Employees of APSTEP, being a State instrumentality under Article 12 and governed by Government policy, are entitled to enhancement of age of superannuation from 58 to 60 years with effect from 02.06.2014. Any retirement at 58 years after the said date is arbitrary and illegal, and such employees are entitled to continuation in service up to 60 years with all consequential benefits in terms of Government Orders and Supreme Court directions.

Service Law — Age of superannuation — Enhancement from 58 to 60 years

Employees working in societies and institutions falling under Article 12 of the Constitution and included in Schedule IX of the A.P. Reorganisation Act, 2014, are entitled to enhancement of age of superannuation from 58 to 60 years in terms of Government policy and statutory prescriptions.
(Paras 3–4, 8)

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State instrumentalities — Article 12

Andhra Pradesh Society for Training and Employment Promotion (APSTEP), being a State instrumentality under Article 12 of the Constitution, is bound by Government policy decisions relating to service conditions of employees.
(Para 3)

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Government Orders — Binding effect

G.O.Ms.No.138 dated 08.08.2017 enhancing the age of superannuation to 60 years with effect from 02.06.2014, and G.O.Ms.No.5 dated 04.06.2020 extending the said benefit to APSTEP and DSSTEP employees, are binding and enforceable.
(Paras 4–6, 8)

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Parity — Similarly situated employees

Employees similarly situated to those covered by the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos.10273 of 2017 and batch are entitled to identical service benefits including continuation till 60 years with all consequential benefits.
(Paras 5–6, 8)

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Illegal retirement — Superannuation at 58 years

Retirement of employees at the age of 58 years after 02.06.2014, despite policy decisions and Government Orders enhancing the age to 60 years, is arbitrary and unsustainable.
(Paras 4–6, 8)

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Reinstatement — Consequential benefits

Employees who were prematurely retired at 58 years and who had remaining service up to 60 years are entitled to continuation in service and all consequential benefits, if not already paid.
(Paras 6, 8)

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ANALYSIS

The writ petition challenged the notice of retirement dated 01.05.2017 issued by the 6th respondent retiring the petitioner at the age of 58 years, contending that the action was contrary to statutory provisions and Government policy enhancing the age of superannuation to 60 years (Para 1).

The Court noted that APSTEP is a State instrumentality under Article 12 and is also included in Schedule IX of the A.P. Reorganisation Act, 2014, making it amenable to constitutional discipline and Government service policy (Para 3).

The Government of Andhra Pradesh had taken a policy decision to enhance the age of superannuation from 58 to 60 years with effect from 02.06.2014, issuing G.O.Ms.No.138 dated 08.08.2017, granting in-principle approval to extend the benefit to Schedule IX and X institutions (Para 4).

The Court relied heavily on the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 09.08.2017 in Civil Appeal Nos.10273 of 2017 and batch, wherein it was categorically held that all employees who attained 58 years on or after 02.06.2014 are entitled to protection of service up to 60 years with all consequential benefits (Para 5).

Further, the Court noted issuance of G.O.Ms.No.5 dated 04.06.2020, whereby the Government explicitly extended the benefit of enhanced superannuation age to APSTEP and DSSTEP employees, including reinstatement of those prematurely retired, subject to amendment of service rules (Para 6).

The respondents did not dispute the applicability of these Government Orders (Para 7).

In view of the binding nature of the Government Orders and the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the Court held that the petitioner is entitled to continuation in service up to 60 years along with all consequential benefits, if not already extended (Para 8).

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RATIO DECIDENDI

Employees of APSTEP, being a State instrumentality under Article 12 and governed by Government policy, are entitled to enhancement of age of superannuation from 58 to 60 years with effect from 02.06.2014. Any retirement at 58 years after the said date is arbitrary and illegal, and such employees are entitled to continuation in service up to 60 years with all consequential benefits in terms of Government Orders and Supreme Court directions.

