Order VII Rule 11 — Rejection of plaint — Stage of registration — Limitation — Scope Held, rejection of a plaint at the stage of registration under Order VII Rule 11 CPC on the ground that the suit is barred by limitation is impermissible where the plaint contains specific averments regarding cause of action and date of knowledge, and where limitation is a mixed question of law and fact requiring evidence. (Paras 25, 31–33, 46) Limitation Act, 1963 — Articles 58 and 65 — Suit for declaration and recovery of possession — Governing article Held, where a suit seeks declaration of title with the further relief of recovery of possession based on title, the relief of declaration is ancillary and limitation is governed by Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, i.e., 12 years from the date when possession becomes adverse, and not Article 58 alone. (Paras 18–19, 46)

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order VII Rule 11 — Rejection of plaint — Stage of registration — Limitation — Scope

Held, rejection of a plaint at the stage of registration under Order VII Rule 11 CPC on the ground that the suit is barred by limitation is impermissible where the plaint contains specific averments regarding cause of action and date of knowledge, and where limitation is a mixed question of law and fact requiring evidence.
(Paras 25, 31–33, 46)

---

Limitation Act, 1963 — Articles 58 and 65 — Suit for declaration and recovery of possession — Governing article

Held, where a suit seeks declaration of title with the further relief of recovery of possession based on title, the relief of declaration is ancillary and limitation is governed by Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, i.e., 12 years from the date when possession becomes adverse, and not Article 58 alone.
(Paras 18–19, 46)

---

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order VII Rule 11 — Meaningful reading of plaint — Defence irrelevant

Held, while considering rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the court must confine itself to the averments in the plaint alone, read the plaint as a whole, and cannot rely on defence material, previous judgments, or inferences of knowledge merely from registration of documents.
(Paras 20–21, 33)

---

Registration Act, 1908 — Effect of registration — Knowledge — Presumption

Held, registration of a document may amount to notice to the world, but such presumption is rebuttable; where the plaint specifically pleads a later date of knowledge, such plea cannot be rejected at the threshold without trial.
(Paras 26, 31–32)

---

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order II Rule 2 — Bar of subsequent suit — Stage of consideration

Held, whether a subsequent suit is barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC, or by res judicata, or for want of cause of action, involves mixed questions of law and fact and cannot be decided at the stage of registration or under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
(Paras 37–38)

---

Andhra Pradesh Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956 — Sections 63 & 64 — Refund of court fee

Held, where rejection of plaint is set aside and the plaint is directed to be received and registered, the appellants are entitled to refund of the entire court fee paid on the memorandum of appeal under Section 64 of the Act, 1956.
(Paras 39–45, 46)

---

ANALYSIS OF FACTS

1. The appellants instituted a comprehensive civil suit seeking:

   • declaration of title,

   • declaration that multiple registered sale deeds and GPA transactions are null and void and not binding, and

   • consequential recovery of possession and permanent injunctions.

2. At the stage of registration, the office of the II Additional District Judge, Vijayawada, raised an objection as to limitation.

3. The plaintiffs explained in their representation that:

   • limitation is a mixed question of law and fact,

   • the suit is one for declaration with recovery of possession, and

   • the cause of action and date of knowledge were specifically pleaded.

4. By order dated 06.05.2025, the trial court rejected the plaint, holding that:

   • registration of documents amounts to notice to the world,

   • the plaintiffs had knowledge long prior, and

   • the suit was barred by limitation and without cause of action, also relying on dismissal of an earlier suit O.S.No.372 of 2015.

5. The plaintiffs preferred A.S.No.409 of 2025 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, challenging the rejection of plaint.

---

ANALYSIS OF LAW

1. The Division Bench examined the scope of Order VII Rule 11 CPC, reiterating that:

   • only the plaint averments are relevant,

   • defence material, previous judgments, or presumptions cannot be imported, and

   • the plaint must be read as a whole with a meaningful reading.
     (Paras 20, 33)

2. Relying on N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board, the Court held that:

   • suits for declaration with recovery of possession are governed by Article 65,

   • limitation runs from the date possession becomes adverse, and

   • such determination necessarily requires evidence.
     (Paras 18–19)

3. The Court distinguished cases where limitation could be inferred on the face of the plaint (e.g., long-concluded partitions with admitted knowledge), holding that those facts were absent here.
   (Paras 27–28)

4. The Court categorically held that:

   • mere registration does not conclusively establish knowledge, and

   • where the plaint pleads a specific later date of knowledge, limitation cannot be decided at the threshold.
     (Paras 31–32)

