Companies Act, 2013 – Sections 448, 451, 447, 212(6) Cognizance – Statutory bar – Private complaint – Fraud offences An offence under Section 448 (false statement) is inextricably linked to Section 447 (punishment for fraud). Since punishment under Section 448 can be imposed only through Section 447, an offence under Section 448 is an “offence covered under Section 447” for the purpose of Section 212(6). Consequently, cognizance cannot be taken on a private complaint in view of the second proviso to Section 212(6). (Paras 33–35, 41–45)

Companies Act, 2013 – Sections 448, 451, 447, 212(6)

Cognizance – Statutory bar – Private complaint – Fraud offences

An offence under Section 448 (false statement) is inextricably linked to Section 447 (punishment for fraud). Since punishment under Section 448 can be imposed only through Section 447, an offence under Section 448 is an “offence covered under Section 447” for the purpose of Section 212(6). Consequently, cognizance cannot be taken on a private complaint in view of the second proviso to Section 212(6).
(Paras 33–35, 41–45)

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Companies Act, 2013 – Section 212(6) (Second Proviso)

Mandatory pre-condition – Cognizance by Special Court

Where allegations attract liability under Section 447, cognizance by the Special Court is permissible only upon a complaint in writing by the Director, SFIO or an officer authorised by the Central Government. The bar is a jurisdictional safeguard against frivolous private prosecutions alleging corporate fraud.
(Paras 24–26, 35)

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Companies Act, 2013 – Section 451

Punishment for repeated default – Dependent offence

When cognizance of the principal offence under Section 448 is barred, cognizance for repeated default under Section 451 is not maintainable, as the foundation offence itself cannot proceed.
(Paras 46–47)

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Interpretation of amended Section 212(6) (2015 Amendment)

Legislative intent – Narrowing of rigour

Post-2015 amendment, Section 212(6) restricts the stringent regime to offences relating to fraud under Section 447. However, offences which derive punishment through Section 447 (such as Section 448) remain within its sweep for purposes of cognizance bar, notwithstanding that Section 447 is not expressly invoked in the complaint.
(Paras 27–35)

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Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 482

Quashing – Lack of jurisdiction – Abuse of process

Where cognizance is taken in violation of an express statutory bar, continuation of proceedings constitutes abuse of process, warranting interference under Section 482 CrPC.
(Paras 41–47)

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Companies Act, 2013 – Section 436(2)

Jurisdiction of Special Court – IPC offences

A Special Court may try IPC offences only when it is also trying an offence under the Companies Act. Once proceedings under the Companies Act are quashed, the Special Court loses jurisdiction over IPC offences, which must then be tried by the competent court of territorial jurisdiction.
(Paras 49–54)

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Civil disputes and criminal liability

Parallel proceedings – Maintainability

Pendency of civil suits or company petitions (including proceedings before NCLT) does not bar criminal prosecution where allegations disclose distinct criminal offences under the IPC.
(Paras 55–57)

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ANALYSIS

1. Core controversy

The appellants sought quashing of criminal proceedings arising from a private complaint alleging falsification of corporate records and fraud, where the Special Court had taken cognizance under Sections 448 and 451 of the Companies Act and various IPC offences.
(Paras 1–11)

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2. Statutory architecture

• Section 448 defines false statements but does not prescribe punishment.

• Punishment flows only through Section 447 (fraud).

• Section 212(6) bars cognizance of offences “covered under Section 447” except on complaint by SFIO / authorised Central Government officer.
  (Paras 21–33)

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3. Effect of 2015 Amendment

The Court examined legislative history and the Statement of Objects and Reasons, holding that while bail rigour was narrowed, the cognizance safeguard for fraud offences remained intact where liability flows through Section 447.
(Paras 27–35)

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4. Indirect circumvention impermissible

The Court held that what cannot be done directly (taking cognizance under Section 447 on a private complaint) cannot be done indirectly by invoking Section 448 alone while avoiding Section 447.
(Paras 43–45)

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5. Precedent consistency

The Court noted consistent views of the Telangana, Madras, Karnataka and Delhi High Courts, and held that the impugned High Court judgment erred in not following or referring the issue to a larger bench.
(Paras 36–40)

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6. Consequence on Section 451

Since Section 451 presupposes a valid underlying offence, its invocation collapsed once Section 448 proceedings were barred.
(Paras 46–47)

