissed by Special Court on 16.12.2025.

• Sole ground for rejection: apprehension that accused may threaten the victim.

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Findings of the High Court

1. Investigation completed and charge-sheet filed on 12.12.2025 — no scope for interference with investigation. (Para 5, 7)

2. Victim’s apprehension of threat was not supported by any material indicating intimidation or attempts to cause alarm after registration of FIR. (Para 7)

3. The Special Court relied only on objections filed by the complainant, without factual foundation. (Para 7–8)

4. The predicate offence under Section 118(1) BNS involved injury to the leg and the victim was out of danger. (Para 7)

5. Continued incarceration of the appellants for about 50 days, despite completion of investigation, was unjustified. (Paras 4–9)

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Error in the Special Court’s Order

The High Court held that:

• refusal of bail solely on speculative apprehension,

• without supporting material, and

• after completion of investigation,

is unsustainable in law.

Accordingly, the impugned order was liable to be set aside.

(Paras 8–10)

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RATIO DECIDENDI

1. After completion of investigation and filing of charge-sheet, bail cannot be denied solely on speculative apprehension of threat to the victim unless supported by concrete material.

2. Objections of the complainant under Section 15-A of the SC/ST (PoA) Act must be substantiated by factual evidence and cannot override the fundamental right to personal liberty.

3. Prolonged judicial custody without demonstrable risk of interference with justice renders refusal of bail arbitrary.

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 — Interim measures — Scope While exercising jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Court must confine itself to interim protection and cannot grant relief in the nature of a final adjudication. Paras 26, 42 Interim mandatory injunction — Grant — Principles An interim mandatory injunction is not a remedy to be granted lightly. It can be granted only when: (i) circumstances are clear; (ii) prima facie material establishes alteration of status quo; and (iii) interests of justice demand restoration of status quo ante. Paras 30–31, 47

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 — Interim measures — Scope

While exercising jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Court must confine itself to interim protection and cannot grant relief in the nature of a final adjudication.

Paras 26, 42

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Interim mandatory injunction — Grant — Principles

An interim mandatory injunction is not a remedy to be granted lightly. It can be granted only when:

(i) circumstances are clear;
(ii) prima facie material establishes alteration of status quo; and
(iii) interests of justice demand restoration of status quo ante.

Paras 30–31, 47

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Status quo — Meaning

“Status quo” in ordinary legal connotation means the existing state of affairs at a given point of time.

Paras 27–28

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Status quo ante — Meaning and effect

“Status quo ante” means restoration of the state of affairs existing prior to the current state, and such an order necessarily disturbs the existing possession and operates as a mandatory injunction.

Paras 29–30

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Status quo ante — Ad-interim stage — Restrictions

Orders directing maintenance of “status quo ante”:

• cannot be passed mechanically,
• cannot be passed without recording reasons, and
• must be supported by prima facie findings justifying restoration.

Paras 30–31, 47

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Judicial orders — Reasons — Necessity

Reasons are the backbone of judicial orders.
A non-speaking order, or an order without justifiable reasons, cannot be sustained in law.

Paras 32–35

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Reasons — “Life of law” — Doctrine

When the reason of a law ceases, the law itself generally ceases.
Recording of reasons ensures transparency, fairness, accountability and enables appellate scrutiny.

Paras 32–35

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Administrative / judicial orders — Requirement of reasoned order

Even administrative or quasi-judicial orders must record reasons.
Judicial orders require an even higher standard of reasoning.

Paras 34–35

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Orders — Validity — Reasons must be in the order itself

The validity of an order must be judged only on the reasons stated therein.
Reasons cannot be supplied later by affidavit or arguments.

(Mohinder Singh Gill principle)

Paras 39–40

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Section 9 proceedings — Pending adjudication — Appellate restraint

When the main Section 9 application is pending, appellate court shall not enter into factual controversies which fall within the domain of the Special Judge.

Paras 26, 41–42

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Lease dispute — Possession — Factual controversy

Whether possession was taken in accordance with lease conditions or statutory procedure is a mixed question of fact and law, which must be decided by the Section 9 Court and not for the first time in appeal.

Paras 36–43

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Major Port Authorities Act, 2021 — Section 68

Questions regarding applicability of Section 68(1) or 68(3) of the Major Port Authorities Act, 2021 involve factual determination and cannot justify an ad-interim mandatory order without prima facie findings.

Paras 36–43

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Appeal under Commercial Courts Act — Maintainability

Appeal against an ad-interim order passed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is maintainable.

