Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — Civil contempt — Compliance with directions of Supreme Court — Refund of stamp value — Subsequent statutory impediment — Moulding relief A. Civil contempt — Scope — Wilful disobedience In contempt proceedings, the Court examines whether there is wilful and deliberate disobedience of its directions. Where substantial compliance is shown and subsequent difficulties arise due to statutory provisions, the Court may mould relief without entering into disputed merits. (Paras 2, 3, 8)

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — Civil contempt — Compliance with directions of Supreme Court — Refund of stamp value — Subsequent statutory impediment — Moulding relief

A. Civil contempt — Scope — Wilful disobedience
In contempt proceedings, the Court examines whether there is wilful and deliberate disobedience of its directions. Where substantial compliance is shown and subsequent difficulties arise due to statutory provisions, the Court may mould relief without entering into disputed merits.
(Paras 2, 3, 8)

B. Compliance with original judgment — Partial compliance admitted
Where the alleged contemnor had refunded the entire deposited amount with interest and paid additional compensation as directed, but failed to refund the cost of non-judicial stamps, the contempt allegation was confined to the limited issue of stamp value refund.
(Paras 2, 3)

C. Non-judicial stamp papers — Expiry — Statutory bar under Stamp Rules
The State authority rejected refund of the stamp value on the ground that under Rule 218 of the U.P. Stamp Rules, 1942, refund of physical non-judicial stamp papers is barred after expiry of eight years, and the petitioner’s claim was time-barred.
(Paras 4, 7)

D. Subsequent impleadment of State — Bona fide action — Unconditional apology
Where the State, after being impleaded, fairly conceded that rejection of refund was based on a bona fide interpretation of statutory rules and tendered an unconditional apology, the Court took the same on record.
(Paras 6, 7)

E. Contempt jurisdiction — Direction simpliciter — Refund ordered without adjudication on merits
Without entering into the merits of issues arising after disposal of the original civil appeals, the Court directed the State to refund the stamp value upon return of stamp papers, thereby disposing of the contempt petitions.
(Para 8)

F. Closure of contempt against original respondent
In view of the above direction, contempt petitions qua respondent no. 1 were ordered to be closed.
(Para 9)

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ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court was seized of civil contempt petitions alleging non-compliance with its earlier judgment dated 06.09.2024, which directed, inter alia, refund of the cost of non-judicial stamp papers to the petitioner (Paras 2–3).

It was undisputed that respondent no. 1 had substantially complied with the judgment by refunding the deposited amount with interest and paying additional compensation of Rs. 15 lakhs. The sole grievance pertained to non-refund of Rs. 3,99,100/- towards stamp value, where expired stamp papers were instead returned (Paras 3–4).

Upon rejection of refund by the Registration Department citing statutory limitation under Rule 218 of the U.P. Stamp Rules, the petitioner approached the Court through contempt jurisdiction (Paras 4–5). Recognising the peculiar situation, the Court permitted impleadment of the State of Uttar Pradesh (Para 6).

The State fairly admitted that its action was taken on a bona fide interpretation of the statutory rules, tendered an unconditional apology, and expressed readiness to comply with the Court’s directions (Para 7).

The Court consciously refrained from adjudicating the merits of the statutory dispute or limitation issue, and instead exercised its inherent and contempt jurisdiction to issue a direction simpliciter to refund the stamp value upon return of the stamp papers, thereby ensuring effective compliance with its earlier judgment and doing complete justice (Para 8).

Consequently, the contempt petitions against respondent no. 1 were closed (Para 9).

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RATIO DECIDENDI

In contempt proceedings, where substantial compliance with the original judgment is admitted and subsequent non-compliance arises due to statutory impediments acting bona fide, the Supreme Court may, without entering into the merits of such subsequent disputes, issue a direction simpliciter to ensure effective compliance with its earlier आदेश, and close contempt proceedings in the absence of wilful disobedience.

