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Thursday, January 22, 2026

Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act (1975) – Licensing and De-licensing – Rights of Apartment Owners. (A) Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act (1975) – License for Residential Colony – De-licensing of portion of land. Developer initially obtained license for 18.98 acres for a residential colony—Subsequently applied for de-licensing of 8 acres to develop a commercial complex (Mall/Hotel)—Residents of Phase-I (10.98 acres) challenged the reduction of area, alleging loss of promised open spaces—Held, the legality of de-licensing depends on whether the rights of apartment owners under the Apartment Buyers’ Agreement and the Haryana Apartment Ownership Act were violated—Matter scrutinized for alleged collusion between State authorities and developer.

Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act (1975) – Licensing and De-licensing – Rights of Apartment Owners.

(A) Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act (1975) – License for Residential Colony – De-licensing of portion of land. Developer initially obtained license for 18.98 acres for a residential colony—Subsequently applied for de-licensing of 8 acres to develop a commercial complex (Mall/Hotel)—Residents of Phase-I (10.98 acres) challenged the reduction of area, alleging loss of promised open spaces—Held, the legality of de-licensing depends on whether the rights of apartment owners under the Apartment Buyers’ Agreement and the Haryana Apartment Ownership Act were violated—Matter scrutinized for alleged collusion between State authorities and developer.

(B) National Green Tribunal Act (2010) – Environmental Compensation – Violation of open space norms. Original Application before NGT alleging destruction of parks and green belts—Joint Expert Committee recommending fine of Rs. 138.83 crores—Held, environmental violations in specialized jurisdictions like NGT are to be treated independently from general civil disputes regarding land title or licensing—Demolition of commercial structures a potential remedy for extreme environmental degradation.

(C) Civil Procedure Code (1908), S. 11 – Res Judicata – Multiplicity of proceedings. Previous suits filed by Residents’ Association (ALARWA) withdrawn or dismissed—Individual residents filing fresh Writ Petitions—Maintainability challenged on grounds of delay and prior litigation—Effect of withdrawal of representative suits on individual rights discussed.


2. Gujarat Public Service Commission v. Gnaneshwary D. Shah

2026 INSC 70

AICTE Act (1987) – Recruitment Rules – Estoppel.

(A) All India Council for Technical Education (Career Advancement Scheme) Regulations (2012) – Nature of Regulations – Direct Recruitment vs. Promotion. AICTE Regulations 2012 titled "Career Advancement Scheme"—Applicability to direct recruitment challenged—Held, the architecture of the Regulations (API scores, PBAS) is designed for "Promotion and Progression" of incumbent teachers—It serves as a "ladder" for those already in the system, not a "gate" for initial entry—Direct recruitment for Government Engineering Colleges to be governed by State Recruitment Rules, not CAS Regulations.

(B) Constitution of India, Art. 16 – Selection Process – Challenge by unsuccessful candidate – Estoppel. Candidate participated in the interview process for the post of Professor without protest—Failed to secure minimum qualifying marks—Challenged the selection criteria only after being declared unsuccessful—Held, a candidate having taken a chance in the selection process cannot turn around and challenge the "rules of the game" or the methodology of evaluation after failing—Principle of estoppel squarely applies.

(C) Administrative Law – Judicial Review – Expert Committees. Evaluation of suitability for academic posts—Held, the decision of a Committee of Experts regarding the suitability of a candidate should not be interfered with by Courts in exercise of powers of judicial review, unless there is patent illegality or mala fides.

A registered Sale Deed carrying clear and unambiguous terms of absolute transfer cannot be declared sham or nominal merely on the basis of oral evidence or subsequent conduct; in the absence of a reconveyance condition embodied in the same instrument as mandated by the proviso to Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, the transaction cannot constitute a mortgage by conditional sale, and the strong statutory presumption of validity attached to registered instruments can be displaced only by specific pleadings and cogent proof satisfying the standard under Order VI Rule 4 CPC.

TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882 — Section 58(c)

Mortgage by conditional sale — Mandatory statutory requirement — Condition must be in same document

For a transaction to constitute a mortgage by conditional sale, the condition that the sale shall become void or that reconveyance shall take place must be embodied in the very document which effects or purports to effect the sale.

