In the absence of a statutory charging event under Section 12 of the Customs Act, customs duty cannot be levied on electrical energy generated in an SEZ and supplied to the Domestic Tariff Area; Section 25 of the Customs Act cannot be used to impose such levy under the guise of exemption, and once the levy has been declared ultra vires, its continuance through subsequent notifications in altered form is equally unenforceable, entitling the assessee to restitution of amounts collected.

Customs duty — SEZ to DTA clearance — Electrical energy — Limits of delegated legislation — Binding effect of precedent — Restitution

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HEADNOTE (Consolidated, authoritative)

Customs duty on electricity generated in SEZ and supplied to DTA — Absence of charging event — Invalidity of levy through exemption notifications

Paras 15–19, 44–51, 58–65, 86–88

Electrical energy generated within India in a Special Economic Zone and supplied to the Domestic Tariff Area is not ‘goods imported into India’ so as to attract customs duty under Section 12 of the Customs Act, 1962. The legal fiction in Section 30 of the SEZ Act operates only for parity of rate and valuation and does not create a new charging event. Section 25 of the Customs Act empowers the Central Government only to grant exemptions from duty otherwise leviable and cannot be used, directly or indirectly, to impose a new customs levy. Notifications purporting to levy customs duty on SEZ-to-DTA electricity, whether retrospective or prospective and irrespective of the rate prescribed, are ultra vires Articles 14 and 265 of the Constitution and beyond the scope of delegated legislation. Once such levy has been declared without authority of law, subsequent notifications continuing the same levy in altered form are equally unenforceable, and amounts collected thereunder are liable to be refunded.

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ANALYSIS (What the Supreme Court Precisely Held)

1. Nature of the 2015 Gujarat High Court decision (Paras 44–51)

The Court held that the 2015 judgment was a declaration of law, not a notification-specific or period-limited relief. The High Court had conclusively determined that:

• there was no charging event under Section 12 of the Customs Act for SEZ-to-DTA electricity;

• Section 25 could not be used to create a levy under the guise of exemption;

• retrospective imposition violated Article 265; and

• the levy resulted in arbitrary double incidence, given Rule 47(3) of the SEZ Rules.

These findings constituted the ratio, binding for all periods resting on the same statutory footing.

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2. Absence of statutory authority to levy customs duty (Paras 45, 60–63)

The Court reaffirmed that:

• customs duty is attracted only on “goods imported into India”;

• an SEZ is not foreign territory, and electricity generated within India does not become imported goods merely because it crosses from SEZ to DTA;

• Section 30 of the SEZ Act is a parity provision, not a charging provision.

Where imported electricity bears nil customs duty, SEZ-generated electricity must receive identical treatment.

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3. Colourable exercise of delegated legislation (Paras 52–58)

The Court characterised Notification No. 25/2010-Cus. as a classic colourable exercise:

• Section 25 authorises exemption from duty otherwise leviable;

• it does not authorise imposition of duty;

• an exemption power cannot be inverted into a taxing power.

What could not be done directly by Parliament could not be achieved indirectly through delegated legislation.

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4. Subsequent notifications do not cure foundational illegality (Paras 58–65, 72–73)

The Court rejected the Union’s contention that later notifications (₹0.10/unit and ₹0.03/unit) constituted a different levy. It held that:

• changing the rate or form does not cure absence of legislative authority;

• if the root is ultra vires, the branch cannot survive;

• the same levy continued on the same taxable fiction.

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5. No need for fresh challenge to each notification (Paras 66–74)

The Court held that:

• once a levy is declared without authority of law, the State cannot insist on separate challenges to each successor notification;

• the 2016 writ was a sequel proceeding, seeking enforcement of an existing declaration;

• constitutional courts must look to substance, not form.

To insist on repeated challenges would legitimise perpetuation of illegality.

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6. Binding force of precedent on co-ordinate Benches (Paras 75–80)

The Court held that the 2019 Division Bench:

• was bound by the 2015 judgment;

• could not artificially narrow its scope;

• if in doubt, ought to have referred the matter to a larger Bench.

Failure to do so violated judicial discipline and stare decisis.