Specific performance being a discretionary and equitable relief, where the plaintiff fails to prove readiness and willingness to perform the contract and the defendants are also in breach of their contractual obligations, particularly after a long lapse of time, the Court may refuse specific performance and, to prevent unjust enrichment, mould the relief by directing restitution through lump sum compensation so as to adjust equities and do complete justice between the parties.

Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Specific performance — Readiness and willingness — Equitable relief — Forfeiture of earnest money — Restitution

A. Specific performance — Readiness and willingness — Failure to prove financial capacity
Where the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he had the financial wherewithal to pay the balance sale consideration on the stipulated date and also failed to attend the office of the Sub-Registrar on the due date, the requirement of readiness and willingness was held not to be proved.
(Para 5)

B. Conduct of defendant — Non-fulfilment of contractual obligations
While the plaintiff failed to establish readiness and willingness, it was also noted that the defendants did not fulfil their contractual obligations, particularly in relation to mutation and conversion of the property from leasehold to freehold.
(Para 5)

C. Readiness and willingness — No straitjacket formula — Case-specific determination
The question of readiness and willingness is not governed by a straitjacket formula and has to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case.
(Para 6)

D. Specific performance — Discretionary and equitable relief — Delay of seventeen years
In view of the passage of more than seventeen years since the execution of the agreement to sell, the grant of specific performance was held to be inequitable, and refusal of such relief was justified.
(Para 6)

E. Equity — Unjust enrichment — Forfeiture of earnest money
Where both parties were at fault, directing forfeiture of earnest money would result in unjust enrichment and an inequitable windfall to the defendants.
(Para 7)

F. Restitution — Adjustment of equities — Lump sum compensation in lieu of specific performance
To do complete justice and adjust equities between the parties, the Court directed payment of a lump sum amount of Rs. 3,00,00,000/- to the plaintiff in substitution of the relief of specific performance, modifying the judgment of the High Court accordingly.
(Para 8)

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ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court examined the equitable nature of the relief of specific performance and the statutory requirement of readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff.

On facts, the Court affirmed the High Court’s finding that the plaintiff failed to prove readiness and willingness, as he could not establish availability of funds to pay the balance consideration of Rs. 5.21 crores on the due date and did not present himself before the Sub-Registrar (Para 5).

Simultaneously, the Court took note of the defendants’ own defaults, particularly their failure to obtain mutation and conversion of the property from leasehold to freehold, which were part of their contractual obligations (Para 5). The case was thus treated as one where both parties were at fault.

Reiterating settled law, the Court observed that readiness and willingness is a fact-dependent inquiry, with no straitjacket formula applicable (Para 6). Considering the long lapse of seventeen years since execution of the agreement, the Court agreed that specific performance was no longer an equitable remedy (Para 6).

On the issue of forfeiture, the Court held that permitting forfeiture of the earnest money would result in unjust enrichment, which equity does not countenance, especially where the defendants were also in breach (Para 7).

Invoking its power to do complete justice, the Court moulded the relief by directing payment of a lump sum of Rs. 3 crores to the plaintiff, thereby restoring him substantially to his original position and bringing finality to a protracted dispute (Para 8).

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RATIO DECIDENDI

Specific performance being a discretionary and equitable relief, where the plaintiff fails to prove readiness and willingness to perform the contract and the defendants are also in breach of their contractual obligations, particularly after a long lapse of time, the Court may refuse specific performance and, to prevent unjust enrichment, mould the relief by directing restitution through lump sum compensation so as to adjust equities and do complete justice between the parties.

Where the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation records a finding of employer–employee relationship and of accident arising out of and in the course of employment on the basis of oral and documentary evidence, including admissions of the employer, such findings—being neither perverse nor legally infirm—cannot be interfered with by the High Court; erroneous reliance on an initial denial while ignoring subsequent admissions constitutes a misreading of the record warranting interference by the Supreme Court.

Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923 — Employer–employee relationship — Finding of fact — Interference by High Court — Scope

A. Employer–employee relationship — Admission by owner — Evidentiary value
Where the owner of the vehicle, in cross-examination and subsequently on affidavit before the Supreme Court, unequivocally admitted that the deceased was employed as a driver under him and that earlier denial was to avoid civil liability, the finding of employer–employee relationship recorded by the Commissioner was based on correct appreciation of evidence.
(Paras 3.4, 6, 7)

B. Accident during and in the course of employment — Fatal motor accident
When the deceased driver met with a fatal accident while driving the employer’s vehicle in the early hours of the morning, the death was held to have occurred during and arising out of the course of employment.
(Paras 3.2, 3.3, 8)

C. High Court — Erroneous reversal of findings — Misreading of record
The High Court erred in reversing the award of compensation by relying on an initial counter-affidavit while ignoring subsequent admissions and by wrongly recording that the FIR was lodged by the wife of the deceased, when it was in fact lodged by the wife of another deceased.
(Paras 5, 6)

D. Commissioner’s award — No perversity or legal infirmity
Findings recorded by the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation, being based on oral and documentary evidence and not suffering from perversity or legal infirmity, ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court.
(Paras 6, 8)

E. Restoration of compensation — Joint and several liability — Withdrawal of deposited amount
The award of compensation of Rs. 3,73,747/- with interest at 12% per annum was restored, and the claimant was permitted to withdraw the remaining amount deposited before the High Court along with accrued interest.
(Paras 9, 10)

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ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court examined the limited scope of interference with findings of fact recorded by the Commissioner under the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923. The Commissioner had concluded that the deceased was employed as a driver with respondent No. 5 and that the accident occurred during and in the course of employment (Paras 3.5, 6).

The High Court reversed this finding primarily on the basis of an initial denial in the counter-affidavit, ignoring the owner’s subsequent admissions in cross-examination and other material evidence. The Supreme Court held that such an approach amounted to a misreading of the record (Paras 5, 6).

A significant factor weighed by the Court was the affidavit filed by respondent No. 5 before the Supreme Court, wherein he categorically admitted the employment, wages, and stated that the earlier denial was to avoid civil liability (Para 7). This admission fortified the correctness of the Commissioner’s findings.

The Court reiterated that findings of fact based on proper appreciation of evidence, in the absence of perversity or legal infirmity, ought not to be interfered with in appeal (Paras 6, 8). Consequently, the interference by the High Court was held to be unwarranted.

Relief was moulded by restoring the Commissioner’s award and issuing consequential directions for withdrawal of the deposited compensation amount with interest (Paras 9–10).

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RATIO DECIDENDI

Where the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation records a finding of employer–employee relationship and of accident arising out of and in the course of employment on the basis of oral and documentary evidence, including admissions of the employer, such findings—being neither perverse nor legally infirm—cannot be interfered with by the High Court; erroneous reliance on an initial denial while ignoring subsequent admissions constitutes a misreading of the record warranting interference by the Supreme Court.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Sudden quarrel — No premeditation — Knowledge infe...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Sudden quarrel — No premeditation — Knowledge infe...: advocatemmmohan Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 299, 300, 302, 304 Part II, 147, 148, 149 — Culpable homicide — Murder — Free fight — Single blow — I...

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 299, 300, 302, 304 Part II, 147, 148, 149 — Culpable homicide — Murder — Free fight — Single blow — Individual role — Absence of common object — Knowledge without intention

A. Free fight — Unlawful assembly — Common object not proved
Where the incident arose out of a sudden quarrel leading to a free fight between two rival groups, and injuries were sustained on both sides, it was held that formation of unlawful assembly with a common object was not established. Conviction with the aid of Section 149 IPC was therefore unsustainable. Offences under Sections 147 and 148 IPC were also not proved.
(Paras 5.2, 5.2.1)

B. Individual act — Single blow with lathi — Medical corroboration
The appellant was attributed a specific individual role of causing a single lathi blow on the head of the deceased. Medical evidence established that the fatal injury was caused by a hard and blunt object and resulted in fracture of parietal bone leading to death.
(Paras 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 5.3)