Where the registered Sale Deed contained no such condition, the transaction cannot be treated as mortgage by conditional sale.

(Proviso to S.58(c) strictly applied.)
(Paras 44–49)


INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 — Sections 91 & 92

Registered sale deed — Clear and unambiguous terms — Bar on oral evidence

Where the terms of a registered Sale Deed are clear, categorical and admit of no ambiguity, extrinsic or oral evidence is inadmissible to contradict its contents.

Oral evidence is not permissible merely to allege that the document was intended as security, unless foundational facts satisfying statutory exceptions are pleaded and proved.
(Paras 15–18, 41–43)


REGISTERED DOCUMENT — PRESUMPTION

Strong presumption of validity and genuineness

A registered Sale Deed carries a formidable presumption of validity.

The burden to rebut such presumption lies heavily upon the person alleging that the document is sham or nominal.

Courts must not casually or lightly declare a registered document to be fictitious.
(Paras 31–33, 38)


PLEADINGS — Order VI Rule 4 CPC

Allegation of sham transaction — Requirement of strict pleadings

A plea that a registered document is sham, nominal or fraudulent must satisfy rigorous pleading standards, akin to Order VI Rule 4 CPC.

Mere use of expressions such as “sham”, “nominal” or “fraud” without material particulars amounts to clever drafting creating illusion of cause of action, and cannot displace statutory presumptions.
(Paras 34–41)


SALE DEED v. MORTGAGE

Intention of parties — To be gathered primarily from document

Where the Sale Deed:

  • recites absolute transfer of ownership,

  • records full consideration,

  • contains indemnity clause,

  • acknowledges delivery of possession, and

  • is followed by execution of a registered lease deed,

the intention of parties is clearly that of an outright sale and not a mortgage transaction.
(Paras 43–55)


RENTAL AGREEMENT — EFFECT

Execution of lease after sale — Admission of ownership

Execution of a registered Rental Agreement by the vendor in favour of purchaser subsequent to sale deed:

  • acknowledges change of status from owner to tenant, and

  • constitutes strong evidence that the sale was intended to be acted upon.

Payment of rent for fourteen months reinforces genuineness of sale.
(Paras 5–9, 54–55)


ADMISSION — LEGAL NOTICE REPLY

Reply admitting tenancy and arrears — Evidentiary value

Where the executant:

  • replies to eviction notice admitting default in rent, and

  • undertakes to clear arrears,

such reply constitutes a clear admission, especially when no plea is taken that reply was issued under mistake or without understanding contents.
(Paras 6–8, 73–75)


INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION

Does not invalidate sale

Mere allegation that consideration was inadequate does not render a sale deed void.

In absence of proof of total absence of consideration, Explanation 2 to Section 25 of the Contract Act applies.
(Para 60)


MUNICIPAL RECORDS — MUTATION

Not proof of title

Non-mutation of purchaser’s name in municipal or revenue records and payment of taxes by vendor do not defeat title created under registered Sale Deed.

Revenue entries do not confer ownership.
(Paras 61–65)


EVIDENCE — SUBSEQUENT CONDUCT

Subsequent conduct such as payment of taxes or continued possession cannot override:

  • express recitals of registered conveyance, and

  • statutory presumptions attached thereto.
    (Paras 61–65)


GANGABAI v. CHHABUBAI — (1982) 1 SCC 4

Distinction explained

Principle permitting oral evidence to prove sham transaction applies only where:

  • execution itself was not intended to operate at all.

It does not apply where:

  • parties knowingly executed registered sale and lease deeds, and

  • subsequent conduct affirms transfer.

High Court erred in mechanically applying Gangabai.
(Paras 72)


CIVIL PROCEDURE — SECOND APPEAL

High Court exceeded jurisdiction

High Court erred in:

  • ignoring statutory presumptions,

  • misapplying Section 92 Evidence Act, and

  • restoring trial court decree contrary to settled law.