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7. Restitution and executive obligation (Paras 81–84, 86–90)

The Court emphasised that:

• judicial declarations are binding commands, not advisory opinions;

• the State cannot retain amounts collected under an invalid levy;

• restitution is a necessary incident of illegality.

Refund was ordered for the entire period 16-09-2010 to 15-02-2016, without interest.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

In the absence of a statutory charging event under Section 12 of the Customs Act, customs duty cannot be levied on electrical energy generated in an SEZ and supplied to the Domestic Tariff Area; Section 25 of the Customs Act cannot be used to impose such levy under the guise of exemption, and once the levy has been declared ultra vires, its continuance through subsequent notifications in altered form is equally unenforceable, entitling the assessee to restitution of amounts collected.

A retrospective amendment to recruitment rules which introduces new weightage or alters the basis of preparation of the merit list cannot be applied to an ongoing recruitment process after the written examination is conducted and the provisional merit list is published, as such application amounts to changing the rules of the game mid-process and violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

Public employment — Recruitment rules — Retrospective amendment — Weightage for contractual experience — “Rules of the game” — Articles 14 & 16

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HEADNOTE (Consolidated, Court-faithful)

Recruitment process — Retrospective amendment altering basis of selection — Impermissibility

Paras 22–29, 34–43

Where recruitment is initiated under statutory rules prescribing selection solely on the basis of marks obtained in a written examination, a subsequent amendment introducing weightage for contractual experience and age relaxation cannot be applied retrospectively after the written examination is conducted and the provisional merit list is published. Retrospective application of such amendment, which alters the basis of preparation of the merit list and eligibility for placement therein, amounts to changing the ‘rules of the game’ after the process has substantially progressed and is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The power of the State to amend rules under the proviso to Article 309, though inclusive of retrospective operation, cannot be exercised to disrupt an ongoing recruitment process or to defeat the legitimate expectation of candidates who participated under the unamended rules.

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ANALYSIS (What the Supreme Court Precisely Held)

1. Governing rules fixed at the commencement of recruitment (Paras 22–27)

The Court held that the recruitment pursuant to the 2019 Advertisements was governed entirely by the 2019 Rules, which prescribed:

• eligibility under Rule 8, and

• selection solely on the marks obtained in the written examination under Rules 12 and 13.

No provision existed for weightage or age relaxation for contractual experience at the time of advertisement.

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2. Stage at which amendment was introduced (Paras 9–11, 34)

The Court emphasized that:

• written examinations were concluded in March 2022,

• provisional merit lists were published in June/July 2022, and

• document verification had already taken place.

The recruitment process had therefore not only commenced but had reached its fag end when the 2022 Amendment Rules were notified on 09.11.2022.

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3. Nature of the amendment — Alteration of basis of selection (Paras 28–29, 35)

The insertion of Rule 8(5):

• reduced the weightage of written examination from 100 to 75 marks, and

• introduced 25 marks for contractual experience, along with age relaxation.

The Court held that this fundamentally altered the criteria for placement in the merit list, and was not a mere procedural or ancillary change.

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4. “Rules of the game” doctrine applied (Paras 30–33, 35–38)

Relying on K. Manjusree and the Constitution Bench decision in Tej Prakash Pathak, the Court reaffirmed that:

• eligibility criteria and benchmarks for selection cannot be changed after the relevant stage is over, and

• even if rule-making power permits amendment, such change must be effected before commencement of the recruitment process or at least before the concerned stage is reached.

The retrospective application of Rule 8(5) was therefore impermissible.

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5. Provisional merit list — Legitimate expectation (Paras 37–40)

The Court rejected the State’s contention that the merit list was only provisional, holding that:

• the provisional nature was limited to document verification,

• it did not permit a complete re-casting of the merit list by changing the selection criteria, and

• candidates who cleared the written examination and were placed in the merit list acquired a legitimate expectation that selection would be finalized under the rules existing at the time of advertisement.

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6. Retrospective rule-making under Article 309 — Limits (Paras 36, 41)

While acknowledging that the State has power to amend rules retrospectively under the proviso to Article 309, the Court held that:

• such power is not unbridled, and

• it cannot be exercised to take away accrued rights, disrupt an ongoing selection, or operate arbitrarily in violation of Articles 14 and 16.