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7. IPC offences severable

Relying on S. Satyanarayana v. Energo Masch Power Engg. & Consulting (P) Ltd., the Court held that IPC offences survive independently and must be tried by the proper territorial court, not the Companies Act Special Court.
(Paras 49–54)

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8. Civil nature argument rejected

The Court reaffirmed that civil and criminal remedies may coexist, and pendency of civil/NCLT proceedings does not ipso facto render criminal prosecution abusive.
(Paras 55–57)

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RATIO DECIDENDI

1. An offence under Section 448 of the Companies Act is an offence “covered under Section 447” for the purpose of Section 212(6), since punishment for Section 448 is imposable only through Section 447.

2. Cognizance of such offences cannot be taken on a private complaint and must comply with the second proviso to Section 212(6), i.e., a complaint by SFIO or an authorised Central Government officer.

3. Invoking Section 448 without Section 447 to bypass the statutory bar is impermissible in law.

4. Where cognizance under the Companies Act is barred, consequential proceedings under Section 451 also fail.

5. Once Companies Act offences are quashed, the Special Court loses jurisdiction under Section 436(2) to try IPC offences, which must be transferred to the competent territorial court.

6. Pendency of civil or company law proceedings does not bar continuation of criminal proceedings under the IPC where criminality is alleged.

An order granting bail in a serious POCSO offence is liable to be set aside where the court ignores the gravity of the offence, statutory rigour, and prima facie material, even in the absence of supervening circumstances. In offences involving sexual assault on minors, alleged consent is legally irrelevant and cannot form the basis for grant of bail. Delay in lodging FIR in sexual offences against minors does not, by itself, discredit the prosecution, particularly where fear, trauma or intimidation explains such delay. Protection of the victim and preservation of a fair trial are paramount considerations; likelihood of intimidation or trauma to a minor victim justifies cancellation of bail. Mechanical or context-free reliance on precedents while granting bail constitutes a serious infirmity warranting interference by the Supreme Court.

Bail – Cancellation of bail – Scope and principles

Bail can be cancelled not only on the basis of supervening circumstances, but also where the order granting bail is perverse, ignores relevant material, considers irrelevant factors, or results in miscarriage of justice, particularly in heinous offences.
(Paras 13, 16, 17)

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Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – Sections 5(l), 6, 9(g), 10

Sexual offences against minors – Gravity – Bail

In offences involving aggravated penetrative sexual assault on a minor, accompanied by intimidation, repeated abuse and recording of sexual acts, courts must exercise heightened caution while granting bail, having due regard to the statutory rigour of the POCSO Act and the vulnerability of the victim.
(Paras 11–15)

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Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – Sections 65(1), 74, 137(2), 352

Heinous offences – Nature and gravity

Allegations of rape of a minor under armed intimidation, kidnapping, repeated sexual assault and criminal intimidation constitute heinous and grave offences, carrying severe punishment including life imprisonment, thereby warranting strict scrutiny at the stage of bail.
(Paras 9, 11, 12)

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Bail jurisprudence – Relevant considerations

While considering bail, the court must examine the nature and gravity of the offence, prima facie material, severity of punishment, likelihood of witness intimidation, and impact on fair trial. Failure to consider these factors vitiates the order granting bail.
(Paras 12–16)

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Delay in FIR – Sexual offences against minors

Delay in lodging FIR in cases involving sexual offences against minors cannot by itself be treated as fatal, particularly where the delay is attributable to fear, threats, trauma or social circumstances of the victim.
(Para 13, relying on Bhagwan Singh v. Dilip Kumar @ Deepu)

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Consent – Minor victim

Where the victim is a minor, any alleged consent is legally irrelevant, and submissions based on consensual relationship are untenable in law.
(Paras 11, 12)

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Witness intimidation – Post-bail conduct

In sexual offences against children, the likelihood of intimidation, psychological pressure or trauma to the victim after release of the accused is a decisive factor warranting cancellation of bail to protect the purity of the trial process.
(Paras 15–17)

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ANALYSIS

1. Nature of challenge

The appeal challenged the High Court’s order granting bail to Respondent No.2 accused of gang rape and aggravated penetrative sexual assault on a minor, punishable under the BNSS and the POCSO Act.
(Paras 1–3, 8)

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2. Prosecution material

The prosecution relied upon:

