Pattadar Pass Books — Cancellation — Scope of Revenue Jurisdiction Revenue authorities exercising powers under the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 are competent only to effect mutation of entries for fiscal purposes and cannot adjudicate complicated questions relating to title, succession, genuineness or validity of registered sale deeds, which are matters falling within the exclusive domain of civil courts. (Paras 6–8, 13–14)

Revenue Records — Cancellation of Pattadar Pass Books — Section 5(3) & 5-B of A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 — Jurisdiction of Revenue Authorities — Civil Dispute — Alternative Remedy — Article 226

Constitution of India — Article 226 — A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 — Sections 5(3), 5-B — Rule 19(2) — Revenue Entries — Pattadar Pass Books — Mutation — Title Dispute — Alternative Statutory Remedy — Status quo

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A. Pattadar Pass Books — Cancellation — Scope of Revenue Jurisdiction

Revenue authorities exercising powers under the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 are competent only to effect mutation of entries for fiscal purposes and cannot adjudicate complicated questions relating to title, succession, genuineness or validity of registered sale deeds, which are matters falling within the exclusive domain of civil courts.

(Paras 6–8, 13–14)

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B. Serious Dispute of Title — Limitation on Revenue Enquiry

Where rival parties assert competing rights over immovable property involving:

• succession,

• validity of registered sale deeds,

• death of alleged vendors prior to execution of documents, and

• challenge to chain of title,

such disputes constitute serious civil disputes, and revenue authorities ought not to decide title by branding registered documents as void or irregular.

(Paras 7, 13–14)

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C. Revenue Records — Nature and Effect

Entries in revenue records, including:

• 1-B Register,

• Pattadar Pass Books, and

• Title Deeds,

are not documents of title but are maintained for revenue purposes only. Cancellation or alteration of such entries cannot operate as declaration of ownership.

(Paras 6–7, 13)

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D. Section 5(3) of ROR Act — Requirement of Notice and Enquiry

Section 5(3) of the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 read with Rule 19(2) mandates:

• issuance of notice to all persons whose names appear in revenue records, and

• opportunity of hearing prior to cancellation or modification of entries.

Persons whose names stand mutated pursuant to registered sale deeds are “persons interested” and cannot be excluded from enquiry.

(Paras 6, 13, 15)

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E. Revisional Power under Section 5-B — Alternative Remedy

Under Section 5-B(2) of the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971, the revisional authority is empowered to:

• call for records,

• examine legality and propriety of proceedings, and

• pass appropriate orders.

When such efficacious statutory remedy is available, the High Court ordinarily should not exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

(Paras 12, 15)

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F. Maintainability of Writ Petition — Alternative Remedy

Though the petitioners were “persons interested” and entitled to question the impugned proceedings, the existence of an effective statutory remedy bars invocation of writ jurisdiction when:

• disputed questions of fact exist, and

• all grounds raised can be canvassed before the revisional authority.

(Para 15)

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G. Interim Protection — Status Quo

In order to safeguard parties pending statutory proceedings, the High Court directed:

• maintenance of status quo as on the date of order,

• liberty to seek interim relief before revisional authority, and

• automatic vacation of interim protection in default of availing remedy within stipulated time.

(Para 15)

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RATIO DECIDENDI

1. Revenue authorities under the ROR Act cannot adjudicate disputed civil title or declare registered sale deeds void or irregular.

2. Where complicated questions of succession and validity of conveyances arise, parties must be relegated to statutory or civil remedies.

3. Persons whose names are recorded in revenue registers pursuant to registered sale deeds are “persons interested” entitled to notice and hearing.

4. Availability of efficacious alternative remedy under Section 5-B of the ROR Act bars exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

5. High Court may grant limited interim protection to preserve status quo while directing parties to pursue statutory remedies.