Executive policies or memoranda (2018 and 2021 Memos) could not override statutory recruitment rules retrospectively.

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7. Relief and directions (Paras 42–45)

The Court:

• set aside the High Court judgment,

• directed that the recruitment pursuant to the 2019 Advertisements be finalized strictly in accordance with the unamended 2019 Rules, and

• ordered appointments to be completed within two months, without applying Rule 8(5).

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RATIO DECIDENDI

A retrospective amendment to recruitment rules which introduces new weightage or alters the basis of preparation of the merit list cannot be applied to an ongoing recruitment process after the written examination is conducted and the provisional merit list is published, as such application amounts to changing the rules of the game mid-process and violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

Multiple FIRs — Same transaction — Criminal conspiracy — Cheating of multiple victims — Clubbing of FIRs — Sections 218–223 CrPC

Multiple FIRs — Same transaction — Criminal conspiracy — Cheating of multiple victims — Clubbing of FIRs — Sections 218–223 CrPC

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HEADNOTE (Consolidated, Court-faithful)

Multiple deposits pursuant to a single conspiracy — Whether separate FIRs mandatory

Paras 9–13, 15–16, 18–23

Where multiple acts of cheating are alleged to have been committed pursuant to a single criminal conspiracy, the registration of a single FIR and treatment of subsequent complaints as statements under Section 161 CrPC is permissible, subject to the ultimate determination whether such acts form part of the ‘same transaction’. Whether offences constitute the same transaction depends on unity of purpose or design, proximity of time and place, and continuity of action. The requirement of separate FIRs for each victim is not mandatory at the threshold; consolidation or separation is to be determined by the Magistrate at the stage of framing of charges under Sections 220(1) and 223(a) & (d) CrPC. The contrary view mandating separate FIRs for each deposit is unsustainable.

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ANALYSIS (What the Supreme Court Precisely Held)

1. Core issue — “Same transaction” (Paras 9–11, 19–20)

The Court held that the decisive issue is whether the alleged offences form part of the “same transaction”. The expression is not statutorily defined and must be assessed on facts, applying well-settled tests:

• unity of purpose and design,

• proximity of time and place, and

• continuity of action.

These tests are not cumulative; existence of one or more may suffice.

2. Conspiracy and multiple acts of cheating (Paras 9–10, 21–22)

Relying on S. Swamirathnam and Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao, the Court reaffirmed that:

• a single conspiracy may give rise to multiple acts, and

• such acts do not become distinct transactions merely because they involve different victims or amounts, if they are in pursuance of the same design.

Where a conspiracy is alleged under Section 120B IPC, multiple acts of cheating flowing from it may constitute the same transaction.

3. FIR jurisprudence — T.T. Antony line (Paras 13, 15–16)

The Court reiterated that:

• there cannot be a second FIR in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same transaction;

• subsequent information relating to the same transaction is to be treated as statements under Section 161 CrPC;

• complainants so treated retain the right to file protest petitions if a closure report is filed or if discharge is proposed.

4. Clubbing of FIRs and trials — Permissibility (Paras 13–17, 19–20)

The Court noted consistent precedent permitting:

• consolidation of FIRs and trials where offences arise from the same transaction, and

• even exercise of Article 142 jurisdiction to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, in appropriate cases.

However, where offences are distinct and independent, separate trials may be necessary (as explained in Lalu Prasad Yadav).

5. Narinderjit Singh Sahni distinguished (Para 18)

The Court observed that Narinderjit Singh Sahni treated each deposit as a separate transaction, but noted that:

• the decision lacked detailed statutory and transactional analysis, and

• later three-Judge Bench decisions reflect the prevailing legal position, which is not an inflexible rule requiring separate FIRs for each deposit.

6. Role of the Magistrate and stage of decision (Paras 20–22)

The Court held that:

• the question whether offences form part of the same transaction cannot be conclusively determined at the FIR stage;

• it is for the Magistrate, on completion of investigation, to decide at the stage of framing of charges whether Section 220(1) and Section 223 CrPC apply;

• if the acts form the same transaction, one trial is permissible; if not, separate trials must follow, subject to Section 219 CrPC / Section 242 BNSS.