Para 24

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Bank guarantee principles — Inapplicability

Judgments relating to restraint on invocation of bank guarantees do not govern cases involving ad-interim mandatory injunctions restoring possession.

Paras 48–49

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FACTS (As recorded by the Court)

Paras 2–15

1. The respondents filed C.A.O.P. Nos. 37 & 38 of 2025 under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the Commercial Court, Visakhapatnam.

2. The lease dated 02.02.2024 was granted by Visakhapatnam Port Authority for:

   • Kalvani A/c Auditorium

   • Nehru Sports and Cultural Complex

   • Lease period: 10 years.

3. Alleging violations of lease conditions:

   • show-cause notices were issued;

   • bank guarantee was invoked;

   • termination notice dated 10/11-09-2025 issued;

   • right of re-entry exercised.

4. Multiple writ proceedings were filed and disposed of, granting liberty to parties to pursue remedies under the lease deed.

5. Thereafter, Section 9 petitions were filed.

6. During pendency of the petitions, the Special Judge passed an ad-interim order dated 19-12-2025 directing:

“Parties shall maintain status quo ante as on the date of filing of this petition.”

7. The said order was extended till 27-01-2026, when the Section 9 applications were posted for orders.

8. The ad-interim order dated 19-12-2025 was challenged in the present appeals.

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POINT FOR DETERMINATION

Para 22

Whether the ad-interim order dated 19-12-2025, directing maintenance of status quo ante, is legal and sustainable?

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ANALYSIS OF LAW

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1. Nature of the impugned order

Paras 25–26

The impugned order is:

• an ad-interim direction,

• passed pending Section 9 petitions,

• directing restoration of possession by ordering status quo ante.

Such order is in substance a mandatory injunction.

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2. Meaning of “status quo”

Paras 27–28

Relying on:

• Satyabrata Biswas v. Kalyan Kumar Kisku

• Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. State of Bihar

the Court held:

“Status quo” means the existing state of affairs at the given point of time.

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3. Meaning of “status quo ante”

Paras 29–30

Status quo ante means:

• restoration of the previous state of affairs;

• disturbance of existing possession;

• exercise of mandatory jurisdiction.

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4. Interim mandatory injunction — governing law

Paras 30–31

Relying on:

Kishore Kumar Khaitan v. Praveen Kumar Singh
(2006) 3 SCC 312

the Court reiterated:

Interim mandatory injunction is granted only when circumstances are clear and justice demands restoration of earlier position.

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5. Absence of reasons in the impugned order

Paras 32–33

The order dated 19-12-2025:

• assigns no reasons;

• records no prima facie findings;

• does not explain why status quo ante was necessary.

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6. Reasons — indispensable requirement

Paras 32–35

Relying on:

Assistant Commissioner v. Shukla & Brothers
(2010) 4 SCC 785

the Court held:

• reasons are the life of law;

• non-speaking orders are unsustainable;

• recording of reasons is mandatory even at interim stage.

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7. Reasons cannot be supplemented later

Paras 39–40

Applying:

Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner
(1978) 1 SCC 405

the Court held:

Validity of an order must be judged only by reasons recorded in the order itself.

Arguments of counsel cannot substitute judicial reasoning.

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8. Lease violation and possession — factual dispute

Paras 36–43

The Court observed:

• whether possession was taken under lease clauses;

• whether Public Premises Act or Section 68 of Major Port Authorities Act applies;

• whether re-entry was lawful,

are mixed questions of fact and law, requiring adjudication by the Section 9 Court.

Such issues cannot justify a blanket mandatory order without findings.

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9. Undisputed factual position

Para 45

The Court recorded:

1. Possession was taken on 15-12-2025;

2. Respondent was not in possession on 19-12-2025;

3. Impugned order contains no reasons.

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10. Distinction from bank guarantee cases

Paras 48–49

The judgment in Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. v. Bansal Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. (2025) 10 SCC 176 was held inapplicable because:

• that case dealt with restraint on bank guarantee;

• present case concerns mandatory restoration of possession.

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FINAL CONCLUSIONS

Paras 47, 51–53

The High Court held:

1. The impugned order is an ad-interim mandatory injunction.

2. No reasons were recorded to justify restoration of status quo ante.

3. No prima facie findings were made.

4. The order violates settled principles governing interim mandatory relief.

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FINAL ORDER

• Impugned order dated 19-12-2025 is set aside.

• Section 9 applications shall be decided by the Special Judge on the scheduled date, independently and in accordance with law.

• Appeals allowed.

