A neighbouring resident has locus standi to challenge constructions made in violation of sanctioned building plans in a residential area; however, once zoning regulations permit the construction and no legal right is infringed, procedural irregularities alone do not vitiate building permission or justify interference, and municipal action affecting property rights must comply with statutory notice requirements and principles of natural justice.

AP HIGH COURT AMARAVATHI

Constitution of India — Art. 226 — Writ jurisdiction — Common order in connected writ petitions

Where multiple writ petitions arise out of inter-related disputes concerning the same property, same parties and overlapping issues, the High Court is justified in hearing them together and disposing them by a common order.
(Para 1)

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Municipal Law — Illegal constructions — Locus standi of neighbouring residents

Residents of the locality have locus standi to question illegal constructions which disrupt the character of a residential area and violate sanctioned building plans, as such constructions invade their personal and legal interests.
(Paras 18–19)
Relied on: Sri K. Ramdas Shenoy v. Town Municipal Council, Udipi

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Municipal Law — Building permission — Challenge by third party

A building permit can be questioned by a third party only on limited grounds, namely:
(i) claim of title or legal right over the property, or
(ii) violation of zoning regulations.
In the absence of infringement of any legal right, a neighbour lacks locus standi to challenge the grant of building permission.
(Paras 21–22)

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Town Planning — Residential permission — Construction contrary to sanctioned plan

Where a building is sanctioned for residential use, but the material on record including photographs, inspection reports and construction features indicate that a commercial structure was constructed from inception, the action amounts to construction contrary to the sanctioned plan.
(Paras 29–30)

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Municipal Law — Subsequent zoning change — Effect

Subsequent change of land use from residential zone to commercial zone under a revised master plan permits issuance of fresh building permission for commercial use, provided the construction conforms to the applicable rules and zoning regulations.
(Paras 28, 32)

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Municipal Law — Building permit — Procedural irregularity

A distinction must be drawn between procedural irregularity and substantive illegality. Mere procedural deviations in granting permission do not vitiate the sanction in the absence of infringement of a legal right.
(Para 22)

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Municipal Law — Occupancy Certificate

When a building conforms to zoning regulations and building rules prevailing at the relevant time, and no deviations are pointed out, there is no justification to withhold issuance of Occupancy Certificate.
(Paras 32–33)

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Municipal Corporations Act — Demolition / closure orders — Principles of natural justice

Orders directing closure of premises or removal of alleged unauthorised constructions, passed without issuance of statutory show-cause notice, violate procedural safeguards and are liable to be set aside, with liberty to the authority to proceed afresh in accordance with law.
(Para 35)

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Equitable jurisdiction — Costs

Where parties make misleading pleadings and suppress material facts, yet the construction ultimately conforms to zoning regulations, the Court may take a balanced approach by imposing exemplary costs instead of directing demolition.
(Paras 30–31)

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

The batch of writ petitions arose from long-standing neighbourhood disputes relating to construction activities in Bhimavaram Municipality, involving allegations of:

• construction of a commercial building under the guise of a residential plan,

• grant of fresh commercial permission after change of zoning,

• refusal to issue Occupancy Certificate, and

• action taken by the Municipality against the complainant himself for unauthorised commercial activity.

The Court first addressed locus standi, holding that neighbours have a right to challenge constructions that violate sanctioned plans in a residential area (W.P. No.15425 of 2023), but do not have locus to challenge a building permit granted in accordance with zoning regulations merely on procedural grounds (W.P. No.17367 of 2024).

On facts, relying on photographs, inspection reports and pleadings, the Court concluded that the structure was commercial in nature from inception, contrary to the original residential permission. However, the Court also noted:

• subsequent change of zoning to commercial under the master plan dated 17-01-2024,

• grant of commercial building permission by EUDA on 28-06-2024, and

• absence of any violation of current zoning regulations.

Balancing equities, the Court refrained from ordering demolition, imposed costs of ₹50,000 on the builders for misleading pleadings, and permitted consideration of Occupancy Certificate.