Interference warranted.
(Paras 72–78)


ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW


1. Nature of dispute

The litigation arose from a registered Sale Deed dated 12.11.1971 followed by a registered Rental Agreement of the same date.

The vendor later sought declaration that:

  • sale deed was sham and nominal;

  • transaction was actually a mortgage;

  • eviction proceedings should be restrained.


2. Trial Court approach

The Trial Court:

  • relied heavily on oral testimony,

  • ignored statutory bar under Sections 91–92 Evidence Act,

  • treated subsequent conduct as decisive, and

  • declared the sale deed sham.


3. First Appellate Court

The First Appellate Court reversed the decree holding:

  • intention must be gathered from document;

  • oral evidence barred;

  • sale was genuine and intended to operate.


4. High Court error

The High Court restored trial court decree relying almost entirely on Gangabai without:

  • examining Section 58(c) TPA proviso;

  • appreciating registered lease deed;

  • addressing admissions in reply notice;

  • applying Order VI Rule 4 CPC standards.


5. Supreme Court correction

The Supreme Court held:

  • Registration creates strong presumption of genuineness.

  • Sham plea requires strict pleadings and strong proof.

  • No clause of reconveyance existed in sale deed.

  • Mortgage by conditional sale statutorily impossible.

  • Subsequent tax payments and possession irrelevant.

  • Reply notice admitting tenancy fatal to plaintiff case.

The Court restored the judgment of the First Appellate Court.


RATIO DECIDENDI

A registered Sale Deed carrying clear and unambiguous terms of absolute transfer cannot be declared sham or nominal merely on the basis of oral evidence or subsequent conduct; in the absence of a reconveyance condition embodied in the same instrument as mandated by the proviso to Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, the transaction cannot constitute a mortgage by conditional sale, and the strong statutory presumption of validity attached to registered instruments can be displaced only by specific pleadings and cogent proof satisfying the standard under Order VI Rule 4 CPC.

Exception — Perjury proceedings Proceedings under Section 340 CrPC / Section 379 read with Section 215 BNSS alleging perjury and fabrication of evidence excluded from blanket quashing — Such proceedings to continue independently as no party can be permitted to pollute the stream of justice. (Paras 28–29) False statements — Stream of justice Perjury proceedings cannot be terminated merely because matrimonial dispute has been settled — Allegations of false evidence must be adjudicated on merits. (Paras 28–29)

advocatemmmohan



Constitution of India — Article 142 — Divorce — Irretrievable breakdown of marriage

Supreme Court, in exercise of power under Article 142(1), may dissolve a marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, even though such ground is not provided under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — Power may be exercised despite opposition of one spouse, where marriage is completely shattered and beyond salvage.
(Paras 10–11, 15, 20, 26)


Irretrievable breakdown — Indicators

Marriage where parties cohabited only for 65 days, lived separately for more than a decade, and were engaged in over 40 civil and criminal proceedings against each other — repeated failure of mediation and reconciliation — held to be a clear case of irretrievable breakdown.
(Paras 7–9, 15–21, 26)


Article 142 — Complete justice — Scope

Power under Article 142 is discretionary, equitable and situation-specific — Court may dissolve marriage to put an end to prolonged litigation, suffering and misery where continuation of legal relationship serves no purpose.
(Paras 11–11.2, 20–21, 26)


Opposition by spouse — Not a bar

Consent of both spouses not mandatory — Divorce can be granted even when one party opposes dissolution, provided Court is satisfied that there is no possibility of cohabitation and continuation of marriage would be unjustified.
(Paras 11.2, 19–20, 26)


Multiplicity of litigation — Abuse of judicial process

More than four decades of cumulative litigation including matrimonial, criminal, execution and perjury proceedings — Courts cannot be used as battlefields by warring spouses to settle personal scores — Judicial system cannot be choked by endless matrimonial litigation.
(Paras 8–9, 21–22)


Mediation — Failure — Consequence

Despite reference to mediation by Supreme Court, process could not commence — repeated attempts at reconciliation failed — absence of any realistic possibility of settlement justified dissolution of marriage.
(Paras 2, 15)