Any demolition or eviction proceedings initiated by a Gram Panchayat without issuing a prior show-cause notice and without affording an opportunity of hearing violate the audi alteram partem rule and are liable to be set aside. Compliance with principles of natural justice is mandatory, and absence thereof vitiates the action irrespective of the merits of the allegation of encroachment.

Constitution of India — Article 226 — Writ of Mandamus

Writ jurisdiction is maintainable to challenge demolition or eviction proceedings initiated by local authorities when such action is taken in violation of principles of natural justice.
(Paras 1, 6–8)

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Natural Justice — Audi alteram partem

Any order directing removal of alleged encroachment or demolition of a dwelling, without issuing a prior show-cause notice and without affording an opportunity of hearing, is violative of the audi alteram partem rule and stands vitiated.
(Paras 6–7)

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Gram Panchayat — Encroachment proceedings

Proceedings issued by a Gram Panchayat directing removal of alleged encroachment must disclose issuance of a prior notice and compliance with due process; absence thereof renders the proceedings illegal and unsustainable.
(Paras 6–7)

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Show-cause notice — Mandatory requirement

Notice is the first limb of the principles of natural justice; it must be precise, unambiguous, and must afford adequate time to respond. Orders passed in the absence of such notice are void.
(Para 6)

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Demolition of residential house — Due process

Demolition of a residential house without enquiry or prior notice infringes constitutional protections under Articles 14 and 21 and cannot be sustained in law.
(Paras 1, 6–7)

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Liberty to proceed afresh

While setting aside illegal proceedings, authorities are not precluded from initiating fresh action strictly in accordance with law and after following due process.
(Para 8)

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ANALYSIS

The writ petition challenged proceedings dated 05.01.2026 issued by the Panchayat Secretary directing removal of alleged encroachment and under which coercive demolition was effected in respect of the petitioner’s residential house (Para 1).

The petitioner asserted ownership over the subject property under a gift settlement deed and contended that the Panchayat acted without issuing any show-cause notice or conducting enquiry, thereby violating settled principles of natural justice (Para 3).

The Court, upon perusal of the impugned proceedings, found that the notice merely directed removal of encroachment and did not disclose issuance of any prior show-cause notice, nor grant any opportunity of being heard (Para 6).

The learned Judge reiterated that audi alteram partem is the foundational principle of administrative fairness. Notice is its first and indispensable limb, which must clearly inform the affected party of the case against him and provide adequate opportunity to respond (Para 6).

The Court categorically held that absence of notice and hearing vitiates the entire action, rendering the order unsustainable both on facts and law, even without requiring a counter affidavit (Paras 6–7).

Consequently, the impugned proceedings were set aside. However, the Court expressly preserved the liberty of the authorities to initiate fresh proceedings in accordance with law, following due process (Para 8).

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RATIO DECIDENDI

Any demolition or eviction proceedings initiated by a Gram Panchayat without issuing a prior show-cause notice and without affording an opportunity of hearing violate the audi alteram partem rule and are liable to be set aside. Compliance with principles of natural justice is mandatory, and absence thereof vitiates the action irrespective of the merits of the allegation of encroachment.

SARFAESI Act, 2002 — Section 14 — Possession through Advocate Commissioner Measures taken by a secured creditor for taking physical possession of secured assets through an Advocate Commissioner appointed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act are amenable to challenge before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. (Paras 2–3)

Constitution of India — Article 226 — SARFAESI proceedings

Where an efficacious alternative statutory remedy is available under the SARFAESI Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the High Court will ordinarily decline to entertain a writ petition under Article 226.
(Paras 3–4)

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SARFAESI Act, 2002 — Section 14 — Possession through Advocate Commissioner

Measures taken by a secured creditor for taking physical possession of secured assets through an Advocate Commissioner appointed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act are amenable to challenge before the Debts Recovery Tribunal.
(Paras 2–3)

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Alternative remedy — Debts Recovery Tribunal

Disputes relating to initiation of SARFAESI measures, including objections regarding notice, legal heirs, and jurisdictional infirmities, fall within the exclusive domain of the Debts Recovery Tribunal.
(Para 3)