• the victim’s statement under Section 183 BNSS (equivalent to Section 164 Cr.P.C.),

• medical evidence corroborating sexual assault,

• documentary proof of minority (date of birth: 18.07.2010), and

• chargesheet filed prior to grant of bail.
  (Paras 3.3, 8, 9.1)

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3. Error in High Court’s approach

The Supreme Court found that the High Court:

• failed to appreciate the heinous nature and gravity of offences,

• overlooked statutory rigour of the POCSO Act,

• ignored prima facie material, and

• placed reliance on irrelevant considerations such as delay in FIR and speculative observations regarding age.
  (Paras 13–14, 16)

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4. Bail cancellation without supervening circumstances

Relying on Deepak Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Court reiterated that bail can be cancelled even without supervening circumstances where the order granting bail is perverse or suffers from serious infirmities.
(Paras 4.5, 13)

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5. Protection of fair trial

The Court emphasised that the primary object of cancellation of bail is to protect a fair trial and prevent intimidation of witnesses, especially in cases involving minor victims residing in proximity to the accused.
(Paras 15–17)

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6. Misplaced reliance on precedents

The High Court’s reliance on Satender Kumar Antil and Manish Sisodia was held to be misplaced, as those decisions turned on entirely different factual matrices and could not be mechanically applied.
(Para 14)

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7. Final directions

The impugned order was set aside, bail cancelled, and the accused directed to surrender within two weeks, with liberty to the trial court to secure custody. The trial court was also directed to expeditiously conclude the trial.
(Paras 17–18)

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RATIO DECIDENDI

1. An order granting bail in a serious POCSO offence is liable to be set aside where the court ignores the gravity of the offence, statutory rigour, and prima facie material, even in the absence of supervening circumstances.

2. In offences involving sexual assault on minors, alleged consent is legally irrelevant and cannot form the basis for grant of bail.

3. Delay in lodging FIR in sexual offences against minors does not, by itself, discredit the prosecution, particularly where fear, trauma or intimidation explains such delay.

4. Protection of the victim and preservation of a fair trial are paramount considerations; likelihood of intimidation or trauma to a minor victim justifies cancellation of bail.

5. Mechanical or context-free reliance on precedents while granting bail constitutes a serious infirmity warranting interference by the Supreme Court.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Where shares of an amalgamating company are held a...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Where shares of an amalgamating company are held a...: advocatemmmohan Income-tax Act, 1961 – Section 28 Profits and gains of business – Stock-in-trade – Amalgamation Where shares of an amalgam...

Income-tax Act, 1961 – Section 28

Profits and gains of business – Stock-in-trade – Amalgamation

Where shares of an amalgamating company, held as stock-in-trade, are substituted by shares of the amalgamated company pursuant to a court-sanctioned scheme of amalgamation, and such substituted shares are realisable in money and capable of definite valuation, the substitution constitutes commercial realisation giving rise to taxable business income under Section 28.
(Paras 30, 31)

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Income-tax Act, 1961 – Sections 2(47), 45 and 47(vii)

Transfer – Capital assets – Distinction from stock-in-trade

Section 47(vii) exempts only transfers of capital assets in a scheme of amalgamation. The exemption does not extend to shares held as stock-in-trade, which fall outside the capital gains regime and are governed by Section 28.
(Paras 12, 27)

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Income-tax Act, 1961 – Section 28

Real income – Receipt in kind – Commercial realisability

Business income under Section 28 may arise in kind and does not require an actual sale or exchange, provided the assessee receives a real and presently realisable commercial benefit. Mere statutory substitution without realisability does not attract tax.
(Paras 15, 18, 24)

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Amalgamation – Nature and effect

Amalgamation results in the extinguishment of the corporate identity of the amalgamating company and statutory substitution of rights in the amalgamated company. Such substitution may amount to commercial realisation when trading assets are replaced by assets of definite market value.
(Paras 16, 18, 19)

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Accrual and timing of taxability – Section 28

In cases of amalgamation involving stock-in-trade, taxability under Section 28 arises only upon allotment of the new shares, and not on the appointed date or date of court sanction.
(Paras 25, 30)

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High Court jurisdiction – Section 260A

The High Court does not exceed jurisdiction under Section 260A by dealing with incidental or collateral questions of law necessary for deciding the appeal, even if not formally framed, provided parties had full opportunity to address them.
(Paras 9–9.6)

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ANALYSIS

1. Core controversy

The principal issue was whether, upon amalgamation, substitution of shares held as stock-in-trade by shares of the amalgamated company results in taxable business income under Section 28, or whether taxation arises only upon subsequent sale.