• No order as to costs.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

1. An ad-interim order directing “status quo ante” amounts to an interim mandatory injunction.

2. Interim mandatory injunctions cannot be granted without clear reasons and prima facie findings.

3. “Status quo ante” restores possession and therefore cannot be ordered mechanically.

4. Reasons are the life of judicial orders; absence of reasons renders the order unsustainable.

5. Validity of a judicial order must be judged solely on reasons recorded in the order itself.

6. Factual disputes regarding possession and lease violations must be decided in Section 9 proceedings, not by ad-interim directions.

A concluded partition effected by registered documents cannot be reopened unless fraud or undue influence is strictly pleaded and proved. Mere inequality of shares or subsequent dissatisfaction does not invalidate partition. Fraud must be pleaded with particulars under Order VI Rule 4 CPC and proved by cogent evidence; vague allegations are insufficient. Partition involving minors is binding unless actual prejudice is established. Registered partition and settlement deeds, when acted upon and supported by revenue records, carry strong evidentiary presumption. First appellate court will not interfere with findings of fact unless perversity or legal infirmity is demonstrated.

Hindu Law — Partition — Finality of partition — Re-opening — Principles

A partition effected between members of a Hindu Undivided Family by free will and volition cannot be reopened, unless it is established that the partition was obtained by fraud, coercion, misrepresentation or undue influence.
Mere inequality of shares does not justify reopening.

Paras 30–35

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Partition — Exceptional circumstances permitting reopening

Partition may be reopened only in limited circumstances, namely:

1. Fraud, coercion, misrepresentation or undue influence; or

2. Where minors are parties and the partition is unjust, unfair and detrimental to their interests.

The burden lies heavily on the party seeking reopening.

Paras 32–35, 48–50

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Fraud — Pleading and proof — Mandatory requirement

Fraud must be:

• Specifically pleaded;

• Supported by material particulars as required under Order VI Rule 4 CPC; and

• Proved by cogent and convincing evidence.

Bald allegations or mere use of the word “fraud” are legally insufficient.

Paras 42–47

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Civil Procedure Code — Order VI Rule 4 — Particulars of fraud

In cases alleging fraud, pleadings must disclose:

• Specific acts;

• Dates;

• Manner of deception;

• Material concealment or misrepresentation.

In absence of such pleadings, no evidence on fraud is admissible.

Paras 42–45

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Fraud — Effect — Judicial acts

Fraud vitiates all judicial acts.
A decree or transaction obtained by fraud is a nullity; however, fraud must first be established in accordance with law.

Paras 39–47

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Partition deed — Registered document — Presumption of validity

Registered partition deeds and settlement deeds, when acted upon, carry strong evidentiary value.
Such documents cannot be lightly set aside in absence of strict proof of fraud.

Paras 51–60

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Revenue records — Presumption of correctness

Entries in revenue records carry statutory presumption of correctness under Section 6 of the Andhra Pradesh Rights in Land and Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971, until rebutted by cogent evidence.

Paras 66–67

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Minor’s interest — Reopening of partition

Partition involving minors is binding if:

• Done in good faith; and

• Not detrimental to minor’s interest.

Only when actual prejudice to the minor is pleaded and proved can partition be reopened.

Paras 48–50

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Evidence — Fraud — Standard of proof

Fraud must be proved with a degree of certainty higher than ordinary civil disputes.
Suspicion, conjecture or inequitable distribution alone is insufficient.

Paras 44–47, 70

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First Appellate Court — Interference with findings of fact

Where findings of the Trial Court are based on proper appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the appellate court shall not interfere unless perversity or legal infirmity is demonstrated.

Para 71

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FACTS (As Recorded by the Court)

1. The suit properties originally belonged to the common ancestor:

   • Goriparthi Venkanna and his wife Venkamma.

2. They had three sons:

   • Goriparthi Srirama Murthy (Defendant No.1)

   • Goriparthi Nageswara Rao (husband of Plaintiff No.1 – deceased)

   • Goriparthi Surya Rao (Defendant No.2)

3. Plaintiffs are:

   • Wife and children of late Goriparthi Nageswara Rao.

4. Suit O.S. No.12 of 2013 was filed seeking:

   • Declaration;

   • Partition;

   • Declaration that:

     • Registered partition deed dated 27-06-2008,

     • Registered settlement deed dated 27-06-2008, and

     • Registered gift deed dated 25-04-2015

     are sham, collusive, fraudulent and not binding.