With respect to municipal action against the complainant’s own property (bar and restaurant), the Court found procedural violations, set aside the closure order, and directed fresh proceedings after issuance of statutory notice.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

A neighbouring resident has locus standi to challenge constructions made in violation of sanctioned building plans in a residential area; however, once zoning regulations permit the construction and no legal right is infringed, procedural irregularities alone do not vitiate building permission or justify interference, and municipal action affecting property rights must comply with statutory notice requirements and principles of natural justice.

O.7 R.11, O.1 R.10 — Registration of plaint — Scope of scrutiny at pre-registration stage. At the stage of registration of a plaint, the trial Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits of the claim or the maintainability of the suit on disputed questions of law and fact. Issues relating to liability of parties and applicability of statutory bars must be decided only after registration, framing of issues and trial. (Paras 8, 10, 11)

AP HIGH COURT AMARAVATHI

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — O.7 R.11, O.1 R.10 — Registration of plaint — Scope of scrutiny at pre-registration stage.
At the stage of registration of a plaint, the trial Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits of the claim or the maintainability of the suit on disputed questions of law and fact. Issues relating to liability of parties and applicability of statutory bars must be decided only after registration, framing of issues and trial.
(Paras 8, 10, 11)

Constitution of India — Art. 227 — Supervisory jurisdiction — Refusal to register plaint.
Where the trial Court refuses to register a plaint by entering into the merits of the claim and adjudicating legal issues prematurely, such refusal amounts to jurisdictional error warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
(Paras 11, 13)

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 — S. 6(4) (as amended by Act 39 of 2005) — Pious obligation — Scope.
Section 6(4) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 does not bar the institution of a suit. It only mandates that a Court shall not recognize the right of a creditor to proceed against a son, grandson or great-grandson (including daughters) solely on the ground of pious obligation, subject to determination during trial.
(Paras 3, 8)

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 — S. 6(4) — Applicability — Stage of consideration.
The question whether liability is sought to be fastened on coparceners on the basis of pious obligation, and whether Section 6(4) applies, are matters for adjudication during trial after registration of the suit, and not at the stage of scrutiny of the plaint.
(Paras 5, 8)

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — O.1 R.10 — Power of Court to strike out parties.
Even where doubts exist regarding the liability of certain defendants, the trial Court retains power under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC to direct deletion of parties at an appropriate stage; such doubts do not justify refusal to register the suit.
(Para 10)

Money suit — Promissory note — Maintainability.
A suit based on a promissory note executed by the first defendant is certainly maintainable against the executant, irrespective of the ultimate determination of liability of other defendants.
(Para 9)

Trial Court — Jurisdiction — Excess exercise at threshold.
By questioning the liability of defendant Nos.2 and 3 and applying Section 6(4) of the Hindu Succession Act at the stage of registration, the trial Court travelled beyond its jurisdiction.
(Para 11)

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

The petitioner instituted a money recovery suit based on a promissory note allegedly executed by defendant No.1, asserting that he borrowed the amount as kartha of a joint family, thereby making his minor daughters (defendant Nos.2 and 3) also liable.

The trial Court, at the pre-registration stage, returned the plaint by invoking Section 6(4) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, holding that post-2005 amendment, no creditor can proceed against children on the basis of pious obligation.

The High Court held that:

• Section 6(4) does not create a bar to institution of a suit.

• At best, upon satisfaction of statutory conditions, the Court may refuse to recognize liability at the stage of adjudication.

• Whether liability of defendant Nos.2 and 3 arises, whether pious obligation applies, and whether such obligation can arise during the lifetime of the father, are mixed questions of law and fact.

• Such questions can only be examined after registration of the plaint, framing of issues and trial.

• The trial Court committed a jurisdictional error by deciding these issues prematurely.

• The existence of power under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC further shows that doubts regarding party liability cannot justify refusal to register a suit.

Accordingly, the refusal to register the plaint was held to be illegal and unsustainable.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

Section 6(4) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 does not bar the filing or registration of a suit; the applicability of pious obligation and liability of coparceners are matters for trial, and a civil court has no jurisdiction to refuse registration of a plaint by adjudicating such issues at the threshold.