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Writ jurisdiction — Self-restraint

High Court should exercise judicial restraint in writ jurisdiction when the legislature has provided a special forum with a complete adjudicatory mechanism for redressal of grievances.
(Paras 3–4)

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Legal heirs — Alleged action against deceased guarantor

Even where the grievance is that SARFAESI measures were initiated against a deceased guarantor without notice to legal heirs, the remedy lies before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and not directly under Article 226.
(Paras 2–3)

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Interim protection — Limited indulgence

While relegating the petitioner to the alternative statutory remedy, the High Court may grant limited interim protection to enable the petitioner to approach the competent forum.
(Para 4)

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Conditional stay — Automatic vacation

Interim protection granted by the High Court stands automatically vacated if the petitioner fails to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal and obtain appropriate interim orders within the time granted.
(Para 4)

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ANALYSIS

The writ petition was filed challenging the notice dated 02.01.2026 issued by the Advocate Commissioner for taking physical possession of the secured property pursuant to orders passed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act (Para 1).

The petitioner contended that his mother, the owner of the secured asset and guarantor, died on 10.09.2021, and that the Bank initiated SARFAESI measures without issuing notice to the legal heirs, thereby proceeding against a deceased person (Para 2).

The Division Bench observed that even assuming such a grievance to be correct, the petitioner had an efficacious statutory remedy before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, which is a forum constituted under a special enactment with a complete mechanism for adjudicating SARFAESI disputes (Para 3).

The Court emphasized that without availing the remedy before the Tribunal, the petitioner had straightaway invoked writ jurisdiction, which is impermissible in view of settled principles governing Article 226 where alternative remedies exist (Paras 3–4).

Accordingly, the Court declined to entertain the writ petition on merits and relegated the petitioner to the Debts Recovery Tribunal, granting three days’ time to approach the Tribunal (Para 4).

As a protective interim measure, the Court directed the Advocate Commissioner not to take possession during this limited period, clarifying that such protection would automatically stand vacated if the petitioner failed to approach the Tribunal and secure interim relief within the stipulated time (Para 4).

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RATIO DECIDENDI

When measures are initiated by a secured creditor under the SARFAESI Act, including taking physical possession of secured assets through an Advocate Commissioner appointed under Section 14, any grievance—whether relating to notice, jurisdiction, or action against a deceased guarantor—must be agitated before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The High Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, will decline interference where an efficacious alternative statutory remedy exists, though it may grant limited interim protection to enable the aggrieved party to approach the competent forum.

Cockfighting involving betting constitutes an unlawful activity attracting the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 and allied laws. When authorities fail to act on representations seeking prevention of such activities, the High Court, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, can enforce and reiterate binding Division Bench and Supreme Court directions. District Collectors and Police authorities bear statutory and personal responsibility to prevent cockfights, invoke preventive powers under Cr.P.C., seize instruments and betting money, and ensure effective enforcement of animal welfare laws, including by initiating disciplinary action against erring officials.

Animal Cruelty — Cockfighting — Betting — Public interest

Cockfighting involving betting constitutes an unlawful activity attracting the provisions of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 and allied statutes, warranting intervention by State authorities.
(Paras 3, 5)

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Writ jurisdiction — Batch matters — Identical relief

Where multiple writ petitions seek the same relief, they may be heard together and disposed of by a common order.
(Para 1)

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Inaction of authorities — Mandamus

Failure of authorities to act on representations seeking prevention of cockfights justifies issuance of directions under Article 226 of the Constitution.
(Paras 3–5)

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Binding precedent — Division Bench directions

Directions issued by a Division Bench in earlier proceedings concerning prevention of cockfights are binding and can be reiterated and enforced in subsequent writ petitions.
(Paras 3, 5)

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Implementation of statutory duties — Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960

District Collectors, Commissioners of Police and Superintendents of Police are under a statutory obligation to ensure effective implementation of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 and the Rules framed thereunder.
(Para 5, Guidelines 1, 5, 6)

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Constitution of SPCA — Mandatory duty

State Government is obligated to constitute State and District Societies for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals strictly in accordance with the 2001 Rules.
(Para 5, Guideline 1)

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Preventive policing — Section 144 Cr.P.C.