5. On the issue of the earlier suit O.S.No.372 of 2015, the Court held that:

   • questions of Order II Rule 2 CPC, res judicata, omission of reliefs, or intentional relinquishment require trial, and

   • cannot form the basis for rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
     (Paras 35–38)

6. On refund of court fee, applying Sections 63 and 64 of the A.P. Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956, the Court directed full refund, as the rejection of plaint was set aside.
   (Paras 39–46)

---

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. A plaint seeking declaration of title with consequential recovery of possession cannot be rejected at the stage of registration under Order VII Rule 11 CPC on the ground of limitation when the plaint contains specific averments regarding cause of action and date of knowledge, making limitation a mixed question of law and fact.

2. In suits combining declaration and recovery of possession based on title, limitation is governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act, and not solely by Article 58.

3. Presumption of knowledge arising from registration of documents is rebuttable and cannot, by itself, justify rejection of plaint without trial.

4. Bars under Order II Rule 2 CPC or res judicata involve factual determination and cannot be decided at the stage of plaint registration.

5. When rejection of plaint is set aside and the plaint is directed to be received, full refund of court fee paid in appeal is mandatory under Section 64 of the A.P. Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956.

O.21 R.58 — Execution — Claim petition — Unregistered non-possessory agreement — Agreement subsequent to decree — Right to resist execution Held, an unregistered non-possessory agreement of sale executed after the passing of the decree, even coupled with alleged part-payments, does not confer any right, title or interest in the E.P. schedule property so as to enable the claim petitioner to resist execution under Order XXI Rule 58 CPC. (Paras 10–14)

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — O.21 R.58 — Execution — Claim petition — Unregistered non-possessory agreement — Agreement subsequent to decree — Right to resist execution

Held, an unregistered non-possessory agreement of sale executed after the passing of the decree, even coupled with alleged part-payments, does not confer any right, title or interest in the E.P. schedule property so as to enable the claim petitioner to resist execution under Order XXI Rule 58 CPC.
(Paras 10–14)

---

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — O.21 R.58 — Claim petition — Prima facie right, title or interest — Requirement

Held, in the absence of any prima facie right, title or interest in the subject matter, a claim petition under Order XXI Rule 58 CPC is not maintainable, and such an application can be rejected at the threshold without numbering.
(Paras 12–13)

---

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Execution proceedings — Plea of collusive decree — Who can raise

Held, a third party, claiming under an unregistered non-possessory agreement of sale executed after the decree, has no locus to allege collusion between the decree holder and the judgment debtor in execution proceedings.
(Paras 8, 11–14)

---

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Appeal under S.96 — Interference with order in execution

Held, where the Execution Court has rightly rejected a claim petition founded on an unregistered agreement of sale subsequent to the decree, no illegality or infirmity is made out warranting interference in appeal under Section 96 CPC.
(Paras 13–16)

---

ANALYSIS OF FACTS

1. The 1st respondent was the plaintiff and decree holder in O.S.No.42 of 2021, instituted on 12.03.2021 for recovery of money based on two promissory notes. The suit was decreed on 23.07.2022.

2. The decree holder initiated execution by filing E.P.No.44 of 2023.

3. The present appellant, as a claim petitioner, filed an unnumbered E.A. under Order XXI Rule 58 CPC, contending that he had entered into an unregistered non-possessory agreement dated 03.10.2022 with the judgment debtor for the E.P. schedule property, and had allegedly paid amounts after the decree.

4. The appellant further alleged that the decree was collusive between the decree holder and the judgment debtor.

5. The Execution Court rejected the claim petition by order dated 14.08.2025, holding that:

   • the agreement relied upon was unregistered,

   • it was subsequent to the decree, and

   • no right could be claimed on such basis to obstruct execution.

6. Aggrieved thereby, the claim petitioner preferred A.S.No.500 of 2025 under Section 96 CPC.

---

ANALYSIS OF LAW

1. The Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh framed the central point for determination as to whether the appellant had any prima facie right, title or interest in the E.P. schedule property to resist execution, based on an unregistered non-possessory agreement dated 03.10.2022, executed after the decree.
   (Para 8)

2. The Court noted the chronology of events, emphasizing that:

   • the suit was instituted on 12.03.2021,

   • the decree was passed on 23.07.2022, and

   • the agreement relied upon by the appellant was executed on 03.10.2022, i.e., after the decree, and even the alleged payments were subsequent thereto.
     (Para 10)

3. The Court held that such an unregistered non-possessory agreement does not confer any right, title or interest in the property, even prima facie, so as to resist execution proceedings.
   (Paras 11–12)

4. The Court rejected the contention that the Execution Court ought to have registered the claim petition, holding that no numbering was required when, on the face of it, the claim was untenable.
   (Para 13)

5. The plea of collusive decree was also held to be unsustainable at the instance of a third party whose claim itself was founded on a post-decree, unregistered agreement.
   (Paras 8, 11–14)

6. Finding no illegality or perversity in the order of the Execution Court, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal.