Wakf Property — Permanent Lease of 1887 — Validity — Authority of Muslim Community — Gazette Notification — Additional Evidence — Order XLI Rule 27 CPC — Remand Wakf Act, 1954 & 1995 — Sections 4, 5, 6 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 96 — Order XLI Rule 27 — Public Documents — Gazette Notification — Ryotwari Patta — Estate Abolition Act — Adverse Possession — Limitation

Wakf Property — Permanent Lease of 1887 — Validity — Authority of Muslim Community — Gazette Notification — Additional Evidence — Order XLI Rule 27 CPC — Remand

Wakf Act, 1954 & 1995 — Sections 4, 5, 6 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 96 — Order XLI Rule 27 — Public Documents — Gazette Notification — Ryotwari Patta — Estate Abolition Act — Adverse Possession — Limitation

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A. Wakf Property — Proof of Wakf — Gazette Notification

Where the plaintiff–Wakf Board pleaded that the suit land was Wakf property identified during statutory Wakf survey and notified by Government Gazette dated 30.11.1961, but such Gazette Notification was not produced before the trial Court, the Gazette Notification constitutes a crucial public document for deciding the character of the property and determination of title.

The Gazette Notification, being prior to institution of the suit and forming the statutory basis for identification of Wakf property, has direct bearing on the adjudication of title and therefore qualifies for reception as additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC.

(Paras 18–25)

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B. Order XLI Rule 27 CPC — Additional Evidence — Scope

Additional evidence may be permitted in appeal not as a matter of right, but:

• when the appellate court requires such evidence to pronounce judgment, or

• when there exists any other substantial cause, including removal of obscurity or lacuna affecting effective adjudication.

The appellate court is empowered to receive additional evidence even where it is otherwise able to pronounce judgment, if the interest of justice requires that material issues be clarified.

(Paras 19–24)

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C. Public Documents — Gazette Notifications — Ryotwari Patta Proceedings

Gazette Notifications issued by Government and proceedings of Settlement Officers, Commissioners of Survey, Settlement and Land Records, writ orders, and decrees of civil courts constitute public documents.

Where such documents relate to a period much prior to institution of the suit and go to the root of title and possession, refusal to receive them would defeat effective adjudication.

(Paras 18, 26–28)

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D. Wakf Property — Lease by Persons Other Than Mutavalli

Plaintiff Wakf Board alleged that permanent lease deeds dated 06.07.1887 executed by members of Muslim community were void ab initio, as:

• only a Mutavalli is competent to lease Wakf property; and

• Wakf property cannot be permanently alienated.

The validity of such leases cannot be conclusively determined without examining:

• statutory Wakf notification, and

• nature of property as Wakf at the relevant time.

(Paras 6–9, 29)

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E. Ryotwari Patta — Effect — Binding Nature

Defendants relied upon:

• ryotwari patta issued by Settlement Officer under Estate Abolition Act,

• dismissal of revisions by higher revenue authorities, and

• writ proceedings confirming such patta.

Where competing claims are based on Wakf law on one side and Estate Abolition proceedings on the other, both sets of documents must be examined together, and no final conclusion can be drawn in absence of complete documentary foundation.

(Paras 15–17, 26–30)

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F. Adverse Possession — Against Wakf Property

Plea of adverse possession was raised by defendants based on long possession and alienations.

However, determination of adverse possession necessarily depends upon:

• proof of lawful origin of possession,

• nature of property (Wakf or otherwise), and

• statutory protection afforded to Wakf properties.

Such issues cannot be finally adjudicated without additional documentary evidence now sought to be produced.

(Paras 9, 29–31)

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G. Remand — When Appropriate

Where:

• both parties seek reception of additional evidence;

• documents are public documents;

• documents relate to period prior to suit;

• evidence goes to root of title; and

• adjudication without such evidence would be incomplete,

the proper course is to set aside the decree and remand the suits, permitting parties to prove existence, authenticity, genuineness and contents of documents in accordance with law.

(Paras 30–32)

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RATIO DECIDENDI

1. Gazette Notification issued under Wakf law identifying property as Wakf is a foundational document for adjudicating title and must be produced and examined.

2. Order XLI Rule 27 CPC permits additional evidence in appeal when such evidence is essential for complete and satisfactory adjudication of the dispute.

3. Public documents predating the institution of the suit and directly affecting title cannot be excluded merely on the ground of delay.

4. Where rival claims arise under Wakf law and Estate Abolition law, both statutory regimes must be examined on evidence before rendering findings.