Pending matrimonial and criminal proceedings — Quashing

All pending proceedings arising out of matrimonial dispute between the parties directed to stand disposed of upon grant of divorce, to bring quietus to litigation.
(Paras 18, 28, 30)


Exception — Perjury proceedings

Proceedings under Section 340 CrPC / Section 379 read with Section 215 BNSS alleging perjury and fabrication of evidence excluded from blanket quashing — Such proceedings to continue independently as no party can be permitted to pollute the stream of justice.
(Paras 28–29)


False statements — Stream of justice

Perjury proceedings cannot be terminated merely because matrimonial dispute has been settled — Allegations of false evidence must be adjudicated on merits.
(Paras 28–29)


Alimony

No alimony claimed by wife — All past claims deemed settled upon dissolution of marriage.
(Para 26)


Costs

Both parties saddled with costs of ₹10,000 each for indulging in prolonged and excessive litigation.
(Para 32)


ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGMENT


1. Nature of proceedings

The case originated as a transfer petition filed by the wife seeking transfer of perjury proceedings from Delhi to Lucknow.

During pendency:

  • wife filed application under Article 142 seeking dissolution of marriage;

  • husband opposed dissolution and appeared in person.


2. Factual matrix

  • Marriage solemnized: 28.01.2012

  • Separation: 02.04.2012

  • Cohabitation: 65 days only

  • Separation period: over 13 years


3. Litigation history

The Court undertook an unprecedented factual verification by:

  • directing both parties to file exhaustive lists of cases;

  • calling reports from Registrars General of Delhi High Court and Allahabad High Court;

  • identifying discrepancies in parties’ disclosures.

More than 40 civil and criminal cases were found to have been filed between the parties across multiple jurisdictions.


4. Application of Constitution Bench ruling

The Court relied principally on:

Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan

(2023) 14 SCC 231

Holding that:

  • irretrievable breakdown is not a statutory ground under HMA;

  • but Supreme Court may dissolve marriage under Article 142;

  • long separation, multiple litigations and failed mediation are decisive factors.


5. Factors applied (para 63 of Shilpa Sailesh)

The Court evaluated:

  • duration of separation (over a decade);

  • absence of children;

  • continuous litigation;

  • failure of mediation;

  • level of bitterness;

  • absence of possibility of reunion.

All parameters stood fully satisfied.


6. Findings

The Court held:

  • marriage was “wrecked beyond salvage”;

  • reconciliation impossible;

  • continuation of legal tie unjustified;

  • case squarely fell within irretrievable breakdown doctrine.


7. Final directions

  • Marriage dissolved under Article 142.

  • All matrimonial proceedings quashed.

  • Perjury proceedings preserved.

  • Parties restrained from further matrimonial litigation.

  • Costs imposed on both parties.


RATIO DECIDENDI

Where spouses have cohabited only briefly, lived separately for more than a decade, engaged in extensive civil and criminal litigation against each other, and all efforts at reconciliation including mediation have failed, the Supreme Court may, in exercise of its extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution, dissolve the marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, notwithstanding the absence of such ground under the Hindu Marriage Act and despite opposition by one spouse, in order to do complete justice and bring finality to the dispute.


LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE

This judgment:

  • Reaffirms the binding authority of Shilpa Sailesh

  • Clarifies that Article 142 divorce is independent of consent

  • Permits global settlement of matrimonial litigation

  • Protects perjury jurisdiction from compromise

  • Demonstrates judicial intolerance towards litigation abuse in family disputes

Factories Act, 1948 — Section 59(2) — “Ordinary rate of wages” — Meaning Expression “ordinary rate of wages” under Section 59(2) means basic wages plus such allowances as the worker is for the time being entitled to — Statute expressly excludes only bonus and overtime wages — No other exclusion can be read into the provision by executive instructions. (Paras 2, 8, 15)

Factories Act, 1948 — Section 59(2) — “Ordinary rate of wages” — Meaning

Expression “ordinary rate of wages” under Section 59(2) means basic wages plus such allowances as the worker is for the time being entitled to — Statute expressly excludes only bonus and overtime wages — No other exclusion can be read into the provision by executive instructions.
(Paras 2, 8, 15)