---

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. An unregistered non-possessory agreement of sale executed after the passing of a decree does not confer any right, title or interest in the property so as to enable a third party to resist execution under Order XXI Rule 58 CPC.

2. A claim petition under Order XXI Rule 58 CPC, lacking any prima facie right or interest in the subject property, can be rejected at the threshold without being numbered.

3. A third party claiming under a post-decree unregistered agreement has no locus to allege collusion between the decree holder and the judgment debtor in execution proceedings.

4. Orders of the Execution Court rejecting such untenable claims do not warrant interference in appeal under Section 96 CPC.

Limitation Act, 1963 — S.5 — Condonation of delay — Delay of 110 days — Misplacement of certified copy — Sufficiency of cause Held, where the sole cause pleaded for condonation of delay of 110 days was misplacement of the certified copy of the judgment and decree, but the record revealed that the very same certified copy applied for and received earlier was filed along with the appeal and no proof of obtaining any extra copy was produced, the explanation does not constitute “sufficient cause”. (Paras 4–6)

Limitation Act, 1963 — S.5 — Condonation of delay — Delay of 110 days — Misplacement of certified copy — Sufficiency of cause

Held, where the sole cause pleaded for condonation of delay of 110 days was misplacement of the certified copy of the judgment and decree, but the record revealed that the very same certified copy applied for and received earlier was filed along with the appeal and no proof of obtaining any extra copy was produced, the explanation does not constitute “sufficient cause”.
(Paras 4–6)

---

Limitation Act, 1963 — S.5 — Diligence — Bona fides — Discretion of Court

Held, lack of diligence and absence of bona fide explanation disentitle the appellant from discretionary relief of condonation of delay; concepts such as liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or substantial justice cannot be employed to frustrate the substantive law of limitation.
(Paras 6–8)

---

Limitation Act, 1963 — Rigour of limitation — Equitable considerations

Held, even though limitation may harshly affect rights of parties, it has to be applied with full rigour as prescribed by statute, and courts have no power to condone delay on equitable grounds when negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large.
(Paras 7–10)

---

Appeal — Condonation of delay — Merits of appeal — Irrelevance

Held, merits of the appeal are not required to be considered while deciding an application for condonation of delay; the Court must first ascertain the bona fides and sufficiency of the cause shown.
(Paras 7–10)

---

Appeal barred by limitation — Consequence

Held, on rejection of the application for condonation of delay, the appeal is liable to be dismissed as barred by limitation.
(Para 7)

---

ANALYSIS OF FACTS

1. The appellant was the plaintiff in O.S.No.210 of 2017, a suit for specific performance of contract, which was dismissed by decree dated 09.04.2025 on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation.

2. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant preferred A.S.No.585 of 2025 beyond the period of limitation, with a delay of 110 days.

3. I.A.No.1 of 2025 was filed seeking condonation of delay. The only explanation offered was that the certified copy of the judgment and decree was misplaced, and time was taken to obtain an extra copy.

4. The Division Bench examined the record and found that:

   • the certified copy annexed to the appeal was the same copy applied for on 10.04.2025 and received on 14.05.2025, and

   • there was no proof whatsoever of applying for or receiving any additional certified copy.

5. On these facts, the Court held that the explanation offered did not inspire confidence and disclosed lack of diligence on the part of the appellant.

---

ANALYSIS OF LAW

1. The Court reiterated the settled position that condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is discretionary, and such discretion can be exercised only when sufficient cause is shown.
   (Paras 6–8)

2. Relying on authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court, including H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah and Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector (LA), the Court emphasized that:

   • liberal or justice-oriented approaches cannot override the statute of limitation, and

   • negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide bars condonation of delay.
     (Paras 7–10)

3. The Court further held that:

   • law of limitation is founded on public policy,

   • courts have no power to extend limitation on equitable grounds, and

   • merits of the appeal are irrelevant while deciding an application for condonation of delay.
     (Paras 7–10)

4. Applying these principles, the Court concluded that no sufficient cause was shown for condoning the delay of 110 days.