5. In absence of complete documentary foundation, confirmation of decree is impermissible and remand becomes necessary.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Advocates Act, 1961 — Bar Council Elections — Nomi..Advocates Act, 1961 — Bar Council Elections — Nomination fee — Power of Bar Council of India — Scope Advocates Act, 1961 — Sections 7, 15 & 49 — State Bar Council Election Rules — Fixation of nomination fee — Enhancement from Rs.30,000/- to Rs.1,25,000/- — Validity. Proceedings issued by the Principal Secretary, Bar Council of India enhancing the non-refundable nomination fee for contesting State Bar Council elections from Rs.30,000/- to Rs.1,25,000/- were challenged as illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction. — Paras 2–4

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Advocates Act, 1961 — Bar Council Elections — Nomi...: advocatemmmohan Advocates Act, 1961 — Bar Council Elections — Nomination fee — Power of Bar Council of India — Scope Advocates Act, 1961 —...

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Advocates Act, 1961 — Bar Council Elections — Nomination fee — Power of Bar Council of India — Scope

Advocates Act, 1961 — Sections 7, 15 & 49 — State Bar Council Election Rules — Fixation of nomination fee — Enhancement from Rs.30,000/- to Rs.1,25,000/- — Validity.

Proceedings issued by the Principal Secretary, Bar Council of India enhancing the non-refundable nomination fee for contesting State Bar Council elections from Rs.30,000/- to Rs.1,25,000/- were challenged as illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction.
— Paras 2–4

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Administrative Law — Executive order — Absence of statutory source — Effect

Where an administrative proceeding does not trace its source of power to any statutory provision, rule or regulation, such proceeding can only be treated as an executive order and does not have the force of law.
— Paras 18–22

The impugned proceeding dated 25.09.2025 issued by the Principal Secretary, Bar Council of India did not refer to any statutory provision nor disclose any decision or resolution of the Bar Council of India authorising such enhancement.
— Paras 17–19

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Statutory bodies — Requirement of transparency — Communication of resolutions

Resolutions of statutory bodies must be made public and communicated to all stakeholders. Proceedings issued in secrecy or without disclosure of the underlying resolution cannot bind stakeholders.
— Paras 20–21

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Bar Council of India — Resolution not published — Legal consequence

Even assuming a resolution dated 07.12.2024 existed enhancing the nomination fee, the same had neither been communicated to State Bar Councils nor disclosed in the counter-affidavit and therefore lacked statutory enforceability.
— Paras 19–21

A mere internal resolution, without publication or statutory backing, does not amount to compliance with the Advocates Act or Rules.
— Paras 20–22

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Election Law — Democratic process — Nomination fee — Unreasonableness

Abrupt multifold enhancement of non-refundable nomination fee has the tendency to:

• frustrate the democratic process;
• deter genuine candidates;
• stifle fair participation in elections.

— Paras 23–25

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Constitution of India — Article 14 — Arbitrariness

Fixation of a non-refundable nomination fee of Rs.1,25,000/- without rational basis, justification or uniform criteria was held to be arbitrary, irrational and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
— Paras 25–27

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Advocates Act, 1961 — Federal structure of Bar Councils

Conditions prevailing in one State Bar Council cannot be mechanically applied to all States. Nomination fee cannot be fixed merely on the basis that another State Bar Council has enhanced the fee.
— Para 26

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Held

Proceedings bearing BCI:D:6880/2025 (Council-STBCs) dated 25.09.2025 issued by the Principal Secretary, Bar Council of India:

• are executive in nature;
• lack statutory authority;
• are arbitrary and unconstitutional;
• liable to be quashed.

— Paras 22 & 27

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Relief

Writ Petitions allowed.

Nomination fee fixed at Rs.50,000/- for the ensuing Andhra Pradesh State Bar Council elections.
— Para 29

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FACTUAL MATRIX

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Background

• Writ Petitions were filed by:

– Andhra Lawyers Association
– Individual Advocates

challenging enhancement of nomination fee for contesting elections to the State Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh.

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Earlier Position

• Under Andhra Pradesh Gazette Notification dated 14.05.2018,
non-refundable nomination fee = Rs.30,000/-.