District authorities are empowered to invoke Section 144 Cr.P.C. to prevent cockfighting events and allied unlawful activities.
(Para 5, Guideline 3)

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Seizure — Instruments and betting money

Authorities are entitled to seize instruments used for cockfights and money collected towards betting.
(Para 5, Guideline 4)

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Administrative accountability — Personal responsibility

District Collectors, Commissioners of Police and Superintendents of Police can be held personally responsible for lapses in enforcement of animal cruelty laws.
(Para 5, Guideline 5)

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Disciplinary action — Dereliction of duty

Failure of Tahsildars and Police Officers to enforce animal welfare laws can attract disciplinary action.
(Para 5, Guideline 7)

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Supreme Court precedents — Animal welfare

Directions issued are in consonance with binding decisions of the Supreme Court recognising animal welfare as a constitutional and statutory obligation.
(Para 5, Guidelines 1 & 7)

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ANALYSIS

The batch of writ petitions was filed seeking a common relief, namely, directions to the State and its authorities to prevent cockfights, particularly during festive seasons, on the ground that such activities involve betting, cruelty to animals, social degradation, addiction among youth and loss of property (Paras 1, 3).

The petitioners complained of administrative inaction despite representations. They relied on earlier Division Bench directions in W.P.(PIL) No.177 of 2016, wherein detailed preventive and enforcement measures had already been laid down (Paras 3, 5).

The learned Government Pleader for Home, on instructions, submitted that the police were taking steps to educate the public and left the matter to the discretion of the Court (Para 4).

The Court, instead of issuing fresh directions, reiterated and enforced the existing binding guidelines, emphasising that they continue to govern the field. The Court reproduced and applied detailed operational directions relating to constitution of SPCAs, joint inspection teams, preventive measures under Cr.P.C., seizure powers, awareness programmes and administrative accountability (Para 5).

Significantly, the Court underscored personal responsibility of District Collectors, Commissioners of Police and Superintendents of Police for effective enforcement, and recognised the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against erring officials, aligning with Supreme Court jurisprudence on animal welfare (Para 5, Guideline 7).

All writ petitions were accordingly disposed of, preserving liberty to police authorities to take action in case of violation of the guidelines (Para 5, concluding portion).

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RATIO DECIDENDI

Cockfighting involving betting constitutes an unlawful activity attracting the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 and allied laws. When authorities fail to act on representations seeking prevention of such activities, the High Court, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, can enforce and reiterate binding Division Bench and Supreme Court directions. District Collectors and Police authorities bear statutory and personal responsibility to prevent cockfights, invoke preventive powers under Cr.P.C., seize instruments and betting money, and ensure effective enforcement of animal welfare laws, including by initiating disciplinary action against erring officials.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Negligence — Collision ...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Negligence — Collision ...: advocatemmmohan Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Negligence — Collision between bus and car In a claim arising out of a collision between two veh...

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Negligence — Collision between bus and car

In a claim arising out of a collision between two vehicles, negligence can be established on the basis of eye-witness evidence, crime record, charge-sheet, and surrounding probabilities, without insisting on proof beyond reasonable doubt.
(Paras 23–27, 30–35)

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Negligence — APSRTC — Departmental action as corroborative circumstance

Where the driver of the APSRTC bus was subjected to criminal prosecution and departmental suspension, the Corporation cannot simultaneously contend absence of negligence. Such contradictory stands amount to blowing hot and cold and cannot be accepted.
(Paras 27–29)

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Contributory negligence — Burden of proof

Plea of contributory negligence must be established by cogent evidence. Mere allegation that the driver of the car was negligent, without examining independent witnesses or producing motor vehicle inspection evidence, is insufficient.
(Paras 24–30)