C. Section 302 vis-à-vis Section 304 Part II — Intention and knowledge — Distinction
In the absence of intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, but where knowledge could be attributed having regard to the nature of weapon and injury inflicted, the offence would fall under Section 304 Part II IPC and not under Section 302 IPC.
(Paras 5.1, 5.1.3, 5.1.4, 5.1.4.1, 5.4)

D. Sudden quarrel — No premeditation — Knowledge inferred in law
Where the act was committed in the midst of a sudden quarrel and group clash without premeditation, and the accused himself suffered injuries in the same transaction, the offence could not be elevated to murder, though knowledge of likelihood of death could be inferred in law.
(Paras 5.5, 5.6)

E. Sentence — Advanced age — Period already undergone
While sustaining conviction under Section 304 Part II IPC, sentence was reduced to the period already undergone, considering that the appellant was more than 80 years of age and had already undergone incarceration of six years and three months.
(Paras 6, 6.1)

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ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court undertook a structured examination of culpable homicide jurisprudence, beginning with a detailed restatement of Sections 299, 300, and 304 IPC (Paras 5–5.1.5). The Court reiterated that culpable homicide is the genus and murder its species, and that the dividing line rests primarily on intention versus knowledge.

On facts, the Court found that the occurrence was not premeditated, but arose from a sudden quarrel when the deceased went to the appellant’s house following an earlier altercation between their sons (Paras 3–3.5). The evidence revealed a free fight, with injuries on both sides, including serious head injuries to the appellant himself (Paras 3.3, 5.3).

The Court approved the High Court’s reasoning that Sections 147, 148, and 149 IPC were not attracted, as there was no proof of common object or unlawful assembly (Paras 5.2–5.2.1). Liability, therefore, had to be determined on the basis of the individual act of the appellant.

Medical evidence conclusively established that the death resulted from a single head injury caused by a blunt object (lathi) (Paras 3.7–3.9). However, considering the circumstances — absence of premeditation, sudden fight, single blow, and mutual injuries — the Court held that the case did not meet the threshold of murder under Section 300 IPC.

Applying the principles explained in Kesar Singh v. State of Haryana (Paras 5.1.4–5.1.4.1), the Court held that the appellant could be attributed knowledge of likelihood of death, but not intention, thereby correctly bringing the case under Section 304 Part II IPC (Paras 5.4–5.5).

On sentencing, the Court exercised judicial discretion by taking into account the appellant’s advanced age, the long lapse of time, and the substantial period of incarceration already undergone, and reduced the sentence accordingly (Paras 6–6.1).

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RATIO DECIDENDI

Where death is caused by a single blow with a blunt weapon in the course of a sudden quarrel and free fight, without premeditation and without proof of common object, and where the accused himself suffers injuries in the same transaction, the offence does not amount to murder under Section 302 IPC; however, knowledge of likelihood of death may be inferred, attracting Section 304 Part II IPC, with liability to be determined on the basis of the individual act of the accused.

In the absence of a statutory charging event under Section 12 of the Customs Act, customs duty cannot be levied on electrical energy generated in an SEZ and supplied to the Domestic Tariff Area; Section 25 of the Customs Act cannot be used to impose such levy under the guise of exemption, and once the levy has been declared ultra vires, its continuance through subsequent notifications in altered form is equally unenforceable, entitling the assessee to restitution of amounts collected.