7. Error of the High Court and premature reference (Paras 21–23)

The Court held that:

• the reference made by the Additional Sessions Judge was premature, investigation being incomplete at that stage;

• the High Court erred in mandating separate FIRs and separate charge-sheets for each deposit;

• answers to questions (a) and (b) by the High Court were therefore set aside.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

In cases alleging cheating of multiple victims pursuant to a single criminal conspiracy, registration of one FIR and treatment of subsequent complaints as statements under Section 161 CrPC is permissible; whether the acts constitute the ‘same transaction’ is to be determined by the Magistrate at the stage of framing of charges under Sections 220(1) and 223 CrPC, and separate FIRs for each deposit are not mandatory.

Departmental enquiry vis-à-vis criminal prosecution — Effect of exoneration — When criminal proceedings cannot be quashed

Departmental enquiry vis-à-vis criminal prosecution — Effect of exoneration — When criminal proceedings cannot be quashed

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HEADNOTE (Consolidated, Court-faithful)

Departmental exoneration — Whether bars criminal prosecution

Paras 2, 6–8, 9–10, 12–13, 15–19

Exoneration of a delinquent employee in departmental proceedings does not ipso facto warrant quashing of criminal prosecution arising out of the same allegations. Disciplinary proceedings and criminal prosecution are independent and parallel, governed by different standards of proof, conducted by different authorities, and decided on evidence adduced in each forum. The principle in Radheshyam Kejriwal applies only where exoneration in adjudicatory proceedings is on merits, negating the very substratum of the allegation. Where departmental exoneration is not on merits but on account of non-examination of a witness or evidentiary lapses, such exoneration cannot form the basis for quashing criminal proceedings. The decision in Ajay Kumar Tyagi governs cases where departmental and criminal proceedings are conducted by distinct authorities, and departmental findings do not bind the criminal court.

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ANALYSIS (What the Supreme Court Precisely Held)

1. Parallel but independent proceedings (Paras 2, 9)

The Court reaffirmed the settled position that disciplinary proceedings and criminal prosecution are independent, even when founded on identical allegations. The former proceeds on the standard of preponderance of probabilities, while the latter requires proof beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Scope of Radheshyam Kejriwal clarified (Paras 6–8)

The Court explained that Radheshyam Kejriwal was rendered in the context of adjudication and prosecution under the same statute (FERA) by the same authority, where the adjudication conclusively held that the alleged transaction itself never occurred. Such a finding destroyed the substratum of the prosecution.

That ratio cannot be mechanically extended to departmental enquiries under service law.

3. Applicability of Ajay Kumar Tyagi (Paras 10–13)

The Court held that Ajay Kumar Tyagi squarely applies where:

• the criminal prosecution is conducted by an independent agency (ACB/Lokayukta), and

• the departmental enquiry is conducted by the employer.

In such cases, departmental exoneration does not govern or conclude criminal liability.

4. Nature of exoneration — not on merits (Paras 8, 16–18)

The enquiry report in the present case did not exonerate the delinquent on merits. The finding was based on:

• non-examination of the ACB Inspector, and

• independent witnesses being outside the room during handing over of the bribe.

The Court held that this was not a finding that the demand or acceptance of bribe did not occur, but at best a consequence of procedural or evidentiary deficiency in the departmental enquiry.

5. Criminal court not bound by departmental lapses (Paras 16–18)

The Court emphasized that:

• criminal courts have ample coercive powers to secure witnesses,

• anticipated lapses in prosecution cannot be presumed, and

• criminal proceedings cannot be scuttled merely because departmental enquiry failed due to lack of diligence.

6. No total exoneration on merits (Paras 17–18)

On examining the enquiry evidence, the Court found that:

• the complainant and independent witnesses had spoken to demand, acceptance, recovery and phenolphthalein test, and

• even on a preponderance of probabilities, guilt could have been established.

Therefore, this was not a case of complete exoneration negating the charge itself.