---

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. Misplacement of a certified copy of judgment, without proof and when the same copy is filed along with the appeal, does not constitute “sufficient cause” for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

2. Condonation of delay is a discretionary relief, and where lack of diligence or bona fide is evident, liberal or justice-oriented considerations cannot override the statutory rigour of limitation.

3. Merits of the appeal cannot be considered while deciding an application for condonation of delay; absence of sufficient cause mandates rejection of the application and dismissal of the appeal as barred by limitation.

Limitation Act, 1963 — S.5 — Condonation of delay — Delay in filing appeal — “Sufficient cause” — Misplacement of certified copy — Proof Held, where the appellant pleaded misplacement of the certified copy of the judgment and decree as the cause for delay of 107 days, but the record disclosed that the same certified copy applied for and received earlier was filed along with the appeal, and no proof of obtaining any extra copy was produced, the cause shown does not constitute “sufficient cause” for condonation of delay. (Paras 4–6)

Limitation Act, 1963 — S.5 — Condonation of delay — Delay in filing appeal — “Sufficient cause” — Misplacement of certified copy — Proof

Held, where the appellant pleaded misplacement of the certified copy of the judgment and decree as the cause for delay of 107 days, but the record disclosed that the same certified copy applied for and received earlier was filed along with the appeal, and no proof of obtaining any extra copy was produced, the cause shown does not constitute “sufficient cause” for condonation of delay.
(Paras 4–6)

---

Limitation Act, 1963 — S.5 — Diligence — Negligence — Effect

Held, lack of diligence in prosecuting the appeal and absence of bona fide explanation disentitle the appellant from discretionary relief of condonation of delay; liberal or justice-oriented approach cannot be invoked to defeat the substantial law of limitation.
(Paras 6–9)

---

Limitation Act, 1963 — Public policy — Rigour of limitation — Equitable considerations

Held, law of limitation has to be applied with full rigour as prescribed by statute; courts have no power to condone delay on equitable grounds when negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large.
(Paras 7–10)

---

Appeal — Condonation of delay — Merits of appeal — Relevance

Held, merits of the appeal are not required to be considered while deciding an application for condonation of delay; the Court must first ascertain the bona fides and sufficiency of the explanation offered.
(Paras 7–10)

---

Appeal barred by limitation — Consequence

Held, on rejection of the application for condonation of delay, the appeal is liable to be dismissed as barred by limitation.
(Para 7)

---

ANALYSIS OF FACTS

1. The appellant was the plaintiff in O.S.No.157 of 2017, filed for specific performance of contract, which came to be dismissed by decree dated 09.04.2025 on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation.

2. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant preferred A.S.No.586 of 2025, but the appeal was filed beyond the period of limitation with a delay of 107 days.

3. I.A.No.1 of 2025 was filed under Section 151 CPC seeking condonation of delay. The sole cause pleaded was that the certified copy of the judgment and decree was misplaced, and that time was taken to obtain an extra copy.

4. The Division Bench examined the record and found that:

   • the certified copy annexed to the appeal was the same copy applied for on 10.04.2025 and received on 14.05.2025, and

   • there was no proof of applying for or receiving any extra copy.

5. The Court thus found that the explanation offered did not inspire confidence and showed lack of diligence on the part of the appellant.

---

ANALYSIS OF LAW

1. The Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh reiterated that condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which can be exercised only on proof of sufficient cause.
   (Paras 6–9)

2. The Court relied upon authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court, including H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah and Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector (LA), to emphasize that:

   • concepts such as liberal approach or substantial justice cannot be used to jettison the law of limitation, and

   • negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide bars condonation.
     (Paras 7–10)

3. The Court reaffirmed that:

   • length of delay is relevant,

   • merits of the appeal are irrelevant at the stage of considering condonation, and

   • courts have no power to extend limitation on equitable grounds.
     (Paras 7–10)

4. Applying these principles, the Court held that the appellant failed to establish any sufficient cause for the delay of 107 days.

---

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. Misplacement of a certified copy of judgment, without proof and when the same copy is filed along with the appeal, does not constitute “sufficient cause” for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

2. Condonation of delay is a discretionary relief, and where lack of diligence or bona fide is evident, liberal or justice-oriented considerations cannot override the statutory rigour of limitation.