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2. Tribunal vs High Court

The Tribunal declined to decide whether the shares were capital assets or stock-in-trade, holding that no income accrues without sale or transfer. The High Court reversed this approach, holding that if shares were stock-in-trade, substitution itself could result in taxable business income, and remitted the matter for factual determination.

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3. Supreme Court on Section 260A

The Court rejected the objection that the High Court exceeded jurisdiction, holding that:

• the issue of Section 28 taxability was incidental to the framed questions;

• parties were fully heard; and

• no prejudice was caused.
  (Paras 9–9.6)

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4. Scope of Section 28

The Court emphasised that:

• Section 28 is a wide charging provision;

• it does not depend on “transfer” as defined in Section 2(47);

• profits may arise in cash or kind;

• the decisive test is real income and commercial realisability.
  (Paras 15–15.3)

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5. Amalgamation and real income

Amalgamation is a statutory substitution. Mere substitution does not automatically create income. However, where:

• stock-in-trade ceases to exist;

• substituted shares have definite and ascertainable market value; and

• such shares are freely tradable,
  the transaction results in commercial realisation.
  (Paras 18–18.6, 24)

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6. Timing

Taxability does not arise:

• on the appointed date, or

• on court sanction of the scheme.

It arises only on allotment of shares, when the assessee acquires a realisable commercial benefit.
(Paras 25, 30)

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7. Capital vs business field

The Court highlighted the legislative distinction:

• Capital assets → protected by Section 47(vii);

• Stock-in-trade → no such protection; governed by Section 28.

Extending Section 47(vii) to stock-in-trade would undermine the business-income tax base.
(Paras 27–27.4)

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8. Result

The High Court’s judgment was affirmed. The legal principle was settled in favour of the Revenue, while factual application was remitted to the Tribunal.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

1. Where shares of an amalgamating company are held as stock-in-trade and are substituted by shares of the amalgamated company pursuant to amalgamation, such substitution constitutes taxable business income under Section 28, provided the substituted shares are realisable in money and capable of definite valuation.

2. Section 47(vii) applies only to capital assets and does not exempt transactions involving stock-in-trade.

3. Taxability under Section 28 arises only upon allotment of the substituted shares, and not on the appointed date or date of sanction of the scheme.

4. The High Court may consider incidental or collateral questions under Section 260A without formally framing them, where such consideration is necessary to decide the appeal and parties have been heard.

Declaration of title and recovery of possession Ancestral property – Alienation Where the plaint schedule property is found to be ancestral property of the plaintiffs, neither one co-owner nor a family manager can alienate the property so as to confer valid title on a third party. (Paras 17–18) Agreement of sale – Unregistered document – Title An unregistered agreement of sale does not convey title in immovable property. When execution of such document is denied and handwriting expert evidence establishes forgery, no rights can be claimed thereunder. (Paras 18–19) Burden of proof – Forged document When the plaintiffs deny execution of an agreement of sale and establish forgery through expert evidence, the burden is not discharged by the defendants merely by producing the document and examining attestors. (Paras 17–18) Evidence – Admissions Admissions of defendants that the plaint schedule property is ancestral property and that plaintiffs inherited the same are relevant and binding and justify decree for declaration and possession. (Para 17)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100

Second Appeal – Scope – Substantial question of law

Second Appeal lies only when the case involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court and First Appellate Court, based on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, cannot be interfered with unless shown to be perverse, contrary to evidence, or based on inadmissible material.
(Paras 15, 19)

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Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XLI Rule 31

First Appellate Court – Judgment – Compliance

Where the First Appellate Court has independently considered the evidence and confirmed the findings of the Trial Court, the appellate judgment cannot be faulted for non-compliance with Order XLI Rule 31 CPC.
(Paras 11, 15)

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Declaration of title and recovery of possession

Ancestral property – Alienation

Where the plaint schedule property is found to be ancestral property of the plaintiffs, neither one co-owner nor a family manager can alienate the property so as to confer valid title on a third party.
(Paras 17–18)

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Agreement of sale – Unregistered document – Title