Overtime wages — Compensatory allowances — Inclusion

House Rent Allowance (HRA), Transport Allowance (TA), Clothing and Washing Allowance (CWA), Small Family Allowance (SFA) and similar compensatory allowances form part of “ordinary rate of wages” for calculation of overtime wages — Exclusion thereof is contrary to the plain language of Section 59(2).
(Paras 2, 15)


Executive instructions — Office Memorandums — No statutory force

Letters, circulars and Office Memorandums issued by Ministries of Defence, Labour or Finance have no statutory authority to interpret or modify Section 59(2) — Executive instructions cannot override or dilute parliamentary legislation.
(Paras 6.1, 9.3, 10–10.2, 12)


Powers under Factories Act — Central Government — Limits

Factories Act vests rule-making and exemption powers only with State Governments — Central Government has no authority to issue clarifications altering wage components under Section 59(2) — Section 113 permits only issuance of directions to State Governments for implementation.
(Paras 8–10.2)


Statutory interpretation — Legislature does not waste words

When statute expressly provides exclusions, courts cannot permit executive to add further exclusions — Legislature consciously excluded only bonus and overtime wages — Reading additional exclusions violates settled principles of statutory construction.
(Paras 15)


Beneficial labour legislation — Interpretation

Factories Act, 1948 is a beneficial and welfare legislation — Provisions relating to working hours and overtime must receive liberal construction in favour of workers — Interpretation curtailing statutory benefits must be avoided.
(Paras 6.2, 12.1–13)


Overtime wages — Social and economic purpose

Payment of overtime at double rate is a statutory safeguard against labour exploitation — Section 59 forms a mandatory protection mechanism — Neither employer nor employee can contract out of it.
(Paras 12.1–13)


Different interpretations by Ministries — Impermissibility

Different Ministries of Government of India cannot assign divergent meanings to the same parliamentary enactment — Uniform interpretation of central legislation is mandatory.
(Paras 14–14.1)


Judgments distinguished

Decisions in:

Bridge and Roofs Co. Ltd. v. Union of India
Govind Bapu Salvi v. Vishwanath Joshi
Union of India v. Suresh C. Baskey

held distinguishable on facts and statutory context — None supports exclusion of compensatory allowances under Section 59(2).
(Paras 11–11.2)


Kerala High Court judgment — Overruled

Judgment of Kerala High Court in V.E. Jossie v. Flag Officers Commanding-in-Chief Headquarters held not laying down correct law, being contrary to Section 59(2) of the Factories Act.
(Para 16)


Result

High Court judgment upheld — Appeals dismissed — Compensatory allowances to be included while computing overtime wages.
(Paras 17–18)


ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGMENT


1. Core issue

Whether compensatory allowances such as:

  • HRA

  • Transport Allowance

  • Clothing and Washing Allowance

  • Small Family Allowance

can be excluded while computing overtime wages under Section 59(2) of the Factories Act, 1948.


2. Statutory provision examined

Section 59(2):

“Ordinary rate of wages means the basic wages plus such allowances… as the worker is for the time being entitled to, but does not include bonus and wages for overtime work.”


3. Court’s interpretation

The Supreme Court held:

  • Phrase “such allowances” is wide and inclusive.

  • Legislature made only two exclusions:

    • bonus, and

    • overtime wages.

  • No power exists to exclude compensatory allowances by executive fiat.


4. Lack of executive power

The Court held:

  • Chapter VI (Sections 59–65) vests exemption powers exclusively in State Governments.

  • Chapter XI confers no interpretative power on Central Government.

  • Ministries cannot issue clarifications altering statutory meaning.


5. Rejection of Ministry circulars

Multiple Office Memorandums relied upon by Union of India were rejected because:

  • they lack statutory backing,

  • they contradict express statutory language,

  • they attempt to amend law indirectly.


6. Beneficial interpretation reaffirmed

The Court reiterated:

  • Factories Act is meant to prevent exploitation,

  • overtime compensation is a labour-welfare guarantee,

  • restrictive interpretation defeats legislative intent.