• This notification remained unchallenged and in force.

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Impugned Proceeding

• Proceedings dated 25.09.2025 issued by the Principal Secretary, Bar Council of India fixed:

Nomination fee = Rs.1,25,000/- (non-refundable)

Reason cited:

• reduction of enrolment fee from Rs.16,000/- to Rs.600/- pursuant to Supreme Court directions.

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Challenge

Petitioners contended that:

• Principal Secretary had no independent statutory power;
• no rule or regulation authorised such enhancement;
• existing State Election Rules governed the field;
• abrupt increase violated Articles 14 and 19(1)(g).

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ISSUES FRAMED BY THE COURT

— Para 15

1. Whether the impugned proceeding dated 25.09.2025 is sustainable in law without reference to statutory power?

2. Whether the proceeding is merely an executive order issued without authority?

3. Whether multifold increase of nomination fee frustrates the democratic election process?

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ANALYSIS OF LAW

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1. Absence of statutory source

The Court found:

• No provision of the Advocates Act cited;
• No Rule under Section 49 invoked;
• No reference to State Election Rules;
• No resolution mentioned in the proceeding.

— Paras 17–18

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2. Post-facto resolution

A resolution dated 07.12.2024 was produced only during final hearing.

The Court held:

• not pleaded in counter-affidavit;
• not communicated to State Bar Councils;
• not made public;
• not traceable to statutory power.

— Paras 19–21

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3. Executive order cannot override statute

The Andhra Pradesh Gazette Notification dated 14.05.2018 was statutory in nature.

An executive instruction cannot override a statutory rule.
— Paras 11, 21 & 22

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4. Democratic process and proportionality

The Court held:

• nomination fee must be reasonable;
• economic inequality among advocates must be recognised;
• excessive fee deters capable candidates;
• democracy under Advocates Act cannot be reduced to formality.

— Paras 23–25

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5. Mechanical fixation impermissible

The Court rejected:

• adoption of Uttar Pradesh Bar Council fee as benchmark;
• uniform fee without regard to State-wise conditions.

— Para 26

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RATIO DECIDENDI

The Bar Council of India or its Principal Secretary cannot enhance the non-refundable nomination fee for State Bar Council elections without tracing the power to a statutory provision under the Advocates Act or Rules. An executive proceeding unsupported by statutory authority, unpublished resolution or reasoned justification is unenforceable in law, and an abrupt multifold increase of nomination fee which stifles participation in elections is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act (1975) – Licensing and De-licensing – Rights of Apartment Owners. (A) Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act (1975) – License for Residential Colony – De-licensing of portion of land. Developer initially obtained license for 18.98 acres for a residential colony—Subsequently applied for de-licensing of 8 acres to develop a commercial complex (Mall/Hotel)—Residents of Phase-I (10.98 acres) challenged the reduction of area, alleging loss of promised open spaces—Held, the legality of de-licensing depends on whether the rights of apartment owners under the Apartment Buyers’ Agreement and the Haryana Apartment Ownership Act were violated—Matter scrutinized for alleged collusion between State authorities and developer.

Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act (1975) – Licensing and De-licensing – Rights of Apartment Owners.

(A) Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act (1975) – License for Residential Colony – De-licensing of portion of land. Developer initially obtained license for 18.98 acres for a residential colony—Subsequently applied for de-licensing of 8 acres to develop a commercial complex (Mall/Hotel)—Residents of Phase-I (10.98 acres) challenged the reduction of area, alleging loss of promised open spaces—Held, the legality of de-licensing depends on whether the rights of apartment owners under the Apartment Buyers’ Agreement and the Haryana Apartment Ownership Act were violated—Matter scrutinized for alleged collusion between State authorities and developer.

(B) National Green Tribunal Act (2010) – Environmental Compensation – Violation of open space norms. Original Application before NGT alleging destruction of parks and green belts—Joint Expert Committee recommending fine of Rs. 138.83 crores—Held, environmental violations in specialized jurisdictions like NGT are to be treated independently from general civil disputes regarding land title or licensing—Demolition of commercial structures a potential remedy for extreme environmental degradation.