3. Merits of the appeal cannot be taken into account while deciding an application for condonation of delay; absence of sufficient cause mandates rejection of the application.

4. Upon rejection of the delay-condonation application, the appeal is liable to be dismissed as barred by limitation.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Limitation Act, 1963 — S.5 — Condonation of delay ...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Limitation Act, 1963 — S.5 — Condonation of delay ...: advocatemmmohan Limitation Act, 1963 — S.5 — Condonation of delay — Inordinate delay — “Sufficient cause” — Test Held , delay of 6624 days ...

Limitation Act, 1963 — S.5 — Condonation of delay — Inordinate delay — “Sufficient cause” — Test

Held, delay of 6624 days (almost 18 years) in filing appeal against an ex parte decree cannot be condoned in the absence of sufficient cause. The cause shown must inspire confidence and demonstrate diligence; delay cannot be condoned for mere asking or on flimsy grounds.
(Paras 4–8, 9–10)

---

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Appeal — Ex parte decree — Conduct of defendants — Effect

Held, where defendants were parties to the suit, summons were served, and they consciously chose not to contest the suit resulting in an ex parte decree, absence of explanation either for non-appearance in the suit or for prolonged inaction thereafter disentitles them from discretionary relief of condonation of delay.
(Paras 3, 6–7)

---

Limitation Act, 1963 — Public policy — Rigour of limitation — Equitable considerations

Held, law of limitation is founded on public policy and has to be applied with full rigour; courts have no power to extend limitation on equitable grounds. Hardship or inconvenience is not a ground to condone delay when statute prescribes limitation.
(Paras 8, 31–33)

---

Appeal — Condonation of delay — Merits of case — Irrelevance

Held, merits of the case are not required to be examined while considering an application for condonation of delay; delay-condonation applications must be decided strictly on parameters governing “sufficient cause”.
(Para 33(vii), 9)

---

Appeal barred by limitation — Consequence

Held, on rejection of the application for condonation of delay, the appeal is liable to be dismissed as barred by limitation.
(Paras 10–11)

---

ANALYSIS OF FACTS

1. The 1st respondent (since deceased) instituted O.S.No.21 of 2006 before the I Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam, seeking:

   • allotment of an alternative site of 203 sq. yards, or

   • payment of market value thereof, with consequential reliefs.

2. The suit was decreed on 12-06-2007, directing defendants 1 to 5 (present appellants) to:

   • allot a site of 203 sq. yards in Sy.No.52/40, and

   • pay Rs.25,000/- towards damages and costs.

3. The defendants remained ex parte and did not contest the suit.

4. The appellants filed A.S.No.677 of 2025 with a delay of 6624 days.
   An application I.A.No.1 of 2025 was filed seeking condonation of delay.

5. The affidavit in support of the application relied inter alia on vague explanations, including reference to the COVID-19 pandemic.

---

ANALYSIS OF LAW

1. The Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh reiterated that condonation of delay is not a matter of right and requires demonstration of sufficient cause.
   (Paras 7–8)

2. The Court found:

   • the explanation offered was an afterthought,

   • the averments did not inspire confidence, and

   • no explanation was given either for non-appearance in the suit or for the long silence after decree.
     (Paras 7–8)

3. The plea based on the COVID-19 pandemic was held untenable, as the decree was passed in 2007, whereas the pandemic occurred in 2020.
   (Para 7)

4. Relying on settled Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Court reaffirmed that:

   • what matters is sufficiency of cause, not length of delay,

   • courts cannot extend limitation on equitable grounds, and

   • negligence, lack of diligence, or inaction disentitles a party from relief.
     (Paras 29–33)

5. The Court further held that merits of the appeal are irrelevant while deciding condonation of delay and cannot be used to dilute statutory limitation.
   (Para 33(vii))

6. Applying these principles, the Court concluded that no sufficient cause was shown for condoning an inordinate delay of nearly 18 years.

---

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. An inordinate delay of several years in filing an appeal against an ex parte decree cannot be condoned in the absence of sufficient cause demonstrating diligence and bona fides.

2. Where defendants were duly served, chose not to contest the suit, and remain inactive for years thereafter without satisfactory explanation, discretionary relief under Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be granted.

3. Equitable considerations, hardship, or subsequent events such as the COVID-19 pandemic cannot override the statutory rigour of limitation.

4. Upon rejection of the delay-condonation application, the appeal is liable to be dismissed as barred by limitation without examining the merits.