Motor accident claims — Evidence — FIR and charge-sheet — Evidentiary value. Crime records such as FIR and charge-sheet, prepared in the regular discharge of official duties, coupled with the testimony of the injured eyewitness, are sufficient to establish negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle in claim proceedings. (Paras 15(i)–(iii))

AP HIGH COURT AMARAVATHI

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 166, 168 — Determination of “just compensation” — Scope of appellate interference.
In an appeal against an award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, the High Court, being the last Court of fact, is duty-bound to reassess evidence and determine whether the compensation awarded is just and adequate, and may enhance or reduce the award where the Tribunal has failed to consider relevant heads or applied incorrect principles.
(Paras 12, 13, 14, 37)

Motor accident claims — Standard of proof — Negligence — Preponderance of probability.
In proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, strict proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. The claimant is only required to establish negligence on the touchstone of preponderance of probability, having regard to the summary nature of enquiry and the social-welfare character of the legislation.
(Paras 15(v), 15(vi), 15(vii))

Motor accident claims — Evidence — FIR and charge-sheet — Evidentiary value.
Crime records such as FIR and charge-sheet, prepared in the regular discharge of official duties, coupled with the testimony of the injured eyewitness, are sufficient to establish negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle in claim proceedings.
(Paras 15(i)–(iii))

Motor accident claims — Permanent disability — Functional disability — Loss of earning capacity — Distinction.
Permanent physical disability is not synonymous with loss of earning capacity. Even where the claimant continues in service and there is no immediate reduction in income, compensation for permanent disability cannot be denied if the disability results in restriction of day-to-day activities, inconvenience, and recurring extra expenditure throughout life.
(Paras 27–33)

Motor accident claims — Permanent disability — Public employment — Continuation in service — Effect.
Mere continuation of employment or absence of reduction in salary does not disentitle a claimant from compensation under the head of permanent disability. The Court must consider the long-term impact of disability beyond office hours, including loss of amenities and increased expenditure.
(Paras 29–33)

Motor accident claims — Assessment of disability — Scaling down — Rational approach.
Where the claimant continues in employment and income is not directly affected, it is permissible for the Court to scale down the percentage of disability spoken to by medical evidence and adopt a rational proportion for computation of compensation.
(Paras 34, 35)

Motor accident claims — Multiplier method — Applicability in injury cases.
The multiplier method is applicable in injury cases for assessing compensation towards permanent disability and future loss, having regard to age, income, and the extent of disability affecting the claimant.
(Paras 16(ii), 35)

Motor accident claims — Heads of compensation — Comprehensive assessment.
Compensation in injury cases must be assessed under multiple heads including pain and suffering, loss of amenities, permanent disability, medical expenses, future treatment, attendant charges, conveyance and special diet, and loss of leave, so as to restore the claimant, as far as money can, to the pre-accident position.
(Paras 16, 36)

Motor accident claims — Award exceeding amount claimed — Permissibility.
There is no bar on awarding compensation exceeding the amount claimed in the petition. The statutory duty of the Tribunal and the Court under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to award “just compensation”, even if it exceeds the claim.
(Paras 38, 39)

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RATIO DECIDENDI

In motor accident injury claims, compensation must be just, reasonable, and comprehensive; permanent disability warrants compensation even where employment continues without salary reduction, and appellate courts are empowered to enhance compensation by reassessing evidence, applying the multiplier method, and awarding amounts exceeding the claim where warranted by the material on record.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — S. 197 — Sanction for prosecution — Police officers — Acts done in discharge of official duty — Cognizance without sanction — Validity. Where the alleged acts of custodial excesses are stated to have occurred during investigation of a registered crime, the acts complained of bear a reasonable nexus with the discharge of official duty, and prior sanction under Section 197(1)(b) Cr.P.C. is mandatory. Cognizance taken without such sanction is vitiated in law. (Paras 14, 18, 20)

AP HIGH COURT AMARAVATHI

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — S. 197 — Sanction for prosecution — Police officers — Acts done in discharge of official duty — Cognizance without sanction — Validity.
Where the alleged acts of custodial excesses are stated to have occurred during investigation of a registered crime, the acts complained of bear a reasonable nexus with the discharge of official duty, and prior sanction under Section 197(1)(b) Cr.P.C. is mandatory. Cognizance taken without such sanction is vitiated in law.
(Paras 14, 18, 20)