An unregistered agreement of sale does not convey title in immovable property. When execution of such document is denied and handwriting expert evidence establishes forgery, no rights can be claimed thereunder.
(Paras 18–19)

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Burden of proof – Forged document

When the plaintiffs deny execution of an agreement of sale and establish forgery through expert evidence, the burden is not discharged by the defendants merely by producing the document and examining attestors.
(Paras 17–18)

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Evidence – Admissions

Admissions of defendants that the plaint schedule property is ancestral property and that plaintiffs inherited the same are relevant and binding and justify decree for declaration and possession.
(Para 17)

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Concurrent findings – Interference barred

When findings of fact are concurrently recorded by both courts below after proper appreciation of evidence, the High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence in Second Appeal.
(Paras 19–20)

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Relief – Time to vacate

Even while dismissing the Second Appeal at the admission stage, reasonable time may be granted to vacate the premises.
(Para 20)

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ANALYSIS (ISSUE-WISE)

1. Nature of the suit and procedural history

The suit was filed for declaration of title, recovery of possession, and mesne profits. The Trial Court decreed the suit. The First Appellate Court confirmed the decree. Defendants 2 to 5 preferred the present Second Appeal.
(Paras 1–3, 11)

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2. Plaintiffs’ case

Plaintiffs asserted that the plaint schedule property was ancestral property, inherited from their ancestors, and that it was let out to the first defendant. On denial of title by the tenant in rent control proceedings, the suit was instituted.
(Paras 3–4, 16)

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3. Defence of defendants

Defendants claimed title under an agreement of sale dated 06-08-1997 (Ex.B1) allegedly executed by the first plaintiff and another family member and pleaded delivery of possession in part performance.
(Paras 5–6, 12, 16)

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4. Evidence and findings on Ex.B1

The Trial Court considered:

• admissions of defendants regarding ancestral nature of property,

• handwriting expert evidence (Ex.X1) opining that Ex.B1 was forged, and

• the fact that Ex.B1 was an unregistered document.

Both Courts held that no title passed under Ex.B1 and that it was pressed into service only to squat over the property.
(Paras 17–18)

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5. Ancestral property and power of alienation

The Courts below found that the property was ancestral and that neither the first plaintiff nor the family manager had authority to alienate it in favour of the second defendant.
(Para 17)

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6. Scope of Second Appeal

The High Court reiterated the settled meaning of “substantial question of law” and held that none of the grounds raised by the appellants satisfied the statutory requirement under Section 100 CPC.
(Paras 15, 19)

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7. Final outcome

The Second Appeal was dismissed at the admission stage. Six months’ time was granted to vacate and hand over possession.
(Para 20)

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RATIO DECIDENDI

1. Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC is maintainable only when a substantial question of law arises; concurrent findings of fact based on evidence are not open to interference.

2. An unregistered agreement of sale does not convey title to immovable property, and when its execution is denied and forgery is proved by expert evidence, no rights can be claimed thereunder.

3. Ancestral property cannot be validly alienated by one co-owner or family manager so as to bind other co-owners.

4. Admissions of defendants regarding ancestral nature of property and inheritance by plaintiffs constitute strong evidence supporting decree for declaration and possession.

5. High Court cannot re-appreciate evidence or substitute its own findings for those of the courts below in the absence of perversity or illegality

A tenant continuing in possession after expiry of lease without acceptance of rent by the landlord is a tenant at sufferance and not a tenant holding over under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. Filing of eviction proceedings and issuance of notice demanding vacation constitute sufficient notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. One co-owner or legal representative of a deceased landlord is competent to maintain a suit for eviction; non-joinder of other co-owners or heirs is not fatal unless prejudice is shown. Concurrent findings on default in payment of rent and fixation of damages, based on appreciation of evidence, are not open to interference in second appeal in the absence of perversity or illegality. Jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC can be exercised only when a substantial question of law arises; re-appreciation of evidence is impermissible.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100

Second Appeal – Scope – Concurrent findings

High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, cannot re-appreciate evidence or interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below unless such findings are perverse, based on inadmissible evidence, or recorded by ignoring material evidence. Existence of a substantial question of law is a sine qua non.
(Paras 31–32)

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Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 106