(C) Civil Procedure Code (1908), S. 11 – Res Judicata – Multiplicity of proceedings. Previous suits filed by Residents’ Association (ALARWA) withdrawn or dismissed—Individual residents filing fresh Writ Petitions—Maintainability challenged on grounds of delay and prior litigation—Effect of withdrawal of representative suits on individual rights discussed.

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2. Gujarat Public Service Commission v. Gnaneshwary D. Shah

2026 INSC 70

AICTE Act (1987) – Recruitment Rules – Estoppel.

(A) All India Council for Technical Education (Career Advancement Scheme) Regulations (2012) – Nature of Regulations – Direct Recruitment vs. Promotion. AICTE Regulations 2012 titled "Career Advancement Scheme"—Applicability to direct recruitment challenged—Held, the architecture of the Regulations (API scores, PBAS) is designed for "Promotion and Progression" of incumbent teachers—It serves as a "ladder" for those already in the system, not a "gate" for initial entry—Direct recruitment for Government Engineering Colleges to be governed by State Recruitment Rules, not CAS Regulations.

(B) Constitution of India, Art. 16 – Selection Process – Challenge by unsuccessful candidate – Estoppel. Candidate participated in the interview process for the post of Professor without protest—Failed to secure minimum qualifying marks—Challenged the selection criteria only after being declared unsuccessful—Held, a candidate having taken a chance in the selection process cannot turn around and challenge the "rules of the game" or the methodology of evaluation after failing—Principle of estoppel squarely applies.

(C) Administrative Law – Judicial Review – Expert Committees. Evaluation of suitability for academic posts—Held, the decision of a Committee of Experts regarding the suitability of a candidate should not be interfered with by Courts in exercise of powers of judicial review, unless there is patent illegality or mala fides.

A registered Sale Deed carrying clear and unambiguous terms of absolute transfer cannot be declared sham or nominal merely on the basis of oral evidence or subsequent conduct; in the absence of a reconveyance condition embodied in the same instrument as mandated by the proviso to Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, the transaction cannot constitute a mortgage by conditional sale, and the strong statutory presumption of validity attached to registered instruments can be displaced only by specific pleadings and cogent proof satisfying the standard under Order VI Rule 4 CPC.

TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882 — Section 58(c)

Mortgage by conditional sale — Mandatory statutory requirement — Condition must be in same document

For a transaction to constitute a mortgage by conditional sale, the condition that the sale shall become void or that reconveyance shall take place must be embodied in the very document which effects or purports to effect the sale.

Where the registered Sale Deed contained no such condition, the transaction cannot be treated as mortgage by conditional sale.

(Proviso to S.58(c) strictly applied.)
(Paras 44–49)

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INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 — Sections 91 & 92

Registered sale deed — Clear and unambiguous terms — Bar on oral evidence

Where the terms of a registered Sale Deed are clear, categorical and admit of no ambiguity, extrinsic or oral evidence is inadmissible to contradict its contents.

Oral evidence is not permissible merely to allege that the document was intended as security, unless foundational facts satisfying statutory exceptions are pleaded and proved.
(Paras 15–18, 41–43)

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REGISTERED DOCUMENT — PRESUMPTION

Strong presumption of validity and genuineness

A registered Sale Deed carries a formidable presumption of validity.

The burden to rebut such presumption lies heavily upon the person alleging that the document is sham or nominal.

Courts must not casually or lightly declare a registered document to be fictitious.
(Paras 31–33, 38)

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PLEADINGS — Order VI Rule 4 CPC

Allegation of sham transaction — Requirement of strict pleadings

A plea that a registered document is sham, nominal or fraudulent must satisfy rigorous pleading standards, akin to Order VI Rule 4 CPC.