Customs duty — SEZ to DTA clearance — Electrical energy — Limits of delegated legislation — Binding effect of precedent — Restitution

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HEADNOTE (Consolidated, authoritative)

Customs duty on electricity generated in SEZ and supplied to DTA — Absence of charging event — Invalidity of levy through exemption notifications

Paras 15–19, 44–51, 58–65, 86–88

Electrical energy generated within India in a Special Economic Zone and supplied to the Domestic Tariff Area is not ‘goods imported into India’ so as to attract customs duty under Section 12 of the Customs Act, 1962. The legal fiction in Section 30 of the SEZ Act operates only for parity of rate and valuation and does not create a new charging event. Section 25 of the Customs Act empowers the Central Government only to grant exemptions from duty otherwise leviable and cannot be used, directly or indirectly, to impose a new customs levy. Notifications purporting to levy customs duty on SEZ-to-DTA electricity, whether retrospective or prospective and irrespective of the rate prescribed, are ultra vires Articles 14 and 265 of the Constitution and beyond the scope of delegated legislation. Once such levy has been declared without authority of law, subsequent notifications continuing the same levy in altered form are equally unenforceable, and amounts collected thereunder are liable to be refunded.

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ANALYSIS (What the Supreme Court Precisely Held)

1. Nature of the 2015 Gujarat High Court decision (Paras 44–51)

The Court held that the 2015 judgment was a declaration of law, not a notification-specific or period-limited relief. The High Court had conclusively determined that:

• there was no charging event under Section 12 of the Customs Act for SEZ-to-DTA electricity;

• Section 25 could not be used to create a levy under the guise of exemption;

• retrospective imposition violated Article 265; and

• the levy resulted in arbitrary double incidence, given Rule 47(3) of the SEZ Rules.

These findings constituted the ratio, binding for all periods resting on the same statutory footing.

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2. Absence of statutory authority to levy customs duty (Paras 45, 60–63)

The Court reaffirmed that:

• customs duty is attracted only on “goods imported into India”;

• an SEZ is not foreign territory, and electricity generated within India does not become imported goods merely because it crosses from SEZ to DTA;

• Section 30 of the SEZ Act is a parity provision, not a charging provision.

Where imported electricity bears nil customs duty, SEZ-generated electricity must receive identical treatment.

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3. Colourable exercise of delegated legislation (Paras 52–58)

The Court characterised Notification No. 25/2010-Cus. as a classic colourable exercise:

• Section 25 authorises exemption from duty otherwise leviable;

• it does not authorise imposition of duty;

• an exemption power cannot be inverted into a taxing power.

What could not be done directly by Parliament could not be achieved indirectly through delegated legislation.

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4. Subsequent notifications do not cure foundational illegality (Paras 58–65, 72–73)

The Court rejected the Union’s contention that later notifications (₹0.10/unit and ₹0.03/unit) constituted a different levy. It held that:

• changing the rate or form does not cure absence of legislative authority;

• if the root is ultra vires, the branch cannot survive;

• the same levy continued on the same taxable fiction.

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5. No need for fresh challenge to each notification (Paras 66–74)

The Court held that:

• once a levy is declared without authority of law, the State cannot insist on separate challenges to each successor notification;

• the 2016 writ was a sequel proceeding, seeking enforcement of an existing declaration;

• constitutional courts must look to substance, not form.

To insist on repeated challenges would legitimise perpetuation of illegality.

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6. Binding force of precedent on co-ordinate Benches (Paras 75–80)

The Court held that the 2019 Division Bench:

• was bound by the 2015 judgment;

• could not artificially narrow its scope;

• if in doubt, ought to have referred the matter to a larger Bench.

Failure to do so violated judicial discipline and stare decisis.

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7. Restitution and executive obligation (Paras 81–84, 86–90)

The Court emphasised that:

• judicial declarations are binding commands, not advisory opinions;

• the State cannot retain amounts collected under an invalid levy;

• restitution is a necessary incident of illegality.

Refund was ordered for the entire period 16-09-2010 to 15-02-2016, without interest.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

In the absence of a statutory charging event under Section 12 of the Customs Act, customs duty cannot be levied on electrical energy generated in an SEZ and supplied to the Domestic Tariff Area; Section 25 of the Customs Act cannot be used to impose such levy under the guise of exemption, and once the levy has been declared ultra vires, its continuance through subsequent notifications in altered form is equally unenforceable, entitling the assessee to restitution of amounts collected.