Notice to quit – Sufficiency

Filing of eviction proceedings and issuance of notice demanding vacation of premises clearly demonstrate intention of landlord to terminate tenancy. Eviction suit itself constitutes sufficient notice to quit.
(Paras 17–18)

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Tenant holding over – Tenant at sufferance – Distinction

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Sections 116 & 111

A tenant continuing in possession after expiry of lease without consent of landlord is a tenant at sufferance and not a tenant holding over. Acceptance of rent after expiry of lease is sine qua non to claim tenancy by holding over.
(Paras 18–23)

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Landlord and Tenant – Default in payment of rent

Where documentary evidence establishes persistent default in payment of rent and refusal of landlord to accept rent on account of default, tenant cannot claim protection as tenant holding over.
(Paras 15–16, 23)

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Eviction suit – Non-joinder of parties – Co-owners

One of the co-owners or legal representatives of the deceased landlord is competent to maintain a suit for eviction against the tenant. Non-joinder of other co-owners or legal heirs is not fatal in the absence of objection from them.
(Paras 26–29)

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Damages / Mesne profits – Fixation

Assessment of damages for unauthorised occupation, based on evidence on record and concurrent findings of courts below, does not warrant interference in second appeal in the absence of illegality.
(Paras 24–25)

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Additional evidence – Order XLI Rule 27 CPC

Rejection of application to receive additional evidence by the appellate court after assigning reasons does not warrant interference in second appeal.
(Para 29)

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Second Appeal – Dismissal

Where no substantial question of law arises from concurrent findings based on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, second appeal is liable to be dismissed.
(Paras 31–33)

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ANALYSIS (ISSUE-WISE)

1. Nature of the litigation

The suit was filed by the landlord seeking eviction of the defendant-tenant and recovery of damages. The Trial Court decreed eviction and damages. The First Appellate Court, being the final fact-finding court, confirmed the decree. The defendant invoked Section 100 CPC.
(Paras 1–8)

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2. Relationship of landlord and tenant

The landlord-tenant relationship was admitted. The tenancy originated under an unregistered lease deed dated 26-04-2001 for 11 months, with subsequent continuation and enhancement of rent.
(Paras 3, 5, 13)

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3. Default in payment of rent

The Trial Court and Appellate Court relied on documentary evidence (Exs.A7 to A9) and admissions to conclude that the defendant committed default in payment of rent. These findings were concurrent and based on evidence.
(Paras 15–16)

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4. Notice under Section 106 TPA

The High Court held that:

• filing of eviction proceedings itself manifests intention to terminate tenancy, and

• issuance of Ex.A3 legal notice further establishes termination.
  Hence, the plea of invalid notice under Section 106 TPA was rejected.
  (Paras 17–18)

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5. Tenant holding over vs tenant at sufferance

The Court elaborated the distinction:

• absence of acceptance of rent after expiry of lease negates tenancy by holding over;

• defendant, having defaulted and whose rent was not accepted, was only a tenant at sufferance.
  (Paras 18–23)

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6. Non-joinder of necessary parties

The Court reiterated settled law that one co-owner or legal representative can maintain eviction proceedings. The death of the original landlord and substitution by his son did not render the suit defective.
(Paras 26–29)

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7. Damages

The fixation of damages at Rs.5,000/- per month was based on evidence and admissions. The High Court found no illegality or perversity warranting interference.
(Paras 24–25)

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8. Scope of interference under Section 100 CPC

Re-emphasising settled jurisprudence, the Court held that it cannot re-appreciate evidence or disturb concurrent findings in the absence of a substantial question of law. None arose in the present case.
(Paras 31–32)

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9. Final outcome

The second appeal was dismissed without costs, and all pending miscellaneous petitions were closed.
(Para 33)

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RATIO DECIDENDI

1. A tenant continuing in possession after expiry of lease without acceptance of rent by the landlord is a tenant at sufferance and not a tenant holding over under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act.

2. Filing of eviction proceedings and issuance of notice demanding vacation constitute sufficient notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.

3. One co-owner or legal representative of a deceased landlord is competent to maintain a suit for eviction; non-joinder of other co-owners or heirs is not fatal unless prejudice is shown.

4. Concurrent findings on default in payment of rent and fixation of damages, based on appreciation of evidence, are not open to interference in second appeal in the absence of perversity or illegality.

5. Jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC can be exercised only when a substantial question of law arises; re-appreciation of evidence is impermissible.