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Ss. 3(1)(x), 3(2) — “Public view” — Police station premises — Scope.
Alleged caste-based abuse occurring inside a police station, which is not freely accessible to the general public and lacks public glare, does not satisfy the essential ingredient of “place within public view” required for offences under Sections 3(1)(x) and 3(2) of the Act.
(Paras 17, 19)

SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act — Investigation procedure — Rule 7 of 1995 Rules — Role of Magistrate.
When the statute mandates investigation by a police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, the learned Magistrate cannot assume the role of an investigating authority and take cognizance solely on the basis of sworn statements in a private complaint.
(Paras 15, 16, 19)

Criminal Procedure — Private complaint — Cognizance — Limits of Magistrate’s power.
Cognizance taken by the Magistrate by overlooking the statutorily prescribed investigative mechanism under the SC & ST (POA) Act amounts to a jurisdictional error.
(Paras 16, 19)

Inherent powers — Quashment — Abuse of process.
Proceedings initiated without statutory sanction, ignoring mandatory procedural safeguards, and lacking essential ingredients of the alleged offences are liable to be quashed in exercise of inherent jurisdiction.
(Paras 18, 20)

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS (Paragraph-wise)

1. Nature of Proceedings
   The Criminal Petition was filed seeking quashment of PRC No.14 of 2019, arising out of a private complaint, insofar as A-1 and A-2 (police officers) are concerned. (Para 1)

2. Status of Petitioners
   Petitioner No.1 is a Sub-Inspector of Police and Petitioner No.2 is an Inspector of Police, both serving in the State Police Department. (Para 2)

3. Allegations in Complaint
   It was alleged that during investigation of Crime No.98 of 2015, the petitioners subjected the complainant to custodial torture, illegal confinement, and caste-based abuse inside the police station. (Paras 3, 5)

4. Failure to Register FIR
   As the police authorities did not register the complaint against their own personnel, the complainant filed a private complaint, and the Magistrate took cognizance after recording sworn statements. (Para 4)

5. Cognizance Taken
   The learned Magistrate took cognizance for offences under Sections 3(1)(ii)(x), 3(2) of the SC & ST Act and Sections 323, 452, 307, 506 read with 34 IPC. (Para 5)

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ANALYSIS OF LAW

1. Requirement of Sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C.
   The Court held that investigation of a registered crime is a statutory duty of police officers. Allegations of excesses during such investigation are acts connected with official functions, attracting the protection of Section 197 Cr.P.C. (Paras 14, 18)

2. Procedural Mandate under SC & ST (POA) Act
   Rule 7 of the 1995 Rules mandates investigation by a DSP-rank officer, followed by a structured supervisory process. The Magistrate cannot bypass this mechanism. (Paras 15, 16)

3. Meaning of “Public View”
   Relying on binding precedent, the Court reiterated that police station premises do not constitute a place within public view, as access is restricted and not open to the general public. (Paras 17, 19)

4. Jurisdictional Error by Magistrate
   By taking cognizance without sanction and by ignoring mandatory statutory procedure, the Magistrate assumed the role of an investigating officer, which is impermissible. (Paras 16, 19)

5. Exercise of Inherent Powers
   Given the cumulative procedural violations and absence of essential ingredients, continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of process of Court. (Paras 18, 20)

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RATIO DECIDENDI

Where police officers are alleged to have committed acts during investigation of a registered crime, prior sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is mandatory; cognizance taken without such sanction is invalid, and allegations of caste-based abuse said to have occurred inside a police station do not satisfy the statutory requirement of “public view” under the SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act—rendering the proceedings liable to be quashed

Preventive detention — Right to representation — Obligation of detaining authority — Non-consideration — Effect. The constitutional right to make a representation against an order of preventive detention under Article 22(5) necessarily includes the right to independent and expeditious consideration of such representation by the detaining authority. Mere forwarding of the representation to the Advisory Board, without independent consideration by the Government after approval of detention, is fatal to the detention. (Paras 9, 10, 12, 19, 25)