7. Consequence (Paras 19–20)

The High Court erred in quashing the criminal proceedings. The appeal was allowed, and continuation of criminal prosecution permitted. The Court clarified that while the departmental proceedings remain closed, conviction in the criminal case would entail service consequences, as already reserved by the disciplinary authority.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

Exoneration of an employee in departmental proceedings does not bar continuation of criminal prosecution on the same allegations unless such exoneration is on merits and negates the very substratum of the charge; where departmental exoneration is founded on procedural or evidentiary lapses and the criminal prosecution is conducted by an independent agency, criminal proceedings cannot be quashed on that basis.

An arbitrator appointed unilaterally by an authority that is itself ineligible under Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule is de jure incapable of acting; such ineligibility can be waived only by an express, post-dispute agreement in writing, and not by conduct, participation, or procedural acquiescence. An arbitral award rendered by such an ineligible arbitrator is a nullity and may be challenged at any stage, including for the first time under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Headnote — Unilateral appointment, ineligibility, waiver and stage of challenge

Paras 32–39, 46–50, 67–70, 74–89, 99–113, 123

The principle of equal treatment of parties under Section 18 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 applies to the procedure for appointment of arbitrators. A unilateral appointment of a sole arbitrator by one party, where the appointing authority itself is ineligible under Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule, is void ab initio and renders the arbitrator de jure ineligible to act. Such ineligibility can be cured only by an express agreement in writing, entered into after disputes have arisen, as contemplated by the proviso to Section 12(5). Mere participation in arbitral proceedings, filing of statement of claim, recording of “no objection” in a procedural order, seeking extension of time under Section 29A, or continued conduct in arbitration does not amount to an express waiver in writing. An objection to such inherent lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage, including for the first time in proceedings under Section 34, as an award passed by an ineligible arbitrator is a nullity and opposed to the public policy of India.

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ANALYSIS (What the Supreme Court Actually Held)

1. Equal treatment and party autonomy (Paras 32–39)

The Court held that party autonomy under Section 11(2) is not absolute. It must operate within the framework of the Act, particularly Section 18. Equal treatment necessarily means equal participation in constitution of the arbitral tribunal. Any clause or practice that allows one party exclusive control over appointment undermines neutrality.

2. Scope of Section 12(5) and Seventh Schedule (Paras 46–50)

Section 12(5) operates notwithstanding any prior agreement. If any Seventh Schedule relationship exists, the arbitrator becomes statutorily ineligible, and disclosure or consent cannot save the appointment unless the proviso is strictly satisfied.

3. Unilateral appointment by ineligible authority (Paras 67–70)

The Chairman of AAI was held to be squarely hit by multiple items of the Seventh Schedule. Once the appointing authority itself is ineligible, it cannot appoint or nominate an arbitrator. A notice invoking arbitration under Section 21 does not amount to consent to such appointment.

4. De jure ineligibility and termination of mandate (Paras 61–64)

Ineligibility under Section 12(5) results in de jure inability under Section 14(1)(a). The mandate of the arbitrator stands automatically terminated by operation of law. This goes to the root of jurisdiction, not merely procedural irregularity.

5. Waiver — meaning of “express agreement in writing” (Paras 74–89)

The Court gave a strict construction to the proviso:

• Waiver must be conscious, informed, post-dispute, and

• Expressly recorded in writing.

Conduct-based waiver, implied consent, procedural acquiescence, or silence is legally insufficient. Section 4 (deemed waiver) has no application to Section 12(5).

6. Participation, pleadings, Section 29A — no waiver (Paras 92–96)

Filing statement of claim, agreeing to procedural orders, or jointly seeking extension of mandate cannot cure statutory ineligibility. Such acts may indicate cooperation but not waiver under the proviso.

7. Stage of challenge — Section 34 permissible (Paras 99–113)

Because ineligibility affects inherent jurisdiction, the objection:

• need not be raised before the tribunal,

• may be raised directly under Section 14, or

• even for the first time under Section 34, after the award.

An award by an ineligible arbitrator is non-est, unenforceable, and contrary to public policy of India.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

An arbitrator appointed unilaterally by an authority that is itself ineligible under Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule is de jure incapable of acting; such ineligibility can be waived only by an express, post-dispute agreement in writing, and not by conduct, participation, or procedural acquiescence. An arbitral award rendered by such an ineligible arbitrator is a nullity and may be challenged at any stage, including for the first time under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.