7. Uniformity of central legislation

The Court strongly disapproved:

  • Defence Ministry excluding allowances, while

  • Railways including the same allowances,

holding that:

Parliament cannot be interpreted differently by different Ministries.


8. Precedents distinguished

Earlier judgments relied upon by Union of India were held inapplicable because they concerned:

  • definition of “basic wages” under other statutes, or

  • notional inclusion of allowances not actually paid.


9. Final holding

The High Court was correct in holding that:

  • compensatory allowances form part of ordinary wages,

  • executive instructions cannot curtail statutory benefits,

  • overtime wages must be calculated accordingly.


RATIO DECIDENDI

Under Section 59(2) of the Factories Act, 1948, the “ordinary rate of wages” includes basic wages together with all allowances to which the worker is entitled at the relevant time, excluding only bonus and overtime wages; compensatory allowances such as house rent allowance, transport allowance and similar payments cannot be excluded through executive instructions, as neither the Central Government nor its Ministries possess statutory authority to modify or restrict the scope of the provision.


LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE

This judgment conclusively establishes that:

  • Executive circulars cannot amend labour statutes

  • Compensatory allowances are part of overtime wage computation

  • Only Parliament may restrict statutory wage components

  • Factories Act must receive worker-protective interpretation

  • Section 59(2) admits no exclusions beyond those expressly stated

Whether the BOCW Act, 1996 and the Cess Act, 1996, though notified in 1995–96, could be treated as operative legislation before constitution of Welfare Boards, so as to deny contractors the benefit of “subsequent legislation” clauses in NHAI contracts.

Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 — Sections 18, 24 — Operation of Act — When effective

Though the BOCW Act was brought into force on 01.03.1996, its provisions could not be given actual effect until Welfare Boards were constituted under Section 18 — In absence of Welfare Boards, levy, collection and utilisation of cess could not arise — The enactment remained dormant in fact, owing to failure of appropriate Governments to implement statutory machinery.
(Paras 35–38, 50, 59(ii)–(iii))


Building and Other Construction Workers’ Welfare Cess Act, 1996 — Sections 3 & 14 — Levy of cess — Condition precedent

Cess Act is complementary to the BOCW Act and enacted solely to augment resources of Welfare Boards — In absence of constitution of Welfare Boards, levy and collection of cess under the Cess Act could not arise — Constitution of Welfare Boards is sine qua non for levy and collection of cess.
(Paras 9, 35–37, 50–51, 59(iii)–(iv))


BOCW Act & Cess Act — Date of enforcement versus date of operability

Though the Acts were notified in 1995–96, they remained ineffective in practical terms until statutory machinery was created — Mere existence of statute on the statute book does not imply enforceability in absence of implementation framework — Welfare legislation cannot operate in vacuum.
(Paras 14–17, 35–38, 59(ii))


Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 34 & 37 — Scope of interference

Courts cannot re-appreciate evidence or substitute their interpretation where arbitral tribunal has adopted a plausible and reasonable view — Construction and interpretation of contract fall primarily within arbitral jurisdiction — Interference is impermissible unless award is perverse, patently illegal or contrary to fundamental policy of Indian law.
(Paras 23–33, 52, 59(vi))


Contract — ‘Subsequent legislation’ clause — Interpretation

Clause fixing a cut-off date of 28 days prior to submission of bids governs determination of liabilities to be factored into bid prices — Where levy of cess became enforceable only after such cut-off date due to later constitution of Welfare Boards or issuance of State notifications, such levy qualifies as ‘subsequent legislation’ under contractual clauses.
(Paras 38–40, 52)


Contractor — Liability to pay cess — When arises

Contractors could not have factored cess into bid prices when no statutory machinery for levy or collection existed — Factoring such levy earlier would have resulted in unjust enrichment — Liability to pay cess arises only after Welfare Boards are constituted and levy mechanism becomes operational.
(Paras 36–38, 50–52)