AP HIGH COURT 

Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 22(5) — Preventive detention — Right to representation — Obligation of detaining authority — Non-consideration — Effect.
The constitutional right to make a representation against an order of preventive detention under Article 22(5) necessarily includes the right to independent and expeditious consideration of such representation by the detaining authority. Mere forwarding of the representation to the Advisory Board, without independent consideration by the Government after approval of detention, is fatal to the detention.
(Paras 9, 10, 12, 19, 25)

Preventive detention — Advisory Board — Distinct role — Not a substitute for Government consideration.
The consideration of a representation by the Advisory Board is not a substitute for consideration by the appropriate Government. The scope of consideration by the Government and by the Advisory Board is distinct and independent, and both are constitutionally mandated.
(Paras 12, 16, 17, 18)

A.P. Prevention of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drugs Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 — Ss. 3 & 10 — Interpretation consistent with Article 22.
Section 10 of the Act, requiring forwarding of representations to the Advisory Board, does not dispense with the obligation of the Government to independently consider the representation. Any interpretation treating the Government as a mere post office would be unconstitutional and violative of Article 22(5).
(Paras 20, 23, 24)

Preventive detention — Approval by Government — Detaining authority — Identity.
Once the Government approves an order of detention passed by a specially empowered officer, the State Government becomes the detaining authority, and is constitutionally bound to consider any representation addressed to it, irrespective of the stage of the detention process.
(Paras 19, 21, 25)

Preventive detention — Violation of constitutional safeguards — Consequence.
Failure of the State Government to consider the representation of the detenue independently renders the order of detention, approval order, and confirmation order illegal, entitling the detenue to be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case.
(Para 25)

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS (Paragraph-wise)

1. Order of Detention
   The District Collector, Chittoor passed an order of preventive detention against the husband of the petitioner on 05.06.2025, branding him as a “Bootlegger” under the Act, on the basis of his alleged involvement in five criminal cases. (Para 2)

2. Government Approval and Confirmation
   The State Government approved the detention on 11.06.2025 and, after receipt of the Advisory Board’s opinion dated 27.06.2025, confirmed the detention for 12 months by G.O.Rt.No.1326 dated 14.07.2025. (Paras 2, 3)

3. Representation by the Petitioner
   The petitioner submitted a representation dated 18.06.2025, received on 19.06.2025, addressed to the State Government. (Para 3)

4. Handling of Representation
   The representation was not considered by the State Government and was merely forwarded to the Advisory Board. (Paras 3, 7)

5. Ground Pressed Before Court
   Though several grounds were raised, the petitioner pressed only one ground—non-consideration of the representation by the Government. (Para 5)

6. Admission by the State
   The Government Pleader conceded that the representation had not been independently considered by the Government. (Para 7)

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ANALYSIS OF LAW

1. Scope of Article 22(5)
   Article 22(5) mandates not only an opportunity to make a representation but also a corresponding obligation on the detaining authority to consider the representation at the earliest. This obligation is implicit and non-negotiable. (Paras 9, 10)

2. Dual Safeguards under Article 22
   The Constitution provides two parallel safeguards:
   (i) consideration of the representation by the Government; and
   (ii) consideration by the Advisory Board.
   These safeguards operate in different fields and for different purposes. (Paras 12, 16)

3. Identity of Detaining Authority
   Upon approval of detention by the Government, the State Government assumes the role of detaining authority, regardless of who initially passed the detention order. (Paras 19, 21)

4. Section 10 of the Act — Harmonious Construction
   Section 10 cannot be interpreted to dilute constitutional guarantees. It must be harmonized with Article 22(5), requiring prior or independent consideration by the Government, followed by reference to the Advisory Board. (Paras 20, 24)

5. Effect of Non-consideration
   Non-consideration of the representation by the Government strikes at the root of the detention, rendering the entire chain of detention proceedings void. (Para 25)

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RATIO DECIDENDI

After approval of a preventive detention order, the State Government becomes the detaining authority and is constitutionally obliged under Article 22(5) to independently and expeditiously consider any representation made by or on behalf of the detenue; mere forwarding of such representation to the Advisory Board without Governmental consideration violates the constitutional scheme and renders the detention order, approval, and confirmation illegal.