Mere use of expressions such as “sham”, “nominal” or “fraud” without material particulars amounts to clever drafting creating illusion of cause of action, and cannot displace statutory presumptions.
(Paras 34–41)

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SALE DEED v. MORTGAGE

Intention of parties — To be gathered primarily from document

Where the Sale Deed:

• recites absolute transfer of ownership,

• records full consideration,

• contains indemnity clause,

• acknowledges delivery of possession, and

• is followed by execution of a registered lease deed,

the intention of parties is clearly that of an outright sale and not a mortgage transaction.
(Paras 43–55)

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RENTAL AGREEMENT — EFFECT

Execution of lease after sale — Admission of ownership

Execution of a registered Rental Agreement by the vendor in favour of purchaser subsequent to sale deed:

• acknowledges change of status from owner to tenant, and

• constitutes strong evidence that the sale was intended to be acted upon.

Payment of rent for fourteen months reinforces genuineness of sale.
(Paras 5–9, 54–55)

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ADMISSION — LEGAL NOTICE REPLY

Reply admitting tenancy and arrears — Evidentiary value

Where the executant:

• replies to eviction notice admitting default in rent, and

• undertakes to clear arrears,

such reply constitutes a clear admission, especially when no plea is taken that reply was issued under mistake or without understanding contents.
(Paras 6–8, 73–75)

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INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION

Does not invalidate sale

Mere allegation that consideration was inadequate does not render a sale deed void.

In absence of proof of total absence of consideration, Explanation 2 to Section 25 of the Contract Act applies.
(Para 60)

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MUNICIPAL RECORDS — MUTATION

Not proof of title

Non-mutation of purchaser’s name in municipal or revenue records and payment of taxes by vendor do not defeat title created under registered Sale Deed.

Revenue entries do not confer ownership.
(Paras 61–65)

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EVIDENCE — SUBSEQUENT CONDUCT

Subsequent conduct such as payment of taxes or continued possession cannot override:

• express recitals of registered conveyance, and

• statutory presumptions attached thereto.
  (Paras 61–65)

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GANGABAI v. CHHABUBAI — (1982) 1 SCC 4

Distinction explained

Principle permitting oral evidence to prove sham transaction applies only where:

• execution itself was not intended to operate at all.

It does not apply where:

• parties knowingly executed registered sale and lease deeds, and

• subsequent conduct affirms transfer.

High Court erred in mechanically applying Gangabai.
(Paras 72)

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CIVIL PROCEDURE — SECOND APPEAL

High Court exceeded jurisdiction

High Court erred in:

• ignoring statutory presumptions,

• misapplying Section 92 Evidence Act, and

• restoring trial court decree contrary to settled law.

Interference warranted.
(Paras 72–78)

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

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1. Nature of dispute

The litigation arose from a registered Sale Deed dated 12.11.1971 followed by a registered Rental Agreement of the same date.

The vendor later sought declaration that:

• sale deed was sham and nominal;

• transaction was actually a mortgage;

• eviction proceedings should be restrained.

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2. Trial Court approach

The Trial Court:

• relied heavily on oral testimony,

• ignored statutory bar under Sections 91–92 Evidence Act,

• treated subsequent conduct as decisive, and

• declared the sale deed sham.

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3. First Appellate Court

The First Appellate Court reversed the decree holding:

• intention must be gathered from document;

• oral evidence barred;

• sale was genuine and intended to operate.

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4. High Court error

The High Court restored trial court decree relying almost entirely on Gangabai without:

• examining Section 58(c) TPA proviso;

• appreciating registered lease deed;

• addressing admissions in reply notice;

• applying Order VI Rule 4 CPC standards.

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5. Supreme Court correction

The Supreme Court held:

• Registration creates strong presumption of genuineness.

• Sham plea requires strict pleadings and strong proof.

• No clause of reconveyance existed in sale deed.

• Mortgage by conditional sale statutorily impossible.

• Subsequent tax payments and possession irrelevant.

• Reply notice admitting tenancy fatal to plaintiff case.

The Court restored the judgment of the First Appellate Court.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

A registered Sale Deed carrying clear and unambiguous terms of absolute transfer cannot be declared sham or nominal merely on the basis of oral evidence or subsequent conduct; in the absence of a reconveyance condition embodied in the same instrument as mandated by the proviso to Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, the transaction cannot constitute a mortgage by conditional sale, and the strong statutory presumption of validity attached to registered instruments can be displaced only by specific pleadings and cogent proof satisfying the standard under Order VI Rule 4 CPC.