5. Trial Court dismissed the suit by judgment dated 11-06-2019.

6. The present appeal under Section 96 CPC was filed challenging the dismissal.

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ISSUES FRAMED BY THE APPELLATE COURT

Para 25

1. Whether plaintiffs are entitled to partition of the 1/3rd share of late G. Nageswara Rao?

2. Whether the registered partition deed and settlement deed dated 27-06-2008 are sham, nominal and fraudulent?

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ANALYSIS OF LAW AND FACTS

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1. Nature of partition under Hindu Law

The Court reiterated that:

• Partition severs joint family status.

• Once effected, joint ownership ceases.

• Partition is ordinarily final and irrevocable.

Paras 30–31

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2. When partition can be reopened

Relying extensively on Ratnam Chettiar v. S.M. Kuppuswami Chettiar
(1976) 1 SCC 214, the Court reiterated the settled propositions:

• Voluntary partition cannot be reopened.

• Exception exists only when fraud or minor’s prejudice is established.

• Strict proof is required.

Paras 32–35

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3. Meaning and scope of fraud

The Court examined:

• Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act;

• Judicial definitions of fraud;

• Dictionary meaning;

• Supreme Court precedents including:

  • S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath

  • A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of A.P.

  • Nidhi Kaim v. State of M.P.

  • Vishnu Vardhan v. State of U.P.

and reiterated:

Fraud must be pleaded with particulars and proved with cogent evidence.

Paras 37–47

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4. Mandatory pleading under Order VI Rule 4 CPC

The Court held:

• Fraud allegations without particulars are legally non-existent.

• Evidence without pleadings is inadmissible.

• Mere allegation does not reopen concluded transactions.

Paras 42–45

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5. Appreciation of evidence

Registered documents

• Partition deed dated 27-06-2008 (Ex.A-1)

• Settlement deed dated 27-06-2008 (Ex.A-2)

were:

• Executed during lifetime of deceased;

• Registered;

• Acted upon;

• Witnessed;

• Followed by mutation and revenue entries.

Paras 51–60

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Conduct of deceased coparcener

The Court noted:

• Deceased was highly educated.

• Government Engineer.

• Businessman and builder in Hyderabad.

• Maintained cordial relations with brothers.

• Never challenged the documents during his lifetime.

Paras 55–65

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Revenue records

Pattadar passbooks, adangals and title deeds stood mutated in favour of defendants, attracting statutory presumption under Section 6 of Act 26 of 1971.

Paras 66–67

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6. Minor’s interest

The Court held:

• No pleading or proof of prejudice to minors.

• No evidence showing unfairness.

• Hence, ground for reopening unavailable.

Paras 48–50, 70

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7. Findings of Trial Court

The High Court found:

• Trial Court’s findings were well reasoned.

• No perversity.

• No misapplication of law.

• No evidence supporting fraud.

Paras 71–73

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FINAL DECISION

Para 74

• Appeal dismissed.

• Judgment and decree of the Trial Court confirmed.

• No costs.

• All pending applications closed.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

1. A concluded partition effected by registered documents cannot be reopened unless fraud or undue influence is strictly pleaded and proved.

2. Mere inequality of shares or subsequent dissatisfaction does not invalidate partition.

3. Fraud must be pleaded with particulars under Order VI Rule 4 CPC and proved by cogent evidence; vague allegations are insufficient.

4. Partition involving minors is binding unless actual prejudice is established.

5. Registered partition and settlement deeds, when acted upon and supported by revenue records, carry strong evidentiary presumption.

6. First appellate court will not interfere with findings of fact unless perversity or legal infirmity is demonstrated.

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LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE

This judgment is a comprehensive reaffirmation of:

• Finality of Hindu family partitions

• Stringent standards for pleading fraud

• Protection against belated challenges to registered family settlements

• Judicial caution against reopening long-settled family arrangements

It serves as a leading authority on:

• Reopening of partition deeds

• Fraud pleadings under CPC

• Minor’s interest in family partitions

• Evidentiary value of registered documents

Peaceful possession of immovable property is protected by law irrespective of title. Even the true owner or State authorities cannot dispossess a person without due process of law. Revenue authorities have no power to interfere with possession without statutory backing. Natural justice — notice and opportunity — is mandatory before dispossession. Article 300-A read with Article 21 prohibits arbitrary deprivation of property.

Constitution of India — Articles 14, 19, 21 & 300-A — Right to property — Due process

No person can be dispossessed from immovable property except by procedure established by law. Any interference by revenue authorities without notice, opportunity of hearing and statutory backing is arbitrary and unconstitutional.

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Possession — Settled possession — Protection of law

A person in peaceful and settled possession of immovable property is entitled to retain such possession and cannot be dispossessed except by recourse to law, even by the true owner.

(Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu, (2004) 1 SCC 769 — followed)

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Trespasser — Even unlawful occupant — Due process mandatory

Even a trespasser or person in unauthorized occupation cannot be forcibly evicted without following due process of law. State authorities have no power to dispossess without statutory authorization.

(Ram Ratan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1977) 1 SCC 188 — followed)

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State authorities — Executive action — Limitation

The State and its executive officers cannot interfere with possession of citizens unless such action is expressly authorized by law.

(State of W.B. v. Vishnunarayan & Associates (P) Ltd., (2002) 4 SCC 134 — relied upon)

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Natural justice — Notice and hearing — Mandatory

Dispossession or demolition without issuance of show cause notice and opportunity of hearing violates principles of natural justice and is illegal.

(H.B. Yogalaya v. State of U.P., (2004) 13 SCC 518 — followed)

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Right to life — Article 21 — Procedural fairness

“Procedure established by law” must be just, fair and reasonable. Any deprivation of property affecting livelihood attracts Article 21 protection.

(Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 25 — applied)

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Eviction — Even from public land — Opportunity mandatory

Even pavement dwellers or unauthorized occupants are entitled to notice and reasonable opportunity before eviction.

(Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545 — applied)

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FACTS (as recorded by the Court)

1. The petitioner claimed peaceful possession over:

   • Ac.10.46 cents

   • Situated in Sy.No.210

   • Santha Kowur Village

   • Thondur Mandal

   • Y.S.R. Kadapa District.

2. The grievance of the petitioner was that:

   • Respondent No.3 (Tahsildar)

   • Acting at the instance of private respondents (4 to 7)

   • Was interfering and threatening dispossession

   • Without issuing notice

   • Without opportunity of hearing

   • Without following any procedure known to law.

3. The petitioner invoked Articles 14, 19, 21 and 300-A of the Constitution.

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ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

Whether the revenue authorities can interfere with or dispossess a person from peaceful possession of immovable property without following due process of law?

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COURT’S ANALYSIS

---

1. Protection of settled possession

The Court reiterated the settled legal principle that:

A person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain possession and cannot be dispossessed except in accordance with law.

Reliance was placed on:

Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu
(2004) 1 SCC 769

where the Supreme Court held:

• Even the rightful owner cannot dispossess a person in settled possession by force.

• Law must be taken recourse to.

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2. True owner also bound by law

Relying on:

Ram Ratan v. State of Uttar Pradesh
(1977) 1 SCC 188

the Court observed:

• Even a true owner cannot forcibly dispossess a trespasser if the trespasser is in settled possession.

• Possession can be recovered only through lawful means.

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3. Executive power has statutory limits

The Court referred to:

State of West Bengal v. Vishnunarayan & Associates (P) Ltd.
(2002) 4 SCC 134

and held:

• State authorities cannot interfere with possession unless action is authorized by statute.

• Executive instructions or pressure from private parties have no legal sanction.

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4. Natural justice is mandatory

The Court relied on:

H.B. Yogalaya v. State of U.P.
(2004) 13 SCC 518

and reaffirmed:

• No demolition or dispossession can take place without:

  • Show-cause notice

  • Opportunity of hearing.

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5. Constitutional guarantee under Article 21

Referring to:

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India
AIR 1978 SC 25

the Court emphasized:

• “Procedure established by law” must be:

  • fair,

  • just,

  • reasonable,

  • non-arbitrary.

Any forcible dispossession violates Article 21.

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6. Even unauthorized occupants are protected

Relying on:

Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation
(1985) 3 SCC 545

the Court observed:

• Even trespassers cannot be removed forcibly.

• Reasonable notice and opportunity must precede eviction.

• Force, if used, must be minimal and proportionate.

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FINAL FINDING

The Court held:

• The petitioner is entitled to protection of her possession.

• Revenue authorities cannot interfere without following due process of law.

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OPERATIVE PORTION

The writ petition was disposed of with the following direction:

Respondents shall not interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the petitioner’s subject property except by following due process of law.

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Costs

No order as to costs.

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Miscellaneous Petitions

All pending miscellaneous petitions were closed.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

1. Peaceful possession of immovable property is protected by law irrespective of title.

2. Even the true owner or State authorities cannot dispossess a person without due process of law.

3. Revenue authorities have no power to interfere with possession without statutory backing.

4. Natural justice — notice and opportunity — is mandatory before dispossession.

5. Article 300-A read with Article 21 prohibits arbitrary deprivation of property.