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Non-joinder of owner and insurer — When not fatal

Non-joinder of the owner and insurer of the car in which the deceased was travelling is not fatal where the evidence establishes exclusive negligence of the driver of the APSRTC bus.
(Paras 23–30, 35)

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Standard of proof — Motor accident claims

In motor accident claims, the standard of proof is preponderance of probability, and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. Tribunals must adopt a holistic and pragmatic approach, consistent with the social welfare object of the legislation.
(Paras 30–35)

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Income — Income Tax returns — Evidentiary value

Income Tax returns, PAN card, VAT registration, and testimony of an Income Tax consultant constitute reliable evidence to establish the income of a self-employed deceased. Non-payment of tax does not negate earning capacity.
(Paras 12–14, 38–40)

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Future prospects — Self-employed deceased

In the case of a self-employed deceased aged 26 years, addition towards future prospects is permissible, having regard to the likelihood of progression in income.
(Paras 40–41)

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Multiplier — Age of deceased

For a deceased aged 26 years, the appropriate multiplier is ‘17’.
(Para 41)

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Loss of consortium — Children

Minor children of the deceased are entitled to parental consortium, each at Rs.40,000/-.
(Paras 42, 44)

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Dependency — Parents-in-law

Even if parents-in-law are not direct dependents, reasonable dependency can be recognised where the family was living together, consistent with the beneficial object of the Motor Vehicles Act and principles under the Fatal Accidents Act.
(Para 43)

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Just compensation — Duty of Court

The Tribunal and appellate court are duty-bound to award just and reasonable compensation, avoiding technicalities, and must reassess compensation where the award is found inadequate.
(Paras 36–45)

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Interest — Enhancement

Enhancement of compensation can be accompanied by enhancement of the rate of interest where justified by facts and delay.
(Paras 45–47)

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ANALYSIS

Both appeals arose from the award dated 02.12.2011 in O.P. No.674 of 2009. The APSRTC challenged liability and quantum, while the claimants sought enhancement of compensation (Paras 1–5).

On negligence, the Court affirmed the finding against APSRTC by relying on eye-witness testimony (P.W.2), charge-sheet, FIR, and admissions of the bus driver, holding that contributory negligence of the car driver was not proved (Paras 23–30). The Court strongly deprecated the contradictory stand of APSRTC in denying negligence while subjecting its driver to suspension and disciplinary proceedings (Paras 27–29).

The plea of non-joinder of the car owner and insurer was rejected, as evidence established exclusive negligence of the bus driver (Paras 23–30). The Court reiterated that motor accident claims are to be decided on probability and holistic appreciation, consistent with the summary nature of proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act (Paras 30–35).

On quantum, the Court reassessed the income of the deceased based on Income Tax returns, PAN, VAT registration, and expert testimony, correcting the MACT’s conservative approach (Paras 38–40). Future prospects were added, the appropriate multiplier applied, and compensation recalculated (Paras 40–41).

The Court awarded parental consortium to minor children, recognised reasonable dependency of parents-in-law, and rationalised conventional heads, resulting in enhancement of compensation from Rs.15,84,000/- to Rs.20,37,000/-, with interest enhanced from 8% to 9% per annum (Paras 42–47).

Accordingly, APSRTC’s appeal was dismissed, and the claimants’ appeal was partly allowed (Paras 46–47).

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RATIO DECIDENDI

In motor accident claims, negligence may be established on the basis of eye-witness testimony, crime records, and surrounding probabilities, without insisting on proof beyond reasonable doubt. Where the evidence establishes exclusive negligence of the APSRTC bus driver, pleas of contributory negligence and non-joinder of the car owner or insurer must fail. Income Tax returns and allied statutory records constitute reliable evidence of income of a self-employed deceased, and future prospects must be added in accordance with settled law. Courts are duty-bound to award just compensation, including parental consortium to minor children and reasonable dependency benefits to parents-in-law, even by enhancing compensation and interest on appeal.