Dewan Chand Builders case — Interpretation affirmed

Observation in Dewan Chand Builders v. Union of India that BOCW Act and Cess Act became operative in Delhi only after notification of Rules was not stray — It affirmed High Court findings — Later decision in A. Prabhakara Reddy clarified that constitution of Welfare Boards is condition precedent for effective levy.
(Paras 21–22, 53, 59(i), (iv))


Public policy — Patent illegality — Test

An arbitral award is not contrary to public policy merely because an alternate interpretation is possible — Violation must strike at fundamental policy of Indian law — Plausible interpretation of contractual terms cannot be interfered with.
(Paras 24–33, 52, 59(vi))


Execution proceedings — Recovery of cess — Impermissibility

Where cess liability did not exist during subsistence of contract, recovery cannot be imposed retrospectively during execution of arbitral award — Post-contract notifications cannot fasten liability on terminated contracts.
(Paras 42–44, 54)


Result

Appeals filed by NHAI dismissed — Appeal filed by Prakash Atlanta (JV) allowed — Deduction of cess from arbitral award amounts held impermissible — NHAI directed to refund adjusted amounts with interest.
(Paras 60)


ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGMENT


1. Core issue

Whether the BOCW Act, 1996 and the Cess Act, 1996, though notified in 1995–96, could be treated as operative legislation before constitution of Welfare Boards, so as to deny contractors the benefit of “subsequent legislation” clauses in NHAI contracts.


2. Court’s central finding

The Supreme Court held that:

Mere notification of the Acts did not make them operational.

Until Welfare Boards were constituted and statutory machinery created:

  • no levy could be raised,

  • no cess could be collected, and

  • no fund could be credited.


3. Dormancy of the Acts

The Court took judicial notice of:

  • decades of non-implementation,

  • repeated monitoring orders in National Campaign Committee cases,

  • massive unutilised cess collections,

  • absence of Boards and authorities in most States.

Result: the Acts remained dormant in fact.
(Paras 14–17, 35–38)


4. Complementary nature of the two Acts

The Court emphasised:

  • Cess Act exists only to fund Welfare Boards.

  • Levy without Boards would collapse the fee–tax distinction.

  • Collection without utilisation would violate statutory purpose.

Hence, cess could not precede Board constitution.
(Paras 35–37)


5. Application to contracts

Across all six appeals:

  • bids were submitted before Welfare Boards existed,

  • State notifications enforcing cess came much later,

  • contractors could not have priced a non-existent levy.

Accordingly, arbitral tribunals correctly applied:

  • Clause 14.3 (bid reference date), and

  • Clause 70.8 (subsequent legislation).
    (Paras 38–52)


6. Arbitration law reaffirmed

The Court reiterated settled principles:

  • Contract interpretation belongs to arbitrator.

  • Two plausible views → arbitrator’s view prevails.

  • Courts under Sections 34 & 37 cannot act as appellate forums.

No award was found:

  • perverse,

  • patently illegal, or

  • contrary to public policy.
    (Paras 23–33, 52)


7. Prakash Atlanta (JV) — special case

  • Contract executed in 2001.

  • Terminated in 2008.

  • UP Rules notified only in 2010 with retrospective sweep.

Court held:

  • NHAI’s attempt to deduct cess during execution proceedings was an afterthought.

  • Liability could not be imposed retrospectively on a terminated contract.
    (Paras 42–54)


RATIO DECIDENDI

Though the Building and Other Construction Workers Act, 1996 and the Welfare Cess Act, 1996 were notified in 1995–96, their provisions could not be given effect to until Welfare Boards were constituted under Section 18 of the BOCW Act; in the absence of such Boards, levy and collection of cess did not arise, and contractors who submitted bids prior to creation of the statutory machinery could not be fastened with cess liability, making subsequent State notifications “subsequent legislation” within the meaning of contractual clauses.


LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE

This judgment conclusively holds that:

  • Statutory notification ≠ operational enforceability

  • Welfare Board constitution is condition precedent

  • Cess cannot exist in institutional vacuum

  • Contractors cannot price imaginary levies

  • Arbitral interpretation of ‘subsequent legislation’ stands protected

  • IBC-style non-interference principles apply equally to infrastructure arbitration